ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
/ 410 5 6:,l
Secret
`MICROFILMED
I W 11 ~7, FBA.
Economic Intelligence Weekly
Secret
CIA No. 8032/74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
Page
Foreign Demand for US Corn Eases Bumper harvests in Argentina
and South Africa bring lower prices. 1
US and USSR to Meet on Exchange of Agricultural Information
Soviet statistics would aid US farm and foreign trade decisions. 2
Portugal: Loosened Economic Ties with African Territories Com-
monwealth arrangement would help territories economically. 3
Japan: Slowing the Capital Drain Tokyo seeks to cushion the
impact of higher import prices. 4
US Proposes Aid for Egypt Washington makes first major economic
overture since the mid-1950s. 6
European Community: Export Drive to the East Exports to the
USSR and Eastern Europe were up 46% last year. 7
PRC-Japanese Civil Air Accord Peking gave little and got much. 10
World Rice Market Eases 13
Price Increases for Phosphate Fertilizer 13
US Investment Prospects at Itaipu Strengthened 13
Publication of Interest
Summary of a Recent Publication
Comparative Indicators
Recent Data Concerning Internal and External
Economic Activity
The oil situation is now being covered mainly in
International Oil Developments, published each
Thursday morning.
Note: Comments and queries re ardin l ' blication are welcoi::ed. They may be directed to Mrs.
i
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
Articles
FOREIGN DEMAND FOR US CORN EASES
Bumper corn harvests in Argentina and South Africa along with
cancellation of precautionary contracts by Japanese and European buyers
are easing the pressure on US supplies and reducing world corn prices.
The Argentine and South African corn harvests will allow exports of
6.3 million and 1.7 million tons, respectively, in the marketing year ending
30 September - 2.3 million tons more than was projected two months
ago and 2 million tons more than in the preceding year. About 80% of
this corn will be available for export between now and September, although
it might not all be moved in this period because of limited port facilities.
Chicago cash prices for no. 2 yellow corn
1973...... '' ..(
1.50 L1111.1J_I11_I.1.1 t WJ~.ll11111ll111L1~11L1J11
Feb Mar Apr
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
Both the increased availability of corn and the diminished threat of
US restrictions on grain exports have induced buyers in Japan and Europe
to cancel some contracts for US corn. These buyers over-contracted earlier
in the year as a hedge against possible US export restrictions. During March,
US net export commitments increased much less than expected, with new
commitments largely offset by a 1.7 million ton reduction in commitments
to EC countries, Eastern Europe, and Japan. The increase in the world export
supply should reduce US exports in the current marketing year by perhaps
one million tons below the 32.7 million tons estimated by CIA in February.
As a result of decreased pressure on supplies, the price of the important
number 2 yellow corn on the Chicago market has dropped from its late
February peak of $3.33 per bushel. In spite of some speculative buying,
the price has remained below that level for the last nine weeks.
The market will remain sensitive to the following factors:
? changes in prospects for the 1974 US corn crop,
? the rate of growth in demand for meat in the developed
countries,
? the availability of relatively low-cost protein meal,
? the severity of drought conditions in Eastern Europe and
India, and
? the decisions in the EC on whether to use wheat or feedgrains
in feeding livestock.
US AND USSR TO MEET ON EXCHANGE
OF AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION
Soviet willingness to cooperate in exchanging agricultural information
important to US farm and foreign trade policies will be tested two weeks
from now.
The second meeting of the Joint Working Group on Agricultural
Economic Research and Information, established last November under the
US-USSR Agricultural Agreement, will convene in Washington on 13 May
for a five-day session. The agenda includes the outlook for agricultural
trade and output in each country, as well as problems encountered in the
information exchange.
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
In terms of timing, the meeting could hardly be more opportune for
US interests. Reports from Moscow of above-normal winterkill and delays
in spring seeding have aroused concern over Soviet grain prospects. By
mid-May, the USSR should know whether the situation is really serious.
Last fall the Soviets agreed to a schedule for the release to the United
States of 10 categories of previously unpublished agricultural statistics. So
far, the data have been late and incomplete. In particular, the Soviets have
balked at supplying some of the data on grain output and livestock
inventories. The United States wants this information in order to judge
the likely position of the USSR in the world grain market.
