WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SPAIN: A FUTURE WITHOUT FRANCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 24, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Spain: A Future Without Franco
25X1
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BPANCH
FILE COPY
Secret
N?_
599
24 March 1972
DO No. 0362/72A
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SPAIN: A Future Without Franco
Special Report
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 As the end of 79-year-old Chief of State
Francisco Franco's rule approaches, he is seeking
to ensure that his system of government will
continue after him. Although Franco over the
years has allowed some mellowing of the harsher
aspects of his authoritarian rule, he has not and
will not tolerate basic changes in the government
he designed for Spain. There are dissident ele-
ments in Spanish society, but after 35 years in
power Franco retains tine support or acquiescence
of the majority of Spaniards. Franco has taken
limited-but relatively significant-steps to pre-
pare for the succession.
In 1967, Franco promulgated a new con-
stitution to construct a framework for transition
from his more than 35 years of personal rule. By
separating the posts of chief of state and chief of
government, the new constitution calls for a divi-
sion of the powers that Franco now holds. Al-
though it contains other provisions that could
lead to a gradual liberalization of the regime, the
Caudillo has not put them into effect.
In 1969, Franco exercised his prerogative
under the new constitution and named Prince
Juan Carlos of Borbon to be king when Franco
dies or is incapacitated. Juan Carlos, a grandson
of the last king, Alfonso XIII, was required to
swear to uphold the constitution and the prin-
Special Report
Crowd at Franco's 35th Anniversary
ciples of Franco's National Movement, the sole
legal political organization in Spain. In effect,
Juan Carlos pledged to carry on the present
regime under a monarchial framework.
Franco could still reverse this decision but
he is unlikely to do so, in part because it has the
support of military leaders who regard the mon-
archy as a stabilizing influence and who do not
wish to see a post-Franco power struggle. There-
fore, Juan Carlos is likely to be sworn in as king
within three days after Franco dies or is declared
incapacitated. Although some government leaders
feel that the transition would be smoother if
Franco resigned now as chief of state, the
Caudillo ruled out that possibility in his 35th
anniversary speech last fall.
The populace greeted Juan Carlos' designa-
tion as future king with indifference. Franco had
kept the young prince in the background. There
has been little enthusiasm for the re-institution of
a monarchy from people who cannot recall a
chief of state other than Franco. In earlier years,
some observers rated the prince as a lightweight
with few opinions of his own. More recently, this
lack of public or private pronouncements has
been ascribed to the prince's recognition of the
limits placed on him by a situation requiring that
he not antagonize Franco or others in the estab-
lishment. There is now a growing feeling that
Juan Carlos has matured in his role as king-
designate. Fewer jokes are bandied about in
Madrid these days as to how long he is likely to
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reign. On 1 October last year, with approximately
one million Spaniards assembled in Madrid to
celebrate the 35th anniversary of Franco's rule,
the Caudillo referred to the fact that after his
own demise Juan Carlos would carry on as king.
The statement drew thunderous applause.
Any tendencies toward liberal rule that Juan
Carlos may hold are likely to he checked by the
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marriage on 8 March of Franco's eldest grand-
daughter to Prince Alfonso of Borbon, who is also
a grandson of the late king Alfonso XIII. The
presence in the wings of a well-connected, more
conservative prince will make Juan Carlos cau-
tious.
in addition to designating Juan Carlos as
next chief of state, Franco in 1969 shook up his
cabinet. Given his age and tendency to I-ing on to
familiar faces, Franco's cabinet choices were an
important move to prepare Spain for the future.
This cabinet probably will carry the country into
the post-Franco era. In choosing the new cabinet,
Franco departed from his habit of balancing
power among key groups. Instead, he assigned the
greatest number of posts to economic specialists
associated with the semi-secret Catholic lay organ-
ization, Opus Dei. These technocrats give eco-
nomic modernization and a loosening of state
economic controls priority over political liberali-
zation. They are European-minded and wish to
increase Spain's ties with Europe. They are, there-
fore, willing to support cautious political liberali-
zation in order to improve Spain's stature abroad.
