ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 24, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

i i 4 It)i P c1i -2,.j /-
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I
Secret
L
Economic Intelligence meekly
'LOAN COPY .
Return to DS&
,?1107, Hq.
Secret
CIA No. 7923/74
24 January 1974
Copy
N2 188
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USSR Warns Against US-Romanian Business Ventures
Committee of Twenty
Argentina: US Subsidiary Prepares for Sale to Cuba
US Firm May Participate in Mammoth Soviet Aluminum Project
Chilean Growth Prospects finF9-74
Page
South Vietnam Requests Step-Up in US Aid Saigon seeks a 3
substantial increase in FY 1974 to cope with declining real imports
and economic stagnation.
Worldwide Grain Developments 4
US Trade with Yugoslavia: Imports Lead the Way US experiences
first postwar trade deficit with Yugoslavia
The United Kingdom: Dismal Current Account Outlook Britain's
trade deficit will rise dramatically in 1974.
Japan: Adjusting to Higher Oil Import Costs Tokyo has large
non-official reserves to cushion the impact of higher oil prices
Floating the Franc Paris moves unilaterally to entrance its
competitive position.
Petroleum Situation Aggravates World Fertilizer Shortage The 11
LDCs are especially hurt.
Comparative Indicators
Recent Data Concerning Domestic and External Al
Economic Activity
The oil situation is now being covered mainly in
International Oil Developments, p:ot,'fished each
Friday morning.
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Notes
USSR Warns Against US-Romanian Business Ventures
Soviet lead,ars, Kosygin and Patolichev, recently advised officials of
Pullman Inc., to avoid business ventures in Romania and seek contracts
instead in Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany. Otherwise, business relations
with the USSR. could be impaired. The USSR may feel that such a warning
to Pullman will be effective since Swindell Dressler, a division of Pullman,
has large contracts for building foundries in the USSR and Poland but does
little business in other East European countries.
Committee of Twenty
With the impact of higher oil prices dominating the C-20 meetings
in Rome, little progress was made on questions of monetary reform. Indeed,
much of the ministerial session was devoted to a discussion of international
borrowing to ease the payment difficulties resulting from soaring fuel costs.
A proposal to use IMF facilities was generally favored. Decision was deferred
because of concern over the de facto acceptance of present oil prices implicit
in such a proposal and over the ability of developing nations to service
increased debts. On reform the ministers agreed to the basic concept of
a new SDR, based on a "basket" of currencies, further study on selection
of currencies and on an appropriate SDR interest rate will be required.
Argentina: US Subsidiary Prepares for Sale to Cuba
Under pressure from Buenos Aires, the Ford Motor Company of
Argentina is negotiating the sale of 1,500 Ford Falcon passenger cars and
1,000 F-7000 heavy trucks to Cuba. Delivery is scheduled to begin in about
three months under a $1.2 billion Argentine credit extended to Havana
in 1973. In response to previous company refusals to negotiate with Cuba
because of the US embargo, Argentina threatened to buy vehicles at punitive
prices for resale to Cuba.
US Firm May Participate in Mammoth Soviet Aluminum Project
Kaiser Industries presented a proposal to the Ministry of Nonferrous
Metals last Saturday for Kaiser participation in a major 10-year program
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for development of the USSR's aluminum industry. The Soviets estimate
that foreign exchange credits of about $3 billion will be required for the
project, which would raise aluminum output by 75?x, -- close to the current
US capacity. Kaiser hopes to organize a consortium of aluminum companies
for the iob and would undertake to obtain the necessary financing.
Chilean Growth Prospects in 1974
Chile's National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) is forecasting a growth
of 8.5% in GNP in 1974. The projection is highly optimistic,
notwithstanding prospects for record copper production and general
recovery in manufacturing and agriculture. The jump in copper production
to I million tons may be partially offset by a decline in word copper
prices. In addition, Chile's import bill for petroleum products is expected
to rise from $120 million in 1973 to $340 million in 1974. These factors,
plus shortages of petrochemicals and mediocre agricultural production, make
GNP growth of 3% to 5% more likely.
