WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BRAZIL'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500060015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 23, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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4
Set; et
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Brazil's Changing Foreign Policy
Secret
N! 935
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August 23, 1974
No. 0034/74)
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Summary
After several years of rapid economic growth, Brazil has come to depend more
and more heavily on international trade to sustain its momentum. Thus, the quest
for markets and resources has become a major foreign policy goal. Indeed, the
urgency of the quest has led Brazil to reconsider and alter its political attitudes
toward several areas of the world. Increasing international activity is contributing to
a belief in Brasilia that sustained world prominence-a vague but deeply felt goal--is
nearly at hand.
In Latin America, Brazil seeks to minimize political instability and reduce
security threats that could hinder its development and trade activities. In the Middle
East, Brazil's growing need for oil has brought about a significant pro-Arab shift in
its political position. In sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil's long-standing but heretofore
vague interest is being focused on the nature and extent of potential markets and the
availability of resources. The quest for markets has also induced Brazil to play down
ideological differences and display an increased willingness to recognize and trade
with the Communist nations, including China.
For the IJS, certain implications arc clear. Brazil will increasingly sec itself as a
competitor for markets and resources. That factor along with nationalistic pride-a
feeling that Brazil has "arr ved," will lead it to differ with the US more of inn and on
more issues.
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Brazilians come naturally by the idea that
their civilization is destined for greatness. More
than 100 million C'.,ong, the inhabitants of one of
the world's largc,t countries are inclined to think
in terms of superlatives. Brazilians are prouc; to be
the offspring of the once-vigorous Portuguese
empire, and they view their country as the logical
center of some future Luso-African cor:rmunity
of nations. Indeed, Brazil was the capital of
Portugal's empire when the royal family fled from
Napoleon in the early 19th century.
A sense of uniqueness pervades the Bra-
zilians. Differing linguistically anJ culturally from
their Spanish American neighbors, they take pride
in their political dove opment, which has been far
more peaceful than that of Snanish America.
Independence was acnieved without the costly
wars of liberation that characterized the Spanish
colonies, and the long Brazilian monarchy pro-
vided a stability that was lacking in the rest of
Latin America.
Early in this century, by a combination of
skillful diplomacy and favorable international
arbitration, Brazil in large pay t completed the task
of demarcating its borders. Neighboring states
suffered, however, and the process left a residue
of fear arid suspicio,,. Brazilians, on the other
hand, gained a genuine preference for the negoti-
ated settlement of disputes.
Brazi! has also benefited from a traditionally
close relationship with the US-the first nation to
recognize Brazilian independence. Brazil has
generally cultivated this relationship, recognizing
the US as its most important trading partner and
as a potential protector in the event of outside
aggressio,l. The US has been particularly impor-
tant because Erazii has no close friends in Latin
\merica. In the main, history nas been kind to
Brazil, giving it an essentially positive view of the
world and an optimistic sense of its own capabil-
ities.
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During recent years, Brazil has been quit25X1
successful in supporting and benefiting from close
ties w i th its conservative neighbors-Bolivia,
Paraciuav. and LICc
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azil sees sue 1 assistance
as instruments it, minmiizing political instability
in these countries, which in return has paved the
way for substantial economic benefits for Brazil.
In Bolivia, Brasilia secured access to large gas
deposits, essential to continued growth of the Sao
Paulo - based industrial complex. In Paraguay, the
Brazilians gained the right to undertake an
ambitious hydroelectric project that will furnish
electricity to a large portion of southern Brazil. In
Brazilian Foreign Minister and counterparts
from Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay
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Uruguay, the military-dominated government has
come to depend heavily on Brasilia for aid and
advice on both economic and political matters-
while serving as a buffer against the turbulence
and uncerfain'cies in nearby Argentina.
Brazil'. good fortune war further denmon-
stratnd when the South Amei ican government
most distasteful to it-that of Salvador Allende--
was toppled last year. The advent of the military
junta in Santiago gratified Brasilia by eliminating
Chile as ,a haven for terrorist and other exiles
from a number of countries, including Brazil.
