WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT VENEZUELA LOOKS TOWARD THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Venezuela Looks Toward the Caribbean
Secret
N! 671
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9 February 1973
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"Without denying the reasons which under-
lay the earlier positions, it falls to us to a;,press a
real national desire for the opening up of our
foreign relations sector, with the general re-estab-
lishment of links with those Latin American
countries from which we had become alienated,
to no good purpose, and through the establish-
ment or renewal of relations with other countries
in the world we cannot afford to ignore."
-President Ca'dera, March 1970.
Prosperity, nationalism, and economic and
security interests have combined in the past
decade to turn Venezuela's attention toward the
Caribbean as a natural area for Caracas to expand
its political and economic influence. The election
of the Caribbean-oriented Christian Democratic
administration of President Caldera in March
1969-following a century of Andean-oriented
dictators and presidents-provided the catalyst for
a shift to a more active role in the area. In
characterizing Venezuelan foreign policy, a lead-
ing official of the new government stated that the
policy is directed toward maintaining relations
with all countries, especially those which "inter-
est us from a political, economic, and cultural
point of view." The working of that foreign
policy over the past few years demonstrates that
it is the smaller Caribbean states and depend-
encies and the Communist government of Cuba
that interest Caracas.
After coming to power in March 1969, the
Christian Democratic government of President
Caldera moved quickly to assert its own person-
ality. As promised during the election campaign,
the Betancourt Doctrine of not recognizing "il-
legal" governments-those installed by coups-in
the Western Hemisphere was discarded. Within
two months diplomatic relations were restored
with Peru, Panama, and Argentina. In June 1972,
Venezuela re-established relations with Haiti,
leaving Cuba the only Caribbean nation with
which Caracas does not have diplomatic ties.
The government has also pressed ahead with
the previous administration's policy of closer ties
with Eastern Europe. Relations have been re-es-
tablished with the USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland,
Romania, and Czechoslovakia. A trade mission
has been dispatched to the People's Republic of
China, and a small commercial agreement has
been initiated.
Until 1969, Venezuelan governments gen-
erally paid little attention to the Caribbean,
Rather, their attention has focused on internal
New Attention to the Caribbean Region...
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problems and on relations with the other states in
South America, with the United States, and with
Europe. The Christian Democratic government's
predecessor, a Democratic Action government,
carried on in closer association with the Andean
states than with the economically less attractive
mini-states of the Caribbean. In fact, had that
party been returned to power in 1968, Venezuela
probably would now be a member of the Andean
Pact-a five-nation economic grouping made up of
Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador-and
the Caribbean would be an area of secondary
interest. Both the Christian Democratic Party and
President Caldera, however, look more to the
north and to Europe, both in terms of ideology
(Christian Democracy has its well-spring in
Europe and the Venezuelan party is generously
supported by Christian Democratic parties of
Italy and the Federal Republic or Germany) and
in terms of the economic relationships to be
found among the better developed nations.
Despite Venezuela's earlier Andean orienta-
tion, it has not felt particularly close ties of
friendship and sympathy with the other Latin
American states and especially those states-
Colombia, Brazil, Guyana-that have gained ter-
ritory at Venezuela's expense.
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by a Traditionally Andean Nation
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mucn more
concerne with wealth and its raw manifestations
than with maintaining and fostering Latin tradi-
tions and values. Further, there is obvious eco-
nomic disparity. Venezuela's gross domestic
product per capita in 1971 was double the Latin
American average and second only to Argentina.
While Venezuelans see a potential threat
from Brazil, the burgeo,ting giant on Venezuela's
underdeveloped and underpopulated southern
border, as well as from the "Colossus of the
North" and its oil companies, as Venezuelans
review their recent past they see that threats to
the country's security, real or perceived, have
come largely from the Caribbean arLa. During the
latter years of the Trujillo dictatorship, the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela were bitter
enemies; in 1960 Trujillo tried to have President
Betancourt assassinated. Cuban support for
Venezuelan insurgents in the early 1960s, ti e
Essequibo dispute with Guyana which reached a
fiashpoint in 1967-68, black power troubles in
Curacao (1968) and in Trinidad and Tobago
(1970), and the dispute with Colombia over ter-
ritorial sea and continental shelf rights have
turned Venezuela's attention forcibly to its Carib-
bean neighbors. Venezuela's sensitivity to politi-
cal instability in Curacao or Trinidad is
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BAHAMA
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TRINIDAD AND
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GUYANA
SURINAM FRENCH-
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heightened by the fact that Caracas sends about
60 percent of its crude oil to these islands to be
refined.