The Soviets have also been reluctant to set up the promised discussions
on foreign trade. To avoid a confrontation on this issue, the Soviets
proposed in March that the Joint Commercial Commission on Trade deal
with the foreign trade aspects of the agricultural agreement. The United
States rejected the proposal on the grounds that the Commission would
be unable or unwilling to devote much attention to agricultural trade.
Subsequently, Minister of Agriculture Polyansky told US Ambassador
Stoessel that the trade data should be supplied by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade. Other recent statements by Soviet officials also indicate that the
Soviet delegation is likely to dodge questions concerning grain purchases
from the United States.
PORTUGAL: LOOSENED ECONOMIC TIES
WITH AFRICAN TERRITORIES
Leaders of Portugal's coup are considering a unified "commonwealth,"
which would result in looser economic ties with Angola, Mozambique, and
Portuguese Guinea.
A commonwealth arrangement presumably would lead to the softening
of pre-coup policies that discouraged (a) non-Portuguese investment in the
territories, (b) the development of local industries in competition with the
metropole, and (c) the purchase by the territories of manufactured goods
from the cheapest source.
Serious economic disruption would follow if Portugal, under rising
insurgent pressure, were to withdraw its forces. The resulting white
emigration would severely damage the economy because few black citizens
are prepared to step into the administrative, managerial, and technical posts.
Loss of Portuguese technical assistance, development loans, and trade credits
would hamper economic growth, at least until alternative sources were
found.
SECRET
1 May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4 ,,;,
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
By far the major cost to Lisbon of continuing its rule in the territories
has been military expenditures for combating insurgency, estimated at about
$200 million annually. Portuguese economic aid to the territories has
consisted mainly of long-term loans for development projects. Outright
grants from the metropole of about $6 million to $7 million a year have
been used to pay for technical assistance and administrative personnel.
Portugal has provided short-term loans and tolerated substantial arrearages
in payments to help finance the territories' trade with the metropole.
Aside from its political and social stakes, Portugal has benefited mainly
from trade and investment opportunities. The territories have provided
protected markets for Portuguese manufactured goods and have been reliable
suppliers of important raw materials. Recently, the Arab oil embargo of
Portugal forced Lisbon to rely heavily on crude oil from Angola, up from
about 8,000 b/d in 1973 to 50,000-55,000 b/d in 1974 - roughly half
of Portugal's needs. The territories also have made a substantial contribution
to the common balance of payments. Portuguese control has insured
metropolitan businessmen a favorable position in high-return territorial
investments.
Lisbon's policies have stimulated economic growth mainly in urban
coastal areas of Angola and Mozambique; the policies have done little for
the blacks, who make up 95% of the population and are mainly engaged
in agriculture. Real economic growth has exceeded 6% annually in both
territories since 1970, and trade has expanded by more than 9% per year.
Comprehensive economic data for Portuguese Guinea, the poorest of the
three territories, are lacking.
JAPAN: SLOWING THE CAPITAL DRAIN
Japan's success in slowing the export of capital is cushioning the impact
of high import prices on the balance of payments.
By discouraging loans and purchases of securities abroad, the
government has substantially reduced capital outflows without cutting direct
investments that increase access to foreign oil and raw materials.
The decline in capital outflows has been caused by changes in the
regulations, by administrative guidance, and by a stringent domestic
monetary policy. Foreigners no longer are permitted to place bonds privately
with Japanese banks - a prominent source of outflows last year - and
securities firms have been admonished not to let customers increase their
4
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
holdings of foreign stock. Controls also have been placed on some forms
of direct investment. The Ministry of Finance may soon request a
broadening of these controls, probably to include deferment of investment
in manufacturing ventures in developed countries.
Major Outflows of Long-Term Capital
Monthly Average
Jan
Feb
Loans
257
151
95
Purchases of securities
142
82
17
Direct investment
160
289
163
Tokyo has been less successful in attracting foreign capital. Foreigners
continue to reduce their holdings of Japanese stocks, and direct investment
in Japan remains small. More helpful is overseas borrowing by Japanese
firms, which amounted to $180 million in March. In the aggregate, net
outflows of long-term capital fell from $800 million in January to
$500 million in February and $300 million in March. This decline, to 60%
of the 1973 monthly average, suggests that Japan will achieve its goal of
halving net outflows to $5 billion this year.
