WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CUBA'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 28, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Cuba s Changing Relations With Latin America
Secret
N! 602
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28 January 1972
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Cuba Changing Relations
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For nearly a decade, Cuba's policy toward Latin America was based almost entirely on
an unequivocal support of armed revolutionary violence. The consistent failures of this
approach, combined with economic difficulties and Soviet pressure, apparently convinced
Castro of the necessity for a more rational approach. Since 1968, Cuba has reduced its
support to insurgent groups and has been cautiously trying to resume friendly contacts with
selected Latin American nations. Asa result of these policies, as well as the changing
political climate in Latin America, Havana has regained respectability with a number of
Latin American nations and has succeeded in undermining the efficacy of the economic and
political sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States. Castro has often stated
that Cuba is interested in establishing full relations with only those nations that follow
policies "independent of US imperialism," but this has not kept him from developing
contacts with countries that fail to meet this criterion. As long as Fidel is convinced that the
present political trend in Latin America is in his favor, he will be less likely to risk an all-out
return to violent subversive operations, Nevertheless, Castro's new policy does not mean
that he has relinquished his belief in the validity of armed struggle, and it does not represent
an abandonment of other forms of subversion, including propaganda support, limited
insurgent training, and funding, which Castro still views as useful political tools.
Background
"We promise to continue making Cuba the
examplr; that can convert the cordillera of the
Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the Ameri-
can continent."
Castro, 26 July 1960
Special Report -2
Virtually from the beginning of the Castro
regime, Cuba's foreign policy toward Latin
America has been principally guided by a simple
and radical objective: duplication of the Cuban
revolution throughout the hemisphere. The tac-
tics used by Castro in his efforts to achieve this
goal were developed from his own experiences as
well as the influence of Cie Guevara. Political
power, he argued, could be achieved only through
armed struggle. During 1959, unsuccessful armed
expeditions from Cuba were launched against
F'nama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and
Nicaragua.
After the dismal failures of the expeditions
in 1959, the Cuban subversive effort was not
stopped but became more carefully organized and
wider in scope. The General Directorate of Intelli-
gence was established in 1961 under Soviet guid-
ance and given the principal responsibility for
directing the effort in Latin America. Support
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from Cuba, although sometimes on a small scale,
was made available to rebel groups in Venezuela,
Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Cen-
tral America, and the Caribbean. This support-
arms, equipment, money, training, propaganda,
and in some cases Cuban personnel-ran Cuba
afoul of the Organization of American States,
which voted in 1964 to impose diplomatic and
economic sanctions against Havana.
The Tricontinental Conference, held in
Havana in January 1966, marked the resumption
of heavy Cuban involvement in armed revolu-
tionary movements. At this conference, Castro
issued an e>.p!icit call for violent revolution in the
hemisphere, a --all he has repeated on numerous
occasions. Following the conference, Havana an-
nounced the formation of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization as a hemisoheric revolu-
tionary front. This period marked tr?e peak of
Cuba's efforts to export revolution. While the
solidarity organization was holding its first con-
ference in Havana during the summer of 1967,
Che Guevara and 16 other Cubans were estab-
lishing a guerrilla movement in Bolivia.. Cuban
advisers were also operating with insurgent groups
in Guatemala and Venezuela.
In May 1967, the Cuban effort received a
sharp setback when four Cubans were captured
on the Venezuelan coast trying to smuggle arms
into the country. A far more damaging Slow
occurred the following October when Guevara's
band of guerrillas was rolled up by the Bolivian
armed forces. Guevara's death made it appear that
the Cuban experience was in essence unique and
could not be duplicated in other countries.
The death of Guevara forced Castro to
reassess his policy. His dedication to subversion
had not only been costly in terms of men and
money, it had also given his opponents justifi-
cation for further isolating Cuba, and he had no
great success to point to. He also faced mounting
domestic problems growing largely out of his mis-
management of the economy. Castro therefore
chose to drop his aggressive tactics. In 1968, he
began to re-establish his ties with the Latin
American Communist parties and project a more
responsible image in the hemisphere.