A second Soviet-Canadian firm -- Stankocanada Machinery - has been
formed to market Soviet-manufactured goods. Although Stankocanada's
initial sales probably will be limited to Canadian markets, future marketing
may be extended to the United States. Belarus Equipment, the first
Soviet-Canadian firm, was established in 1972 to assemble Soviet tractors
for sale in Canada and the United States. The Soviets have also sought
to interest US firms in distributing Soviet agricultural machinery and
machine tools.
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Articles
SOUTH VIETNAM REQUESTS STEP-UP IN US AID
Faced with major price increases for key imports and a sluggish
economy, South Vietnam - the largest recipient of US aid - has appealed
for a substantial increase in assistance for FY 1974. To this end, the US
Mission (Saigon) recently requested $250 million of new funds to
supplement $550 million of US economic aid anticipated for the current
fiscal year.
Efforts to initiate reconstruction and steady growth have been
frustrated by a decline in real foreign aid and uncertain investment
conditions. In 1964 prices, US aid has dropped by 40% and South
Vietnamese imports by 2070 since 1971. Saigon has persistently tried to
reduce imports of non-essential consumer goods and to channel available
funds toward investment. Nonetheless, recovery in economic growth since
Estimated Imports and US Economic Aid
Imports
US Aidl
Current
Prices
1964
Prices
Current
Prices
1964
Prices
1964
270
270
222
222
1965
325
325
277
277
1966
553
547
736
729
1967
689
663
568
546
1968
628
603
537
516
1969
704
666
414
391
1970
657
597
477
434
1971
648
560
576
497
1972
684
548
475
380
1973
740
438
500
296
1974
925
406
5502
24!
1. Excluding piaster purchases.
2. The 1974 economic aid figure is a preliminary estimate based on current US
Congressional action involving Security Assistance legislation amounting to about
$300 million. To this are added requests for surplus agricultural commodities (PL-480)
totaling some $200 million and a carryover 1973 US development loan of about
$40 million. The total does not include US piaster purchases (in-country procurement,
personal uses, and various official US assistance programs), which reached $180 million
in 1973 and are projected at $130 million in 1974.
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the 1972 military offensive by North Vietnam has been inhibited by caution
on the part of investors - concerned about the security situation -- and
the need to use aid funds to import badly needed primary goods.
Appreciable economic growth is not possible Without the requested
supplemental aid. Should it not be forthcoming, South Vietnam's imports
in 1974 will probably be limited to about $925 million, a substantial
reduction in real terms. The result probably will be yet another decline
in real per capita incomes, further erosion of investment, and a probable
slowdown in growth in the expanding export industries. This tendency for
declining real aid levels to create greater dependence has prompted the
Mission to note repeatedly that achieving self-sustaining growth will require
a large initial jolt of US capital.
Barring major petroleum discoveries,* foreign support levels will remain
high for South Vietnam throughout the 1970s. Based on earlier CIA
projections (in 1972 dollars) and allowing for likely global inflation, imports
two to three years hence would probably be on the order of $1.5 billion
to $1.6 billion to achieve sustained rapid growth. Even allowing for of sizable
increase in South Vietnamese exports, this will mean that annual capital
inflows from all foreign sources would have to amount to $800 million
* Although some concessions have been leased and exploration is beginning,
South Vietnam's petroleum resources almost certainly will not be
significantly exploited during this decade.
WORLDWIDE GRAIN DEVELOPMENTS
Official estimates for this year's wheat crop have been lowered by
more than I million tons. Because of poor harvesting weather and disease,
production at best will reach only 1 1 million tons, with about 15% being
low-quality wheat. Although probably able to meet its export commitments
to traditional markets in 1974, the Wheat Board currently is refusing orders
from new customers. An estimated three-quarters of the 7.5 million tons
of wheat available for export in 1974 has already been committed. These
developments increase the prcSsure on alternative suppliers of w;teat, such
as the United States.
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Bangladesh
Recent commercial grain purchases along with aid-financed grain
imports and a large fall rice harvest should satisfy Bangladesh's foodgrain
needs during the next six months. Scheduled grain imports during
January-June already amount to 670,000 tons and may be augmented by
73,000 tons of US PL-480 wheat. Although the 670,000 tons is only half
the amount imported during the same period last year, the major rice
harvest, which started in November, is estimated at 1.4 million tons more
than last year-'s. The cost of commercial grain imports and shipping for
the first half of 1974 will be a staggering $125 million. Dacca no doubt
will keep a tight lid on non-food imports.