Last year a $5.2 billion jump in the net outflow of long-term capital
to a record $9.7 billion was a major factor in turning a substantial
balance-of-payments surplus into a $10.1 billion deficit. As a consequence,
official foreign exchange reserves were drawn down from $18.4 billion to
$12.2 billion during the year. The remainder of the deficit was covered
by drawing on non-official holdings and by short-term borrowing abroad
by Japanese banks. The capital outflow in 1973 stemmed from three years
of government encouragement of investment abroad aimed at reducing
embarrassingly large reserves. This outflow turned out to be more than
Tokyo desired when currency adjustments and sharply higher import prices
slashed the trade surplus.
The expected deterioration in the current account balance in 1974
would leave balance-of-payments deficit comparable to last year's, even
if the Japanese succeeded in cutting capital outflows to $5 billion. Official
reserves may be held above the $10 billion benchmark level by heavy
short-term borrowing and drawing down unofficial holdings. Unofficial
holdings, which consist mainly of dollar deposits in commercial banks, now
amount to about $8 billion.
5
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
US PROPOSES AID FOR EGYPT
In its first major economic overture to Egypt since the mid- 1950s,
Washington has proposed a $250 million aid package for FY 1975 -
? $150 million for repair of war damage and resumption of
economic development,
? $80 million for commodity assistance, and
? about $20 million for clearing the Suez Canal.
The proposal places the United States on the growing list of nations
willing to contribute to the $1 billion cost of rehabilitating the Canal area.
Sadat's call for international help in clearing and widening the Canal brought
immediate pledges of aid. Japan committed $140 million and may provide
an additional $140 million later, Kuwait's Fund for Arab Economic
Development committed $35 million, and the World Bank Group probably
will ante up $40 million during 1974. Further aid will be forthcoming from
Arab, European, Soviet, and other sources.
British and US naval teams began clearing work at the Canal last month
and should complete their work within a year. About 100 US military
advisers also are already training Egyptians to remove mines and other
explosives.
In addition to the $150 million of proposed US aid for FY 1975,
other substantial sums for reconstruction and development are surfacing.
? The World Bank Group is considering the allocation of as
much as $150 million for 1974.
? Japan has committed $50 million, over a longer time period,
for reclamation, transportation, and other projects.
? West German and Soviet officials also have expressed
willingness to provide new assistance.
Cairo has been slow to accept Moscow's aid offers for both
rehabilitation of the Canal and repair of war damage. No new economic
aid has been forthcoming since 1971, although an Egyptian delegation has
recently returned from Moscow. Soviet aid may well be confined largely
to continuing work on existing Soviet projects.
6
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
Moscow's day as the principal economic aid donor ended with the
June 1967 war, when other Arab nations agreed to underwrite the Egypt-
ian economy with $250 million annually in grants. Saudi Arabia has
supplemented its share of these grants with cash transfers for general budget
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: EXPORT DRIVE TO THE EAST
Intensified Soviet and East European efforts to buy Western equipment
resulted in huge increases in trade with the European Community in 1973.
The EC countries accommodated their Eastern customers by offering credit
at good terms and allowing some purchases to be repaid through future
commodity deliveries.
Thanks mainly to growing sales to the USSR and Poland, EC exports
to the East jumped by 46%, to $9.1 billion, in 1973. This represents a
sizable increase in physical volume, even after allowances for inflation and
currency realignments. Soaring prices for food, fuels, and industrial raw
materials permitted Soviet and East European sales to rise almost as fast,
to $8.3 billion.
Moscow decided in 1971 to devote more resources to Western
technology in order to improve the performances of its motor vehicle, fuels,
and chemical industries. At about the same time, Warsaw also went on
a buying spree. Less burdened by hard-currency debt than most other East
European countries, Poland decided to buy large amounts of Western
equipment to expand and modernize its shipbuilding, food processing,
petrochemical, steel, and electronic industries.
community members responded by offering liberal credit terms and,
in sonic cases, by agreeing to accept commodities in repayment. As a result,
they have rung up some $5 billion in machinery and equipment orders
in a little more than two years. A handful of huge projects sold to the
Soviets during the last 16 months account for half of this total.
