ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150028-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 26, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Economic Intelligence Weekly
Secret
CIA No. 8131/74
26 June 1974
Copy N2 360
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Secret
Italy's Austerity Program: A Possible Reprieve Proposed measures may
improve credit standing and decrease import bill. I
China: Trade Boom Continues Petroleum exports and expanded use of
credits help finance record purchases of grain and machinery. 2
Argentina: Wage-Price Pact Under Stress The stabilization program is being
eroded by shortages, labor unrest, and declining profits. 3
Mexico: Friendlier Reception for Foreign Investment Major projects
involving 100% US ownership have been approved in spite of new investment
law.
Developed Countries: Employment Holding Up As the slowdown
continues, firms will be more reluctant to retain excess workers.
Portugal: New Freedom, New Problems The Spinola government has
promised more than it can deliver.
Surinam: Alcoa Bauxite Holdings at Stake
Soviets May Help on Itaipu Dam
Summary of a Recent Publication
Comparative Indicators
Recent Data Concerning Internal and External
Economic Activities
i
Secret
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Secret
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
Articles
ITALY'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM: A POSSIBLE REPRIEVE
The austerity program devised by the Rumor government last week should
improve Italy's credit standing and trim at least $1 billion from the 1974 import
bill.
The proposed fiscal and monetary measures represent a compromise between
the Christian Democrats, who favored draconian measures to curb imports and
inflation, and the Socialists, who wished to maintain employment and increase
welfare spending. The patchwork program aims to boost tax revenues by $4.7 billion
annually while reducing the income tax bite on low-income groups. As a concession
to the Socialists, the Christian Democrats agreed to ease credit slightly.
Failure to obtain approval of the program in parliament and in labor union
councils would bring down the government. While the coalition parties probably
can exercise enough self-discipline to get the measures through parliament, labor
union cooperation is less certain. The unions may go along with the program for
the time being; but if prices continue to rise rapidly at the same time taxes are
cutting more deeply into income, trade union cooperation almost certainly will
evaporate.
Ingredients of the Package
the government is
relying most heavily on increases in value-added and other indirect taxes. While
some of the tax measures - such as a hike of 25 cents per gallon in the gasoline
tax - have the particular aim of cutting the trade deficit, most are designed to
reduce overall consumer demand.
The Christian Democrats' agreement to ease credit features increased long-term
loans to small- and medium-sized companies and loans to finance economic
development in the South. These loans are to be covered by a $3 billion sale
of special bonds to commercial banks. Minister of the Trea.,ury Emilio Colombo
reaffirmed Italy's commitment to IMF credit ceilings.
Impact
The tax package should trim domestic demand by about 3% over 12 months.
GNP growth probably will slow to 3%41o in 1974, compared with 5.4% in 1973.
The growth rate in 1975 will be even lower when the full impact of the austerity
program is felt.
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The anticipated drop in domestic demand will reduce imports by about 10%,
after a lag of a few months. Many import orders already have been placed, and
time is needed for the direct tax measures to have their full impact. Together
with some small effects from the import deposit scheme, the austerity program
should hold Italy's trade deficit (imports c.i.f.) to about $10.5 billion in 1974
instead of the $12.0 billion implied by trade flows so far this year.
Even after adjusting the trade account for the favorable impact of the austerity
program, the current account for 1974 will be about $7.5 billion in deficit. Italy's
traditionally large surplus on net services and transfer payments has been decreasing
in recent years, largely because of hidden capital flight and increased interest
payments. Heavy net capital outflows could boost the balance-of-payments deficit
to an estimated $10 billion.
The balance-of-payments deficit expected in the second half of 1974 will
require additional foreign borrowing. Rome has only a meager $2.2 billion in
v;tilable foreign exchange, and support of the lira has been costing $1 billion
monthly. Italy still has large reserves of gold. But it would sell substantial quantities
only as a last resort. The gold could be used as collateral for loans if the parties
could agree on the price and other terms. The $4 billion that the Bank of Italy
lined up under short-term swap arrangements with other central banks cannot be
drawn because the banks fear, justifiably, that they would not be repaid.
