ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500140023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 19, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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ecre
25X1
LOAN COPY
IMAM to He
1 1 l l 1, Hq,
Economic Intelligence Weekly
On file Department of Agriculture
release instructions apply.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
CIA No. 7719/73
19 July 1973
Copy No. 1 3
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CONTENTS
China Seeks US Nuclear Plant
Peruvian Fishmeal Prospects Improve
US Refinery Profits Squeezed by New Indian Po1;-y
Pakistan Resolves Longstanding Problems with Some US Firms
The Concorde in Trouble
The USSR Faces Higher Costs for Natural Gas Imports
Brazil-Bolivia Pipeline Negotiations Near Completion
Copper Prices Rise to a Record High Commodity speculators,
consumer demand, and supply bottlenecks have caused a doubling in
LME copper prices so far in 1973.
Page
Worldwide Grain Devr;lopments 6
Implications of 'ire Recent Monetat,' Crisis The recur-1, ing monetary
crises have not produced the world recession and trade problems that
many feared, but they have hampered US economic negotiations. 8
Comparative Indicators
Recent Data Concerning Deniestic and External
Economic Activity Inside Back Cover
Not. Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcomed.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
China Seeks US Nuclear Plant
Peking has asked General Electric to prepare a proposal for the sale
of a 650-megawatt nuclear powerplant to China. Although other US firms
are interested in selling nuclear powerplants to China, GE is the first firm
to hold serious conversations with Chinese technicians. The inspection issue,
however, could prove to be an obstacle to the sale. Sales of powerplants
and enriched uranium fuel require expert licenses, which the United States
has granted only when the buyer acce ted internationally supervised on-site
inspection of refueling operations.
Peruvian Fishmeal Prospects Improve
Ocean conditions off Peru's coast continue to favor an excellent
anchovy spawn in the season that begins next month. Prudent conservation
policies, however, should cause Lima to restrict fishing tightly for at least
another twelve months to rebuild depleted stocks. Fishmeal output and
exports thus are not expected to recover until next fall. Peru traditionally
supplies about three-fifths of world fishmeal exports. Before the anchovy
crisis, Peru's annual fishmeal exports were averaging 1.8 million tons, the
protein equivalent of some 2 7 million tons of soybean meal.
US Refinery Profits Squeezed by New Indian Policy
In a policy reversal, the Indian Government will allow the EXXON-
and CALTEX-owned refineries in India to operate at full capacity and to
pay market prices in hard currency to their suppliers of crude oil outside
India. New Delhi, however, has set price ceilings on domestic petroleum
products that do not cover the cost of imported crude oil. While the new
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policy could force the US-owned re5neries to operate at- a loss, they are
not likely to shut down, since the companies make most of their profits
on the crude oil they buy from theii producing subsidiaries.
Pakistan Resolves Longstanding Problems with Some US Firms
Islamabad has recently reached -ral agreement with Esso Fertilizer,
and possibly Hercules, for compensation for losses resulting from the May
1972 rupee devaluation, as called for in the initial contraci. The Bhutto
regime is considering compensation to the American Life Insurance
Company, which was nationalized in 1972. Favorable treatment of US firms
probably was intended in part to remove obstacles to discussions of foreign
aid and debt issues that Bhutto was expected to raise during his summit
with President Nixon, now rescheduled for 11 September.
The Concorde in Trouble
The failure of buyers to place additional orders for the French-British
SST Concorde at the Paris Air Show has led Concorde officials to consider
reducing production to eight planes per year. The current schedule calls
for one plane per month. Earlier this year, eight airlines withdrew options
on 58 aircraft. Only nine firm orders - five for BOAC and four for Air
France - have been received, while development costs have skyrocketed
to $2.7 billion. Officials hope that most of the backsliders will return to
the fold once the aircraft is flying commercially in 1975.
The USSR Faces Higher Costs for N aural Gas Imports
Moscow, long under pressure from Iran to pay more for natural gas
imports, is facing similar demands from Afghanistan in discussions that
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began on 14 July. The Soviets pay Tehran only 19 cents per thousand
cubic feet for natural gas
'Tehran and Kabul are repaying Soviet credits with deliveries of natural
gas, which the USSR uses in border areas and which permits larger Soviet
gas exports to Western Europe. Increased domestic and export needs
probably will force Moscow to concede some price increases, raising the
cost of natural gas imports from last year's $79 million ($62 million from
Iran and $17 million from Afghanistan).
