WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT GUATEMALA: NATION IN TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 16, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Guatemala.- Nation in Transition
C I A Secret
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH N? 653
16 June 1972
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 Guatemala, a land of five million people in an area about the size of Ohio, has
always been somewhat of an enigma. To the tourist, it is a spectacular land dotted
with Mayan ruins and colorful Indian villages. To the armchair traveler, it is a
menacing and violent country where ambassadors are assassinated, and extremists on
the left and right vie in killing each other. The economist sees a basically healthy and
expanding economy, but the sociologist observes a society that operates almost
exclusively for the aggrandizement of a small upper class, leaving the multitudes to
live in poverty and ignorance. The political analyst perceives the result of this deep
social cleavage in a turbulent political system characterized by a growing estrange-
ment between the intellectual and business elites. Indeed, a pessimist would suggest
that the country is poised on the edge of an abyss.
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The reality is riot so bleak; the country is in
no danger of falling apart. President Carlos Arana,
nearly half way through his term of office, is
firmly in power and enjoys solid military support.
Although the leftist insurgency has not been de-
stroyed, it has suffered serious losses as a result of
a vigorous government counterinsurgency pro-
gram and has no chance of overthrowing the
government anytime soon.
Arana has shown himself to be a master of
Guatemalan political arts. He has been tough on
his political foes, capitalizing on existing rivalries
to divide and demoralize the political opposition.
He has been careful to keep political tension
below the critical point. He has discouraged many
of the excesses of the extreme right and remains
sensitive to international and domestic pressures
to reduce the violence.
Having spent much of his time thus far learn.
ing the ropes and dealing with the security prob-
lem, Arana may be able to use his ren-.Jining two
years to improve schools and medical 'ervices and
to assist the rural poor to achieve a better life.
This is not to suggest that vested interests will be
displaced or that a new social order is just around
the corner, but calls for reform and change are
less likely to be equated with Communism. Some
very necessary, though probably fairly narrow,
reforms may be achieved, and, more important, a
foundation may be laid on which future adminis-
trations can build.
Of perhaps even greater significance for
Guatemala's future will be Arana's preparation
for the 1974 elections. Already, there are a num-
ber of serious candidates. Arana must first decide
whether to strengthen Guatemala's shaky demo-
cratic tradition by holding the elections, or
whether his own ambitions will require that he
have more time in office. If the elections are held,
Arana will have to decide whether to run26X1
candidate, perhaps a military man, who will con-
tinue a moderat.s reform program, or whethsr In
Mario Sandoval
hat decision alone cou
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determine the course the country takes for the
next decade.
Political Polarization
When, in July 1970, President Mendez
turned his sash of office over to Colonel Arana, it
was only the third time in nearly 150 years that a
Guatemalan president had completed his tern of
office, and the first time that a freely elected
president of one party turned power over to the
opposition. It should have been a day of great joy
for political moderates who had long hoped fc'
some augury of political maturity and respect for
democratic institutions, but it was not. Arana was
the champion of the far right, with gory creden-
tials as an architect of the counter-terror ap-
proach to subversion. He had run a somber Iaw
and order campaign and had garnered only 42
percent of the popular vote. He was a minority
president, who, many felt, possessed neither the
brainpower nor the temperament for the job.
While the moderates were apprehensive,
there was rejoicing on the far right and, strangely
enough, on the extreme left as well. The right was
itching for a no-holds-barred counter-terror cam-
paign that might once and for all destroy the
Communist and leftist apparatus. The left wel-
comed the advent of what it saw as a more
narrowly based regim': that, through its own in-
eptness and repression, would arouse sufficient
discontent to give the insurgents a degree of pop-
ular support that had thus far eluded them.
As president, Arana was a disappointment to
both extremes. The guerrillas, in particular, saw
little profit in letting the government Play at
reform and stepped up terrorist activity to pro-
voke repressive action.