In coming weeks, Italy will have to let the lira's value plummet, impose
additional import controls, or obtain new foreign loans. The government will try
to avoid the first two options. A plunge of the lira would be opposed by the
Socialists and trade unions because of its inflationary effects.
Further import controls would be objectionable to the EC and GATT and
would violate the terms of Italy's IMF standby credit. By giving some assurance
that Italy is finally starting to put its house in order, the austerity program should
help Rome find new funds abroad, especially if gold is offered as collateral.
Pushed by soaring world prices, currency revaluations, and a rising physical
volume of imports and exports, the dollar value of China's foreign trade. in 1973
increased by 60% to approximately $9.4 billion. The outlook for 1974 is for trade
to increase another 30% to 40%.
Boom Continues in 1974, June 1974
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China's trade deficit with the non-Communist world is expected to reach.
$1 bihion in 1974, up from $425 million last year. To help cover these deficits,
Peking has relaxed its conservative financial policy and greatly expanded the use
of short- znd medium-term credit. At the same time, China has stepped up efforts
to boost hard currency earnings from exports and invisible transactions. Petroleum
exports alone should rise from $35 million in 1973 to more than $300 million
in 1974.
The recent surge in imports is aimed at offsetting agricultural shortfalls and
boosting industrial development. Imports of grain, sugar, cotton, and vegetable oils
should increase from a record $1.3 billion in 1973 to about $2 billion in 1974.
Roughly half of China's agricultural imports will come from the United States.
Machinery and equipment orders from the West in 1973 totaled almost $2.5 billion,
including $1.2 billion worth of complete industrial plants from Japan, Western
Europe, and the United States. New orders in 1974 for machinery and equipment
continue strong, despite a growing debate in China over the dangers of reliance
on foreign equipment and technology.
Trade with the non-Communist world will again account for 80% or more
of China's total trade in 1974. Japan will remain the leading partner, with two-way
trade reaching about $3 billion. The United States will repeat as China's number
two trading partner. Total Sino-US trade is expected to reach $1.2 billion, up
from $870 million last year. China's trade deficit with the United States probably
will exceed $1 billion. Trade with Hong Kong and the less developed countries
will provide the vrinc6nal offset to Ch 's large deficit with the developed West.
ARGENTINA: WAGE-PRICE PACT UNDER STRESS
President Peron's economic stabilization program is being eroded by growing
shortages, labor unrest, and declining profits.
Since returning to power in May 1973, the Peronists managed to cut inflation
from an annual rate of about 80% to less than 10%. This signal achievement was
jeopardized two months ago when rerun, uuwmg to continuing labor unrest, granted
premature wage increases averaging 20%. Business, already pressed by former wage
hikes and higher prices for imported materials, was granted price increases averaging
These increases upped the inflation rate to nearly 15% and did little to a'leviate
July. He also decreed that, as in previous wage hikes, the cost could not be passed
on to the consumer.
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the face of the threat, Peron subsequently declared a one-month pay bonus for
growing shortages of food and industrial materials. Heightened labor unrest
precipitated Peron's 12 June resignation threat. Although labor turmoil abated in
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1?eron's Social Pact - an agreement among labor, business, and the government
to hold down prices and wages - is in danger of crumbling. Its ultimate objective,
to increase labor's share of the national output, is being pursued at the expense
of investment and business incentives. The Peronists claim labor's share of national
income has risen from 33% to 42% and its purchasing power has increased 12%.
As for business, stiff price controls and rollbacks instituted in mid-1973,
combined with higher labor and material costs, have depressed profits to about
one-third of the pre-Peron level. New private investment has almost halted;
replacement of wornout capital has been held to a minimum; inventories have been
depleted; and shortages are erupting with greater frequency and severity. While
public spending has taken up some of the slack in private i;riestment, it has done
nothing to relieve the supply situation.
Lagging capital spending is making the Mexican government more receptive
to direct foreign investment.
Since the restrictive new foreign investment law took effect a year ago, Mexico
has muted its nationalist rhetoric and has begun to woo foreign businessmen.