Opus Dei members insist that they are not
subject to central political guidance from their
leadership and that the society is devoted ex-
clusively to spiritual goals. But critics still charge
that Opus Dei is intent on controlling the nation's
economic, political, and educational life. The
society has attracted a wealth of managerial talent
and Franco, recognizing Spain's need for such
Franco at Granddaughter's Wedding to a Prince
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24 March 1972
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skills, has kept the Opus Dei - dominated cabinet
in spite of pressures to drop it. Such pressures
intensified in the wake of the Matesa financial
scandal, in which large sums of export credits
granted by the government allegedly were
misused by officials of the company. Several
Opus Dei officials were implicated, and this dam-
aged the society's reputation for probity. Ulti-
mately, three former Opus Dei ministers were
indicted, but the present foreign minister and the
minister of education were cleared.
To counteract the loss of prestige from the
Matesa case, the technocrat faction in the cabinet
decided to expand its influence by working for
the appointment or election of Opus Dei mem-
bers to the Cortes (legislature) chosen last fall.
Although Opus Dei improved its position in the
Cortes, it failed to gain dominance in the Council
of the Realm, the body that will help choose a
prime minister when Franco relinquishes that
post. Opus Dei's chances of controlling the selec-
tion of a new chief of government have thereby
lessened; indeed, it will probably have to nego-
tiate with other factions to stay in power after
Franco goes.
Rumors persist that Franco will soon give up
his position as prime minister. Because Franco
already leaves much of the day-to-day business of
running the government to Deputy Prime Minister
Admiral Carrero Blanco and to the cabinet, the
Caudillo really has little reason to give up the post
of prime minister. Many government officials
would prefer that Franco designate a prime min-
ister now while he can control the choice. If
Franco were to do so, he probably would chose
Carrero, a rather colorless 64-year-old bureaucrat
whose chief asset is his long association with
Franco. Because the admiral wants the economic
expertise of the Opus Dei technocrats, he would
probably keep them in the cabinet. But in spite of
the influence of his Opus 'Jei colleagues, Carrero's
reputation as a close associate of Franco and as a
hard-line, unimaginative reactionary might not
Special Report -5
facilitate acceptance of Spain into NATG or the
European Communities.
If the choice of prime minister is left until a
new chief of state takes over, Carrero's chances
would be considerably reduced. He is not popular
among the military leaders, who feel he is not a
proper admiral at all, having been promoted to
that rank despite a lack of suitable sea service.
.i hese leaders may insist on one of their own for
the post. The chief of the high general staff,
General Manuel Diez Alegria, or one of the chiefs
of the nine military regions are possibilities. Diez
Alegria is notable among Spanish military men for
his European outlook and for his espousal of
gradual change in the direction of a freer society
once Franco is gone. He also works well with the
Opus Dei technocrats. He might not be acceptable
to some of the hard-line regional military com-
manders.
If the military chooses to remain in the
background, a member of the present cabinet
could get the post. One leading possibility is Min-
ister of Economic Development Laureano Lopez
Rodo, a leader in Opus Dei. Lopez Rodo would
continue to emphasize economic goals. Another
strong contender is Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gregorio Lopez Bravo, a dynamic personality and
favorite of the press. With him as prime minister,
Spain's chances of closer association with Europe
would be improved. Franco i~~ said to be very
pleased with his performance a; foreign minister.
Lopez Bravo has clashed with Juan Carlos and
might not have the prince's backing.
Other possible choices include former
cabinet members. Among these is Federico Silva
Munoz, former minister of public works and a
member of the National Association of Catholic
Propagandists, a rival of Opus Dei. He resigned in
1970 to separate himself from the Opus Dei -
dominated cabinet and to build more support for
himself as an alternative who is loyal to Franco.
He favors gradual political evolution in the post-
Franco era. His abilities as minister and his tele-
vision appearances have won him wide public
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support. He would be more able than Carrero
Blanco-and less able than Lopez Bravo-to pro-
mote Spain's acceptance into West European
organ izations.
The Military: For Preserving Order
Franco's authoritarian system has rested
chiefly on support by the army; the conservative
business, banking, and land-owning interests; the
Roman Catholic Church; and, to a lesser degree,
the National Movement. Franco has played these
groups off against each other and, by timely shifts
of power,-has prevented any one of them from
becoming too powerful. They all see a prospect,
once the Generalissimo's hand is removed, that
they will have greater scope for political expres-
sion. They are making their plans to enhance their
own positions accordingly.