Booming economic conditions in the Community helped spur EC
purchases from the USSR and Eastern Europe last year. Demand for rolled
steel, meat, and lumber increased sharply, despite higher prices. Soviet and
Romanian earnings from petroleum sales to the West rose substantially, even
though volume remained almost unchanged.
West Germany -- by far the most active particir-ant - increased its
trade surplus with the USSR and Eastern Europe to $1.5 billion last year.
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
France, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands also enlarged their
surpluses. Despite substantially increased trade deficits for other EC
countries, the Community's overall surplus was about twice that in 1972.
Major Soviet Orders for Machinery
and Equipment from EC Countries
1973 - Jan-Mar 1974
Supplier
Project
Million
US $
Terms
West Germany/
Kama River
600-700
French
deliveries
are
being
Fiance
truck plant
covered
by an official line of
credit,
under which large
contracts are financed at 6.05%
over 8-1/2 years. The German
contract for a $140 million
transmission plant signed in May
1973 called for seven years'
credit at 6-1/4%.
West Germany
Italy
Kursk steel
complex
Seven
500
Repayment in ammonia or other
France/
chemical
plants
Other
400
chemicals over 10 years.
Mostly long-term credits.
West Germany/
Italy/United
Kingdom
chemical
plants
Soviet and East European Orders
of Machinery and Equipment
Million US $
Jan-
Mar
1972
1973
1974
Total
1,555
2,355
1,095
West Germany
485
685
8251
France
555
475
40
Italy
200
860
110
United Kingdom
230
240
120
Other EC
85
95
....
1. Including the Kursk steel complex agreement; specific
contracts have not yet been awarded.
SECRET I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
EC Exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe
Million US $
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
1972
1973
1972
1973
1972
1973
Total EC
6,268
9,125
1,713
2,669
4,555
6,456
West Germany
3,119
4,883
712
1,182
2,407
3,701
France
938
1,308
336
576
602
732
United Kingdom
689
791
226
238
463
553
Italy
780
954
268
347
512
607
Belgium-Luxembourg
264
494
89
208
175
286
Denmark
141
192
27
35
114
157
Netherlands
329
487
54
81
275
406
Ireland
8
16
1
2
7
14
EC Imports from the USSR and Eastern Europe
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
1972
1973
1972
1973
1972
1973
Total EC
5,834
8,300
1,825
2,835
4,009
5,465
West Germany
2,268
3,359
421
761
1,847
2,598
France
710
1,007
291
433
419
574
United Kingdom
983
1,342
562
808
421
534
Italy
1,104
1,435
325
428
779
1,007
Belgium-Luxembourg
265
393
105
184
160
209
Denmark
159
272
37
94
122
178
Netherlands
305
440
78
120
227
320
Ireland
40
52
6
7
34
45
EC trade with the East should continue to increase rapidly during the
next few years. Probably less than half of the capital goods ordered in
the last two years or so has been delivered. Soviet and East European sales
will be buoyed by repayments in kind for Western-financed projects and
by higher prices, particularly for oil. EC oil payments to Communist
countries are expected to triple in 1974, to $1.8 billion.
The scramble by Community members for energy supplies and for
export earnings to offset higher oil bills is generating new thrusts to the
East:
9
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4 :->t:? :--. __,-::,,:.,;1L~,-ri
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
? The French see the USSR and Eastern Europe as a prime
target for export expansion. Meanwhile, they are negotiating
with the Soviets to exchange advanced technology for oil
exploration and exploitation rights on the Kamchatka
Peninsula and to sell them LNG tankers.
? Paris has agreed to double its official lime of credit to Warsaw,
to $1 billion. Part of the additional financing will cover
French sales of steelmaking equipment and a cable plant.
PRC-JAPANESE CIVIL AIR ACCORD
In negotiating the civil air accord with Japan, Peking gave little and
got much.
