WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHINA: A TOUCH OF PARALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-J216c
w 1, Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
China: A Tomb of Paralysis
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES DPtANCI
FILE Cuey
DO NO? DESThOY
Secret
N2 657
1 December 1972
No. 0398 72A
/
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042
-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO
(Elected April 1969)
Mao Tse-tung (78) Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Chairman, Central Committee Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head,
Yeh Chun (44)
VG ~- C i ilitary Affairs
-in itte ; efens er tee %
Chou En-lai (74)
Premier
K'ang Sheng (72)
Adviser, C F-ROvatu
nternal Security Chief
Chi Teng-k'uei (40)'
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military
Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
rovincial
mittee
Chang Ch'un?ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Second
Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution
Group
Li Te-sheng (61)
Commander, Anhwei Military
District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Hsu Shih-yu (64)
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander.
Nanking Military Region; Chairman,
Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary
Committee
Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Member,
Cultural Revolution Group
'Alternate Members Inactive
Huang Yurng-sheng (62
C of-c~~St itary Af-
ommi
Ch'iu Hui-tso (56)
Deputy C ? taff; Army
_Legistics C i ry Af-
fairs Committee
Li Tso-p'eng (60)
e uty chief of S ; Po-
litical sar, Navy;
Mitsiary Affairs o ittee
Wu Fa-hsien (58)
-9e, uty Chief W -Staff; Com-
man rce; Military
Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Af-
fairs Committee
Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister
Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown)
Public Security Vice Minister; Direc-
tor, General Office, Party Central
Committee
Chu Te (85)
Chairman Utk eoplWs
ess
eople's
ss; Military Affairs Committee
Tung Pi-wu (85)
Vice Chaim!]! s epublic
eft naa
lic SecurityJJiaister; Chairman,
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
25X1
China: A Touch of Paralysis
Despite the outward appearance of order in China, stability has not been fully
re-established since the purge a year ago of Lin Piao. The notion that Defense
Minister Lin Piao, the man chosen personally by party chairman Mao Tse-tung as
designated successor, could turn against the great helmsman has sharply eroded
confidence in the country's leadership. The failure to reconstitute the ruling Polit-
buro and replace the military leaders who went down with Lin, together with the
general absence of leadership turnouts and authoritative policy pronouncements,
leaves a clear impression that tensions exist among the surviving leaders-on impres-
sion that is evidently share i by numerous low- and middle-level cadres in China.
Moreover, there are signs that a significant number of military men who hold power
in the provinces may also be purged-a situation that involves real risks for domestic
political order.
During this time of uncertainty and strain, Premier Chou En-lai has played a
pivotal role, seeking to diminish the divisive forces at work while guiding China on
the road toward political recovery. It is largely through his efforts that the political,
military and economic machinery has continued to function. On the question of the
fate of the military leaders in the provinces, for example, Chou seems intent on
limiting the damage, at least until the wounds of the Lin affair have had time to
heal. His efforts at moderation are meeting resistance, however, and further clashes
within the Politburo are by no means out of the question. In such a conflict, Mao's
role obviously would be a determining factor, and the aging party chairman seems to
be keeping his options open.
In view of the magnitude of the problem,
the regime has achieved notable success in
managing the aftermath of the purge of Lin Piao.
Basic social order has been maintained. The
armed forces have remained stable while the
regime moved to re-subordinate them to civilian
party control. The trend toward moderation in
domestic po!icies-a trend evident since 1969 and
one that has wide popular support-has been even
more pronounced since Lin's departure. In the
conduct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a
succession of triumphs in 1972, the fruit of a
decision several years ago to pursue a more
pragmatic and outjoing foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the events of last autumn
dramatically shattered the fragile political mosaic
Special Report - 3 -
painfully constructed at the party congress in
1969, and the leadership has been extremely
cautious in picking up the pieces. The havoc is
most evident within the Politburo itself; only 16
of the original 25 members named in 1969 are
still mentioned in the official press, by name, and
of these only a dozen appear to be taking part in
the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay
in reconstituting the Politburo is undoubtedly
associated with the question of the military's
proper place in that body.
While the regime wrestles with this problem,
the armed forces are without designated leaders.
Marshal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de
facto defense minister but has not been officially
appointed to this position. Similarly, no one has
been named to replace chief of staff Huang
Yung-sheng, and the vacancies at the top of the
1 December 1972
Approved For Release 2005/0-S'EECR FTDP85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
25X1
air force, navy, and logistics services remain un-
filled. This does not mean that the administration
of the armed forces has been neglected .jr that the
efficiency of the armed forces has suffered se-
verely; merely that they have been an uncom-
monly long time without formally d3signated
leaders.
