WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENT DAOUD'S FIRST SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500060003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 15, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Afghanistan: Prerider~t Daoud'r First Six Months
State Department review completed
C I A
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N! 957
February 15, 1974
No. 0007/74A
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Presideiit Zaoud's Arst Six l4onths
On July 17, 1973, a decade after the King dismissed him as prime minister,
Mohammad Daoud Khan returned to power in a daring military coup staged by a small
group of predominantly junior officers. Since then, Daoud has devoted his efforts to
securing his power at home and to the pursuit of a foreign policy that has significantly
worsened relations with Pakistan. Although Daoud now appears to have gained the
upper hand over his rivals, either the dangers inherent in his Pakistan policy or failure
to deal with basic political and economic problems could ultimately bring about his
downfall.
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Last July, it was unclear whether Daoud,
who as prime minister had been virtual dictator
from 1953 to 1963, would be able to regain his
former unchallenged power. Despite conflicting
reports as to his role in the coup, the bulk of the
evidence suggests that the young officers who
overthrew the monarchy and established a repub-
lic acted largely on their own with little-if any-
direction from Daoud.
In the earliest days of the new republic,
Daoud, the young military officers and a few
others seem to have shared power in the Central
Committee they established as the supreme gov-
erning authority. There was probably consid-
erable disagreement among them as to even the
general direction the country should take, and
none apparently had any thought-out program. It
took the committee nine days to issue even gen-
eral outlines of how the government would oper-
ate, and ancther week to decide on a cabinet.
The distribution of portfolios was the first
good indication of Daoud's progress in asserting
his authority. He retained all of the offices he had
assumed a few days after the coup, which in-
cluded those of president, prime minister, defense
minister and foreign minister. In addition, long-
time associates of his were named as deputy
prime minister and as the heads of some lesser
ministries. The junior officers and their friends
received the interior and four other portfolios in
an arrangement that was a compromise but
clearly favored Daoud.
Since then, the junior officers, inexperienced
and in some cases incompetent, have generally
performed poorly both as administrators and in
the backstage maneuvering for power. Daoud may
even be keeping some in office to demonstrate
their lack of ability and thus neutralize them. In
any case, as Daoud's authority has grown, that of
the Central Committee has diminished.
At present Daoud appears to make the major
decisions in Afghanistan, assisted by men he
knows and trusts. His most important adviser and
confidant is Mohammed Naim, who has no offi-
cial position but is Daoud's brother and served as
foreign minister when Daoud was prime minister.
Deputy Prime Minister Sharq, once Daoud's pri-
vate secretary, is also important, despite some
reports of tension between him and Daoud.
Wahid Abdullah, a long-time confidant, appar-
ently plays an influential role in formulating for-
eign policy.
Even so, Daoud has not triumphed com-
pletely over the young officers. Although their
power has clearly been waning, the President
probably still cannot act without taking their
wishes into account. Most of these officers are
Soviet-trained and many lean far more to the left
than Daoud. They have helped put a number of
pro-Soviet officials in high positions in several
ministries. Even should Daoud continue to gain
power at the expense of the rest of the Central
Committee, the leftists-some of them members
of Parcham, the pro-Soviet Communist Party-in
the bureaucracy will continue to influence the
government's policies.
The Military
i_ontrol of the military
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he new army com-
mander, enera Mustagni, is a long-time friend of
Daoud, who managed to survive in the army even
when Daoud was in eclipse. In an attempt to
ensure the loyalty of the lower ranks, all non-
commissioned officers were promoted to third
lieutenant. The young military officers who
staged the coup have also garnered some rewards
as any of them or their friends who could claim
even peripheral involvement were promoted at
least two grades.
In September, the government announced it
had uncovered a major coup plot headed by a
former prime minister, Mohammad Hashim Mai-
wandwal. Among those accused of being involved
were retired air force commander Razak, who had
actively supported Daoud shortly after the coup,
and Lieutenant General Khan Mohammad Khan,
who for a few days after the coup thought Daoud
had named him defense minister.
It is still not clear exactly who was behind
these arrests. At the time, it appeared that Daoud
might have been out-maneuvered by other mem-
bers of the Central Committee, but this now
seems unlikely because the end result was to
remove a number of Daoud's potential rivals. Mai-
wandwal allegedly committed "suicide"; Razak is
now serving a life sentence; Khan Mohammad
Khan was executed. Other officers, more junior,
were accused of plotting another coup in Decem-
ber, and in mid-Juriuary arrests were still being
made.