The Insurgents
Arana was not dealing with a mere rash on
the body politic but with a full-blown disease. He
was facing neither a group of radical students who
thought it fashionable to become weekend guer-
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rillas nor transient disturbances that could be
brought to an end by a fev, arrests and a few
concessions. Instead, Arana was up against a
determined, disciplined, experienced, and ade-
quately funded terrorist movement that had
existed for over a decade and had taxed the
energies and resources of three previous adminis-
trations.
The pro-Soviet Communist Party with its
action arm and the Cuban-oriented Rebel Armed
Forces are the two major subversive groups. The
Communists, with a hard core of 500-700 and
Probably twice that many sympathizers, accept
guerrilla warfare and terrorism as important tools
in the struggle for power. They agree, too, that
there is tactical utility in kidnaping for ransom
and occasionally assassinating government offi-
ngages in these activities. he party,
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however, rejects the view that this alone is suf-
ficient to overthrow the government. On the con-
trary, it places primary attention on organization
of worker-peasant-student fronts as a broadly
based political framework for guerrilla activity.
Having tasted political power under Arevalo
(1945-51) and Arbenz (1951-54), the Communist
leaders also emphasize the need to infiltrate and
work through the legal political parties.
The Rebel Armed Forces, on the other hand,
has largely ignored, indeed scorned, this type of
political activity. It espouses a more simplistic
approach that has had considerable appeal for its
younger and less-sophisticated membership a -
This group has held as an
ar is e o ai a full-scale guerrilla warfare is
the best and quickest road to power. As a first
step, it has stressed the use of terror to cripple the
governint-it, hinder its security forces, and gain
publicity. The general public, it believes, will be
forced to become involved as government coun-
ter-terror comes more and more to affect the lives
of the people.
The guerrillas provided a most s9rious threat
to stability from 1963 to 1966 and again in the
early days of the Mendez regime. From late 1966
through mid-1967, the military launched a fero-
cious anti-guerrilla c{fensive that not only set the
insurgents on their ear, but precipitated a blood-
bath to which many innocent people fell victim.
Insurgency remained at a relatively low level from
1958 to mid-1970 as the insurgents devoted
themselves to reorganization, resupply, and re-
cruitment. Nevertheless, it was during this period
that some of the most spectacular terrorist opera-
tions occurred. The murder of US Ambassador
Mein during a kidnap attempt in August 1968 and
the murder of West German Ambassador Von
Spreti in April 1970 drew world attention to
Guatemala. Terrorist activity flared at the height
of the 1970 presidential campaign as the insur-
gents attempted to embarrass the government and
force cancellation of the elections. The Arana
victory and the Von Spreti incident led to an
undeclared truce that lasted a few months. By
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I wish to make clear... that my becoming chief
executive would signify in one word: order. Order in
all aspects of life. Order at the cost of any sacrifice
and above any obstacle.
-accepting nomination, Feb 69
Arana and Caceres Henhoff (vice president) of-
fered peace, order, and tranquility to a desperate
people who lived in fear and who were longing for...
security. They will keep their promise.
-after declaring state of siege, Nov 70
I have tried to save the country by respecting all
its bastitutions and laws.... But perhaps our enemies
have underestimated us, have confused serenity with
tolerance, and tolerance with weakness. They are
totally mistaken.
-address to the nation, May 72
mid-September 1970, however, bombings, kid-
napings, and murders had increased dramatically.
By early November, Arana was coming under very
heavy criticism for the drift and lack of direction
in his handling of the internal security situation.
On 13 November, he finally took up the gauntlet.
He put the country sander a state of siege and
unleashed the security forces.
The security forces floundered at first, ap-
pearing ridiculous as they picked up mini-skirted
girls and long-haired youths on dcwntown streets,
pulling down the hems of the former and shaving
the heads of the latter. Nevertheless, it was not
long before the security forces settled into their
job. The terrorists began to suffer important de-
feats, losing key leaders, safe-house facilities, sup-
ply centers, and arms caches. The security ser-
vices, however, were not overly preoccupied with
the niceties of law, and their scatter-gun tactics
resulted in some unjustified killings. Moreover,
with the resurgence of rightist terrorist groups,
violence climbed far above the levels that had
precipitated the state of siege.