Prior to this shift, he had carefully main-
tained relations with Mexico, the only member of
the OAS that refused to implement political and
economic sanctions. The relationship was never
especially warm or cordial, but both governments
felt that it was in their interests to keep these ties.
The advantages for Cuba were obvious: the air
connection with Mexico was Havana's sole
window on tin America
As or-We-Wee-Ricans,
ties served to underline Mexico's "Estrada Doc-
trine," which calls for the maintenance of diplo-
matic relations with a friendly country regardless
of the origin or nature of its government. In
addition, pressure from Mexican leftist groups
was reduced.
Events elsewhere in Latin America helped
make Cuba's shift to a more pragmatic policy
something of a success. October 1968 saw the
accession to power of a highly nationalistic gov-
ernment in Peru. This was followed by a leftward
drift (until August 1971) in Bolivia and the elec-
tion of Salvador Allende in Chile. In addition,
other Latin American leaders have come to favor
some form of renewed contacts with Cuba. These
leaders share an intense desire to demonstrate
independence from the US, a decreased concern
with the threat of Cuban subversion and a fear of
being last to jump on the bandwagon.
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`'~ \\ \
Cuban Contacts With
~,'\ J~`,o,\2?`,~DO`,\,~,.\ ~\ Latin America Since 1968
%
01 9.1-\ 0
COI\
Argentina
Bahamas
Bolivia
Brazil
British Honduras
British West Indies
Chile ?
Colombia ?
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic,
Ecuador I?i
El Salvador
French West Indies I
French Guiana
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Surinam
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Special Report
Castro visit; Air agreement;
Diplomatic relations
Cuban-Colombian Friendship Institute
? ? ! ? ? ?
Consular relations;
Frequent Cubana charter flights
i ?
?
? ? ?
Diplomatic
omatic relations; Air agreement;
i
?
Fishing agreement
j
?! !
I ?
,
!
? ?
? ?
Castro visit
I
.
?,?~
. f
j ? ?
j I i
Cuban-Venezuelan Friendship Institute
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Breaking Out of Isolation
Castro launched his efforts to reduce Cuba's
isolation in the Caribbean. His initial successes
were in the French territories of Martinique,
Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. In mid-1968,
the Cubans negotiated an agreement permitting
their fishing boats to use service facilities in the
port of Cayenne in French Guiana. At about the
same time, Cuba arranged for the sale of cement
to Martinique and Guadeloupe and agreed to pur-
chase pineapple seedlings from Martinique. Al-
though these ventures had little importance for
the Cuban economy, they were a foot in the
door. By 1969, several Cuban delegations had
visited Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French
Guiana; Cuban merchant ships were calling regu-
larly at Martinique and Guadeloupe; Cuban
fishing boats were being serviced in Cayenne; and
cargo flights from Cuba were landing frequently
in Martinique. Cuban contacts with the three
French departments continue. The level of trade
has not been significantly expanded, but visits by
technical and trade delegations occur with fair
regularity, The Cuban fishing fleet has been
granted certain port privileges in French Guiana
that enable the boats to remain on station off the
northeast coast of South America for extended
periods of time.
In November 1969, Prime Minister Williams
of Trinidad-Tobago called for greater trade coop-
eration between Cuba and other Caribbeam na-
tions. Cuba responded the following month by
sending an agricultural delegation, and Trinidad
reciprocated in February 1970 by sending a simi-
lar delegation is Cuba. Contacts with Jamaica
have also increased. Jamaica, not a member of the
OAS when the sanctions were imposed, now
maintains consular relations with Cuba. Cubana
Airlines uses Kingston as a transfer point for
charter flights transporting passengers between
Cuba and Latin America, but no meaningful trade
has developed.
A change of government in Peru provided
Cuba with its first opportunity to cultivate a
Special Report
major nation in South America. Following the
assumption of power by a nationalist military
regime in Peru in October 1968, Castro altered his
definition of "revolutionary" to include govern-
ments that follow policies independent of "US
imperialism and implement basic reforms. In a
public speech in July 1969, Castro expressed his
approval of the Peruvian Government. In early
1970, Cuba succeeded in establishing a Prensa
Latina office in Lima in return for an implicit
promise not to publish items embarrassing to the
Peruvian Government. A generous response to the
mammoth May 1970 earthquake significantly it
proved Cuba's image in Peru and made propa-
ganda points elsewhere in Latin America as a
display of the responsible and humanitarian side
of Cuba's new foreign policy. The Cuban assist-
ance, arranged through the Prensa Latina office,
consisted of medical supplies, medical teams,
mobile kitchens, and clothing. In October.