Emergency grain shipments to drought-stricken Niger and Chad
apparently will be at least 10,000 tons, or 20%, short of needs during
February 1974. Requirements are greater than anticipated, and donor
countries have not coordinated shipments. Crops in Niger, in particular,
have been poor, and supplies reportedly are practically exhausted. Even
if shipment of US food commitments for January-September 1974 -
250,000 tons of grain to be divided among Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania,
and Upper Volta - were stepped up, inadequate land transport from the
seacoast to the landlock?d countries would hold up deliveries.
Commitments to deliver I million tons of wheat to Japan through
western ports and 200,000 tons to a US broker through eastern ports by
February-March have reportedly absorbed Canada's transport capacity for
the current crop year. Recent withdrawals of offers to Caribbean countries
and a refusal to sell at market prices to Lebanon indicate that Canada might
be waiting to see whether railroads and Great Lakes shipping lines can deliver
more. Until Canada starts selling again, buyers will be turning to US and
US TRADE WITH YUGOSLAVIA: IMPORTS LEAD THE WAY*
After stagnating in the late 1960s, US-Yugoslav trade climbed steadily
to $420 million by 1973. US imports accounted for all of the increase,
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and the United States experienced its first postwar trade deficit with
Yugoslavia in 1973.
US-Yugoslav Trade'
US exports
196
146
195
189
187
US imports
67
92
116
167
233
US trade balance
129
54
79
22
?46
The surplus reflects a long-term campaign by Belgrade to balance its
trade with the United States. Yugoslav exports ''lave doubled since 1971,
with traditional exports of processed foods, wine and brandy, nonferrous
metals, furniture, and leather goods leading the way.
'rnports from the United States have fallen from 20% of Yugoslav
intpoi is in 1961 to 4% in 1973. US agricultural sales -- a major export
in the j 950s and early 1960s -- fell sharply after the Findley Amendment
in 1966 banned concessionary PL-480 sales to countries with ships calling
in Cuba. Yugoslavia now imports large amounts of US foodstuffs only in
bad agricultural years. Non-agricultural imports from the United States are
widely distributed among machinery and equipment, raw materials,
chemicals, and industrial manufactures. The US share of Yugoslav imports
of such goods has also slipped.
The boom in Yugoslavia's exports to the United States and the
availability of Eximbank credit improve US sales prospects for 1974-75.
A number of Eximbank-financed deals are already in the pipeline, including
the $200 million Krsko nuclear plant, expansions in a number of steel
plants, and modernization of the Yugoslav power grid system. Eximbank
credit exposure now totals $410 million, and another $610 million in
extensions is pending
* This is the second in a series of articles on curren developments and prospects for US economic
relations with the East European Communist ,ountries.
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Britain's December trade deficit of $770 million put the current
account $3.7 billion in the red for the full year 1973, more than triple
the record deficit of 1964. Moreover, a current account deficit of at least
$7 billion looms for 1974 because of the oil price dikes. To finance the
deficit without slashing official reserves, Britain will seek to increase foreign
borrowing - possibly drawing on IMF credits -- and will encourage other
capital inflows. For example, Arab countries are being encouraged to use
London's extensive financial facilties in investing their new wealth.
Even before the oil crisis, a trade deficit of $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion
in 1974 was expected. With higher oil prices adding about $5.0 billion
(assuming imports of 2.5 million b/d in 1974) to the import bill, Britain
now faces a trade deficit of some $9 billion.
The deficit could be still larger if the government and the dissident
unions do not reach a settlement soon. Because of the short workweek,
export deliveries are being delayed in spite of the exemption of exports
from profit controls. This delay has prompted some foreigners to cancel
orders.
As the year progresses, demand for British goods is expected to weaken
because of a worldwide economic slowdown. At the same time, British
demand for imports other than oil will be restricted by slackening economic
growth and higher fuel bills, which will absorb an increased share of
consumer's income.
Tn hold down the trade deficit, the Heath government has
? curbed consumer credit and reduced planned public
expenditures to hold down import demand;
? sought to establish barter arrangements with several Arab
countries to offset partly the cost of imported oil with
exports of industrial machinery and technology; and
? removed the ban on arms exports +,) the countries involved
in the Middle East war.