Brazil-Bolivia Pipeline Negotiations Near Completion
Brasilia and La Paz last week agreed in principle to construct the
long-discussed $1 billion pipeline needed to exploit Bolivia's eastern gas
fields, once foreign financing is found. This 1,750-mile pipeline would
supply the Sao Paulo area with 240 million cubic feet of gas daily, or
1.8 trillion cubic feet over 20 years. Several Japanese firms are particu-
larly eager to supply the pipe.
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MINE PRODUCTION
inctubs Not Imports by Communist Coantrlu
'Jon-May at an Annual Refs
0 -
1970
LONDON METAL EACRLNGE
I I
1970 167t 1971 Ma
197]
LONDON METAL
EXCHANGE
U5 Pfl000CERS
1973 Jul
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Copper Prices Rise to a Record High
Copper prices on the London Metal Exchange reached an all-time high
of 97.5 cents per pound last week. Increased commodity speculation has
been a major factor in this year's rapid price rise: a sharp increase in
demand in importing countries and supply bottlenecks in Chile and Zambia
also contributed. Copper consumption in developed countries jumped 10%
in the first half of the year. Until May, Free World mine output had been
running about 3% ahead of last year's, and higher prices had induced a
25% increase in scrap recovery. Since May, however, world production has
fallen because of strikes in Chilean mines.
Surging demand and sluggish output have sharply reduced world copper
stocks. Producer and consumer stocks have been drawn down by some 20%.
Stocks held by the LME have also dropped from 192,000 tons late last
year to only about 40,000 tons at present. Declining stock levels in turn
have made the LME price even more volatile than usual, and prices have
reacted sharply to any new supply interruptions or unusual demand. Prices
rose some 10% in January, when the Zambia-Rhodesia border dispute anu
a Belgian refinery strike delayed copper shipments. Renewed monetary
turmoil subsequently brought a much sharper rise in LME prices as
speculators bought up copper as a hedge. LME cash quotes jumped by some
24% between February and April, while the US producer price rose from
an average of 54 cents to 60.25 cents per pound. After stabilizing at about
70 cents a pound, LME copper prices rose further in June and July as
Chile declared a force majeure on its copper shipments and China reportedly
re-entered the LME market as a major purchaser. After increasing some
14% in June, prices skyrocketed a further 19% in the first two weeks of
July.
Prices could rise still higher in coming months. Supply problems in
Chile and perhaps Zambia are likely to continue, and severely reduced stocks
afford little cushion for continued high demand. Record LME quotations
have stimulated little substitution of other materials because prices have
been frozen for most copper consumed in the Unite 4 States, and currency
revaluations have reduced the impact of higher LME prices on major copper
consumers in Western Europe and Japan. As a result, most of the price
pressure has fallen on copper consumers in the United Kingdom and other
relatively weak currency areas and on those smaller US consumers that do
not have an assured supply from major domestic producers.
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Worldwide Grain Developments
Poor Weather Clouds Soviet Grain Outlook
Harvesting problems have arisen in s,,.ne important winter grain areas.
Heavy rains and winds flattened (lodged) 2-1/2 million hectaies of winter
grain in the Ukraine (the equivalent of snore than 6 million tons) as well
as large amounts in Belorussia, Moldavia, and the North Caucasus. The
lodged and overripe grain will be difficult to harvest without losses. Its
milling quality is likely to be poor also.
Soviets Turn Away from US Grain
According to Soviet trade officials who recently visited the United
States, the USSR does not plan to buy any more US grain through 1975.
The USSR is concerned over the heated reaction in the United States to
Soviet grain purchases last year and will attempt to satisfy its grain import
requirements from Canada, Argentina, and other unspecified sources. Soviet
purchases of US grain in the first half of 1973 exceeded 5 million tons.
India bought 300,000 tons of US wheat this week at $125 per ton,
a price $20 per ton higher than it paid for the 360,000 tons bought h;t
month. All of this wheat is for delivery by September. According to the
Indian Ambassador, however, India now urgently needs an additional 4
million tons of wheat for delivery before late October. There is no chance
of meeting this deadline; India may, however, obtain about 1 million tons
by October. As a result, civil disturbances will almost certainly increase.
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Indonesia continues to seek suppliers for about 1.2 million tons of
rice it wants to import during the next 12 months. Thus far, Jakarta has
concluded contracts only with China for 50,000 tons and Taiwan for 20,000
tons.
Africa
US foodgrain aid to drought areas has been increased by 100,000 tons
for shipment by sea, bringing the US share to 250,000 tons, or a little
Other US Wheat Market De'elopments
Numerous foreign buyers are looking in the US market for wheat and
corn, but few are willing to pay the rising prices.