The army is by far the strongest of the
power groups. Army officers have consistently
been given posts in the cabinet, and many have
been appointed to the boards of business firms
and banks. The army is united in loyalty to
Franco and in a commitment to preserve order,
but it has internal differences about how much
reform is desirable in a post-Franco era. Some
officers have joined with police and old guard
fascist elements of the National Movement-the
Falangists-to oppose any liberalization at all.
Other officers support the Opus Dei technocrats
in their efforts to modernize the economy and
relax the more rigid controls on political freedom.
For the most part, the military has prefered to
stand aside from politics and to intervene only
when there is a threat to public order or to
military prestige. All in all, military leaders are
likely to back those who can best preserve order
after Franco departs.
As senior generals whose service dates back
to the Civil War fade from the scene, younger
officers drawn from the more European-minded
middle class may slowly swing the army toward a
less authoritarian political system. As in most
armies, younger officers complain because promo-
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tions are slow and pay has not kept pace with
civilian pay. Discipline is good, however, and
discontent among junior officers is unlikely to get
out of hand.
The Burgos trial of 16 Basque terrorists in
December 1970 brought the military into sharp
conflict with a modest goveniment effort toward
liberalization. The hard liners-including many in
the military and the security police as well as the
Falangists-wanted a military trial culminating in
death verdicts to discourage terrorism. The
moderate cabinet ministers and those government
officials who wish to associate Spain with Western
Europe, wanted leniency. The church, opposition
groups, students, and labor also protested against
the trials. The military grew angry over the gov-
ernment's failure to control criticism. Franco
eventually decided to allow the military trials and
a death sentence. This satisfied the military but,
in line with his habit of balancing the interests of
all concerned, Franco allowed an open trial and
later commuted the death sentences. The con-
tretemps led observers to speculate on the
implications for the future: if a similar conflict
were to arise without Franco to arbitrate, could
differences be resolved without a military take-
over?
The suspension of habeas corpus decreed
during the trial was continued for six months,
during which the police arrested over 2,000 per-
sons; most or them were released after a short
detention, but some 228 persons were still being
held when the suspension was lifted. A stiff
public order law was passed in July 1971, aimed
as much at controlling professional and middle-
class political activity as at worker and student
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groups. Orders, warnings, and threats have been
issued to the press to curtail criticism of the
government. The campaign against the press was
highlighted by the closure and forced sale of the
newspaper Madrid. Plans to relax the ban on
political parties by allowing tightly controlled
political associations to be formed within the
National Movement were put aside.
Labor: Most Likely to Cause Trouble
Workers, students and, to a lesser degree, the
church do not share the military's satisfaction
with the regime. Under Franco's corporative
system, the only legal labor body, the Syndicate
Organization, is under government control.
Workers do not feel that the syndicates represent
their interests effectively. To counter this, syn-
dicate officials drafted a new and more liberal law
reducing government controls. But the cabinet so
watered down the law that the version finally
passed by the Cortes last year had little effect.
Labor discontent has led to a proliferation
of groups that aim to improve the lot of the
workers. Some, sponsored by Catholic organi-
zations, are tolerated within narrow limits by the
regime. Others, sponsored by illegal political or-
ganizations opposed to Franco, are suppressed by
the police. One of the most active of the latter
groups is a grass-roots, loosely confederated one
known as the Workers' Commissions. Communists
and Catholics collaborate in these commissions
with far rightists, Socialists, and the apolitical. In
spite of their illegal status, the Workers' Com-
missions have had some success in organizing
demonstrations and in getting plant managers to
negotiate with them as the legitimate spokesmen
of the workers. In some plants, the Workers'
Commissions have penetrated the government
syndicates by getting their own candidates elected
as shop stewards. The Workers' Commissions
hope to build an organization so strong that the
government will have to treat with it.
Strikes are illegal in Spain, hut work stop-
Employees learn of Madrid's closing. pages occur periodically in spite of the harsh
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measures employed to prevent them. Of the sev-
eral serious strikes over the past year, some have
involved demands for wage increases to meet the
rise in the cost of living. Others have been pro-
tests against labor legislation and rules governing
dismissal of workers. The technocrat cabinet and
the syndicate leadership have been more willing
than their predecessors to allow labor and man-
agement to settle disputes among themselves. The
government has called in the police to break up
protests, and a willingness to use force is still the
regime's prime method for keeping a lid on labor.