While working its will vis-a-vis Taiwan, the PRC was able to emerge
with an agreement in keeping with its longrun interest in extended
international operations. The accord gives Peking landing and beyond rights
at Tokyo - a major aviation crossroad - thus facilitating future service
to North America and Europe.
By acceding to Peking's demand for abrogating the Japan-Taiwan air
agreement, the Japanese, gave up one of their most profitable high-density
routes. For example, the 37 flights per week to Taiwan have accounted
for about 20% of Japan Air Lines' (JAL) total weekly international flights
and 10% of total revenues.
From Taiwan's vantage point, the PRC-Japanese agreement further
undermined its legitimacy as a nation-state. The text of the accord, although
permitting continued service to Taiwan, specified that civil air relations
between Tokyo and Taipei were non-governmental.
10
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
Current and Planned PHC
International Air Service..
6T k
rsnrNVrMy Nonbllolo f
~.,~-,.~.J `_i 11 1... % . , -5 ~..~xmina / .N.n?nmo
N.I.th1r/ --y.~-_.- / v -_.? ) BarmW~2'Morl. VOW-
SECRET
U. S. S. R.
nambrr
SECRET
CAAC
China
CP
AEROFLOT
U.S.S.R.
EAL
AF
Ai, Franca
JAL
CAAK
North Korea
PIA
TAROM
Canada
Ethiopia
Japan
Pakistan
Romania
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
Japan did offer Taipei a compromise that provided for continued
service to Taiwan. The main ingredients:
China Air Lines (CAL), Taiwan's national carrier, could
maintain a Tokyo service, provided the airline changed its
name.
Taipei service to Tokyo would terminate at the old airport
of Haneda and not at the new, modern airport of Narita.
Japanese service to Taipei would be handled by a specially
established dummy, subsidiary corporation of JAL.
Ironically, the use of a dummy company was the same tactic used by Japan
in the 1960s for establishing maritime service to mainland China while
maintaining main line shipping service to Taiwan.
Taipei rejected the compromise, severing all air links with Japan and
closing Taiwanese airspace to JAL. The latter action adds as much as 300
miles on JAL flights to the South Pacific and South Asia.
Yet, the compromise would have been good economics for CAL.
Haneda airport is only 12 miles (30 minutes) from Tokyo; Narita more
than 40 miles (1-1/2 hours). As most international carriers, including the
PRC's national airline, CAAC, will be using Narita, CAL would have had
a key advantage in offering close-in service to Tokyo.
The impact of the Sino-Japanese air accord on future US-PRC civil
air negotiations is uncertain. Whereas JAL is the only Japanese international
carrier, the United States has several carriers in the Far East - including
Pan Am, TWA, and Northwest Orient. Among these three, only Pan Am
does not serve Taiwan. Pan Am already has made; overtures to establish
a PRC service. The ultimate decision on a US-PRC air accord may rest
on whether the PRC is willing to relax its demand for the abrogation of
US-Taiwan civil air accords as a necessary condition for a US-PRC
SECRET I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
World Rice Market Eases
Rice prices declined about 10% in April, reflecting slightly larger
exportable supplies and consumer resistance to prices over $600 per ton.
The new Venezuelan crop is meeting urgent needs in Ecuador and pos,ibly
in the Philippines. Thailand is expected to resume taking orders soon; the
earlier halt to new export contracts appears to have ensured adequate
domestic supplies at reduced prices. Countries that have been holding
supplies in anticipation of higher prices are getting nervous. Italy, for
example, offered 60,000 tons for sale last week.
If the new US crop continues to progress favorably, the price of rice
may slip further below its present high level.
Price Increases for Phosphate Fertilizer
Pending rises in the cost of phosphate rock will drive up phosphate
fertilizer prices still further. Prices for rock exported from the United States
more than doubled in January and will go up by an additional 32% in
July.
Togo announced recently that its export prices will
be based on Morocco s and voided all existing contracts. Phosphate rock
prices have been a major factor in the spiraling cost of important fertilizers
such as diammonium phosphate and triple superphosphate, now routinely
selling at $250-$300 per ton, compared with $115-$140 six months ago.