Actual purchases include Iraq for 75,000 tons
and Tunisia for 40,000 tons of wheat, both with September delivery dates.
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Implications of the Recent Monetary Crisis
The receat turmoil in international money markets is the fourth in
a series of crises that have come with increasing rapidity since December
1971, when the Smithsonian Agreement was concluded.
The monetary crises last year and this reflect in part not only
continuing US balance-of-payments problems but also a change in the
psychology of international curre icy traders. Money managers, representing
the large multinational firms and commercial banks and some less developed
countries including the oil producers, came to believe that further currency
realignments were likely. Windfall profits could be made with limited risk,
or the value of assets could be protected by shifting from dollars into the
stronger currencies. To the extent that traders acted on their belief, it
became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The repeated n ney market crises have not produced the worldwide
recession that many feared. Despite continuing international monetary
instability and the growing weakness of the dollar, world trade is expanding
rapidly. Indeed, it has accelerated in line with the current worldwide
economic boom. Exporters and importers have taken steps to reduce their
exchange risks througl, contract adjustments or dealings in the exchange
market, but this has gene,_i!ly resulted in only a small increase in trading
costs.
Continuing international monetary instability has, however, worsened
the inflation problem in countries that are the object of speculative capital
inflows. 'West Gennany in particular has had to absorb massive currency
inflows - first dollars and then guilders, French francs, and Danish
crowns - and this has complicated Bonn's policy of slowing the growth
in the rnr,,iey supply. Because of the anti-inflationary consequences of
revaluatic' and s. bseque';t monetary stability, Germany has generally been
more willing to revalue than other countries.
The impact of the doll ir's continuing devaluation o-.i the trade balances
of our major trading partn, -s has so far '.leer small. In part this is because
most of their trade is nc 'th the United States and because of lags in
he adjustment process. Ti, 'r's devaluation lowers the price of US
exp arts in foreign mark,,,, tj. this leads to an increase in US sales only
Lc customers adjust th- I;rchases to the new prices.
The curren i -ie economic prosperity has also r: duced and
:ked the i.,ipact ne .;ontir;..ing currency realignments. The US
e' ouorny and the economies of most of c,,.r major trading parbiers are
r,xpan.dir,,, rzpic'iy -? too rapidly in some cases. This has lessened cot,cern
about the potentis.l impact cf cheaper US goods.
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These factors explain the lack of strong countermeasures so far against
the devaluation. Only a handful of new foreign export subsidies and tax
incentives have been introduced. Nevertheless, some Europeans, the French
in particular, feel that the dollar has been driven down too far and that
the United States has been given an unfair competitive advantage.
The United States, after an adjustment period, will benefit from the
increased foreign demand for its exports, now made cheaper by devaluation.
Investment in this country also has become more attractive to foreigners.
Both of these factors will help create jobs and reduce unemployment in
the United States. To a lesser extent the United Kingdom and Italy, whose
currencies also have depreciated, will similarly benefit.
On the other hand, US imports are more expensive because of
devaluation, and this contributes to domestic inflation. The price of oil
imports in particular has increased because of successful contract
renegotiation by the oil-producing countries as well as through the direct
effects of the devaluation.
The price advantage gained by US agricultural and other raw material
exports through devaluation, and what apparently has been a desire - at
least in Japan -- to convert unwanted dollars into commodities, has probably
a!co played a role in the disruption of world commodity markets. Although
the large grain purchases by the USSR were more significant, the resultant
introduction of controls on US commodity exports has dampened US
balance-of-payments prospects, intensified pressures for a further dollar
devaluation, and undercut the long-held US advocacy of freer access to
foreign agricultural markets.
Some of the advantages of the dollar depreciation to Washington are
disadvantages for our trading partners. Although their trade position has
been little damaged so far, in the longer term cheaper US goods and
increased investment in the United States rather than in their domestic
economies will mean more job opportunities in the United States while
bringing significant adjustment problems for certain countries.
As a result, US trading partners probably will become increasingly
agitated if international monetary instability and the weakness of the dollar
continue. Since a downturn is inevitable, if only because of action by foreign
governments to bridle the accompanying domestic inflation, a slowdown
in their exports to the United States and an increase in their imports and
foreign investment (because of the currency realignment) will further depress
their domestic economies.