Since last Christmas, there have been relb-
tively few labor disturbances. Workers have been
waiting to see how they fare in the collective
bargaining contracts now being negotiated in a
number of major industries. An exception has
been the Basque area, where a labor dispute led
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty terrorists to
kidnap a Basque businessman. He was released
after management met most of the kidnapers'
demands, including reinstatement of 183 fired
workers and a wage increase. The police then
arrested some 30 alleged members of the terrorist
group, who are now awaiting trial in connection
with the kidnaping. Another serious incident was
the bloody clash on 10 March in El Ferrol del
Caudillo on the northwest coast between the
police and some 3,000 shipyard workers who
were protesting the dismissal of six fellow
workers. Labor is the element most likely to
cause trouble in the post-Franco period. Well
aware of this, the government is likely, at least in
the immediate aftermath of Franco's death, to
use force to prevent serious agitation. Thereafter,
much will depend on how well the government
adjusts to labor's demands for a free labor organ-
ization and better wages.
The Students: Always Troublesome
Only a minority of students are politically
actin?, and they do not pose a serious threat to
the present regime or to a post-Franco govern-
ment. They are an irritant to a regime that will
not tolerate demonstrations and is slow to adjust
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8 -
to
to demands for change. Activist students have
sought reform of the official student organization
and have demanded organizations of their own.
Conflicts were inevitable. Police have suppressed
periodic demonstrations, and universities have
been closed to allow tempers time to cool. Usu-
ally, the threat to cancel examinations with a
subsequent loss of credit for the year has been
sufficient to stop the students.
Nonetheless, there were violent confron-
tations between students and police in 1967-68,
when protests against the regime were added to
demands for university reforms. In January 1969,
after prolonged student-worker demonstrations,
the authorities reacted strongly. They closed in-
definitely the universities of Madrid and
Barcelona. A 90-day state of emergency was pro-
claimed, and certain civil rights were suspended.
The authorities also arrested over 1,000 persons
and shipped some 35 individuals to remote Span-
ish provinces for the duration of the state of
emergency. By early March 1969, the situation
was sufficiently quiet to persuade the government
to reopen the universities and lift the state of
emergency. The authorities took the precaution
of placing police and plain-clothes' agents in the
universities to maintain order.
In January of this year, the police again took
strong action against students demonstrating at
Madrid University. Although the clashes were
precipitated by the suspension of 4,000 medical
students protesting a char,ga in their curriculum,
the unrest had more fundamental causes. Stu-
dents resent the presence of uniformed and plain-
clothes' police on the campus. Many deans are
ineffective and hostile to the students. In addi-
tion, a polarization of students has been brought
on by the disruptive tactics of a small but militant
group of extreme leftists-including a number of
Communists-who have clashed with an even
smaller group of extreme rightists. Underlying
these factors is campus opposition to authority in
general and to the Spanish establishment in par-
ticular.
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Demonstrating Madrid students flee police.
student general strike was called for the first six
days of March, and this led to disturbances
through,:ut the country. The university situation
is likely to remain unsettled, but authorities will
keep matters under control through police action
and, when necessary, by closing colleges. Im-
provements in educational facilities are planned,
and these should help reduce tensions.
Church-stage relations have deteriorated in
recent years. Both the Vatican and a majority of
the Spanish clergy want to disassociate the church
from Franco's regime, but neither is prepared as
yet to face the loss of state subsidies. The church
is hard put to reconcile the concept of social
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justice with the labor policies of the government.
The state wishes to retain its influence over the
church. The Vatican has asked the Spanish Gov-
ernment to renounce its voice in ecclesiastical
appointments, but Madrid is unwilling. Church-
state relations were strained last September when
the Assembly of Spanish Bishops and Priests
called for broader recognition of human rights in
Spain and the independence of church and state.
Last December-possibly as a gesture of
good will to reduce tension-the governmen;
agreed to a reshuffling of bishops. As a result,
liberal bishops were appointed to head six of the
seven dioceses involved. The most significant
change was the appointment of Cardinal Enrique
y Tarancon as bishop of Madrid-Alcala, Spain's
most important diocese. He is an advocate of an
active social role for the church. The principal
victory for the government was the transfer of the
liberal Bishop Cirarda from Santander, where he
also had responsibility for Bilbao and the Basque
area, to the deep southern province of Cordoba.
