ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2009
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 10, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligeznh
nce Weekly
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Canada: Economic Implications of the Trudeau Victory Policies affecting
the United States probably will remain unchanged. I
EC Beef Sales to the USSR Nearly half of the EC's stored beef reportedly
has been sold to the USSR at prices well below the world level. 2
German Bank Failure Shakes Currency Exchanges Fear of other failures has
reduced volume on many European exchanges. 2
The Impact of Countervailing Duties on US Relations with Brazil and
Argentina Brasilia and Buenos Aires strongly oppose possible US
countervailing duties on their shoe exports.
Declining Japanese Exports Hit LDC Fertilizer Supplies Cutbacks threaten
to reduce food production in food deficit Asian LDCs, particularly Indonesia
and the Philippines.
Britain's Case for EC Budget Renegotiation The United Kingdom's share of
the EC budget would be inordinately large by 1980. 6
Problems with Growing Arab Wealth International financial system faces
challenge of recycling oil wealth. 8
Sperry-Univac Sale 9
Soviet Orders for US Equipment 10
Summary of a Recent Publication 10
Comparative Indicators
Recent Data Concerning Internal and External
Economic Activities
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
Articles
CANADA: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
OF THE TRUDEAU VICTORY
The Liberal Party's surprising achievement of a Parliamentary majority in this
week's election is not likely to cause much change in Ottawa's policies on key
issues of contention with the United States. The need for support from the New
Democrats had entailed little compromise in the Trudeau government's positions
on such issues as oil and other raw material exports and foreign investment policies.
These positions were not seriously contested by the Conservative opposition.
Ottawa thus is not likely to alter significantly the domestic oil pricing policies
that have been discouraging exploration. Moreover, it will also continue the present
policy of increasing self-sufficiency, which has put narrow limits on crude oil
exports to the United States. The 1 June hike in the oil export tax to $5.20
per barrel probably will soon be reduced, however, as the tax hike has cut purchases
by US refineries below quota limits.
Ottawa will continue pursuing policies in the mining sector aimed at receiving
the best price possible for its raw materials. Development of mining can be expected
to suffer as Ottawa remains intent on capturing federal tax control of the country's
resources from the provinces. The new budget is expected to raise taxes on ui-ining
firms' income at the same time that provinces are taking similar actions. As a
result of higher provincial taxes, several major projects already have been suspended
and exploration has fallen off.
Ottawa's attitude on foreign investment is unlikely to ease. Indeed, campaign
promises by Trudeau point to an even tougher stand. He has proposed a 40%
to 50% limitation on foreign equity in new projects to exploit Canadian raw
materiais. US companies now control 80% to 90% of investment it the resource
sector.
On the inflation issue, the voters accepted Trudeau's contention that wage
and price controls demanded by the Tories are not the answer. Trudeau can now
avoid restrictive fiscal and monetary policies that he believes would exacerbate
unemployment. The victory will ensure passage of Trudeau's mildly expansionary
budget, which was defeated earlier and triggered the election. The outlook for
the next six months or so nevertheless is for a moderate slowdown in economic
growth and some rise in uunemploymen*..
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EC BEEF SALES TO THE USSR
The EC reportedly has sold nearly half of its stored beef to the USSR at
prices well below the world level. Although the sale should have little impact on
the world market, EC consumers and beef exporting nations will react negatively
to the move.
Because world beef prices dropped below the average EC intervention price
of 86 cents per pound, the Commission has been forced to buy large quantities
of surplus beef. The 50,000-ton sale to the USSR tops off two months of
maneuvering by the EC Commission to reduce mounting pressure on its beef storage
capacity.
? On I May, export subsidies were increased by 251/c.-
0 Beginning 7 May, importers of frozen beef were required to purchase
an equal amount of stored beef for all foreign beef bought. Starting
on 12 July, all types of beef will be covered by the restriction.
? On 9 May, import levies on frozen beef were nearly doubled.
? On 26 June, import licenses for live cattle were suspended for two
weeks.