Consequently, when the Christian Demo-
crats came to power in March 1969, the Caldera
administration began to foster closer ties with
these neighbors. The non-Caribbean neighbors
were not ignored-witness Caracas' negotiations
to enter the Andean Pact-but rather for the first
time Caribbean affairs merited equal attention. In
a speech the following year, the Venezuelan
Navy's leading Caribbeanologist and Director of
the Navy War College, Captain Manuel Diaz
Ugeto, pinpointed Venezuela's responsibilities
and commitments in this area. "Venezuela's sea is
the Caribbean," he said, adding that an opening
to the Caribbean would be the most important
step in the coming of age of Venezuela in the
international arena. He characterized this process
as "the best alternative for the country's maritime
aspirations and an appropriate balance for Vane-
zuela's relations with the South American con-
Aristides Calvani
Foreign Minister
Spec;al Report
tinent." The forty-year-old Diaz is highly re-
spected by President Caldera and is a naval con-
sultant on complex foreign policy issues. On 1
February, Diaz was appointed chief of the Presi-
dent's military household, a position which is
prestigious and a stepping stone to higher rank.
The leading force in this policy departure is
Foreign Minister Aristides Calvani, who was born
in Trinidad of Venezuelan parents. A feature of
Calvani's foreign policy is a conviction that per-
sonal contact counts for much in the interna-
tional field, and in his four years as Venezuela's
"Henry Kissinger," Calvani has, visited every
Caribbean capital except Port-au-Prince and
Havana. He is a leading ideologue in the Christian
Democratic Party and a strong believer in the
virtues of Christian Democracy as an alternative
between Communism and capitalism. Calvani
holds that it is Venezuela's manifest destiny to
Rafael Caldera
President
Manuel Diaz
Caribbeanologist
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play a major role in Caribbean affairs by guiding
and assisting the Caribbean people.
Key elements of Calvani's policy include
expansion of trade and investment, formation of
closer cultural and political ties with all the states
whether Spanish-speaking or not, and assertion of
a Venezuelan role as a champion of the interests
of the smaller states vis-a-vis the world's great
powers, especially the United States. The desire
to encourage the growth of Christian Democratic
movements throughout the Caribbean area is a
lesser corollary of this policy. Venezuela will
foster these ties even in the absence of any acute
interest on the part of the Caribbean states. To
sharpen the focus of the government's activities
toward this area, Foreign Minister Calvani an-
nounced in early January 1973 that an Office of
Caribbean Affairs was being set up within the
Foreign Ministry.
Venezuela's efforts to establish itself as the
leader of the Caribbean nations with regard to
maritime matters are illustrated by its active role
in convening the Caribbean Law of the Sea Con-
ference in November 1971 and in preparing for a
broader conference this year. Its tendency in this
direction was developed during its negotiations
with Colombia on the disputed Gulf of Vene-
zuela.
All along, Venezuela has stressed the con-
cept of a "patrimonial" sea, i.e., the coastal state
exercises jurisdiction over resources out as far as
200 miles. Venezuela would like to foster a
special Law of the Sea for the Caribbean that
would link together the maritime interests of the
various states, at least partially to defend Carib-
bean interests against those of the great maritime
powers. Venezuela's aim is to push the Caribbean
states toward a common stand, a Latin consensus
that might then be developed and presented at
the World Law of the Sea Conference. The Carib-
bean meeting in November 1971 was called with
this goal in view.
Although the meeting did not arrive at a
consensus on the idea of a "patrimonial" sea,
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considerable spade work was done and the
Caracas conference was a success from the Vene-
zuelan point of view. The nations agreed to set up
institutions for research and resources in the
Caribbean and to exchange scientific and tech-
nical knowledge. In early June 1972, representa-
tives of fifteen Caribbean countries met in Santo
Domingo and called for a Latin American con-
ference in 1973 to seek a "definitive consensus,"
which the Latin Americans would then take to
Geneva.
The Caldera government lobbied strenuously
and with success to exclude the United States
from the Caribbean meetings. Caracas no doubt
feared undue US influence on some of the Central
American nations that are unfamiliar with the
subject. Although there have been subsequent
indications the US may be allowed to send ob-
servers to future meetings, one Venezuelan noted
that inviting the US would be like "an elephant at
a meeting of fleas."