Hard liners in the government did not approve of
Cirarda's sympathy with the nationalism and
labor grievances of his fellow Basques.
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With relatively liberal men in the principal
ecclesiastical posts, the church is in a better posi-
tion to work with political groups that want a
stronger role for labor. As part of the price for
the government's concurrence in these liberal
appointments, the church may have agreed to
concentrate on social action and to soft-pedal
political reform. This did not stop a church sub-
committee from taking the government to task a
short time later for its unjust social and economic
policies. Franco himself, in his traditional year-
end message to the people, warned the church
against interference in temporal affairs. At his
investiture as Archbishop of Madrid-Alcala in
early January, Cardinal Enrique y Tarancon
pledged to speak up for "those without voice to
defend their legitimate aspirations." This was a
clear reply to Franco's warning and indicates that
the church has changed from a pillar of the
regime to a major political irritant.
The Opposition Parties: A Distant Prospect
The traditional opposition parties-Christian
Democrat, Socialist, Communist, and Anarchist-
are illegal, fragmented, and powerless. They are
for the most part survivals of former political
parties and regional organizations. Practically all
of them, except for a few extremist bands, are
resigned to waiting out Franco's passing to obtain
political rights and a role in the government.
Some of these groups would like to see a
provisional government installed after the passing.
This provisional government would call a con-
stitutional convention to decide on the form of
government and to formulate guarantees for
political liberties. Because the chances of this
happening are very poor, the opposition will have
to settle for working to liberalize the present
system; for example, by working with labor and
students to bring more effective pressures for
change and agitating for legal political status.
If political parties should be legalized, none
of the present opposition parties looks strong
enough to win a dominant position. The Social-
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ists, using the nucleus of a clandestine trade
union-the General Union of Labor-would have
an initial advantage. They would also benefit
from the traditional anti-clericalism of many
Spanish workers and intellectuals as well as from
the financial support of West European Socialists
and trade unionists. At present, they are badly
split between those who accept direction from
elderly Socialist leaders in exile and those who
support a self-proclaimed "interior" Socialist
group led by the intellectual Tierno Galvan.
The Christian Democrats have a potentially
strong party, which would draw support from
religious organizations, businessmen, and intel-
lectuals. But they are also badly split. Various
active Catholic groups exist, but some ci them
would prefer a secular Social Democratic Party.
The Communist Party has some influence in the
illegal Workers' Commissions, but its leadership is
under fire from dissident elements. Moreover, the
Communist Par+?' is not likely to be legalized
soon, even if other parties are, and its ability to
work with other groups and to develop a popular
base is limited by widespread hostility to Com-
munism.
In the Basque provinces and in Catalonia,
regional groups demand greater cultural, eco-
The Economy: A Bright Spot
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The strong performance of the Spanish econ-
omy in the 1960s promoted the stability of the
Franco regime, and continued economic progress
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Spain:
Growth of Real and Per Capita GNP, 1960-1970
Annual Growth Rate (percent)
5 1
15,
Real GNP
Real
01 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 l 1
1960 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70
Annual Growth Rate (percent) Per Capita GNP
01 I I I I I I I I I I
1960 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has
23 members: all West European countries plus Australia, Canada,
Greece, Japan, Turkey and the United States.
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obviously would improve the staying power of
any successor government. Spain achieved a
seven-percent annual growth rate in the 1960s,
one of the highest in Europe. Before that, Spain's
economic stagnation had been chronic since the
Civil War and had forced Franco in 1959 to agree
to abandon traditional policies of autarky in favor
of modernization and an open-door policy toward
foreign investment. With an expanding domestic
market, relatively low labor costs, comparative
freedom from labor strikes, and a generous gov-
ernmental attitude toward foreign ownership,
repatriation of profits, and low tax rates, Spain
attracted a good deal of direct investment from
abroad. It zoomed from $36 million in 1960 to
$222 million in 1970. Morover, Spanish traders
and industrialists soon discovered that, given their
low labor costs, they could compete readily in
European markets. By 1971, per capita gross
national product was but $31 shy of the $1,000
mark sometimes used as the benchmark of a
modern Western economy.