? Government officials are promi'ing that investment proposals will
be given a friendlier reception than last year.
investment law has become sufficiently flexible to be no longer a
major consideration in most decisions.
administration of the
? Mexico is opening u four-month investment fair in the capital this
week to highlight business opportunities and is sponsoring
investment seminars in four US cities this summer.
Mexico City hopes that a pickup in foreign investment will stimulate as well
as supplement outlays by domestic firms. Uncertainty over President Echeverria's
reformist inclinations has retarded the recovery of private investment from the
1971 credit crunch. Until the current year, the slack has been taken up by public
investment, which accounted for about 49% of total outlays in 1973. With public
spending being held down in 1974 to curb inflationary pressures, Mexico sees more
spending by foreign interests as the key to maintaining the investment rate.
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Taking a pragmatic tack, they Foreign Investment Commission has been granting
numerous exceptions to the laws general requirements for majority ownership of
new establishments by Mexicans - requirements that most US companies are
reluctant to accept. Several major projects involving 100% US ownership recently
have been approved. Some of these do not appear to meet previously cited
conditions for exemption from the equity requirement, such as having export
potential or introducing advanced technology.
Mexico: Growth of Gross Fixed Investment
Index 1969-100
160 r
1 I
71 72 73
EST.
Certain ventures proposing majority ownership by foreign investors are still
being turned down. The law apparently is being used to block most projects that
would compete with established Mexican-owned companies or that would depend
heavily on imported components.
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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: EMPLOYMENT HOLDING UP
Despite the economic slowdown in all major developed countries,
unemployment has increased thus far only in the United States and West Germany.
Unemployment rates in Britain, Canada, and Italy have actually declined. As the
slowdown continues, unemployment no doubt will rise.
Unemployment
1973
(1st Half)
1973
(2d Half)
1974
(1st HalfI )
Canada
5.6
5.6
5.5
United States
5.0
4.7
5.2
Italy
4.0
3.0
2.8
West Germany
1.3
1.3
2.7
United Kingdom
2.9
2.5
2.5
France
1."
2.0
2.0
Japan
1.4
1.4
1.2
Stability in employment is explained by business reluctance to lose experienced
workers, at least during the early stage of the downturn. Instead, firms have cut
the average hours worked in all major countries except Canada. Since the beginning
of the year, the workweek in Japan and the United Kingdom has been reduced
about 8% and in the United States and France about 1`/o to 2%.
Because unemployment has been mild, governments have been able to pursue
tighter monetary and fiscal policies to deal wit]-.. inflation and rising current accou1it
deficits. As a result, workers' income this year has declined almost 9% in Japan
and 6% in the United Kingdom and has increased by less than 2% in France and
West Germany.
Unemployment almost certainly will rise in coming months. Although some
governments hope to offset declining consumer expenditures by boosting exports
and maintaining a high level of domestic investment, this seems overly optintisti.;.
The slowdown in world economic growth will dampen exports, while restrictive
domestic policies should depress investment spending. As the slowdown continues,
firms will be more reluctant to retain excess workers.
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PORTUGAL: NEW FREEDOM, NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Since General Antonio de Spinola came to power through a bloodless cc:.:p
two months ago, the Portuguese economy has been shaken by labor militance,
popular unrest, and uncertainty about the future. As a result, industrial production,
retail sales, and private investment have declined.
Receipts from tourism and workers' remittances are
down, threatening the first foreign payments deficit
in several years.
Pre-Coup Economic Situation
In the months preceding the coup, Portugal's
control of Angolan oil largely insulated the country
from the oil supply crisis. Real growth was continuing
at a pace near to the long-term average 6%. Lisbon
felt little immediate concern over the balance of
payments, even though higher oil prices and lower
tourist earnings presaged some decline in the current account surplus.
Inflation was the most pressing problem, with prices up by 25% in the 12
months before the coup and the rate of increase accelerating. Inflation had
trimmed - perhaps even reversed -- the steady gains in real wages that workers
had become accustomed to. There was also concern about employment. For many
years two out of every three Portuguese had found industrial jobs only by going
to another European country. Thus, the economic slowdown in Western Europe
threatened to reduce employment opportunities for Portuguese workers.