Although this alleged plotting probably re-
flects some actual opposition to the new regime,
the government may be overreacting. In any
event, Daoud is not likely to take chances with
the military. The events of last summer made it
clear both to him and to any dissatisfied group in
the military that an Afghan government can be
overthrown rather easily.
During the ten years Daoud was out of
office, King Zahir had tried a limited "experiment
in democracy." A sometimes irresponsible parlia-
ment gained steadily in power. Prime ministers-
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despite the frustration of having the responsibility
for governing while Zahir retained ultimate
authority-became important national figures.
And political parties, although never legalized,
began to develop.
None of the politicians had a strong power
base, however, and Daoud has successfully cowed,
won over, or destroyed potential rivals among
them. Ex - prime minister Shafiq, who was turned
out by Daoud's coup, had little opportunity to
develop a following, but he remains in jail any-
how. Probably the most successful at building a
personal following was former prime minister
Maiwandwal, who served from 1965 to 1967.
Daoud reportedly tried to win his support with
the offer of a high post in the new government; if
so, Maiwandwal refused. In September, he was
arrested and accused of organizing a foreign-
backed coup attempt; after a week of question-
ing, the Afghan press reported he had confessed
and then committed suicide.
Some other politicians have fared better.
Two members of Shafiq's cabinet are now in
Daoud's. Former prime minister Etemadi is
Daoud's new ambassador in Moscow. Daoud has
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Pushtunistan
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named a few members of the disbanded parlia-
ment to important positions, such as provincial
governorships, but for the most part they are
maintaining a very low profile.
The close associates of deposed King Zahir
have been no problem for Daoud, probably be-
cause the politically apathetic Afghan people had
little love for Zahir. In addition, Daoud's close
relationship to the King-his cousin and brother-
in-law-gives his succession some legitimacy.
Zahir, who was in Italy at the time of the
coup, quickly abdicated and recognized the re-
public, perhaps as the price for getting his imme-
diate family to Rome. Prince Abdul Wali, another
cousin of the King, and regarded as the second
most important man in the country in pre-coup
days, is being tried for treason.
The Traditional Society
The religious conservatives-who protest
often and sometimes violently against such things
as communism, unveiled women, mini-skirts and
motion pictures-attribute many of the changes in
Afghan society that they deplore to Daoud's ear-
lier period in power. Their influence has eroded
steadily for several decades, however, and many
urban, educated Afghans are content with the
pro-forma assertions of loyalty to Islam expected
of all leaders. Nevertheless, the religious leaders
are still capable of stirring up short-lived local
disorders, and Daoud has cracked down. In Sep-
tember, a few were sent to jail for organizing
demonstrations, and as many as 900 may have
been arrested for their part in the alleged military
coup plot exposed in December. Even so, some
are still preaching against Daoud.
Afghanistan's Pushtun tribes have acquiesced
in the change in government. Almost half of the
country's people are Pushtuns, and even though
only about a tenth of the population still leads a
nomadic life, tribal loyalties remain a basic factor
in Afghan politics and society. Daoud kept up his
contacts with tribal leaders when he was out of
power; as President, he has tended to give the
impression that his is a Pushtun administration.
His policy toward Pakistan, on which much of his
attention has been focused, is probably designed
partly with the tribes in mind.
Daoud's Foreign Policy
Pushtunistan Again
Daoud has increased tensions with Islama-
bad, but the normally cool relations between Pak-
istan and Afghanistan had been growing colder
for several months before he came to power. The
immediate cause was Kabul's disapproval of the
way the Bhutto government was treating its polit-
ical opposition in Pakistan's two frontier prow
inces-in effect, a revival of the "Pushtunistan
issue."
Pushtunistan has been a major irritant since
Pakistan became independent in 1947. The Push-
tuns (who are called Pathans in Pakistan) are the
dominant ethnic group in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province; they
also predominate in the northern part of Pakis-
tan's Baluchistan Province. In the past, few Af-
ghans have openly advocated the annexation of
the Pushtu-speaking areas of Pakistan to Afghanis-
tan, but Kabul has long supported their formation
into an independent (or at least semi-autono-
mous) state called Pushtunistan. The Afghans
have usually included all of Baluchistan Province
in the proposed Pushtunistan, although the Balu-
chi tribesmen who predominate in the southern
part of the province are neither Pushtuns nor
Pushtu-speakers.