With the current beef glut in the world market, few other outlets were available
for disposing of the excess meat. While the sale is sure to be unpopular with the
European housewife, who is paying about $1.50 per pound for her chuck roast,
it will be welcomed by cattlemen. The cost to the EC Commission above the price
tag on the Soviet sale is nearly $50 million.
The attractive price of 43 cents per pound enticed the Soviets to buy foreign
meat - something they rarely do. The last time the USSR imported large quantities
of beef (63,000 tons) was during 1970-71, when meat shortages were particularly
severe. Although Soviet meat production for the first five months of 1974 exceeded
that of the comparable period in 1973 by 12%, reports of local shortages persist.
The current purchase from the EC provides an opportunity to ease unsatisfied
demand and will also permit farms to hold some cattle to heavier weights.
GERMAN BANK FAILURE SHAKES CURRENCY EXCHANGES
Last month's failure of the West German bank, I.D. Herstatt, has caused
concern about the safety of currency dealings and has led to a substantial reduction
in spot and forward transactions in some currencies.
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Although l-lerstatt was only a medium-size West German private bank, its
failure has aroused concern because:
? Herstatt had a disproportionately large share of forward currency
obligations for a bank of its size.
? Other banks may be in similar difficulties that have not yet been
exposed.
? The bank was closed down in the middle of a business day before
it could deliver on a substantial quantity of spot currency contracts.
The midday closing struck at the heart of the international payments system.
Firms already had paid fur several hundred million dollars worth of currencies -
normally considered a risk-free transaction. Even though customers eventually will
recoup most of their losses, the fear that other banks will fail to make good on
currency transactions has reduced volume on many European exchanges.
Herstatt's problems - like those of some other German banks, the Union Bank
of Switzerland, and Franklin National -- stem in large part from the increased
exposure in currency dealing since the advent of floating exchange rates. Under
fixed rates, banks were less tempted to speculate and stood to gain or lose
substantially less when they did so.
Some European countries are moving to reduce the possibility of similar bank
failures. West Germany is requiring its banks to report forward obligations by
maturity and, to some extent, by currency.
Bonn s
refusal to paper over Herstatt s difficulties should warn other erman an s inclined
to similar excesses. Thus far, they have made no provision to ensure that spot
THE IMPACT OF COUNTEFkVAILING DUTIES
ON US RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
Brazil and Argentina have reacted strongly to possible US imposition of
"countervailing" duties on their shoe exports.
Brasilia is intensifying its campaign against the US action. For months the
press has criticized the US Department of the Treasury's investigation of incentives
to footwear exports, arguing that countervailing duties would be a blow struck
at an old and reliable friend, that the shoe industry is not guilty of dumping,
and that Brazilian shoes are only a small share of the US market. Now Brazil's
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Minister of Industry and Commerce asserts that "restrictive threats" to its exports
must be met by broadening its markets and that the purchase of Russian
hydroelectric turbines is under consideration as a step toward new trade
opportunities.
Buenos Aires has been intransigent, offering only token cooperation to
Treasury officials investigating the subsidies received by the shoe industry. Argentine
footwear exports are small but have symbolic value because they represent one
of the few areas in which sales to the United States have expanded in recent years.
Moreover, Argentina fears that countervailing duties on shoes will be followed by
similar action against other exports.
Footwear exports are of considerably greater importance to Brazil. More than
80% of Brazil's shoe exports, now more than $100 million annually, are sold to
the United States. The economic impact of countervailing duties, however, would
not be serious if they ranged around 15%o. The Brazilian industry makes a higher
profit on shoes sold abroad than on domestic sales and can absorb somewhat higher
duties without loss of its competitive position.
Higher duties or the addition of other products to the list for countervailing
duties would be more serious. The Brazilian trade deficit this year is growing much
more rapidly than had been projected because energy imports have soared and
exports have fallen below expectations. While the balance-of-payments position is
still strong, Brasilia considers its export drive more vital to economic prosperity
thaii before.
Brazilians resent Washington's "legalistic" approach to an issue they regard
as political and therefore negotiable. Brazilian officials close to the problem
understand the mandatory nature of the US statute and also recognize that some
of their export incentives clearly constitute subsidies. They point out, however,
that the incentives are available to all industrial exports and therefore do not
constitute a subsidy for a specific export product. They fear that other
manufactured exports are equally vulnerable to US penalties and that other
countries may follow the US lead.