US Investment Prospects at Itaipu Strengthened
The appointment of Jose Costa Cavalcanti as president of the Brazilian
organization building the $3 billion Itaipu hydroelectric project strongly
enhances US chances for participation. Cavalcanti is friendly to the United
States and favors US equipment for the project, to be constructed on the
Brazil-Paraguay border. Some Brazilian officials are less enthusiastic about
US companies, and contracts probably will be signed with other countries
as well. The USSR still has great interest in furnishing the large turbines
for Itaipu, claiming superior equipment, favorable prices, and generous
financial terms. Although Brazil has bought Soviet hydroelectric equipment
in the past, it has moved cautiously in dealings with Moscow on this project,
particularly since Paraguay has expressed opposition to Soviet involvement.
SECRET
I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
SECRET
(CIA ER RP 74-7, April 1974,
By the end of 1973 the Chinese rail network had been extended to
44,000 kilometers, twice the length of the pre-Communist network. This
publication, which updates previous research, focuses on railroad
construction in China since 1970. It describes the boom in railroad
construction in )971-72 and the sharp falloff in 1973. An Appendix
contains information on both major and minor standard-gauge lines,
including many branch lines. An outline map gives the general pattern of
railroad development in China, and a foldout map provides detail on the
whole system as of February 1974.
SECRET I May 1974
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO1500150020-4
 r...lwnel.e~.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
INTERNAL. ECONOMIC INDICATORS
GNP'
WIIULi_SA'I: PIIICI:S
Cnn!;tanl Maiket rhure
Avrr,up' Annual
Growth l iit! 'imr
e
Intlusinal
Average Annual
lirnwlh Ildir Since
V ilr;t
Unifier
I'rnenl (.i.,n lc
hnni Prevrur: I Year
Quarter 1!Uu I ar tier
I'rnvmu+
Ouailcr
Pon rot Champ;
land horn Ihevmu'.
Month Minh
I Year a rdunltrs
19/e lailmr Les lii'i
United States
74 1
- 1.4
4.0
0.4
5.6
United States
Mar 74
2.9
8.1
19.6
30.7
Japan
73 IV
1.4
8.3
7.0
5.8
Japan
Mar 74
07
11.2
354
48 2
West Germany
73 IV
- 0.1
3.1
3.4
- 0.3
West Germany
Fab 74
2.3
6.5
11.9
26.5
France
73 III
0.9
5.6
3.8
France
Mar74
4.9
12.8
33.4
72.7
United Kingdom
73 III
1.3
3.9
5.2
United Kingdom
Mar74
3.1
10.0
18.7
41.3
Italy
73 I
0.8
3.1
3.4
Italy
Nov 73
1.3
8.6
21.2
17.8
Canada
73 IV
I
2.8
6.1
11.6
Canada
Jan 74
3.3
9.4
19.8
27.8
Average Annual
Grnwih Hate Suir.e
Average Annual
(ituwth 11.1111 Su t'
1'en ant Changb,-__---_-.---~-~---.--
I'rri rnl Ch,nnp- J `------
Lne'.t Irons Prewni', I Year 3 Manlhs
I lIl t horn Prevuun: I Year 3 Mantis
Munch Month 19111 I,u lu!i frilk r
Moolh Month 17/1) lailn'r Earhet
United States
Mar 74
-0.4
4.4
0 -7.9
Unit
ed States
Mar 74
1.1
5.8
10.3
14.0
Japan
Feb 74
-0.5
8.2
8.7 -2.9
Japa
n
Mar 74
0.7
10.9
24.0
39.4
West Germany
Jan 74
-0.6
3.2
0.6
-4.3
Wes
t German
y
Feb 74
0.9
6.3
7.6
10.2
France
Feb 74
-05
6.6
4.1
2.0
Fran
ce
Mar 74
1.2
7.5
12.2
18.0
United Kingdom
Jan 74
-0.4
0.1
-6.6
-17.0
Unite
d Kingdo
m
Mar 74
0.9
9.6
13.6
19.8
Italy
Feb 74
-2.2
4.6
18.7
-2.5
Italy
Jan 74
1.6
8.0
13.2
18.3
Canada
Feb 74 1
1.2
6.7
4.5
8.7
Cana
da
Feb 74
1.0
5.8
9.6
9.9
RE [All SALES'
Current Pace',
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Average Annual
Growth Ram Since
Pineal Change
Latest Irum Previous I Year
Month Month 1910 Cartier
Mar 74 2.0 10.5 4.8
Nov 73 3.4 14.6 27.4
Dec 73 0.5 7.8 5.8
Jan 74 -2.7 7.0 16.3
Jan 74 -1.3 11.6 13.1
Oct 73 0.6 16.2 29.1
Jan 74 2.9 11.2 12.9
3 Months
Eallir.r"
5.5
32.0
7.6
29.2
16.9
56.7
15.9
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Canada
Euro-Dollars
me/tesenlairve Hates
Prime finance paper
tall money
Interbank leansi3Monthsl
Call money
Local authority leposits
Finance paper
Three-month deposits
I May 1974
Office of Economic Research/CIA
29 Mar
15 Mar
29 Mar
22 Mar
29 Mar
29 Mar
29 Mar
8.00
12.50
11.38
11.88
16.00
9.00
10.00
1 Year
Earlier
6.63
5.50
NA.