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The state of siege restricted political activ-
ities and suspended certain constitutional guar-
antees, but there was no curfew and the life of
the average Guatemalan was little affected. Then,
too, political violence had become so much a part
of life that its increase did not immediately pene-
trate the popular apathy. But, as the months went
by, public support of the government crackdown
began to evaporate. Restiveness began to grow
among students, professors, church officials, the
bar association, and the political opposition. Even
some of Arana's own supporters began to suggest
the need for a change; the cure had become more
painful than the disease.
Arara was not insensitive to this changing
domestic mood and was even more concerned by
criticism in the foreign press. He began to dis?
courage the extra-legal activities of the right and,
if he did not succeed in eliminating them, at least
kept them in check. By November 1971, Arana
concluded that he had squeezed all possible polit-
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ical mileage out of his get-tough campaign. He
declared his pacification program a success and
lifted the year-old state of siege.
In a political sense the pacification program
was, indeed, a success. Arana had seriously weak-
ened the subversive movement without causing
irreparable cracks in the body politic. The tactical
losses suffered by the guerrillas had far exceeded
any strategic gains, and they were in need of a
period of recuperation. Government pressures,
moreover, appeared to have forced the insurgents
to shift some of their attention from Guatemala
City to the rural areas, particularly the Peten,
Guatemala's sparsely populated northernmost
province. Since tension over violence in Guate-
mala appears directly proportional to incidents in
the capital, this alone has solved some problems
for the government.
On the other hand, the guerrillas retain their
organizational integrity and the capacity to en-
gage in selected acts of terror. The result could
best be described as a standoff in the govern-
ment's favor. The government has not destroyed
the terrorists; the terrorists have not even come
close to overthrowing the government.
What Arana had succeeded in doing, there-
fore, was to remove much of the accumulated
pressures from the right and the left and to buy
time to pursue, if he chooses, more fundamental
and far-reaching social and economic policies. Al-
though the state of siege has ended, there is no
sign that security forces vJl become less vigilant
or less aggressive. The government will continue
to try to keep the guerrillas off-balance and on
the run. The Castroite Rebel Armed Forces, of
course, is not likely to admit the bankruptcy of
its guerrilla warfare strategy nor forswear vio-
lence. It may take greater care that its activities
do not become identified in the public mind as
ordinary criminality. it may consider a more
sophisticated political approach designed to
broaden its base of support and may once again
opt for closer ties with the Communist Party. The
Communists, for their part, are likely to be more
convinced than ever of the importance of a politi-
cal program and take great pains to avoid provok-
ing the government at this time.
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Guatemala's political problems do not begin
and end with the insurgency movement. There are
the social conditions that spawru'd it, the political
conditions that perpetuate it, and the slim pos-
sibilities for meaningful change. The facts are
grim. A majority of Guatemalans are illiterate,
subsistence farmers mired in poverty. Their diet is
inadequate, their education, health, and welfare
services are among the poorest in Latin America.
At the core of the problem are the Indians who
make up half the total population and whose
traditions lead them to resist social integration
and modernization. Pervasive rural poverty also
reflects the failure to develop peasant agriculture.
Growth in agricultural production has been con-
centrated in a few export crops that are raised on
a few large, modern farms. The small holder lacks
credits, education, extension services, and incen-
tives.
Guatemala, moreover, provides a striking
contrast in ideology and political style with neigh-
boring Mexico. Mexico proclaims itself the land
Arana on Development
We want to be very clear. This government has
one fundamental objective: to better the social con-
ditions of the working population.
-inauguration speech, Jul 70
We are not carrying out the pacification of the
country only with arms in hand, but we are taking
education to the countryside, bread to the farms,
health to Guatemalans, prosperity through work with
better salaries.