Brazil is now reviewing its export incentives, and some modifications probably
will be made late this year or early in 1975. The incentive program is complex,
however, involving tax exemptions and offsets as well as access to
government-subsidized lines of credit. The exemption from indirect taxes is not
considered a subsidy by the United States or by GATT, but most of the other
incentives are. Although ready to make some cosmetic changes, Brasilia is not willing
to undertake the drastic surgery needed to eliminate all GATT-defined subsidies.
It believes that the incentive program is one of the chief pillars of its economic
boom.
If a countervailing duty is imposed, Brazil would characterize the action as
a denial of the special relationship with Latin America that the United States
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articulated ::t Mexico City and as further evidence of US unwillingness to permit
expansion of LDC industrial exports. In an attempt to get even, Brasilia may also
accept Soviet bids - which will probably be the lowest - for equipment for the
Itaipu power project. Buenos Aires' reaction probably will be more shrill and will
take the form of additional restrictions on US subsidiaries in Argentina.
DECLINING JAPANESE EXPORTS HIT
LDC FERTILIZER SUPPLIES
Declining Japanese exports of nitrogen fertilizer threaten to reduce food
production in food deficit Asian LDCs - particularly Indonesia and the Philippines.
Production in FY 1975 is expected to remain at last year's level because of
reduced capacity in the wake of industrial accidents in urea and petrochemical
plants last year. Domestic demand, meanwhile, will increase by at least 7%,
reflecting Tokyo's effort to increase self-sufficiency in food. As a result, exports
probably will fall by 10%, or about 150,000 tons.
Japan: Supply of Nitrogen Fertilizer)
Thousand Tons of Nitrogen
Production
Consumption
Exports
Ending
Stocks
1969/70
2,131
879
1,236
684
70/71
2,105
366
1,410
513
71 /72
2,125
880
1,274
484
72/73
2,454
970
1,680
288
73/742
2,400
1,020
1,460
208
74/752
2,400
1,090
1,310
208
1. The fertilizer year extends from 1 July through 30 June.
2. Estimate.
Because of uncertain production and strong foreign demand, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) is keeping a tight rein on exporters.
Contracts are being negotiated much later and for shorter periods and smaller
amounts than usual. Japan normally sells most of its fertilizer on annual contracts,
but MITI now is insisting that exporters make commitments for no more than
six months and include a provision for renegotiation of prices.
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Contracts recently signc'l with India and Indonesia for July- December
represent a cut of 25% from the same period a year ago. China, by far the largest
buyer, has been notified of a 15% to 201/o cut but has resisted the higher price
agreed to by other buyers. Accor.ling to Tokyo, the price of $215 per ton of
urea being offered to China and agreed to by India is still about $35 below the
price other large exporters are getting.
Indonesia and the Philippines probably will be hardest hit by the shortfall
in fertilizer exports because they rely on Japan for 901/0 of their imports and 60%
of their consumption. Both countries anticipate a substantial rise in import
requirements and were counting on Japan to cover the bulk of it. Unless other
suppliers make up the difference, the drop in Japanese exports would result in
about a 20% shortfall in fertilizer imports for Indonesia and about 301%. for the
Philippines.
India is much less dependent on imports for its nitrogen fertilizer. Japan
provides only about 30% of its imports and 10% of its consumption. Since India
apparently was counting on Japan foi- the same :;hare in FY 1975, it is expected
to suffer a shortfall of about 10% in imports. China will not be hurt seriously
by a decline in Japanese exports, because domestic production is increasing rapidly.
BRITAIN'S CASE FOR EC BUDGET RENEGOTIATION
Britain has softened its earlier demands on reneo.iating its EC membership
terms but remains adamant on reducing its future share in EC budget support.
Foreign Secretary Callaghan has left open the means of achieving this budget share
reduction, noting that either a cut in Britain's gross contributions or an increase
in its receipts would be satisfactory.