Post-Coup Developments
The wave of labor unrest unleashed by the removal of the autlioritariar.
Cactano regime is the problem of greatest concern to businessmen and the new
government authorities. Although union leaders are comparatively moderate -? as
is the Communist Party -- the same is not true of ad hoc workers' committees
that have sprung up in n;.merous firms. After decades of political impotence,
workers have been demanding huge wage increases and a voice in management.
Facilities hard hit by wildcat strikes include US-owned Firestone, Timex, Pfizer,
and Merck plants. The Spinola government has been most alarmed by "abuses of
freedom" on the part of transportation and bakery employees, whose strikes left
the Lisbon populace without buses or bread for several days earlier this month.
Labor disputes and uncertainty over government policy have led to an
economic slowdown. Many firms are deferring investment and refusing to hire
additional workers. Layoffs are threatened in some labor-intensive industries.
Housing construction is particularly slack, in part because of a lack of fund;. Retail
sales of non-essentials appear to be off sharply, reflecting apprehension among
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Portugal: heal GNP Growth
Index 1903-100
200 r
Pareent Change In Real GNP 8.0
0.4 7.3 7.8
n n n 1.3 0.7 6.5 5.0
5.7 I II Inl I I I l~l I F] E I I
0 '-
1983
I I I I I I I I I I
64 65 66 67 08 09 70 71 72 73
Portugal: Wage and Price Trends
Index 1903-100
250 r
100
1963 64 65 60
503501 074
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Portugal: Balance of Payments
Million US $
Exports
720
810
1,099
1,512
Imports
1,236
1,427
1,770
2,155
Trade balance
-516
-617
-671
-643
Travel
124
185
238
264
Other services
-68
-20
-20
-12
Pri%atc remittances
483
635
801
975
Current account
balance
23
183
350
586
Long-term capital
40
84
31
N.A.
Basic balance
63
267
381
N.A.
Other capital
-60
6
-80
N.A.
Total
3
273
301
N.A.
consumers. The balance of payments is expected to be in deficit this month,
compared with a normal monthly surplus of $40 million.
iihe government thus far has taken only stopgap measures. Immediately after
the coup, emergency steps were taken to stanch capital outflows. The minimum
wage was increased to $130 monthly, which raised pay for about half of the work
force and substantially boosted labor costs. Prices have been frozen, and higher
pensions and family allowances have been promised. Inexperienced government
arbitrators are trying to resolve labor disputes. The regime has used threats to
get some essential workers back to their jobs.
The new government has appointed some able people but as yet has not devised
a workable economic program. Considerable authority has been delegated to a
civilian cabinet, which is predominantly center-left but has representatives from
all political factions. In the hope that a leftist can best restrain worker demands,
Spinola has appointed a Communist as Minister of Labor. The Economic Minister
is a highly regarded young banker with no formal political ?iffliation.
In the heady post-coup atmosphere, the junta promised almost everything:
reduced inflation, higher wages, increased investment, tighter environmental
controls, liberalized trade and capital flows, tax reform, cconontic decentralization,
improved social security, and more. It will have to choose among conflicting goals
and, even then, will find it difficult to deliver. The likely failure of the government
to fulfill many of its economic pledges could add to political unrest.
The economic outlook hinges principally on the government's ability to
maintain order in the labor field and to restore confidence among businessmen
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and consumers. The price freeze is likely to fall apart before long under the pressure
of huge increases in labor costs. Labor problems in turn could easily coalesce,
resulting in further disruption of the economy and exacerbating the political
situation. Although increasingly disillusioned by excessive demands from workers
and political radicals, the Spinola government will be reluctant to take repressive
measures to restore momentum to the economy.
The government is giving priority to settling the African conflicts. The
popularity of a settlement would buy time to meet other problems and free
substantial resources for the effort. At the same time, Lisbon almost certainly will
continue pressing the United S -it-, and major European countries, probably
successfully, for assistance to . zip meet its economic promises and to bolster
confidence in the new regime.