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The growing concern of our trading partners will slow progress toward
trade and monetary reform. The monetary situation has clearly helped Paris
in its insistence that the multilateral trade slka take account of the
advantages Washington may gain from a deva,'.ued dollar, and this could
emerge as a very difficult problem in 'he final trade bargaining Progress
toward international monetary reform in the ongoing discussions under the
auspices of the Inters ational Monetary Fund already has been made more
difficult by foreign concerns resulting from the dollar's decline. Difficulties
in the economic negotiations will also complicate political and military
negotiations between the United States and its allies.
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DOMESTIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since,
Percent Change
Latest from Previous
Percent Change'
Latest from Previous I Year 3 Months
Period Period 1910 Earlier Earlier
(o Cstant Market Prices) Provioue
Quarter
United States 73 I 7.9 7.9
VIIHO
Indus
Unite
LESAL
trial)
d States
E PRICES
Jun 73 1.0 7.7 14.8
Japan
73 1
16.0
15.2
Japa
n
Jun 73
1.3'
13.6
11.4
West Germany
73 I
5.8
23.6
West
Germany
Jun 13
0.5
6.7
8.8
France
73 I
3.8
8:2
Franc
e
Apr 73
0.8
12.0
20.2
United Kingdom
73 I
7.1
6.2
Unite
d Kingdo
m
Jun 73
1.0
6.2
3.7
Italy
73 I
5.2
3.4
Italy
Aar 73
1.1
12.1
18.7
Canada
73 I
8.0
12.1
Canad
a
Mar 73
2.3
12.3
27.3
United States Jun 73 0.2 5.5 9.6 8.1
Unite
d States
May 73 5.5 9.3
Japan
May 73
2.7
9.4
19.4
23.3
Japan
Apr 73
9.4
23.5
West Germany
May 73
1.1
4.4
7.8
-4.3
West
Germany
Jun 73
7.9
8.5
France
May 73
4.2
7.9
10.8
10.7
Franc
e
May 73
7.2
8.9
United Kingdom
May 73
0.1
3.8
9.2
3.5
Unite
d Kingdo
m
May 73
9
5
13.8
Italy
Feb 73
-J.0
-0.8
-1.0
-21.2
Italy
May 73
.
11.0
15.5
Canada
Apr 73
1.0
7.0
8.7
14.6
Canad
a
Jun 73
8.1
11.4
RETAIL SALES"
(Current Prices)
United States Jun 73 -0.8 11.0 12:1 -8.1
United
States
Jun 73 1.2 7.8 7.4 10.3
Japan
Mar 73
4.0
12.9
24.8
45.2
Japan
Apr 73
3.8
19.9
34.0
48.9
West Germany
Mar 73
-5.7
9.1
5.9
14.2
West
Germany
Apr 73
-0.6
12.2
9.5
6.9
France
Mar 73
4.1
6.3
7.0
6.7
Franc
e
Mar 73
0.8
12.5
10.0
-3.4
United Kingdom
Mar 73
3.0
12.9
19.8
26.8
United
Kingdom
Apr 73
2.2
12.2
13.1
19.1
Italy
Jan 73
-8.3
8.1
11.9
.
3.3
Italy
Jan 73
3.7
23.4
27.0
63.6
Canada
Apr 73
2.5
12.1
14.6
30.6
Canad
a
May 73
2.3
14.1
17.5
20.3
MONEY-MARKET RATES
Representative Rates
Percent Rate of Interest
12 Months 3 Months
latest Earlier Earlier
1 Month
Earlier
United States Prime finance paper Jul 13 8.13 4.75 6.75 7.50
Japan
Call money
Jul 6
7.25
4.25
5.88
8.63
West Germany
Interbank loans (3 months)
Jul 13
14.25
4.75
NA.