-press interview, Jun 71
I offered to work in order to do as much as
possible to alleviate the most pressing needs of the
poor people. I have visited almost every municipality,
listening to complaints, investigating needs, and have
understood the people's hopes and desires because I
am part of that people.
-address to the nation, May 72
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of the revolution, and Mexican governments, pro-
gressive or not, maintain that they are fulfilling
and safeguarding the 1910 revolution. Guatemala,
on the other hand, is very much the land of the
counter-revolution, and Guatemalan governments,
even when they are not totally reactionary, find it
necessary to declaim "it won't happen again
here." If prevailing political attitudes are becom-
ing dated in Mexico, they are shopworn, indeed,
in Guatemala.
Guatema Sa, of course, had its own
revolution, which began in 1944. As the upheaval
progressed, it took on all the earmarks of a classic
revolution bent on overturning the traditional
power bases and radicai'ly remolding society. First
under Juan Jose Arevalo and even more under his
successor, Jacobo Arbenz, the leadership of the
revolution fell under Communist influence. In
1954, when the government was about to give
recently acquired Czech arms to peasants avid
workers, a military coup by Colonel Castillo
Armas cast out Arbenz. Castillo Armas' overturn-
ing of land reform efforts and restoration of the
old elite to its usual place left a bitter herit-
age-violence in politics.
The political scene today has been greatly
affected by the extremes the nation has experi-
enced since 1944. On the one side are the
revolucionarios who glorify the 1944 revolution
and the beginnings of the modernization of soci-
ety under Arevalo. On the other side are the
liberacionistas who view the overthrow of Presi-
dent Arb"nz as the salvation of the country from
Communism. Reformers have been indiscrim-
inately considered Communist by the conserv-
atives, whose inflexibility in turn makes the lib-
erals more willing to collaborate with the extreme
left.
From 1966 to 1970, Mendez, a liberal,
democratically elected president, made a major
effort to arrest the polarization of Guatemalan
politics by establishing a dialogue between his
government and the power elite. He was caught,
however, in a cruel dilemma. On the one hand, he
wanted to bring about change and reform to
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President Arana visits the countryside.
prevent an explosive buildup of discontent. On
the other, his political survival depended on those
who were opposed to even the most modest re-
forms, and he had to convince the landed gentry,
businessmen, and the army that he was not work-
ing against their interests.
Mendez had been permitted to take office
on the understanding that the military would
have a free hand in dealing with the insurgents,
and his liberal image was marred by the indiscrim-
inate use of force that resulted. When, midway
through his term, he finally brought the military
to heel, he had come to accept the impossibility
of his achieving far-reaching reform. Although he
half-heartedly advocated social and economic
measures, his obsession became the survival of his
government. He began to believe that he would
make a major contribution to Guatemalan polit-
ical stability if he could only complete his term in
office and preside over the election of a constitu-
tional successor. That his successor was the repre-
sentative of the far right was the final irony.
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From the beginning of his administration,
Arana surprised his opponents by being more
than a front man for the oligarchy. His stance on
the insurgency was clear, but even in this he
showed an awareness that previous governments
had been handicapped by ineptness in public rela-
tions and an inability to win public confidence.
More important was Arana's concern with eco-
nomic development and social reform. He seemed
to realize that economic and social under-
devr-.nnment provided fertile ground for ex-
tremism a,: i violence. Unlike Mendez, Arana was
in a positiot, to talk sense about Guatemalan
development needs, to take positions at variance
with conventional political orthodoxy, and to get
away with it. His reputation and career made it
virtually impossible for the ho: iness community
or the large landowners to tar him with the Com-
munist label. Moree"er, Arana enjoyed wide-
spread support among the armed forces. He did
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not have to ~: orry about a coup nor dissipate his
e,iergy trying to maintain his political balance.
Even before his inauguration, Arana pledged
greater technical assistance and bank credits to
farmers, more job opportunities and better educa-
tional and health facilities for the masses, admin-
istrative reform and improvement of the civil
service. When he came into office, he quickly set
the tone of his administration by moving to fulfill
those pledges. In addition, Arana began imple-
menting the comprehensive five-year development
plan prepared by the Mendez government.