Because Lin was officially designated Mao's
successor, Peking must also work out a new for-
muia for succession and rewrite a substantial
segment of party history. The idea of a post-Mao
"collective leadership" has persisted for at least a
year, anti it seems likely that it is the composition
of this collective, rather than the principle itself,
that is still at issue. While Peking vacillates, the
leadership grows older: Mao Tse-tung will be 79
this month, and Premier Chou is 74.
The Lin affair and its sequel make it ap,-;ear
that one of the central issues in Peking is civilian
versus military control. In fact, the issues at stake
are much more complex. Evidence-some of it
antedating Lin's demise-indicates that while the
institutional problem is a real one, the leadership
has long been deeply divided on a much wider
range of policy and personnel questions. The
Cultural Revolution itself, with its bitter factional
disputes and Red Guard mania, clearly added to
and intensified personal antipathies, particularly
between radical leaders who were identified with
its excesses and those of a more moderate persua-
sion. It is hard to believe that these antipathies
have now vanished or that, on any given issue,
they no longer cut across institutional lines,
including the armed forces.
The actual facts surrounding the demise of
Lin Piao in September 1971 may never be known
in detail, but, in any event, it has not ended the
rivalry between moderate and radical forces at the
center. The purge removed the leading spokesman
of radical interests in the armed forces, Lin Piao
himself. On the other hand, it also claimed as
victims high-level military officers who had been
at the opposite end of the political spectrum,
most notably the former chief of staff, Huang
Yung-sheng. Moreover, a campaign against ul-
Special Report - 4 -
traleftists-which had begun in late 1969 and
evidently was directed by Chou En-lai-has been
muted since Lin's fall, even though a number of
extreme leftist figures are still prominent and
active. For example, Chiang Ching, deputy head
of the Cultural Revolution Group, which directed
Mao's purge of the old party apparatus, should
have been an earl; target, but as Mao's wife she
has thus far been immune. Another prominent
leftist, Shanghai party leader Yao Wen-yuan, con-
tinues to appear frequently in Pekir.g.
Despite the uneasy political equilibrium
within the leadership in Peking, China's policies at
home and abroad seem well defined. Rationality
and pragmatism seem to be the order of the day,
not only in foreign policy but also in such do-
mestic areas dear to Mao's heart as education.
Indeed, some of the present educational policies,
such as the broadening of the academic cur-
riculum and the special advantages given to tal-
ented students, are a virtual repudiation of con-
cepts Mao himself has advocated in the past.
From time to time, there are hints in domestic
media that the move toward moderation is being
challenged on a selective basis, but these chal-
lenges have had no visible impact on policy
implementation.
Military Under Fire
The protracted effort to repudiate Lin Piao
is almost certainly raising political temperatures
throughout the country. Since early this year,
cadres have been studying a succession of docu-
ments spelling out the alleged details of Lin's
coup plut. The key item in this series, the so-
called "571 document," contains Lin's purported
operations plan. The plan lists not only those
forces that Lin could count on for support-
primarily in the air force-but also a number of
other military units he was attempting to enlist in
the plot. The implication is strong that there are
elements within the armed forces whose loyalty is
being questioned in Peking. The most recent doc-
ument in the anti-Lin series, issued in early July,
is more ominous. It suggests that the central
authorities may be considering moves against a
wide range of military leaders and that the au-
thorities will not in the future wait for written
evidence to move against such individuals.
Approved For Release 2005/01&E-GR UP85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01k5KffP85T00875R001500040042-2
25X1
CHINA: Missing Provincial Military Leaders
HEILUNGKIAN(i
Wang Chia-tap
SINKIANG
Lung Shu-chin
Special Report
PEr.ING
-z KlAN
Sun r
ri-cha
ANHWEI(
Cheng
iih-chip
KIANGSI
Approved For Release 2005/01/,% C?IREgP85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
of a number of provincial military leaders to
25X1
Some members of the leadership may in fact
be exploiting the Lin affair to bring down the
military leaders of the provinces. This impression
has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure
If a move against these leaders is under way,
even on a selected basis, it risks jeopardizing do-
mestic political order. The Cultural Revolution
dismantled the old party and government bu-
reaucracies, leaving the military as the best avail-
able unified instrument of control. Efforts have
been made to re-establish the civilian party struc-
ture and to reassert the party's leading role, but
military Izaders still hold the balance of power in
the party apparatus in many pla,.es outside
Peking. Thus, a move against these military
leaders, particularly if widespread, could con-
ceivably cause a breakdown in control, since no
alternative mechanism is available to fill the void.
This consideration could help explain why Peking
is moving with such caution in this matter.