London is on reasonably firm economic ground in requesting a cut in its
scheduled budget contributions. Because these contributions increasingly will be
based on the amount of duties each member collects on non-EC imports, Britain
will be called on to provide financing that is inordinately large. Its share in budget
support is scheduled to rise from 9% in 1973 to an estimated 27% in 1980. At
the same time, its share in total Community GNP would decline from 17% to
14% during the same period if recent growth trends continue.
On a net basis - gross contributions less receipts from EC coffers - Britain
will be a heavy contributor to the b>idget even though its per capita GNP will
remain considerably below the EC average. By contrast, France 'vill be a net
recipient despite an above-average per capita GNP.
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Britain's Share in EC Budget Relative to GNP Standing
1973
Projected 1980
Budget Con-
Budget Con-
Total GNP
GNP as
tributions as
GNP as
tributions as
(Billion
US $)
Per Capita
GNP ($)
a percent
of Total
a Pr-crcent
oi' Total
a Percent
of Total
a Percent
of Total
Total
1,040
4,050
100
100
100
100
West Germany
347
5,600
34
29
34
28
France
256
4,900
25
25
26
18
United
Kingdom
175
3,120
17
9
14
27
Italy
125
2,280
12
19
12
10
Netherlands
55
4,100
5
9
6
7
Belgium-
Luxembourg
44
4,400
4
8
4
5
Denmark
31
6,200
2
1
3
4
Ireland
7
2,330
1
Negl.
1
1
Other EC members have not rejected London's request out of hand even
though they are opposed to the basic concept of renegotiation of entry terms.
The Council, under German Chancellor Schmidt's leadership, recently decided to
refer the budget-share question to the Commission for study.
Britain has suggested several approaches to reducing its net share but ]VIS filet
with opposition from other Community members.
A larger part of proposed regional fund disbursements could be
allocated to Britain; France is opposed to such use of the fund,
and Germany wants to limit the size of the fund itself.
The formula by which EC revenues are to be generated could be
changed in Britain's favor; several EC members object to this
approach on the grounds that it alters basic Community structures
to benefit one member.
s A lump-sum rebate could be made to Britain and other "overpaying"
countries to bring their contributions more in line with GNP' such
an approach has the advantage of not tampering with Community
institutions but would be costly to France and sonic other members.
The fundamental issue of whether ether EC members should pay more so
that Britain can pay less will hinder negotiations regardless of the means of altering
budget shares. Any improvements that London obtains will come only after long,
hard bargaining that probably will further strain EC cohesiveness.
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PROBLEMS WITH GROWING ARAB WEALTH*
Higher oil prices are dramatically altering the international payments system.
If they continue:
? OPEC earnings in 1974 will total about $90 billion and the OPEC
current account surplus will exceed $60 billion.
? The surplus is likely to decline after 1974, but it will not be
eliminated until the 1980s.
? Foreign holdings -- which will total about $300 billion in 1980 --
will be increasingly concentrated in the Arab states, particularly
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms.
Arab investment has been concentrated in financial markets in a few developed
countries, particularly the Eurodollar market. Most holdings are in short-term assets,
particularly bank deposits. Arab producers have continued to rely on the Eurodollar
market because it has satisfied their investment objectives; there is little risk their
assets will be seized for political reasons, interest rates are high enough to maintain
the real value of holdings except in periods of very rapid inflation, and these
investments provide a high degree of flexibility. At present, the United States has
the only other financial market in which Arab investment objectives can be realized.
Continuation of present patterns of Arab investment within the existing
financial system will seriously disrupt the international payments process. The
continued concentration of Arab investment in the Eurodollar market will depress
interest rates pain on Arab deposits and increase potential market instability. The
shift of Arab deposits to the United States and other major financial centers, now
just beginning, thus will become more pronounced. Increasingly, US financial
institutions will be faced with the task of recycling oil producers' surpluses to
all consuming countries on acceptable terms.
Oil consumers will face increasing difficulty in financing their oil-related
current account deficits.
? Developing nations and some developed countries with especially
large current account deficits will be shut out of financial markets
and will be unable to obtain marke t financing on almost any terms.
? Many credit-worthy countries will be unwilling to incur a rapidly
mounting debt and d,,.bt service burden.