Brazil's leaders also took Allende's fall as proof
that, on their continent at least, Marxist solutions
cannot work. Brazil welcomed the junta and
offerad large amounts of assistance. Thus far,
however, aid has not reached promised levels, and
has been on terms largely favoring Brazilian ex-
ports. Nevertheless, Brasilia remains committed to
the survival of he military government in Chile
and would probably go to considerable lengths-
short of armed intervention-to prevent its col-
lapse.
As Brazil's leaders contemplate Argentina,
they see terrorism, political strife, and ec; nomic
stagnation
any raze cans are uneasy
over tneir nerg or s instability-particularly the
terrorism, which does not always respect national
boundaries. Moreover, Brazilian leaders have no
desire to see an Argentina so thoroughly frustra-
ted by domestic confusion or feeling so encircled
by pro-Brazilian regimes that it would scheme
with other Spanish-speaking nations to upset the
South American order and block Brazilian eco-
nomic and diplomatic advances.
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In an effort ca stave off such a development,
and protect wha'. it has gained, Brazil now seeks
to soothe Arge-itine sensitivities by playing dcwn
the rivalry question. The naming of a former
ambassador to Buenos Aires and top expert in
regional affairs as foreign minister, as well as
conciliatory statements by high-level leaders,
points in this direction.
Brazil's fear of joint action against it by
Spanish-speaking nations is not new, dating back
to the colonial period. Even though this {ear
gradually waned as Brazil's power grew, it re-
mained as a vague concern that the Spanish-
speaking nations would someday join to isolate
Brazil diplomatically and economically.
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This concern has persisted and was intensi-
fied last year by Venezuela's entrance into the
Andean Group and by the renewed possibility
that Argentina will associate with that organiza-
tion. The recent South American trip by Mexican
President Echeverria-who unabashedly seeks to
assert himself as a leader of Latin America and
the Third World-undoubtedly left Brazilian
leaders a bit uneasy. They probably suspect that
in some countries Echeverria's discussions
touched on the need to react to Brazil's growing
economic power in the hemisphere. Privately,
Brazilians were probably annoyed by Echeverria's
casual approach to protocol and his thinly veiled
criticisms of their government.
Brazil has come to realize that its recent
extraordinary growth has revived old fears among
its Spanish American neighbors of Brazilian
"imperialism" or "expansionism." Indeed, its
very success serves to foster this view. Its con-
tinuing quest for raw materials and energy
resources-currentl"" including exploration
ventures in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia-
further contributes to this perception. Moreover,
Brazilian efforts to integrate the long-empty
hinterlands by road building and domestic coloni-
zation projects cannot fail to provoke fears of
encroachment in nations like Peru and the
G.ryanas, long isolated from Brazilian population
ranters.
Consequently, just as Brazil perceived a need
to mollify Argentina, so it recognizes the need to
reassure other Latin nations that it seeks no hege-
mony. Partly in an effort to do just that, the
former foreign minister recently made a South
American trip through all b-it one of the Andean
Group nations. In addition, Brazil plays up its
own role as an emerging nation-albeit an ad-
vanced one-by joining in Third World demands
on the industrialized states for trade concessions,
technology, and a bigger share of the profits from
multinational corporations. In so doing, Brazil
seeks to demonstrate its growing independence
from the US, :t a time when the rest of Latin
America is on the same path. At the same time,
Brazil seeks to destroy the impression, voiced at
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Transamazon highway
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times by some Latin observers, that it acts as the
agent of the US in hemispheric affairs.
The tension that characterizes relations
among Chile, Peru, and Bolivia provides an oppor-
tunity for Brazil to practice regional diplomacy
and to work for the stability it favors. Bolivians
have long nursed a grudge against the Chileans,
who deprived them of their coastline almost a
century ago. Regaining access to the sea has been
a major goa! of Bolivian foreign policy ever since.
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Paraguayan President Stroessner and President Geisel
In Peru, which lost territory to Chile in the same
war, military leaders talk of a revenge war by the
centenary in 1979.
Last March, when Brazil's President Geisel
was inaugurated, he brought the visi;.ing Chilean
and Bolivian heads of state together to discuss
mutual problems. He undoubtedly had several
purposes in mind. For one, any kind of improve-
ment in relations between Chile and Bolivia,
which currently have no diplomatic ties, is likely
to lessen tensions generally and contribute to
overall stability.