Whitehall apparently has decided not to impose import restrictions for the
time being. If an early call for an election brings in a Labor government,
such restrictions, as well as on capital flows, will be reconsidered.
The pound, already floating at record lows, will remain weak, given
the dismal current account outlook.
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JAPAN: ADJUSTING TO HIGHER OIL IMPORT COSTS
Japan faces a rise in oil import costs this year of about S 1 1 billion,
the largest increment for any country except the United States. At the
same time, Japan is in a letter position than most countries to handle
the increased cost. Tokyo still has sizable reserves of official foreign
exchange and can draw on large non-offfcia; reserves, as well. It also can
reduce net capital outflows simply by reversin,; policies introduced in 1972.
Japan's official foreign exchange holdings at the end of 1973 amount
to about $12 billion (down 37% from the February 1973 peak) and
non-official holdings of approximatly $11 billion. The latter consist
primarily of central bank loans to commercial banks for foreign trade
financing. Most of these loans were made in 1972, when Tokyo tried to
minimize the impact of a large payments surplus on official reserves.
To slow the recent decline in official holdings, Japan has both drawn
on the non-official reserves and taken steps to cut back capital outflows.
The government wants to hold the net capital outflow to about $4 billion
this year, compared with $9.7 billion in 1973 -- a world record. Thus, it
is restricting overseas lending by Japanese banks, dropping other measures
that have raised outflows, and permitting domestic firms to borrow abroad
for the first time in several years. Since the last measure was announced
a few weeks ago, the Ministry of Finance has received 120 applications
to float bonds abroad.
The Japanese trade should not be hurt much by the reduction in central
bank funds deposited in commercial banks. This action is being offset by
increased use of the US acceptance market, which the Japanese once relied
on heavily to finance trade.
FLOATING THE FRANC
The French decision to float the franc was taken at a time when the
franc was not under particularly strong pressure. Paris took the decision:
in the cold in order to be one up on its trading partners and rivals, i.e.,
to maintain an edge in export competitiveness with, if possible, a slightly
undervalued exchange rate. Paris has o-:ce more demonstrated it gives little
weight to cooperation with either its EC partners or the international
economic community as a whole.
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150 Dollars par troy ounce
1.10
130
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London Free Market Gold Price"
Renewed currency Two-Iler gold
turmoil begins pact terminated
gold.
60111111111111II1111111III1IIII1IIIIII1111111111111III
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Toned on Iho afternoon fir in London on in Insf trading tiny in arch woo*. 1973
I I I I I
Jan 2122 23
1974
The decision to float the franc czeated a new rush for dollars and
? Gold surged to a record high of $138 as speculation
accelerated against paper currencies.
? European currencies continued to decline relative to the
dollar. The pound and lira fell to record lows. The Bank
of Italy maintained the lira's rate against the franc by
stopping its dollar sales and allowing the lira to follow the
franc down. The mark remained the strongest major
European currency but is still declining against the dollar.
? The Bank of Japan sold an estimated $650 million to support
the yen at 300 to the dollar when the Tokyo exchange
reopened yesterday.
The French move has already resulted in a substantial de facto
devaluation of the franc. Since dropping out of the joint float, the franc
has declined about 5% against the dollar and 4% relative to the mark. Thus
the float has already improved French trade competitiveness. It also meets
the French goal of preserving French monetary reserves as a cushion against
the i,icreased cost of imported oil. Moreover, the large-scale intervention,
which had been necessary to support the joint float, will no longer
complicate management of French monetary policy; floating will enable
Paris to pursue economic expansion more effectively if the energy problem
results in a drop-off in economic growth.
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Percent Change In the Value of the US Dollar
Relative to Selected Foreign Currencies
Compared With January 2, 1973
lot
301_-L-L ,,j I .. I I I I 1 1 H I I I f il I I I
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 4 1 1 1 8 22
*Based on nonofficial bank trading
"Relative to 16 major currencies
Paris is, however, taking steps to keep the franc from declining
drastically. It apparently is prepared to intervene in moderate amounts --
the Bank of France has reportedly sold about $250 million since the start
of the float - and has moved to alleviate speculative pressure by tightening
capital controls.