For further details, ,see ER IR 74-14, Problems with Growing Arab Wealth, July 1974,
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In the absence of an international consensus on an acceptable pattern of current
account deficits and the means of financing them, the consuming countries will
take independent steps to cope wit'n the oil payments problem. For those countries
with a weak balance of payments, such steps could include more restrictive demand
management policies and specific measures for stimulating exports and limiting
imports. Such policies would tend to shift oil-related deficits to the countries best
able to finance them - the United States and West Germany.
A number of proposals have been advanced to attract and recycle Arab funds
through existing official institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, and some new
joint producer-consumer investment institutions, but these channels are unlikely
to handle more than a small share of the oil money. Despite the plethora of schemes
for direct producer country aid to consumers, these will provide relief for only
a few, primarily Islamic, states.
If new arrangements are not implemented, there will be a large inflow of
oil money to the United States. While there will be some outflow of these funds,
they are certain to fall far short of financing oil deficits in other consuming
countries. Consequently, the dollar will appreciate. This will help shift more of
the consuming countries' total oil-related deficit to the United States.
New arrangements could be implemented to facilitate recycling through the
US market. These could take a variety of forms: encouraging private capital
outflows, direct official long-term loans, and new long-term swap arrangenic;,ts,
some of which probably would be on concessionary terms. To the extent that
recycling took place, other countries would be tinder less severe pressure to
minimize their balance-of-payments deficits.
Sperry-Univac Sale
Winning a competition wit:i IBM, Sperry-Univac has been awarded a $10
million contract to provide the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation with a completely
automated airline reservations system. The system will consist of two large
computers and 140 remote access terminals in five major Soviet cities. Most of
the hardware will be built in Univac's US plants, although a subsidiary in West
Germany will supply a small portion. The software will be supp;ied in conjunction
with Air France and will be a modified version of the system originally developed
by Univac for the French airline. The sale still requires US as well as COCOM
approval.
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Soviet Orders for US Equipment
The signing in June of contracts worth $300 million for a fertilizer complex --
$200 million for four ammonia pants from Chemico and $100 million for
associated port facilities from Occidental -- brings Soviet orders for US equipment
to nearly $400 million in 1974. The USSR is expected to order another $100
million in equipment for the fertilizer complex later this year, and additional
contracts are likely for the Kama River truck plant. These orders will boost Soviet
contracts for IIS onninment W~?II above the 1973 total of $450 million.
The Economic Situation in South Vietnam, June 1974
(ER IR 74-18, June 1974, 25X1
This month's report discusses (1) a break in earlier price stability, (2) the
government's award of new offshore oil rights, (3) some economic policy dilemmas,
(4) import licensing under French and Japanese aid programs, and (5) development
of industrial parks.
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INTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
I'err.ent Change
Lclest Irunll'rumous
Quarter Quarter 1910
741 -1,0 3.9
741 -5.0 0.2
74 1 1,6 3.3
73 IV 1.8 .5.8
74 1 -3.5 1.9
73 IV 1.9 3.7
741 1.7 5.4
Percent Change -
Lalest train Previous
Month Month 1970
May 74 0.4 4.8
May 74 1.8 7.3
Apr 74 0 3.2
Apr 74 -0.8 5.0
Apr 74 1.7 2.6
Apr 74 2.7 4.5
Apr 74 -1.1 6.2
Percent Chang[
Latest Irani Previous
Month Month
May 74 1 1.0
Feb 74
Feb 74
Mar 74
Mar 74
Dec 73
Apr 74
-2.2
0.9
0.8
1.3
3.0
0.3