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Socrot
In last week's article on OECD growth projections, p. 8, the May forecast
by OECD of the increase in US GNP for 1974 was mistakenly shown as 4.7%.
The correct figure is 0.4%.
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Surinam: Alcoa Bauxite Holdings at Stake
The Hague has indicated that it would not oppose Surinam's use of Dutch
economic aid to finance acquisition of properties of foreign-owned firms after
Surinam gains independence in 1975. This attitude helps the cause of Surinam
nationalists who are pressing the government to demand equity participation in
Suralco, a subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of America and Surinam's largest
business enterprise. The company's
$350 million Surinam property accounts for 37% and 24% of its hauxite and
aluminum capacity, respectively. Surinam, a member of the recently formed
Intergovernmental Bauxite Association, supplied 17% (aluminum content) of US
bauxite, alumina, and aluminum imports in 1973.
Soviets May Help on Itaipu Darn
Brazilian officials have added the USSR to the countries being considered
for participation in the $3 billion Itaipu hydroelectric power project. The
announcement follows the visit to Brasilia of a four-man Soviet delegation to
negotiate the sale of turbines. Only last month, the USSR won the contract to
provide equipment for the Salto Grande dam -- a joint Argentine-Uruguayan
project. Moscow had underbid all competitors, offering lower prices and more
favorable financing.
Current Status of the 1974 Soviet Grain Crop
(ER IB 74-5, June 1974,
Delays in the spring sowing campaign and above-average losses of winter grains
suggest that gross grain output in the USSR this year - assuming average weather
from now on -- will amount to about 190 million tons, well below last year's
record 222.5 million tons. The projected output would fall short of current
domestic needs and usual export commitments but could be covered by the reserves
built up after the record 1973 harvest. Therefore, we do not anticipate large-scale
Soviet grain imports in fiscal year 1975, although the Soviets may still import
grain if the price is right. Since Soviet grain yields are extremely sensitive to weather,
the USSR will not have a firm enough estimate of output to calculate its import
needs before July or August.
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INTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
GNP'
Conslanl Markel Vrwvs
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Average Annual
Grnwlh [title suite
Percent Change ----------------
Lohsl trout Pravmus I Year Previous
Quarter Quarter 19111 Earlier Quorlor
741 -1.0 4.0 93 -3,3
741 -5.0 6.2 -2.4 -18.0
73 IV -0.1 3.1 3.4 - 0,3
73 IV 1.0 5.0 5.7 7.3
741 -3.6 1.9 -4.4 -13.3
73 IV 1.9 3.7 5.3 7.7
74 1 1.7 5.4 3.0 7.0
United States
Japan
West Germalr'
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
RETAIL SALES*
Current Prices
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Average Annual
Grnwlh note Sane
I'nn:e111 Change
Latest trust Previous I Year 3 Months
Moth Month I97U Earlier Earlier"
May 74 0.4 4.6 0.4 -0.5
Apr 74 - 1.1 7.0 3.3 -9.3
Apr 74 0 3.2 1.1 -2.9
Apr 74 -0.8 5.6 5.1 0
Apr 74 1.7 2.6 0.5 0.6
Apr 74 2.7 4.5 13.7 -18.5
Apr 74 - 1.1 8.2 3.6 6.1
Average Annual
Growth Aare Sauce
Percent Change
Latest treat Previous I Year
Month Month 19/U Earlier
May 14 1.0 10.3 8.8
Feb 74 -2.2 13.2 17.6
Feb 74 0.9 8.7 0.9
Mar 74 0.8 7.1 9.8
Mar 74 1.3 12.0 9.4
Nov 73 -3.3 1 #.4 34.1
Mar74 -1.0 11.4 11.8
United States
Japan
West Germany
ranee
United Kingdom
Canada
Euro-Dollars
representative rains
Prime finance paper
Call money
Interbank loans(3Monihs)
Call money
local authority deposits
Finance paper
Three-month deposits
26June 1974
Office of Economic Research/CIA
3 Months
Earlier"