Paralysis in the Provinces
The political uncertainty generated by the
protracted anti-Lin campaign is having a notice-
Special Report
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 .QEBP85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
Liu Hsing-yisan
levels is likely to continue until the leaders at the
center resolve their fundamental policy and per-
sonnel problems.
Throughout the Cultural Revolution, it was
not Lin Piao, the defense minister, but Chou
En-lai, with no official military title, who kept
the armed forces generally i:nited and to al
during a period of extreme stress.
Special Report
25X1
25X1
Given this background, it is no suprising to
find that in 1972 Chou is again being linked with
efforts to protect harassed military administrators
in the provinces.
An example of how a provincial luminary
can be buffeted about is provided by the case of
Liu Hsing-yuan, a career military officer who ran
Kwangtung Province until March of this year. At
that time, reports began to circulate that Liu, a
close associate of purged chief of staff Huang
Yung-sheng, was being transferred to the top
party post in Szechwan Province in southwest
China. His transfer to Szechwan would serve two
objectives: it would separat,3 him from his south
China power base, thus carrying out the logical
extension of Huang's purge; at the same time, it
would preserve his prestige, because his assign-
ment would be an even more responsible post.
Similar stratagems were used by Premier Chou
during the Cultural Revolution on the behalf of
25>
After remaining in the shadows for seven
months, Liu Hsing-yuan showed up again last
week in Szechwan. He was identified only as a
"leading member" of the Szechwan hierarchy,
but the fact that he gave the major speech for the
occasion will be a signal to many that he is or will
be the province chief. This sequence of events
suggests that Liu's transfer may have been
opposed by those seeking to reduce the influence
of moderate elements within the military estab-
lishment. The length of his absence from view
could mean that Chou, if in fact he pushed for
Approved For Release 2005/01/11$EIQ-l P85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
25X1
An Accusatory Finger?
Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching at a National Day musical performance on 1 October this year.
Liu's transfer, had some difficulty getting his way
even though he finally prevailed.
Chou, in any event, can be expected to have
a realistic view of the dangers inherent in trying
to reduce the army's political role too abruptly.
He is apt to urge caution at every step along this
path. The moderates among the provinical mili-
tary figures would appear to have nowhere else to
turn if they are to make their voices heard in
Peking.
Many of the fires that Chou has been called
upon to put out in the last six years were lit by
Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. On at least one oc-
casion, she herself was burned. In July 1967, at
the height of the Wuhan confrontation, Chiang
Ching urged that her militant Red Guard groups
be armed in order to defend themselves against
the repressive actions of the conservative military
Special Report
leaders in the provinces. Chaos ensued, and by
September 1967 Madame Mao was obliged to
back down and disavow her slogan, "arm the
masses."
Since 1969, most of the extremist policies
associated with the madame and other Cultural
Revolution leaders have been discarded, 2&X1
Chiang Ching continues to be accorded a high
place among the narty elite. e e d only by
Mao and Chou.
25X1
On the basis of what is known about their
behavior in the Cultural Revolution, Chou and
Chiang Ching probably differ sharply today not
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 6F 85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
25X1
Photos taken from a Canton television broadcast monitored in Hong Kong.
only on the question of the fate of military
province chiefs but also on a number of other
important personnel and policy matters. Since the
Cultural Revolution ground to an end, the two
have been able to mask these differences from
public view, but on several recent occasions for-
eign visitors to China have detected what they
believed to be considerable impatience and an-
noyance on the premier's part at Chiang Ching's
behavior. The fact that Chou and Madame Mao
are poles apart temperamentally as well as politi-
cally does not mean that they are in permanent
and implacable opposition on every issue; nor
does Chiang Ching appear to be in a position to
challenge Chou directly. Chou, for his part, is in
no position to put the madame down completely
as long as she retains Mao's patronage.
As has been the case at times in the past,
Mao's role in. China's recent internal affairs is
Special Report
obscure. In some respects, lie has removed himself
from the public stage. He has not presided over a
major public gathering since the funeral of the
late foreign minister Chen I in January 1972 and
has not appeared on the rostrum at Tien An Men
Square in Peking since May 1971. The chairman's
periodic meetings with foreign visitors in his
private residence indicate that his mental and
physical condition are probably not the reason
for his reduced public activity.
The pattern of Mao's recent activities, in
fact, is reminiscent of earlier periods in which he
engaged in intense behind-the-scenes maneu-
vering, either to shore up his own position or to
plot the next move against real or fancied op-
ponents. It could be, for example, that Mao is
personally directing the anti-Lin campaign,
viewing it as an opportunity to settle scores with
a number of provincial military leaders, primarily
those whose opposition to the Red Guard
Approved For Release 2005/O1/1'F"-CAA'-F~T85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
movement led to a closing out of the Cultural
Revolution before it had accomplished all of
Mao's objectives.