In the more serious matter of a possible
arrn?d conflict between Peru and Chile, Brazil
genuinely hopes there will be no actual clash.
Brasilia has probably decided not to provide arms
to Chile and is likely to take every opportunity to
act as a force for moderation, which it sees as ever
more important for an eventual peaceful settle-
ment. Brazil's conservative leaders view the Peru-
vian regime-the most leftist in South America-
with sushi, ion Nonethe;ess, Brasilia harbors no
particular animosity toward That country, which
has little impact in it.
In the OAS, Brazil's position bears some
resembla,ice to that of the US. The lone Portu-
guese-speaking nation in a grouping numerically
dominated by Spanish-speaking ones, Brazil is
envied and to some extent feared and distrusted
by the Hispanic majority. Brazil prefers not to
have its freedom of action circumscribed by an
organization whose other members are so unlike
it. Also, Brazil is ambivalent in its reaction to
recent Spanish American unity and assertiveness
in seeking to reduce the hemispheric influence of
the US. On the one hand, as the effort succeeds,
the area for potential Brazilian influence grows.
On the other hand, however, Brazilians must be
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concerned that they might be the Spanish Ameri-
cans' next targets.
Heightened Brazilian activity in the Middle
East derives primarily from the need to assure
continued access to petroleum and to attract large
amounts of Arab capital. Furthermore, since its
dependence on oil imports is so great-over 75
percent of consumption-Brazil is hardly in a
strong position in dealing with the Arab coun-
tries. Nevertheless, Brazil eschews collective
negotiations by oil-consuming nations and has
opted instead for the aggressive pursuit of close
bilateral diplomatic and commercial relations.
Brasilia seek-, to emphasize its ties to the Third
World and in so doing, to demonstrate to the
Arabs that it is not in league with Western indus-
trial powers and that its commitment is broadly
based and durable.
Brasilia has intensified its diplomai:ic efforts
in the Middle East, sending its first resident
ambassador to Libya, establishing an embassy in
Saudi Arabia, and working to develop relations
with several other states.
At the same time, Brasilia hds sought to gain
stature in the eyes of Arab leaders by subtly but
perceptibly moving off its relatively pro-Israel,
though nominally "equi-distant," stance in favor
of the Arabs. Brazil now appears to favor the
removal of Israeli troops from occupied areas.
Despite its changed position, however, Brazil as
yet has made no substantial commitment to the
Arab cause. Its public attitude toward the Pales-
tinians, for example, is a bland expression of hope
that a just solution of their plight will be found.
Brazilian diplomacy has been augmented by
the commercial activities of officials representing
the Finance Ministry and Petrobras, thL state oil
enterprise. The Brazilians have been aggressive
and innovative in arranging for oil supplies. For
example, Petrobras has, on occasion, hid sub-
stantially higher for oil than competitors, and has
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obtained joint exploration rights in Iran, Iraq, and
Egypt. Brazil has also sought barter deals, offering
technology, manufactures, and agricultural
commodities in exchange for fixed amounts of
petroleum. Ironically, in the process of demon-
strating its independence of the US and identi-
fying more closely with the Arab nations, Brazil
virtually acknowledges another kind of depen-
dence, this time on Middle Eas.ern oil and Arab
good will. The Brazilians are bound to find this
galling, and will feel a continuing pressure to seek
petroleum elsewhere while still practicing "re-
source diplomacy" in the Middle East.
Brazil has long felt that its Luso-African
heritage placed it in a unique position to serve as
a bridge between Africa and Europe, and, by
extension, between the Third World and the West.
Indeed, Brazil has always been fascinated by
Africa, ancestral home of much of its population.
Some Brazilian geopoliticians even see West
Africa as the other part of a "South Atlantic
Community" based on cultural, trade, and politi-
cal ties, and led by Brasilia.
Ironically, though, Brazil's close relationship
with Portugal ultimately made its position in
Africa awkward. Brasilia hesitated to alienate Lis-
bon, yet found close identification with that
colonial power a hindrance in its African and
Third World dealings. The change in government
in Portugual did not, as some Brazilians had
hoped, provide Brazil the opportunity to mediate
between colonies and motherland. Instead, Brazil
has become suspicious of the political direction of
the new regime. Brasilia appears to have decided
that the potential benefits to be gained from close
identification with Africa outv 'eigh the cost of
further irritating Lisbon.