? Tighter restrictions were placed on foreign lending, forward
currency purchases, and import payments to limit outward
capital flows.
? Inward flows were 1ncouraged by raising the maximum
amount French firms can borrow abroad.
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Change In the Trade-Weighted
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? Paris is also retaining the two-tier exchange market, which
restricts dealings in the commercial tier to most current
account transactions while capital transactions take place on
the free market. Support operations will continue to be
limited to the commercial tier.
The remaining members of the float now form essentially a
"deutschemark zone" in which the mark is floating with six other currencies
following in its path. For Bonn, little difference exists between this situation
and Paris' controlled float. Germany's partners, however, are unlikely to
be any more willing than the French to maintain fixed parities with other
joint float members when (a) intervention becomes unac?'ertably expensive
or (b) they become unhappy with their exchange rate relative to their
non-participating trading partners.
PETROLEUM SITUATION
AGGRAVATES WORLD FERTILIZER SHORTAGE
Petroleum shortages are aggravating the tight world fertilizer situation
by undermining plans, pushing up prices, and creating shipping problems.
The developed nations, which produce a major portion of their
fertilizer needs, will fare better than the LDCs, which rely heavily on
import;;, Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can all probably
avoid serious domestic shortages in 1974 by reducing exports. The major
concern in developed countries is the recent 2017v-50% rise in fertilizer prices
attributable to rising demand and the soaring costs of petroleum feedstocks
and phosphate rock.
Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the fertilizer shortage.
High yields from "miracle seeds," which account for much of the incre'-.se
ir. grain production in recent years, depend on heavy applications of
fertilizers.
Overall nitrogen exports to the Asian market are expected to be reduced
by about 15% in 1974. Deliveries in the Far East are running six-eight
weeks behind schedule, and any increase in the rate of output (assuming
oil supplies are improved) will be too late for the fall crops. Because Japan
needs Indonesian and Chinese oil, it probably will maintain fertilizer exports
to these countries.
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India's fertilizer supplies for the current crop year will be about I5%
less than last year's, with supplies falling 30"%,40'1(% below the level desired
for this year's spring wheat crop. New Delhi is attempting to increase
domestic fertilizer output by reducing gasoline use by 25%.
The Philippines expects to import only about one-half of the nitrogen
fertilizer originally planned for 1974. Domestic production, normally
accounting for half of the country's needs, is off about 30'/, because of
shortages of refinery gas and diesel oil; imports, mostly from Japan, were
off by 50`% in the last quarter of 1973. The Philippine government is
considering having farmers revert to the older rice strains because of the
Fertilizer shortage.
Indonesia plans to produce about 100,000 tons of nitrogen in 1974
but expects imports to fall 140,000 tons short of the 500,000 tons needed.
The further tightening of the world fertilizer situation reduces the
prospects of substantial gains in world food output in 1974. Even though
weather remains the key determining factor in the short run, the failure
of fertilizer supplies to increase in many LDCs will be a blow to plans
for rapid increases in food output.
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DOMESTIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS
GNP'
Constant Market Prices
Avernge Annual
druwlh limn Since
I'nicest Change
latest it Prevmus I Year Previous
boost
Ouarler Quarter 19711 Earlier Quarter
Month
United States
73 III
5.0
5.7
3.7
;lnited States
Doc 73
Japan
73 III
0.5
10.0
2.0
Japan
Doc 73
West Germany
73 111
3.3
5.3
0.5
West Germany
Nov 73
France
73 11
6.2
8.7
2.9
France
Nov 7:s
United Kingdom
73 III
4.5
11.3
3.0
United Kingdom
Doc 73
Italy
73 I
3.1
5.2
3.4
Italy
Nov 73
Canada
73111
5.7
0.9
1.7
Canada
Nov 73
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Avengle Annual
Growth Rule state
I'mcent Change
train PlOVil)(IS I Year 3 Mon Its
Month 19111 Earlier rather
6.0
15.0
32.0
8.9
29.0
61.6
5.1
8.2
0.3
8.0
I9.9
27.4
8.0
10.2
15.8
9.0
21.1
17.5
10.2
24.8
6.1
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
Percent Chan go
Latest [ram Previous I Year 3 Montle
I'er cent Change
Latest from Previous I Year 3 Month
Month
Doc 73
Month
-9.2
197U
5.6
Earlier
5.4
Earlier??