Pursuant to this plan, the Arana government
has taken steps to increase domestic tax revenues
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and its investment budget. Stress has been on
social. services anr, agricultural development.
Administrative reform legislation has been passed,
and the government has embarked on an
ambitious rural electrification and rural public
health program. The government also is pro-
moting agricultural research and reforming the
rural credit system.
/krana has not been content with a purely
mechanistic approach to development problems.
He has made a major effort to visit the depart-
ments and municipalities to show his concern for
the welfare of individual citizens. From this, he
has, of course, reaped direct political benefits:
good publicity, high exposu;e, and a gain in
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personal popularity. But there has been more
than tinsel. Arana has used the tours to begin a
dialogue with rural leaders, learning first-hand
about the needs of the smal; communities. He has
appeared genuinely shocked at some of the con-
ditions he has encountered, such as rural wages of
35 cents per day.
Despite all that has been done, it is far too
soon to pronounce he problem solved. Arana has
not abandoned the powerful vested interests,
which form a tightly knit and highly conservative
oligarchy. He will undoubtedly achieve sufficient
progress to prevent any significant increase in the
insurgents' popular appeal and, with the state of
siege eroded, he may pursue an even more vigorous
reform program, but it is unlikely that he will
underiaKe the kinds of reforms that will seriously
threaten vested interests. The Arana governme,it
may prove just as reluctant as previous adminis-
trations to make the politically difficult decisions
that would accelerate the rate of social change.
Even if such a course were attempted, implemen-
tation would be constrained by the shortages of
managerial skills and money, and by opposition
from the political right.
Arana may go down as a transitional figure
in Guatemalan political history. He is a product
of the army and not the oligarchy. While the
Guatemalan Armed Forces lack the reformist zeal
of the Peruvian mil;iary, they show a growing
sympathy for the plight of the impoverished. The
oligarchy tries to keep alive the dichotomy be-
tween liberacionistas and revoluclonarios and to
woo the soldiers away from any thought of
tinkering with the country's basic socio-economic
structure. Nevertheless, Arana talks of himself as
one of the "people," and his reformist impulses
appear to strike a respor.s:ve chord among many
of the junior officers. So long as this is the case,
the social, political, and cultural integration of
the lower income groups into the mainstream of
national life will probably keep pace with "effec-
tive demand," the rising expectations of the
people. If the armed forces will not serve as the
engine of progress, they will at least not be cast in
the role of a caboose with its brakes on.
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Party Politics
Even if Arana's commitment to economic
and social development is sincere, he may not be
similarly committed to building a democratic
tradition, strengthening the country's political
institutions, or creating a viable party system.
Indeed, problems associated with Guatemala's
political development are more likely to cause
difficulty in the coming months than any debate
over social policy.
First, the opposition parties are operating
under severe constraints, and the situation is not
likely to improve. Although Arana likes to think
that he is above politics, certainly above party
politics, he has never been entirely sold on the
concept of a loyal opposition and, in fact, may
consider the two words mutually exclusive.
Second, executive-legislative relations may
worsen. At present, congress is a rubber-stamp
organization. The rightist coalition holds 37 of
the 55 seats. Continued cooperation, however,
hangs by a thread, and that thread is the relation-
ship between Arana and the president of congress,
Mario Sandoval. Arana is not timid in the exercise
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of power and has the strength and determination
to bind the system to his will. Should the two
men fall out, Arana might decide to operate with-
out the congress.
Third, the 1974 elections are already casting
a very large and very dark cloud over the political
horizon. Arana is not clear who should be his
successor. It is, of course, in his interest to play
his cards close. There are indications that he will
not support Sandoval-the man who seems most
determined to run. He may as a matter of fact put
forward his own candidacy.
Apart from the illegal Communist Party,
there are five basic political parties. On the right,
the National Liberation Movement, run by San-
doval, and the Democratic Institutional Party
form the government coalition. The latter is very
much the junior partner and rather unhappy at
the cavalier treatment it is accorded by Sandoval.