Rapid economic expansion led to vast
imports and a yawning trade deficit that reached
$2 billion in 1971. The tourist boom, foreign
investment, and remittances from Spaniards
working abroad, nevertheless, moved Spain into a
positive over-all balance-of-payments position.
Tourism receipts alone covered about 80 percent
of Spain's trade deficits in the 1960s and 95
percent in 1971. Indeed, Spain was not only able
to cover its trade deficits but to accumulate large
foreign exchange reserves which amounted to
$3.2 billion in 1971.
The economy will more than likely continue
to progress if the transition period after Franco
goes is relatively smooth. Despite a slowdown in
late 1970 and 1971, Spain should experience
strong economic growth in 1972 and into 1973.
The 1972 budget and 1972-75 Third Devel-
opment Plan are geared toward expansion, calling
for an annual growth rate of seven percent or
more and a $13-billion increase in public invest-
ment over the next four years. Exports, which
now finance almost 60 percent of total imports,
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are expected to continue growing at an acceler-
ated rate.
With a continued sound basic balance-of-
payments position, rapid domestic growth, and
growing export markets in both Western and East-
ern Europe, Spain will continue to attract foreign
investment. There are already signs that Spain
could become a production base for many of
Europe's multi-national companies-a prospect
that increased with Spain's 1970 preferential
trade agreement with the European Communities.
Nevertheless, Spain faces a number of seri-
ous economic problems. Wages as a proportion of
gross national product have been stagnant over
the past decade and have barely kept ahead of
rising prices. Although wages rose 13 percent in
1971, for example, the real increase was only 4.6
percent because prices rose 8.4 percent. The wage
lag is the most serious source of labor unrest in
Spain and could exacerbate social frustrations and
make for an uneasy transition period. There
seems to be a growing awareness in Madrid, how-
ever, of the need for increased "social develop-
ment" and for governmental intervention in the
economy to ensure balanced economic growth in
the 1970s.
Special Report
Another problem is the approaching en-
trance of one of Spain's principal trading part-
ners, the UK, into the European Communities.
This threatens to make obsolete the 1970 prefer-
ential trading agreement with the EC. Once
Britain goes behind the EC tariff fence, French
and Italian products will have a strong com-
petitive edge over Spanish products that now
enjoy a good market in the UK. The EC is ready
to consider revising the present agreement to
cover the new situation through adjustment of
commodity coverage and tariff levels. But Madrid
officials hope for a new agreement that will also
clarify the timing of eventual Spanish association
with the EC. There are strong objections from
some EC members to permitting the Franco
regime to become an associate or full member,
and Madrid's chances of getting such a com-
mitment are no better than in 1970. The govern-
ment does have some time to work for political
liberalization to aid in reaching its goal of associ-
ation and eventual membership in the EC.
As long as Franco remains in power, the
problems facing his regime can be kept under
control. The succession law that he devised prob-
ably will be followed and Juan Carlos wil! be
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installed as king. The recent appointments of
three more hard-line Falangist generals to top
military posts may complicate efforts of the
present technocrat cabinet to remain in power.
Although the first post-Franco government will
undoubtedly remain authoritarian, pressures to
lift present political controls, at least partially, are
likely to grow. Many within the Spanish estab-
lishment favor economic and social reforms and a
gradual evolution toward a freer political life.
Thus, even within the regime there will be forces
working for change. Improved economic con-
ditions have given more people a stake in society
and more reason to work for orderly change. The
impact of better education and contacts with
freer Europeans have reduced the old animosities
of class, religion, and politics which so divided
Spaniards in the past. These influences, too, will
improve chances for gradual progress toward a
more open society.
Other factors could upset the situation after
Franco. If the government makes changes too
Special Report
slowly, popular aspirations for social, economic,
and political reforms could provoke widespread
protests. Both workers and students are capable
of causing trouble, especially if encouraged by the
various opposition parties and labor unions. A
recession or serious inflation would stimulate
support for protests. If unrest were' to become
widespread, the military probably would take
over in the name of stability. But given the
expectations that Franco's passing is sure to
arouse, a military take-over might prove only a
temporary solution, and a period of great
instability could follow.
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As of now, the progress that the present
government has made in stimulating the economy
and in promoting modernization and Europeani-
zation has a good chance to continue. If the trend
holds, the possibilities will improve for an evo-
lution from the present government to a more
responsive s stem.
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