7.25
7.32
5.13
8.63
3 Months
father
8.00
12.00
13.00
NA.
16.91
9.50
10.13
I Month
Earlier
7.25
12.00
10.38
12.75
14.63
8.50
8.88
Aver age Annual
Growth Pale Since
Pro rni Change -~-"
latest Iron) Previous 1 Yrar 3 Months
Month Month 1!1/11 larlier father
Mar 74 0.8 6.8 6.5 5.7
Dec 73 0 17.5 16.7 14.7
Jan 74 0.1 8.9 0.6 9.8
Jan 74 1.1 13.2 12.3 16.'1
Mar 74 -0.2 8.8 2.7 0.5
Oct 73 1.6 20.7 23.0 21.4
Feb 74 0 13.0 11.6 13.3
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Average for latest 3 months compared
with average for previous 3 months.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
EXPORTS EXPORT PRICES
Lab LUSS
Million US S I'ercuul
Million US $ 1974 1973 Change
United States
Mar 74
7,674
22,394
15,421
45.2 United States
Japan
Mar 74
3,739
11,023
8,082
38.4 Japan
West Germany
Feb 74
6,527
13,541
9,324
45.2 West Germany
France
Mcr74
3,671
10,542
7,913
33.2 France
United Kingdom
Mar 74
2,830
7,704
6,434
19.7 United Kingdom
Italy
Jan 74
1,966
1,960
1,494
31.6 Italy
Canada
Feb 74
2,458
4,902
3,941
24.4 Canada
IMPORTS" EXPORT PRICES
full National Currency
.alesl Month
M
ll
US S P
i
ion
ercent
Mdhun US $ 1974 19/,3 chat Itle
United States
Mar74
7,845
21,705
16,254
33.5 United States
Japan
Mar 74
4,390
11,949
6,350
88.0 Japan
West Germany
Feb 74
4,376
9,363
7,449
25.7 West Germany
France
Mar74
3,953
11,226
7,633
47.1 France
United Kingdom
Mar 74
3,890
10,592
7,313
44.8 United Kingdom
Italy
Jan 74
2,170
2,170
1.487
46.0 Italy
Canada
Feb 74
2,507
4,733
3,637
30.1 Canada
TRADE BALANCE' IMPORT PRICES
National Currency
to
V1,1111111 US $ 1974 1973 Clrmge
United States
Mar74
-171
689
-833
1,522 United States
Japan
Mar 74
- 651
-926
1.725
-2,651 Japan
West Germany
Feb 74
2,151
4,178
1.875
2,303 West Germany
France
Mar74
-282
-684
280
-964 France
United Kingdom
Mer 74
-1,060
-2,888
-878
-2,010 United Kingdom
Italy
Jan74
-205
-205
8
-212 Italy
Canada
Feb 74
-49
169
304
-135 Canadrt
BASIC BALANCE" EXCHANGE RATES
Current and Long-Term- Capital Transac.ions As of 28 April 74
Lalesl Period Curnulalwe (Million US SI
Million US S 1973 1972 Change
United States'
73 IV
200
1,186
-9,838
11,024 J apenlYcnl
Japan
Mar 74
-1,150
-9,702
2,137
-11,839 West Germany V Mark)
West Germany
Feb 74
1,161
3,950
4.566
-616 France Irtancl (Pound
France
73 IV
-352
-2,391
-369
^.072 United Kingdom Sterhnn)
United Kingdom
73 IV
-1,394
-3,164
-1,989
-1,175 Italy anal
Italy
72 IV
800
N.A.