Havana announced that it would build six hospi-
tals in the areas devastated by the earthquake.
The inauguration of President Salvador Al-
lende in November 1970 provided Castro with
perhaps his greatest opening to date to break
Cuba out of its hemisphere isolation. Although
some trade between Cuba and Chile had devel-
oped during the Frei administration (1964-70),
ties were quickly expanded under Allende. On 12
November 1970, Chile and Cuba re-established
diplomatic relations. In February 1971, they
signed a two-year commercial agreement and a
bilateral civil air agreement. There were cultural
and technical exchanges, and Fidel Castro was
invited to visit.
During 19G9, Ecuadorean officials, including
President Jose Velasco I barra, began to make
public statements critical of the hemispheric
policy of isolating Cuba. In September, Ecuador
very nearly shipped 10,000 tons of surplus rice to
Cuba. The deal fell through when Havana refused
to return the persons responsible for the murder
of a pilot during the hijacking of two Ecuadurean
Air Force planes. The climate later improved,
however, and in June 1970 Cuba was permitted
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? in Chile with Allende
? in Peru with Velasco Alvarado
? in Ecuador with Velasco Ibarra
to station a Prensa Latina correspondent in Quito.
25X1 Cuba has also been gradually developing ties
with Panama since General Omar Torrijos seized
power in October 1968. B 1969, athletic teams
were exchanging visits
7MMmV~
seizure o two anamanian-flag merchant vessels
in December 1971, Castro went out of his way to
assure the Torrijos government that Cuba had no
hostile intentions toward Panama. He welcomed a
Panamanian delegation to Cuba to negotiate the
release of the captured crewmen. Cuban spokes-
men in recent months have been giving heavy
propaganda support to the Panamanian position
in the canal talks. Castro's interest in Panama is
somewhat unusual since the Torrijos administra-
tion does not come close to meeting Castro's
definition of a "revolutionary" government. The
critical factor in this case revolves around Tor-
rijos' attitude toward the 'JS.
The past year was marked by further gains
for Castro and his policy. In June, Peru agreed to
sell Cuba 105,000 tons of fishmeal in contraven-
tion of the 1964 OAS economic sanctions. Cuba
Special Report - 6 -
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gained substantial hemispheric attention from the
achievements of its athletes during the VI Pan
American games in Cali, Colombia. Sponsored by
Peru, Cuba became a member of the UN organiza-
tion of underdeveloped nations, the Group of 77.
Probably the most satisfying event for Castro
personally, however, was his trip to Chile, and its
brief post-script stops in Peru and Ecuador. The
trip, which lasted from 10 November to 5 Decem-
ber, enhanced his image as a Latin American
leader. I n December, Peru undertook an initiative
within the OAS to permit member states who so
desire to re-establish relations with the Cuban
Government. The initiative was postponed but
will probably be brought up again by the
Peruvians. Even if it is defeated, Peru will proba-
bly re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Cuba also experienced some disappoint-
ments during 1971, notably the overthrow of the
Torres regime in Bolivia and the electoral defeat
of the leftist front in Uruguay. Although Castro
reacted to both events by stating that armed
struggle was the only road to power in those
nations, thus far there has been no conclusive
evidence that Castro is departing in a significant
way from the more moderate course he has set
for Latin America as a whole.
Castro has long viewed himself as a modern-
day Bolivar, destined to lead Latin America in its
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"second war of independence." And by this he
means independence of the US. In his eyes, the
US is responsible for all of Cuba's economic dif-
ficulties and has replaced Spain as the colonial
power in the hemisphere. Castro's policy of ag-
gressive support for insurgency movements was
designed to reduce if not eliminate US influence
in the hemisphere. Having discovered that these
tactics were not yielding results, Castro modified
his approach. But he has not discontinued com-
pletely his support of violent revolution. Rather,
he will probably continue to give limited support
to viable guerrilla groups in certain countries.