13.9
8.8
11.4
13.8
8.5
100.2
23.1
latest Date
Jun 21 1 9.00
Jun 14
Jun 12
Jun 21
Jun 19
Jun 19
Jun 19
12.65
9.17
13.25
12.55
11.00
11.90
WHOLESALE PRICES
Induslual
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Percent Chan'le
I atcl hntn Prr.wuus
Month Month
May 74 2.7
May 74 0.7
Mar74 1.0
Apr 74 2.4
May 74 2.1
Jan 74 7.1
Mar 74 2.8
Avurnlle Annual
Grnwlh Halt) Since
I"711
b.4
11.1
0.8
13.2
10.9
11.8
10.4
I Year
[arlar
20.1
35.3
13.1
35,7
24.5
33.9
20.7
3 Mnnllc.
Ether
40.6
8.4
30.3
53.2
35.x1
68.3
39.1
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
1 Year
Earlier
7.63
8.50
13.50
7.62
1.22
7.00
8.94
3 Months
Earlier
7.25
12.50
11.00
12.13
15.50
8.38
8.88
1 Month
Earlier
9.25
12.00
9.00
13.00
13.38
11.15
12.06
Average Annual
Growth Role Smce
Percent Change --
Latel Iran, Previous
Month Month I97t
May 74 1.0 6.0
Apr 74 2.7 11.4
May 74 0.6 6.3
Apr 74 1.6 7.7
Apr 741 3.4 10.3
Apr 74 1.2 9.2
May 74 1.7 6.3
Percent Champ;
latest from Previous
Munch Muntlr
May 74 1.6
Mar 74 2.6
Mar 74 2.0
Feb74 -0.3
May 74 - 0.2
Dec 73 2.6
Apr 74 4.2
I Year
Lanier
10.7
24.9
7.2
13.2
15.2
16.3
10.3
3 Months
Earhnr
11.8
30.8
6.2
17.7
27.0
26.6
14.3
Average Annual
Growth note since
1910
7.0
18.0
9.2
11.9
9.1
21.2
13.8
I Year
Earlier
7.0
15.4
-0.8
9.0
2.5
17.9
14.4
3 Months
Cit be r
10.0
15.7
9.0
14.9
4.7
22.1
18.5
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Average for latest 3 months compared
with average for previous 3 months.
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EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
EXPORTS`
f.o.b.
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
IMPORTS
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
TRADE BALANCE"
f.o.b./l.o.b.
United States
Japan
Wesi Germany
France
United Kingdom
Ita!y
Canada
Latnsl Monlll
Million US $ I'mcmll
Million US S 11174 1973 Clango
Apr 74
8,230
30,024
20,908
40.5
May 74
4,070
19,972
13,014
44.0
Apr 74
7,734
28,076
19,070
47.2
May 14
3,032
18,151
13,800
31.5
May 74
3,082
13,831
11,104
24.0
Apr 74
2,502
8,827
5,768
53.0
Apr 74
2,429
10,010
7,978
26.5
Cunudahve
Million US S Percent
Million I15 S 1974 1973 Challgn
Apr 74
0,138
29,843
21,545
38.5
May 74
4,907
21,550
11,398
89,1
Apr 74
5,423
19,720
14,994
31.5
May 14
4,487
19,845
13,281
49.4
May 14
4,242
18,812
12,033
48.9
Apr 74
3,368
11,580
6,406 80.8
Apr 74
2,306
9,560
7,290 31.1
Million US S 1974 1973 Change
Apr 74
92
781
-637
1,418.