Economic Opportunities Limited But Useful
There are economic opportunities for Vene-
zuela in the Caribbean, although their importance
has not been overestimated by government offi-
cials. Perhaps because of difficulties encountered
in the negotiations for entering the five-nation
Andean pact, Venezuela has looked to the Carib-
bean Free Trade Association and the Caribbean
Development Bank as a partial alternative for
regional economic cooperation. Venezuela has
not been admitted to the former but has to the
latter and no doubt sees the bank as providing
another means for extending its economic in-
fluence in the area. Furthermore, Venezuela is
making a great effort to identify itself as a Carib-
bean tourist area and has offered technical as-
sistance in tourism to some Caribbean entities. Its
state-owned airline is an important carrier in this
area. Though these economic opportunities are
small in relation to Venezuela's over-all economy,
they are useful as a concrete expression of inter-
est in the area.
Another factor turning Venezuela toward
the Caribbean may well be a perception that the
gradual withdrawal of the British and Dutch from
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Growing Nationalism, Growing Prosperity
the area is leaving a vacuum. Indeed, there have
been complaints in the larger English-speaking
islands and also in the Dutch Antilles that Vene-
zuela is trying to gain an economic foothold in
the smaller islands. Opportunities do exist, such
as investments in petroleum refining in the An-
tilles, bauxite extraction in Guyana, and offshore
petroleum exploitation. No statistics are available,
but Venezuelan businessmen reportedly are in-
vesting heavily, particularly in food-processing
plants. Some islanders are characterizing the
Venezuelans as the new imperialists of the Carib-
bean. Perhaps symptomatic of this attitude is the
extensive publicity give; charges by a newspaper
in Curacao that Caracas pians to annex Aruba,
Bonaire, and Curacao once they are independent.
Charges such as these have stung Venezuelan
officials, and Calvani has denied that Caracas
harbors any aggressive designs on the islands or
any imperialistic ambitions. Venezuelan activities,
he said, are merely designed to extend a helping
hand. Despite these denials, there is a growing
reaction against Venezuelan initiatives, particu-
larly in the English-speaking islands. Private
British firms are beginning to see the possibility
that Venezuela might become a real competitor in
an already limited market.
Harder to define than security or economic
considerations, but perhaps just as important in
explaining Venezuela's quest for influence in the
Caribbean, is a relatively recent surge in national-
Special Report - 7 -
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ism. Prosperity and the peaceful transition of
power from one government to the next and from
one party to another have resulted in a growing
national pride.
Until the last twenty or thirty years, Vene-
zuelans have felt culturally and politically inferior
to other South American nations. Disappointed
Spaniards found no gold or great Indian civiliza-
tions there, and Simon Bolivar disparagingly
referred to Venezuela as the garrison for South
America. The unbroken succession of dictators
was the source of little pride to Venezuelans.
Territorial losses to Venezuela's neighbors grew
out of the country's backwardness. Now, Vene-
zuelans are proud of themselves and their coun-
try, and this is demonstrated in the international
field in a greater assertiveness and a decreasing
willingness to follow the US lead in international
forums. As a relatively prosperous nation, with
leaders possessing the drive and desire to play a
greater role in the world, Venezuela sees the
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Caribbean as a natural area to expand its in-
fluence and prestige.
A Stumbling Block Removed
Before the new look in Caribbean policy
could be implemented, however, the Caldera gov-
ernment had to remove or at least neutralize a
major stumbling block. In May 1970, Venezuela
and Guyana reached an agreement on a protocol
to establish a 12-year moratorium on their border
dispute. This has created an outward appearance
of friendly relations, even though officials in
Georgetown probably realize that the benign
policy of Caracas could suddenly change.
An equally emotional border dispute with
Colombia over division of the territorial sea and
continental shelf has been taken to the nego-
tiating table. No early resolution of the dispute is
expected.
Application of New Policy
Having mended fences with neighboring
Guyana and Colombia, the Caldera government
turned its attention to the rest of the Caribbean.
By 1970, it had established mixed commissions
with Trinidad and Tobago to promote coopera-
tion between the governments and among private
enterprises. Then, Foreign Minister Calvani set
out on a series of visits to one Caribbean island
after another negotiating commercial ventures,
economic assistance, and cultural exchange.
In May 1971, Calvani laid the cornerstone
for a joint-venture paper mill in St. Lucia, his first
success in stimulating Venezuelan industry to as-
sociate itself with industry elsewhere in the Carib-
bean. A year later, Calvani again visited St. Lucia
to inaugurate another joint commercial venture.
Between these two events came official visits by
Calvani to six English-speaking West Indies As-
sociated States as well as the islands of the Dutch
Antilles. Caracas also embarked on a strenuous
courtship of Surinam, which is also involved in a
border dispute with Guyana. A steady procession
of Venezuelan cultural performers and exhibits
have been sent to Surinam, and large numbers of
Surinamers have been invited to Caracas. Re-
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cently, a large government-business mission from
Surinam, led by Minister of Economy Rens, was
treated to a lavish reception followed by as-
surances of Venezuelan support should Surinam's
border problems with Guyana escalate.