On the other hand, the chairman must rec-
ognize that his close personal identification with
Lin renders him vulnerable in important ways.
The 571 document contains unusually harsh
words about Mao's leadership. It accuses him of
imposing ill-conceived and unpopular domestic
programs and characterizes him as a "cruel
tyrant." This attack on the chairman is attributed
25X1
to Lin, and it has been circulated with Mao's
explicit approval. Still, the effect has been to give
wide publicity to a list of grievances against Mao
with which many officials can identify. Indeed,
there are signs that the regime-and perhaps Mao
himself-are taking steps to disassociate the chair-
man from the Cultural Revolution experience. A
letter now circulating officially seems designed to
show that Mao was opposed to Lin Piao and that
Piao was less than enamored with "leftists" in
general as early as 1966. This hardly seems to
conform with the facts.
The 571 Document on Mao's Leadership,16 January 1972
(Mao) is the greatest dictator and tyrant in the history of China.
The days of B-52 (this reference is clearly to Mao) are numbered. B-52 has consistently
adopted the tactics of "divide and rule"; he is very cunning and treacherous and very rarely leaves
his residence.
Nobody has ever been able to work with him from beginning to end. Today you are his guest
of honor, but tomorrow you will be his prisoner.
He is a suspicious and cruel maniac.
His several secretaries and some people who were close to him were either killed or locked up
and struggled against.
The struggle in the party has come to typify his personal likes and grudges.
The leadership of the ruling group has fallen into corrupt, decadent, ignorant, and inefficient
hands.
The troops are under pressure, and dissatisfaction is widespread among cadres of the middle
and upper ranks.
Initially the Red Guards were hoodwinked into serving as cannon fodder, but now they are
being suppressed, criticized, and repudiated. The sending of intellectual youth to the mountains it
the countryside is just another torm of labor reform.
Cadres sent to the countryside are just swelling the ranks of the unemployed.
The living standard of workers and peasants is falling; the freezing of the wages of the
workers, particularly young workers, has increased dissatisfaction.
The socialist system in China is now being threatened in a serious manner.
Special Report _10-
Approved For Release 2005/01/11SET5T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
At the same time, there has been a marked
de-emphasis in Mao's role as the party's theo-
retical guide. Propaganda organs in China are
reverting to more orthodox ways of justifying
policy; namely, invoking the authority of the
"party line" rather than citing passages from
chairman Mao's works. Mao himself has given
personal approval to a general playing down of his
"cult," however, and speculation within-and out-
side-China that Mao is losing his grip and is
about to step down is at best premature.
25X1
The Coming Months
At this juncture, these domestic headaches
seem containable. Pro',incial military leaders are
not being faced, either collectively or individ-
ually, with the massive public attacks and orches-
trated violence that were a leitmotif of the
Cultural Revolution. Premier Chou's coricein for
the loyalty of the armed forces to the political
system is surely as great as his concern for the
cohesion of the military establishment. On both
Chairman Mao at the Funeral of the Late Foreign Minister Chen 1, 10 January 1972
Special Report
1 December 1972
Approved For Release 2005/018 E 1 - P85T00875R001500040042-2
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040042-2
SECRET
scores, he is likely to attempt to limit the damage
rather than place himself at the head of a group
determined to end the pressures against the mili-
tary, especially if such a stance would involve
open defiance of Mao.
Mao's motives in the present situation are
less predictable. He was stung by the army's
equivocal role in the Cultural Revolution, and
vindictiveness on his part could be .4 major factor
in the current drive to unseat the provincial mili-
tary. Mao presumably is aware of the disruptive
influence of his wife, but he seems unwilling to
put a stop to all her activities. On the other hand,
the chairman's willingness to support relatively
conservative and pragmatic policies at home as
well as abroad seems to indicate that he is not
preparing for another major political offensive at
this time. Mao seems intent on establishing a
better balance between competing leftist and con-
servative forces-and hence enhancing his own
maneuverability-by whittling away at the pre-
dominantly conservative military leaders in the
provinces through a process of linking them, how-
ever tenuously, to Lin Piao.
25X1
Mao may not be content for long merely to
whittle away. His seeming lack or activity and the
surface calm in China may again only be the
reassuring backdrop an old magician artfully
develops before he unveils his next startling trick.
A hint as to what it will be may have beer,
provided in appointments recently made in
Peking. While most of the new appointees are
conservatives who were under attack during the
Cultural Revolution, there are two notable excep-
tions. The elevation of these two leftist veterans
of the Cultural Revolution points to the possi-
bility of yet another leftward swing of the olit-
ical pendulum.
25X1
Special Report
Approved For Release 2005/01DP85T00875R001500040042-2