1.3
Unite hates
Month
Nov 73
Month
0.7
1970
5.1
Earlier
8
4
s
Earlier
7
6
Nov 73
0.4
9.3
16.8
14.0
Japan
Nov 73
1.0
8.2
.
15.9
.
18
4
Oct 73
-1.1
3.8
0.5
7.7
West Germany
Nov 73
1.3
6.1
7.4
.
9
5
Nov 73
1.5
7.3
7.4
-2.6
France
Nov 73
0.9
8.7
8.4
.
12
1
Nov 73
0.4
3.5
4.1
1.6
United Kingdom
Nov 73
0.8
8.9
10.4
.
15
7
Nov 73
10.1
7.0
20.2
35.3
Italy
Doc 73
1.7
7.7
12.3
.
. 5
4
Sep 73 1.8 8.0 8.3
-3.4
Canada
Dec 73
0.6
5.8
9.1
.
6.7
RETAIL SALES"
Current Prices
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Percent Change
Larest from Previous
Month Month 1970
Dec 73
-1.3
10.2
Aug 73
-0.1
12.6
Oct 73
4.1
9.1
Oct 73
2.2
8.5
Aug 73
0.7
11.1
Aug 73
8.7
12.4
Nov 73
0.3
10.1
United States
Japan
Wese Germany
France
Unite'; Kingdom
Canada
Euro-Dollars
24 Jan 74
Representative Rates
Prime finance paper
Call money
Interbank loans (3 Months
Call money
Local authority deposits
Finance paper
Three-month deposits
Average Annual
Growth Hale Since
1 Year
Earlier
7.8
21.0
9.2
12.5
12.1
19.0
10.5
3 Months
Earlier''
4.1
16.9
1.2
3.1
14.8
5.0
8.0
WHOLESALE PRICES
Industrial
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Percent Change
Latest from Previous
Month Month
Dec 73
O.b
Sp73
4.0
Oct 73
-0 5
Oct 73
0.4
Doc 73
-0.2
Jun 73
2.8
Nov 73
-2.2
Lates
I Year 3 Months I Month
t Date Earlier Earlier Earlier
18 Jan
1 7.75
5.38
7.75
8.,5
11 Jan
11.50
4.88
8.75
10.00
18 Jan
11.75
8.00
14.38
13.00
18 Jan
13.25
7.00
11.00
11.88
18 Jan
15.50
5.81
12.88
15.94
18 Jan
9.38
5.25
9.00
9.50
18 Jan
9.83
6.08
9.75
11.00
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
I Year 3 Months
1970 Earlier Earlier
7.2
4.9
3.7
18.7
27.0
6.8
8.3
-0.6
-8.9
12.0
7.4
2.5
9.8
3.8
-7.1
20.8
22.2
26.5
12.3
9.6
4.9
'Seasonally adjusted.
"Averaps for latest 3 months compared
whh av.raps for previous 3 months.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150004-2
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
IMPORTS'
fah.
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
EXPORT PRICES
Latucr Y;unth
Millian US S 1973 1972
Nov 73 0,020 93,060 44,600
Doc 73 3.404 35,930 1.7,878
Nov 73 0,751 02,405 42,469
Doc 73 3,178 30,836 26,398
Doc 73 2,384 28,401 22,815
Nov 73 2,004 19,831 10,549
Oct 73 2,149 20,233 10,420
Million US S 1973 1972
Nov 73 6,730 03,086 50,551
Dec '3 3,452 31,905 18,995
Nov 73 4,972 47,270 34,465
Doc 73 2,972 35,428 25,268
Dec 73 3,154 33,946 24,627
Nov 73 1,501 21,973 15,296
Oct 73 2,106 19,020 15,463
TRADE BALANCE'
f.o.b./f.o.b.