Brazil has lung sought to work closely with
those African nations that produce items it also
exports-notably coffee and cacao-in order to
find ways to keep prices high. Furthermore,
Nigeria is already a supplier of oil, and other
countries of Africa could p -ovide both oil and
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other important resources. Finally, at least some
Brazilian officials think that African nations
represent potential markets for their country's
goods and technology.
To some extent, the increased efforts in
black Africa represent something of a victory for
the Foregn Ministry, which in recent years has
contested for foreign affairs leadership with the
Finance Ministry. The former advocated extensive
African ties while the latter expressed reserva-
tions. Still, the revised African policy does not
preclude cordial ties with white-ruled South
Africa, as demonstrated by the recent establish-
ment of regular air service between Rio de Janeiro
and Johannesburg.
Brasilia undoubtedly hopes that the signifi-
cance of its decision to identify more strongly
with Africa, highlighted by the recent recognition
of Guinea-Bissau, and to diverge considerably
from Portugal will not be lost on its Middle East-
ern oil suppliers or, indeed, on the whole Third
World, which it has vague but genuine pretensions
of leading.
In an effort to expand trade, Brazil has
steadily lowered its ideological barriers and has
played down its suspicion of Communist nations.
The result has been a wave of diplomatic and
commercial activity involving countries through-
out the Communist world. Formal relations have
been established for the first time with East
Germany, while legations in Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Romania have been raised to embassy status.
Soviet and East European representatives in Brazil
reportedly have said they feel Brazil is becoming
much more receptive to them and their countries'
proposals. The diplomatic and tr,ide initiative
even extends to China, with which Brazil has just
established diplomatic relations.
Further Brazilian moves to improve ties with
the Communist world are to be expected. The
Geisel government's commitment to what it calls
"responsible pragmatism," basically the pursuit of
economic and political advantage wherever bene-
ficial and regardless of ideological differences,
makes this p2rticularly likely.
Factors other than economic considerations
facilitate and encourage the rapprochement with
the Communist nations. Success in virtually elimi-
nating domestic terrorist movements-sometimes
inspired and supported from abroad-has built up
Brazil's confidence in its abi!ity to protect itself
from untoward communist influence. In addition,
Brasilia probably feels that the current trend
toward East-West detente makes such a threat less
likely than before. Moreover, the new initiative,
although implemented for very practical reasons,
also serves once again to demonstrate Brazil's
independence in foreign affairs and its desire to
emerge as a nation with truly global interests.
Foreign Minister Azeredo da Si!veira vir-
tually put the US on notice recently that it can
expect Brazil to differ more and more on a va-
riety of issues. He was quoted as saying, "Brazil
will not necessarily be for or against on the basis
of prejudgment. Each episode, each situation, will
be examined from the standpoint of national in-
terest." Indeed, Brazil has already diverged from
t'o views in a number of areas, such as its refusal
.o sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
its extreme position on the Law of the Seas.
It is logical to expect this trend to continue
and to grow. Brazil, just emerging on the inter-
national stage, will feel an even greater need to
demonstrate that its independence in world
affairs is complete and unqualified. Moreover,
Brazil's Third World leadership bid-along with its
own desire for special treatment-will lead it to
push further for preferential access to markets in
the developed nations, especially the US. Thus,
there exists the potential for further disputes such
as a current one over Brazilian shoe imports.
Finally, it is possible that Brazil will at least
explore prospects for cartel-like arrangements
with other producers of coffee, cocoa, and iron
ore.
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Brazil's leaders are unlikely, however, to
allow differences to cause a serious breach with
Washington. They value their country's tradition
of cooperation with the US, as exemplified by
Brazilian participation on the Italian front in
World War II and its active role in the peace-
keeping contingent in the Dominican Republic in
1965. Moreover, the very economic concerns that
imoel current foreign policy point to the need to
retain access to markets in the US, which
Is the
single largest customer for Brazilian exoorts_
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