In the early 1960s, Pakistan and Afghanistan
almost went to war when Daoud, attempting to
force creation of Pushtunistan, tried to stir up
tribal rebellion in Pakistan. Daoud's policy re-
sulted in economic problems for Afghanistan,
however, and his subsequent decline in prestige
helped furnish the King with an opportunity to
dismiss him from office.
When Daoud gained control again in Kabul
last July the Pakistanis immediately became ap-
prehensive that Pushtunistan would become once
more a major problem between the two countries.
Daoud did nothing to reassure them by noting in
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his first speech that the question of Pushtunistan
was Afghanistan's only dispute with a foreign
country.
In the months that followed, the Afghans
have greatly stepped up their propaganda on
Pushtunistan. The Pakis{anis have replied with
denunciations of the government in Kabul and
with warnings against meddling in Pakistan's in-
ternal affairs. Both countries have increased the
strength of their forces along the border, although
neither has so far made the preparations that
would be expected for full-scale war.
Domestic politics in Pakistan complicate the
problem. The strongest single party in both fron-
tier provinces-the National Awami Party-advo-
cates much greater provincial autonomy. Many in
the frontier provinces see Afghanistan as a natural
ally in this domestic dispute, although, at least
until recently, most did not seem willing to go
beyond trying to extract concessions from Prime
Minister Bhutto by pointing to the possibility
that they might turn to Kabul.
Bhutto, for his part, has long been suspicious
that National Awami Party leader Wali Khan and
The Khyber Pass
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other opposition figures are intent on secession.
He has responded with a mixture of repressive
measures and efforts to reach a compromise. As
his suspicions have grown, he has also taken a
progressively harder line toward Kabul.
The Afghans see Bhutto's actions as further
evidence of his oppression of Pushtuns and Balu-
chis. Daoud, long personally inclined toward in-
tervention, has come under increasing pressure
from his associates, the military, and politically
aware Pushtuns to do something to help the "op-
pressed brethren."
Despite the pressures and mutual suspicions,
at this time none of the parties appears to want a
violent confrontation. Relations at the moment,
in fact, appear to be improving, at least super-
ficially. Bhutto does not want his country torn by
civil war, particularly in view of the large number
of Pushtuns in the Pakistan Army. Most National
Awami Party leaders apparently believe that they
stand little chance of success in gaining greater
autonomy through force so long as Bhutto retains
control of the armed forces and of the govern-
ment. Bhutto and the opposition have appeared
to be on a collision course a number of times, but
have always reached at least a temporary com-
promise, usually at what seemed to be the last
minute.
The Pakistanis are concerned that India, the
USSR, or both might intervene to assist Kabul if
it should come to war between Islamabad and
Kabul. Daoud apparently is aware that he cannot
count on outside help, however, and that his
army and air force are no match for the larger,
better-trained Pakistani forces. There have been
several incidents that either side could have
pushed to a major crisis, but neither did.
In October, for example, a five-man Pakis-
tani paramilitary unit was captured after it en-
tered Afghanistan allegedly in pursuit of smug-
glers. Tensions rose, but the Afghans released the
Pakistanis quiety. A month later, the Pakistanis
threatened to enforce restrictions-such as requir-
ing passports-on tribesmen during their annual
migration from Afghanistan. Such a policy could
have led to clashes along the border had the tribes
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decided to migrate anyway, or would have
saddled Kabul with caring for the tribes had they
stayed in Afghanistan. Despite the threat, the
Pakistanis do not appear to have made a serious
effort to enforce the restrictions-which would
have come too late to affect many of the migrants
this season-and last month decided to drop the
issue.
In coming months, Bhutto, Daoud, and the
National Awami Party will all ccntinue to try to
enhance their positions. In the process, any or all
could easily make miscalculations that would
bring unsought violence closer; they might even
decide that force offers the best prospect for
success.
A misreading in Kabul of the point at which
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profitable could be particularly danaerous.i
Nevertheless, there is increasing evi-
dence that Daoud is turning from advocating
autonomy for Pushtunistan to seeking the incor-
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greater Afghanistan, which may well have always
been his ultimate goal. If this is indeed now his
objective, it could reflect a serious mis-estimation
of the state of affairs across the border.