It remains in the coalition for want of anywhere
else to go. On the left are the Revolutionary
Party, headed by Carlos Sagastume; the Christian
Democratic Party, led by Rene de Leon Schlotter;
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and the Democratic Revolutionary United Front,
an unregistered grouping around Manue.'' Colour
Argueta, the popular young mayor of Guatemala
City.
It is a tribute to Guatemalan courage and
stamina that there are any political parties at all.
Local officials and party leaders live harsh and
frequently brief lives. Those on the right are in
danger of assassination by the insurgents; those
on the left are in similar danger from the righ`.
Political opponents have often found it cheaper
and more convenient to rub out or scare off the
opposition than to stuff the ballot box.
The parties of the left have had a par-
ticularly hard time since Arana came into office.
Their activities were restricted by the state of
siege, their organizational efforts hamstrung by
the government-controlled electoral registry and
their members subjec,, 1 to personal intimidation.
Last December, the governing National Liberation
Movement, with a minority of delegates to a
nationwide conference of mayors, used its muscle
to elect a majority of officers. In the March
municipal elections, the party not only kept up a
Guatemalan practice whereby the government
wins a majority, but bettered any previous record.
With local control in its hands, the party now can
manipulate the electoral machinery for the 1974
presidential and congressional elections-provided
the military keeps its hands off.
Difficulties for the Revolutionary Party be-
gan soon after it lost control of the presidency.
For almost two years, from July 1970 until Feb-
ruary 1972, the government-controlled electoral
registry kept the party from electing a new leader.
In February, Carlos Sagastume won the post over
his more leftist opponer.ts with the behind-the-
scenes help of Mario Sandoval. The result was to
divide the party and make more difficult the
formation of an alliance with the Christian Demo-
crats.
With the Revolutionary Party in disorder,
the government is turning its attention toward the
Christian Democrats, who recently made the mis-
take of criticizing too loudly Arana's decision to
pay $18 million for the US-owned utility
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company that provides Guatemala City and
environs with electric power. The party leaders,
while applauding the decision not to renew the
company's fifty-year concession, argued that
since the cost to the Americans had been under
$1 million, Arana had gone too far in his gener-
osity. They hinted that Arana was retaining some
of the money for himself. Arana shortly there-
after made a nationwide radio and television ad-
dress during which he singled out the Christian
Deinocrats for criticism, and it now appears the
electoral registry is taking a close look at charges
of irregularity leveled by a dissident Christian
Democratic faction against party leader De Leon.
Although Mayor Colom is so far to the left
as to be anathema to the government coalition, it
may not block his efforts to obtain official recog-
nition for his party. This generosity would reflect
the government's interest in further fraction-
alizing the left.
Th' greatest potential for trouble, however,
may come not from government harassment of
the left but from within the government camp.
Mario Sandoval has been making it clear that he
wants to be the next president, and many in his
par 'Ly regard the Arana administration as a stage
to total political domination by Sandoval's Na-
tional Liberation Movement. Arana and probably
a majority within the military do not regard a
Sandoval candidacy as being in the best interests
of Guatemala.
25)
Sandoval is much more the doctrinaire rightist
than Arana and in many ways is a throwback to
the past. Few men on the Guatemalan political
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scene today are less likely to unify a divided
country.
Both men would like to avoid a showdown
as long as possible. Sandoval recognizes the thin-
ness of his military support and knows that he
cannot win against Arana without such backing.
Willing for the present to trade on his prestige as
party and congressional leader, he has drawn back
from a confrontation. Arana, for his part, desires
to keep control of the congress and the National
Liberation Movement and realizes that an attack
on Sandoval would split the party. Nevertheless,
unless Arana changes his mind or Sandoval is
cured of 2residential fever, a collision seems
inevitable.
25X1
16 June 1972
Approved For Release 2005/01/'ISEPR 85T00875R001500040023-3