May 74
-237
-1.578
2,416
-3,994
Apr 74
2,310
8,355
4,075
4,280
May 74
-635
-1,694
519
-2.213
May 74
-1,160
-4,981
-1,529
-3,452
Apr 74
-868
-2,753
-638
-2,115
Apr 74
123
449
688
-238
BASIC BALANCE
Current and ong?Term-Capital Transactions
Latest Pnrlod Cunulativc (Million US SI
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Million US S 1973
741 2,070 2,070
May 74 -5 -5,893
Apr 74 800 3,271
73 IV -352 -2,391
73 IV -1,394 -3,184
7311 -338 639
73 IV 27 376
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Latest Month
End of Billion US S Jon 1970
May 74
May 74
Mar 74
May 74
May 74
Mar 74
May 74
14.9
13.2
32.9
8.1
6.9
8.7
6.2
1972
-888
-3,594
917
-369
-1.954
971
1,155
Change
2,956
2,299
2,354
-2,022
-1,210
-332
-779
I Year
Ember
3 Moths
Earlier
EXPORT PRICES
IISS
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXPORT PRICES
National Currency
I'mcunl Change --..
Latusl brio IhgvIous
Month Month
Apr /4 I 0.6
Jan 74
Mar 74
Jun 74
Doc 73
Nov 73
Fob 74
Jan 74
Mar 74
Jan 74
Doc 73
Nov 73
Fab 74
I'rn:enl Change(
Latest Ironi Previous
Month Month
Apr 74 j 0.6 I
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
IMPORT PRICES
National Currency
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
0.1
5.9
-5.9
0.1
-2.4
4.1
19711
11.5
13.4
13.9
11.1
8.7
10.5
12.4
Avoiaou Annual
Grnwlh Hato Since
I Year
Earlier
30.3
31.4
21.9
18.9
17.4
21.3
34.3
:1 Months
I:arbcl
23.5
8.0
37.5
-35.2
12.0
12.4
65.6
Average Annual
Glowth Hale S1111:1,
19711
11.5
7.6
4.1
8.0
9.8
8.7
I Year
Ear her
30.3
27.3
13.0
17.6
18.8
22.8
31.8
3 Months
Earlutl
23.5
71.3
30.8
31.3
33.0
22.9
51.5
Average Annual
Glawth Rate Since
Pen:enl hh;uupi--- - ---'
Latest hum Ihevm. I Yin 3 Months
Month Month 19711 Latkur Earlier
Apr 74 6.3 19.0 48.6 98.2
Jan 74 13.1 10.8 43.1 170.0
Mar 74 1.6 6.2 25.7 56.1
Jon 74 14.9 11.3 33.0 127.4
Dec 73 4.5 16.3 42.6 50.6
Nov 73 3.5 14.8 42.3 30.8
Feb 74 3.6 7.9 21.3 42.4
EXCHANGE RATES Spot Rate
As of 21 Jun 74
IIS S
Per Unit
Ilcc GG
19 Mar
1913
Japan Viol
0.0035
28.16
8.90
-7.02
West Germany
lMaik( he
Mark)
0.3939
58.68
26.94
11.24
France Irranr:l
0.2037
0.89
3.45
-7.58
(Pound
United Kingdom sterhnn)
2.3800
-14.71
-8.66
-3.29
Italy (Lou)
0.0015
-4.31
-10.93
-13.45
Canada )nnearl
1.0313
11.81
3.36
3.37
TRADE-WEIGHTED
As of 21 Jun 74
14 Jun
1974
-0.03
-0.93
0.05
-0.52
-0.13
-0.55
14 Jun
1974
0.40
0.09
-0.65
0.57
-0.29
0.31
-0.47
Dec 0e
10 Dec
1971
19 Mal
1973
16.3
14.0
14.6 United States
-16.72
-7.34
-0.71
4.1
15.9
11.9 Japan
18.93
3.17
-8.74
8.8
32.3
33.1 West Germany
33.02
15.92
10.88
4.4
11.6
8.1 France
-21.89
-8.35
-10.79
2.8
6.7
6.0 United Kingdom
-34.29
-20.09
-5.71
4.7
6.3
8.4 Italy
-26.02
-24.64
-17.72
4.3
6.1
6.2 Canada
8.61
2.01
3.64
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Converted into US dollars at current market rates of exchange.
26 June 1974
"'Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 18 other industrialized
countries to reflect the competitive it-N;?t of exchange-rate variations
among trw major currencies.
Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150028-6
EXCHANGE RATES ""
Pm cent Change hunt