Castro's long-range design apparently envi-
sions political and economic unification of Latin
American countries. The Cuban leader has fre-
quently stated that such unification is necessary
to give Latii1 America the strength to "confront"
the US. Typical of this belief are his repeated
calls-echoed by Cuban representatives at regional
conferences-for a "union of Latin American na-
tions" that would replace the OAS and would
exclude the US.
He has also set at least three shorter range
and perhaps more attainable goals: 1) reduce US
influence in Latin America; 2) discredit the OAS;
and, 3) create a leadership role for Cuba in
Special Report - 7 -
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hemispheric affairs. Castro will probably attempt
to achieve these goals by continuing Cuba's ex-
pansion of its Latin relations on a selective,
bilateral basis. This does not mean that Cuba is
interested in developing ties with every nation in
the hemisphere. As Castro stated during his visit
to Chile, Cuba is "not desperate to normalize
relations with other Latin American countries."
He does take the position that there is no reason
for diplomatic recognition of countries "that
obey orders from the United States." Castro
probably also realizes that there still are Latin
American nations that are adamantly opposed to
the re-establishment of any sort of relations.
Castro's moderate stance is likely to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future. Neither eco-
nomic realities nor Soviet pressures are likely to
change over the next several years. In addition,
Castro can see that an all-out promotion of vio-
lent revolution throughout the hemisphere would
succeed only in returning Cuba to its former
isolation. Only if Castro thought that Havana's
new policy were leading to a string of sharp
reversals would he be tempted to abandon his
moderate approach.
Cuba will continue to strengthen its ties with
Chile although the relationship will not be with-
out problems. By coming to power through legiti-
mate electoral means, the Allende government has
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demonstrated the unsoundrass of Castro's theory
that armed struggle is the only path to power for
a true "revolutionary" government. Although Al-
lende is a close personal friend of Castro, he
represents a legitimate challenge to Castro's posi-
tion as the leading spokesman for Marxist ideol-
ogy in Latin America. At present, however, there
is no evidence to indicate this will seriously im-
pair their relationship.
Castro will probably continue strengthening
ties with Peru. Regardless of the outcome of
Lima's initiative in the OAS, Peru will in all
likelihood establish diplomatic relations with
Cuba. In the meantime, routine exchanges can
easily be conducted through the Prensa Latina
office in Lima or the liaison staff of the Cuban
hospital-construction team.
Cuba's future relationship with Ecuador is
less clear. Castro has been impressed with Ecua-
dor's strong defense of its 200-mile territorial
waters claim and has frequently voiced his sup-
port of that claim. His brief stopover in
Guayaquil was strongly criticized by opponents
of the Velasco regh ,e, however. Asa result, Quito
may be more inclined to follow quietly in the
footsteps of Peru on the Cuba issue. For its part,
Havana will probably attempt to expand its con-
tacts with the Ecuadorean Government and
gently encourage Ecuador to follow the Peruvian
example, nationalize foreign businesses, and im-
plement agrarian reform.
Castro will probably continue his increased
public support for the Panamanian position in the
canal talks. He is extremely interested in the
outcome because a settlement favorable to
Panama will have a strong impact on US influence
in that area. Such an agreement could, for exam-
ple, provide a tool in pressuring the US to get out
of Guantanamo. Every indication is, however,
that the Cuban leader will exercise caution about
doing anything more than pay lip service to
Panama's canal aspirations.
The new moderation in Cuba's foreign
policy does not extend to the OAS, for which
Fidel still reserves his most vituperative language.
In the unlikely event that the sanctions are lifted,
there is little chance that Cuba would consider
rejoining what Castro has often called "that in-
decent garbage heap called the OAS."
As for other Latin American countries, Cuba
will probably continue its efforts to develop
closer ties with those nations it deems "ac-
ceptable," a term that has already proved flexi-
ble. These efforts will probably take the form of
exchanges of athletic teams, cultural groups, and
scientific and technical delegations. These
contacts will probably be followed by attractive
Cuban trade offers, which can be expanded until
only formal diplomatic relations are lackin .
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