Other Foreign Relations
Traditionally, the basis of Kabul's relations
with the Great Powers has been an effort to
ensure Afghan independence by playing one out-
sider off against another. Daoud also subscribes to
this policy, although his version of Afghan nation-
alism may give Pushtunistan even greater priority.
For relations with most countries, such a shift in
emphasis makes little difference.
Daoud wants good relations with the US,
although it is not clear whether his main purpose
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is to offset Soviet influence or to limit US sup-
port for Pakistan. Relations may, in fact, be mar-
ginally better than under his somewhat pro-
-Western predecessor, because Daoud does not
have to stand up to Washington to prove his
independence.
The Pushtunistan policy and Afghan military
weakness have, however, pushed Kabul somewhat
closer to the USSR. Moscow may have speeded
up arms shipments, which should eventually im-
prove the quality of the Afghan inventory. It is
not known whether any new arms agreements
have been signed since the coup, but Soviet mili-
tary delegations have visited Kabul, there may be
a few more Soviet military advisers in the coun-
try, and more Afghans are being trained in the
USSR. The Pakistanis-and their friends, the Iran-
ians-see these developments as further evidence
of a grand Soviet design to extend Moscow's
influence in the entire area, with Pakistan and
Iran as major targets.
Neither the change in government nor the
current oil crisis has had much effect on trade
with the USSR, Afghanistan's largest trading part-
ner. With no commercially exploitable oil re-
sources and no refinery facilities, Afghanistan re-
lies heavily on the USSR to meet its petroleum
needs. For political reasons, Moscow is unlikely
to reduce petroleum shipments especially since
the amounts are so small. Further, the USSR
would not want to jeopardize its imports of Af-
ghan natural gas, which are over twice as valuable
as its petroleum exports to Afghanistan. Prices of
traded commodities are set at annual bilateral
negotiations, the next session to begin this
month.
Daoud has also tried to improve relations
with India, a potential ally against Pakistan. Ka-
bul apparently will receive limited economic and
military aid. At this time, however, the Indians
almost certainly do not believe that a further
breakup of Pakistan is in New Delhi's best inter-
ests.
The Chinese, who support Pakistan, had for
several years been trying to establish a modest
influence in Kabul, largely through economic aid.
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Relations have cooled since the coup, however,
and although they remain ostensibly correct, the
Chinese say no new aid projects are planned.
Political and Economic Problems
Daoud's preoccupation with the Pushtunis-
tan issue and with his potential domestic rivals
has left little time for dealing with the country's
basic political and economic problems.
He took power with a promise to "establish
a real and reasonable democracy" and may well
be planning to promulgate a constitution later
this year. If he should do so, the government
would still be under his control and would be
unlikely to provide the kind of democracy fa-
vored by many in the small, modern sector of the
society. It would, in fact, probably guarantee no
greater institutional stability than the 64-year-old
President can provide personally.
At the time of the coup, Daoud also prom-
ised land and fiscal reform, greater industrializa-
tion, and an end to Afghanistan's "economic
paralysis." By early November, however, the US
Embassy was reporting that the economy was
drifting toward complete stagnation. Commercial
activity was at a standstill, and the new regime
was neither developing new economic plans nor
acting on the programs and plans of the previous
government. Moreover, an overvalued currency
was damaging the export trade.
Since then, there has been some' improve-
ment, and commercial activity has picked up.
Daoud finally approved the establishment of an
internationally supported industrial development
bank and the acceptance of several foreign loans.
In December, he established a High Economic
Council, with a mandate to review the country's
economic policies.
Whatever he does, Daoud will be unable to
deliver all he has promised. The basic problem, of
course, is that Afghanistan is a very poor country,
with few known natural resources and an un-
skilled population. It can hardly expect the sort
of prosperity its rulers have been promising for
years.
Most Afghans will probably be willing to be
ruled by Daoud even if he is unable to effect the
reforms he has promised and even if the country
continues to be poor. The central government
does not usually touch their lives directly, and so
they do not give it either the credit or the blame
for much that happens. They are probably as
indifferent to Daoud as they were to Zahir.
The potential threat to Daoud comes rather
from the small, better-educated, more-urbanized
part of the society, particularly the officer corps
and the leftists in the bureaucracy. In time, they
may well take action if Daoud does not appear to
be making progress in the economic field, or if his
Pushtunistan policy again fails. For the time
being, however, Daoud appears to be winning the
struggle for dominance.
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