I-) addition, the Venezuelan and Barbadian
ministers of agriculture exchanged visits, and the
prime minister of St. Vincent and the minister of
justice of the Netherland Antilles were officially
received in Caracas. In August 1972, representa-
tives of St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Antigua, Grenada, St.
Vincent, and Dominica met with Venezuelan gov-
ernment officials and exporters. Agreements for
cultural exchanges and the establishment of
eleven joint industries were signed. In November
1972, the vice president and foreign minister of
the Dominican Republic paid official visits to
Caracas followed in late January by a visit from
the Dominican Republic's armed forces chief.
President Caldera himself, in speeches, press con-
ferences, and other public forums, has empha-
sized the importance his government places on
relations with the area; in September 1971, he
paid a highly publicized visit to Curacao, the first
such visit by a Venezuelan head of state.
In this spate of activity, Cuba and Puerto
Rico have not been overlooked, but they do
present unique problems for Venezuelan policy
makers.
Opinion is divided in Venezuela over what
Puerto Rico stands for. Leftists claim that it
represents a classic example of a country's accept-
ing total political domination of the US in return
for economic success-an analogy which the left
finds applicable to Venezuela. On the other hand,
the government has shown interest in studying
some successful Puerto Rican institutions. Vene-
zuela has an interest in the island commonwealth
not only for cultural reasons but also as a market
for petroleum. Regarding Puerto Rico's future
political status, Venezuelans by and large
ambivalent.
While opinion may be divided on Puerto
Rico, there is no discernible division of opinion in
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government, political, or economic circles regard-
ing policy toward Castro's Cuba. A slow but per-
ceptible shift toward relations with Cuba is in line
with successes in the government's pacification
program and its belief in universality with regard
to relations among nations. A further spur to
accommodation is the widespread belief that
there will be a shift in US policy toward Cuba.
Caldera and Calvani have made it clear that Vene-
zuela looks forward to Cuba's reincorporation
into the Inter-American System. Responsible ele-
ments in Venezuela are urging a change. The
opposition Democratic Action party would prob-
ably be willing to go along if several sister states
were to change their policies. Even military lead-
ers, who still carry memories of the high price
pair' by security forces in combating Cuban-sup-
ported guerrillas, would not be totally opposed to
closer ties with Havana. The direction is clear, the
question is one of timing: "Venezuela will be
neither the first nor the last to establish relations
with Cuba."
Although diplomatic relations do not exist,
in the past year there has been a significant
amount of low-level contact, especially in the
a. eas of culture, sports, and education. Exchanges
of delegations have been increasing and a Prensa
Latina office has been allowed to operate in
Caracas. A number of other options involving
trade lies and economic relations are available.
Leading officials in Caldera's own Christian
Democratic party have raised the possibility that
Venezuela may ship some of its petroleum to
Cuba. Recently the acting president of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party said that negotiations were
under way with the USSR on providing some part
of its petroleum shipments to Cuba from Vene-
zuelan sources. The Christian Democrat's presi-
dential candidate Lorenzo Fernandez has said, "If
the Soviet Union wants to buy oil from Vene-
zuela because it is inconvenient to transport oil all
the way from the USSF', why not sell the oil to it.
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It is good business for Venezuela, and solves a
problem for the Soviet Union. Nobody loses."
Such a sale would not only demonstrate the polit-
ical independence of Venezuela's foreign policy,
but would also strengthen Caracas' position
among those of its neighbors that have already
established relations with Havana.
The increasing attention to Caribbean affairs
could have serious implications for US policy. If
Venezuela can consolidate a position as a leader
among Caribbean states, it may encourage them
to take positions on international matters-such
as Law of the Sea-which could be inimical to US
interests.
For the time being, Venezuelan military and
economic power in the Caribbean is still minimal,
and Venezuelan investment in the poor islands,
although welcome, is marginal compared with
other foreign investment and assistance. The
extent to which Venezuela pushes its interests in
the region will be governed to a large extent by
the outcome of the current negotiations on mem-
bership in the Andean Pact and the Venezuelan
presidential election to be held in December.
Entry into the five-nation Andean Common
Market could deflect some of the current atten-
tion on the Caribbean back toward the Andes. A
similar result might be expected if the Christian
Democrats are not returned to power.
Nevertheless, regardless of the outcome,
Venezuela will remain an influence in the Carib-
bean. Geography, security, and economic inter-
ests argue for this role, as does Venezuela's inter-
est in serving as a bridge between the under-
developed and developed world and between
North and South America.
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