13.50
France
Call money
Jul 6
9.00
3.75
7.25
7.63
United Kingdom
Local authority deposits
Jun 29
6.32
3.96
7.32
7.52
Canada
Finance paper
Jun -13
7.50
4.88
5.75
6.88
Euro-Dollars
Three-month deposits
Jul 13
9.75
5.69
7.88
8.75
'Seas
onally Adjusted
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EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Average Annual
Growth flame Since
Percent Change
Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
Paried Period 1970 'arlier Earlier
EXPORT PRICES
(US $)
United States
May 73
8.3
13.7
18.9
Japan I
May 73
11.9
20.7
64.0
West Germany
Apr 73
10.9
13.0
64.5
France
Mar 73
12.8
20.6
70.4
United Kingdom
May 73
10.4
8.2
34.7
Italy
Feb 73
8.0
8.8
26.9
Canada
Mar 73
4.9
9.4
19.1
EXPORT PRICES
(National Currency)
United States
May 73
3.1
13.7
18.9
Japan
May 73 ~
1.3
4.8
13.5
West Germany
Apr 73
0.7
1.3
4.2
France
Mar73
1.5
8.3
12.3
United Kingdom
May 73
0.6
9.6
15.3
Italy
Feb 73
2.7
6.6
19.8
Canada
Mar 73
1.8
9.3
20.4
IMPORT PRICES
(National Currency)
United States May 73
1.2
9.9
17.4
43.1
Japan I May 731
2.5
2.8
14.1
13.2
West Germany Apr 73
1.3
0.0
7.2
5.3
France Mar 73
1.9
2.5
0.4
-16.3
United Kingdom May 73
35
11.1
28.1
38.8
Italy Feb 73
3.5
6.4
9.3
23.2
Canada Mar 73
3.4
4.0
6.2
18.4
EXPORTS'
t Cumulative (Million US S)
L
t
(f.o.b.)
es
a
Period Million US S 1973 1972
United States
May 73
5,603
Jen-May
26,511
1901-
Japan
Jun 73
2,854
Jan-Jun
16,626
13.068
West Germany
May 73
5,740
Jan-May
24,827
18,721
France
Jun 73
3,135
Jon-Jun
17,002
12,821
United Kingdom
Jun 73
2,512
Jan-Jun
13,638
11,716
Italy
May 73
1,768
Jan-May
7,542
7.352
Canada
Apr 73
1,983
Jan-Apr
7,760
6,260
IMPORTS'
(f.o.b.)
United States
Jan-Ma
27,306
20.647
Japan
Jun 73
2,'32
Jan-Jun
13,765
8,719
West Germany
May 73
4,362
Jan-Ma
19,370
15,245
France
Juu 73 3,038
Jan-Jun
18,370
12,371
United Kingdom
Jun .3 2,867
Jan-Jun
15,523
12,231
Italy
May 73 2,118
Jan-May
8,508
6.774
Canada
Apr 73 1,747
Jan-Apr
7,219
5,968
TRADE BALANCE'
Latest
Q.o.b./f.o.b?)
Period Million US S 1973 1972
United States
May 73
-158
Jan-May
-795
-1,632
Japan
Jun 73
122
Jan-Jun
2.862
4.349
West Germany
May 73
1,378
Jan-May
5.45'
3.475
France
Jun 73
97
Jan-Jun
832
449
United Kingdom
Jun 73
-356
Jan-Jun
-1,887
-515
Italy
May 73
-353
Jan-May
-966
578
Canada
Apr 73
236
Jan-Apr
541
292
us IS
Per Unrt Dec 66 18 De: 71 19 Mar 73 6 Jul 73
OFFICIAL RESERVES Billion USS
Latest Period I Year
Ehd of June 1970 Earlier
United States
May 73
14.0
16.3
13.3
14.0
Japan
Jun 73
15.2
4.1
15.8
18.1
West Germany
May 73
32.2
8.8
19.9
29.5
France
Jun 73
12.3
4.4
9.4
11.2
United Kingdom
Jun 73
7.0
2.8
8.9
6.0
Italy
Apr 73
8.4
4.7
6.5
5.8
Canada
Jun 73
5.9
4.3
6.2
6.0
'Seasonally Adjusted
19 July 1973
TRADE-WEIGHTED
As of 13Jul73
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXCHANGE RATES
Percent Change from
Dec 66 18 Dec 71 19 Mar 73 6Jul 73
-20.10
-10.50
-'1.70
1.73
23.17
9.19
-2.86
-0.23
32.89
15.83 10.17
-2.03
-6.43
4.75
2.36
-1.89
-31.18
-17.11
-2.74
2.33
-21.77
-20.51
-13.82
3.02
4.12
-2.41
-0.74
0.58
3 Months
Earlier
Japan(Yen)
0.0C38
36.79
18.23
-0.76
-1.15
West Germany (Deutsche
Mark)
0.4201
87.10
35.39
18.84
-5.47
France (Franc)
0
2448
21
23
24
33
11.07
-5.41
(Pound
United Kingdom sterhng,
.
2.5428
.
-8.88
.
-2.41
3.32
-0.48
Italy (Lira)
0,0017
8.81
-0.58
-3.39
-1.16
Canada (Dollar)
1.0015
8.58
0.37
0.38
0.05
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500140023-2