2,983
N.A. Canada IDcuan
Canada
731V
27
376
1,155
-779
3 Months
End of Billion US S Jun 1970 Earlier Earlier
United States
Feb 74
14.6
16.3
14.0
14.4
Japan
Mar 74
12.4
4.1
18.1
12.2
West Germany
Feb 74
32.0
8.8
29.7
34.1
France
Mar 74
8.1
4.4
11.2
8.5
United Kingdom
Mar 74
6.4
2.8
8.0
6.5
Italy
Feb 74
5.4
4.7
6.4
6.1
Canada
Mar 74
6.1
4.3
6.2
5.8
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Converted into US dollars at currant market rates of exchange.
Average Annual
Ginwnr Ilnte Suu:e
I'ercunt Change.
Lalusl Iran Pr4vuiur.
Mouth Menth
1!1711
Fob 74
3.5
11.0
Nov 73
-0.8
13.2
Jan 74
-4.5
10.6
Dec 73
-1.7
13.4
Dec 73
0.1
8.7
Oct 73
2.1
11.6
Dec 73
3.1
10.2
Ihrcent Change
latest Iium Pravmus
Mnnlh Milt 111
19/11
Feu 74
3.6
11.0
Nov 73
3.6
4.8
Jan 74
1.1
2.7
Dec 73
2.1
7.3
Dec 73
3.1
9.8
Oct 73
2.4
8.3
Dec 73
3.1
8.7
I'en:ent Change-
LiIILsl Irit III Pi vv en its
I Viii
Lulii i
27.6
27.4
21.8
27.4
17.4
23.7
28.8
Avmage Annual
Gntwlli [tall, Smce
I Year
rather
27.6
14.9
7.1
15.0
18.8
20.4
21.0
3 Months
Earlier
38.3
34.1
14.5
22.3
33.0
17.0
44.8
Average Annual
Grnwnr Hate Since
I Viii 3 Munths
Father rather
40.6 71.4
19.8 31.0
19.5 82.3
16.4 37.3
42.8 50.6
38.7 J0.8
15.8 19.5
Feb 74
Nov 73
Jan 74
Dec 73
Dec 73
Oct 73
Dec 73
5.4
3.7
6.2
9.0
4.5
3.4
2.4
15.6
4.6
5.0
8.0
16.3
14.0
6.3
Spot Rata
US S
Per Will
0.00356
0.40550
0.20460
2.41150
0.00157
1.03930
tic 60
29.18
61.30
1.34
-13.58
-2.19
12.67
18 Dec
1971
9.76
30.68
3.91
-7.45
-8.95
4.16
19 Mar
1973
-8.28
14.52
-7.17
-2.01
-11.53
4.17
19 Apr
1974
-1.22
2.30
-0.53
1.13
-0.38
0.37
EXCHANGE RATES-
Percent Change Iron
Dec 66
United States
-17.82
Japan
17.37
West Germany
35.35
France
-23.02
United Kingdom
-33.78
Italy
-25.07
Canada
9.11
19 Dec
1971
-8.39
3.59
18.11
-9.42
-19.56
-23.68
2.51
19 Milt
1973
-1.74
-8.34
13.04
-11.86
-5.17
-16.75
4.15
;1 Months
Lulmt
38.3
11.6
-37.8
-9.1
12.0
29.1
50.1
19 Apr
1974
-0.46
-1.80
1.37
-1.94
0.22
-1.55
0.22
"'Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized
countries to reflect the competitive impact of exchange-rate variations
among the major currencies,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150020-4