Average Annual
Growth Role Some
I Year
Earlier
0.2
-2.4
-0.7
5,7
-4.4
5.3
3.0
Previous
Quarter
-0.3
-18.0
8.1
7.3
-13.3
7.7
7.0
Average Annual
Growth Ilale Smcu
I Year
tastier
0.4
2.3
1.1
5.1
0.5
13.7
3.6
3 Months
Earlier"
-0.5
-8.6
-2.9
0
8.6
-16.5
6.1
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
1970
9.5
13.2
8.7
7.1
12.0
17.2
11.3
I Year
Earlier
6.4
17.6
0.9
9.8
9.4
25.5
10.1
3 Months
Earlier"
12.9
8.8
11.4
13.8
6.5
47.0
19.3
WHOLISAII: PIIICES
Indnutrull
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Percent Chonqu
Latest rein Prevu its
Month Montle I!1711
May 74 2.7 8.4
May 74 0.7 11.1
May 74 1.2 7.1
May 74 -0.5 13.2
May 74 2.1 10.0
Apr 74 2.1 14.7
Mar 74 2.8 10.4
I'eiconl Change
latest floor Previous
Month Month
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
I Year
Latest Date Earlier
Jun 28 9.00 7.63
Jun 21 12.63 6.63
Jun 26 9.17 13.50
Jun 23 14.00 8.50
Jun 26 13.05 6.32
Jun 28 11.00 7.00
Jun 28 12.73 9.06
3 Months
Earlier
7.75
12.50
8.63
11.88
15.63
8.03
9.50
1 Month
Earlier
9.75
12.00
8.63
12.88
13.25
11.15
11.88
May 74
May 14
May 74
May 74
May 74
May 74
May 74
Average Amoral
Growth Rate Suter
I Year
Luhur
20.1
35.3
14.4
37.0
24.5
45.1
20.7
Months
E:n lute
40.6
8.4
10.5
37.7
35.8
04.2
39.1
Average nonual
Growth Hale Since
19711
6.0
11.3
6.3
7.9
10.5
9.4
8.3
I Year
Earlier
10.7
23.1
7.2
13.5
16.0
16.2
10.9
3 Months
Earlier
12.1
15.7
6.2
17.1
25.3
23.2
14.3
Average Animal
Growth Rate Since
Per curt Change
Latest from Prevmus 1 Year
Month Month 1970 Earher
May 74 1.6 6.9 I 7.0
Mar 74 2.6 18.0 15.4
Apr 74 0.3 9.1 0.4
Feb 74 -0.3 11.9 9.0
May 74 -0.2 9.1 2.5
Dec 73 2.6 21.2 17.9
May 74 8.1 15.8 20.8
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Average for latest 3 months compared
with icings for previous 3 months.
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GNP'
Conmant Market Prices
France
United Kingdom
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Canada
Euro-Dollars
Representative Rates
Prime finance paper
Call money
Interbank loans (3 Months)
Call money
local authority deposits
Finance paper
Three-month deposits
10 July 1974
Office of Economic Research/CIA
3 Months
Earlier
10.0
15.7
9.5
14.9
4.7
22.1
31.5
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EXTERNAL ECONOIl!IIC INDICATORS
P X I' (I II 1
Lu.b.
United Status
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
IMPORTS'
f.11 1).
United Status
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXPORT PRICE;
IiSS
United Status
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXPORT PRICES
National Currency
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
TRADE BALANCE"
Inb./l.a.b.
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
May 74
May 74
May 74
May 74
May 74
Apr 74
May 74
Million US $
Million US S 11174 1973
7,030 38,2171 20,304
4,077 10,079 13,814
0,490 30,400 24,734
3,845 18,103 13,800
3,082 13,831 11,104
2,502 8,832 5,708
2,773 12,783 10,077
Lnlast Munai
Million US $
May 74 8,407
May 74 4,003
May 74 6,020
May 74 4,482
May 74 4,242
Apr 74 3,368
May 74 2,608
Million US S
1914 1913
38,249 27,293
21,541 11,398
25,073 19,298
19,869 13,281
18,812 12,633
11,586 6,406
12,169 9,220
I'ercnnl
Glo'om'
45.0
44.0
47.4
31.0
24.0
53.1
20.9
I'en:eul
Clnuylu
40.1
89.0
33.0
49.5
48.9
80.9
32.0
Million (IS S 1914 1973 Charup'
May74 -777 2 -909 911
May 74 -226 -1.567 2,416 -3.983
May 74 2,473 10,793 5,435 5,357
May 74 -837 -1,896 519 1,215
May 74 -1.160 -4,981 -1,529 -3,452
Apr 74 -861+ -2,753 -638 -2,115
May 74 165 814 858 -242
BAS:e. BALANCE-
Current and long-Term?Capilal Transactions
latent Penml Cunndalwc (Million US $I
United States'
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
74 I
May 74
Apr 74
73 IV
73 IV
73 II
74 I
-1,006
-1.322 -7,211 -3,594
860 3,253 917
-352 -2,391 -369
-1,394 -3,164 -1,954
-336 639 971
-195 -195 -191
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
End at Billion US S Jun 1910
May 74 14.9 14.5
May 74 13.4 4.1
May 74 34.4 8.8
May 74 8.1 4.4
May 74 6.9 2.8
Mar 74 6.7 4.7
Jun 74 6.1 4.3
ar
"I
Earlier
12.9
15.9
31.4
11.6
8.7
8.3
8.0
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Converted Into US dollars at current market rates of exchange.