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United K:ngdorn
Italy
Canada
Percege nt
Chan
43.0
20.9
40.9
39.5
244
19.8
23.2
Par cant
Change
24.8
68.0
37.2
40.2
37.8
43.6
23.0
Nov 73
Dec 73
Nov /3
Dec 73
Doc 73
Nov 73
Oct 73
90
- 48
1,779
205
- 770
23
43
774
4,024
15,136
1,408
-5,485
-2,143
1,213
1972
-5,891
8,883
8,004
1,129
-1,751
1,253
957
Change
6,6ca
-4,859
7,132
27C
-3,734
-5,395
257
BASIC BALANCE"
Current and Long?Term-Cap'tal Transactions
United States'
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Latest Period Cumulative (Million US S)
Million US S 1973
73 111 12,540 990
Nov73 -8,471
Oct 73 925 3,445
73 II 17 -559
73111 -522 -1,844
72 IV 800 NA.
7311 93 -151
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Nov 73
Dec 73
Oct 73
Dec 73
Dec 73
Oct 73
Dec 73
14.4
12.2
39.8
8.0
6.5
8.2
5.8
16.3
4.1
8.8
4.4
2.8
4.7
4.3
1972
-8,400
1,907
3,867
-202
-1,347
2,983
434
1 Year
Earlier
13.3
18.4
23.9
10.0
5.6
6.3
6.1
'Seasonally adjusted,
"Converted Into US dollars at current market rates of exchange.
Change
9.390
0.378
-421
-357
- 497
N .A.
-585
3 Mo4ths
Earlier
14.0
14.8
42.4
9.9
6.4
5.7
5.5
United Status
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXPORT PRICES
National Currency
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
IMPORT PRICES
National Currency
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Average Annuol
Grnwlll Rate Since
Latest train Previous I Year ;1 Munlhs
Month Month 1970 Earlier F rrher
Nav 73 1.4 9.2 21.5 13,8
Rep 73 1.7 13.2 25.1 39 9
Oct 73 2.0 15.5 38.2 -5.2
Sop 73 ,5 15.6 35.2 11.5
Sep 73 -1.8 9.6 12.8 -8.1
Aug 73 2.4 10.7 18.4 40.5
Sep 73 2.2 1.5 17.0 33.5
Average Annual
Gruwth Rate Since
('urcenl Charige _"
iateal Iran) Previous I Year
Month Month 19111 Earlier
Nov 73 1.4 9,2 21.5
Sep 73 1.8 3.3 10.2
Oct 73 1.7 1.8 4.6
Sep 73 2.7 6.3 14.3
Sep 73 0.5 9.1 12.8
Aug 73 on 7.8 16.7
Sep 73 2.2 6.3 18.7
Percent Change
Latest from Prev,aus
Month Month
Nov 73
Sep 73
Oct 73
Sep 73
Sep 73
Aug 73
Sep 73
3.4
0.7
1.9
4.0
5.5
3.5
0.7
3 Munlhs
rather
18.8
41.4
4.5
12.4
15.5
30.0
33.5
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
1970
12.3
2.8
0.7
8.0
14.8
13.4
5.4
1 Year 3 Months
Earlier Earlier
26.5
14.1
4.3
11.9
41.5
J.
121)
EXCHANGE RATES Spot Rate
As at 18Jan74
Japan(Yen)
West Germany iD ;tklel'e
France nraocl lPound
United Kingdom sterling)
Italy (Laa)
Canada (Dollar)
US S
Per Unit
0.0033
0.3556
0.2018
2.1870
0.0016
1.0074
Dec 66
20.80
41.45
-0.05
-21.63
-2.87
9.22
18 Dec
1971
2.85
14.60
2.49
-16.07
- 9.59
0.96
19 Mar
1973
-12.36
0.42
-8.44
-11.13
-12.15
0.97
As of 18Jan74
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Dec 66
-11.71
12.85
2A.03
-15.22
37.51
17.57
7.93
33.5
23.4
16.8
45.1
65.2
72.6
11.5
4 Jan
1974
-6.66
-1.03
-2.56
-3.91
-3.60
0.02
18 Dec 19 Mar 4 Jan
1971 1973 1974
2.50 4.13 2.28
0.77 -12.60 - 6.31
11.23 6.26 1.34
- 1.97 -4.42 -0.59
-23.271 - 8.88 -2.29
-16.38 9.57 - 1.88
1.30 2.93 0.89
'''Weighting is based an each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized
countries to reflect the competitive impact of exchange-rate variations
A 2 among As major currencies.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150004-2