CIrangu
3,071
-3,616
2,336
-2,022
-1.210
-332
-4
3 Monks
Earlier
14.6
11.0
32.0
8.1
6.0
6.4
6.1
IMPORT PRICES
National Currency
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Avl.lnue Annual
liru'wlli Hula Since
I'urcunl CHu olu
label Inns I'rgvunls I your 3 Mnnlhs
Moalh Mnnll' I911l Iorlwr lurher
May 74 -0.2 11.2 20.1 13.2
Apr 74 3.1 10.9 35,0 70.8
Mar 74 7.7 13.9 21.9 37.8
Jan 74 -5.0 11.1 18.9 -35.2
Jon 74 -2.0 7.7 12,1 -10.0
Nov 73 -2.4 10.5 I 21.3 12.4
Fab 74 4.1 12.4 34.3 05.0
Ih'ir.enl CHanau..
Lutnsl Irma Pruvle"s
Averugu Annual
Gruw;n Hole Since
Muuni Month
May 74 -0.2
Apr 74 1.6
Mar 74 2.3
Jon 74 3.2
Jon 74 1.5
Nov 73 2.0
Feb 74 2.7
19111
11.2
9.2
4.1
8.0
10.0
8.7
10.3
I Year
hillier
20.1
41.4
13.0
17.0
18.7
22.8
31.8
:I Months
Garber
13.2
35.0
30.0
31.3
20.9
22.9
51.5
Pcrcunl Cliangr ----
Latest from I'revmm,
Month Month 19111
May 74 1.3 18.9
Apr 74 1.3 17.0
Mar 74 1.6 6.2
Jan 74 14.9 11.3
Jon 74 5.9 17.8
Nov 73 3.5 14.8
Feb 74 3.6 1.9
Average Aunual
Growth Hale Since
I Yea'
Errhe.r
48.7
83.4
25.7
33.0
49.8
42.3
21.3
EXCHANGE RATES Spat Hate
As of 5 July 14
Japan hunt IDoulsel"West Germany Mink)
France (1w or.) (Pomul
United Kingdom slerhnal
Italy ILual
Canada molar)
us S
Per Uml
0.0035
0.3925
0.2083
2.3880
0.0016
1.0268
Dec 60
26.13
56.13
3.17
-14.43
-3.06
11.32
TRADE-WEIGHTED
As at 5 July 74
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
'8 Dec
1911
7.18
26.49
5.79
-8.35
-9.77
2.91
19 Mar
1973
-8.49
10.84
-5.49
-2.97
-12.32
2.92
3 Manllrs
E;uher
79.4
153.9
50.1
127.4
75.9
30.8
42.4
28 Jun
1974
-1.08
0
0.19
-0.13
0.32
-0.17
EXCHANGE RATES""
Percent Change rain
Dec 66
-16.42
15.17
31.87
- 19.77
-34.17
-25.09
8.17
18 Dec
1971
-7.07
1.48
14.84
-6.32
-19.99
-23.74
1.58
19 Mar
1973
-0.45
-10.40
9.80
-8.77
-5.62
-18.83
3.21
28 Jun
1974
0.23
-1.10
-0.12
0.11
-0.19
0.26
-0.13
"'Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized
countries to reflect the competitive impact of exchange-rate variations
among the major currencies.
Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150030-3