WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT PEKING'S DRIVE TO OFFSET SOVIET AND US INFLUENCE IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030031-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Peking's Drive to Offiet Soviet and US Influence in Europe
MB HU COPY
RETEN hi 1E-61
Secret
N2 671
10 September 1971
No. 0387/71A
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PEKING'S DRIVE TO OFFSET SOVIET AND US INFLUENCE IN EUROPE
As part of Peking's ongoing competition with Moscow and Washington, the
Chinese over the past decade have attempted to exploit changing international
developments in order to improve China's relatively weak standing abroad. Through-
out the early sixties Peking devoted conside-able attention to the Afro-Asian third
world, where the emergence of newly independent states raised Chinese hopcs that
these states might be inclined to lean toward China and away from Washington and
Moscow. Although maintaining a continuing interest in the Afro-Asian world, the
Chinese have noticeably shifted attention to the economically and politically more
powerful states of West and East Europe during the past two years. Most sig-
nificantly, Peking has taken an increasingly positive attitude toward what it sees as
more assertive and independent policies developing among many European states
against the dominant influence of America and Russia on the continent. Seeing a
common interest with these states against the superpowers, the Chinese have focused
particularly on wooing the more important, independent-minded governments,
notably France, Romania, and Yugoslavia, while also making significant gains with
long alienated, but potentially friendly states, such as Great Britain.
The Chinese appear to believe that this new posture will not only enhance their
general international leverage and reinforce their long-standing claim to be a major
world power, but will also outflank the Soviet Union and the United States in
Europe. Peking calculates that both powers consequently will be forced to devote
increased attention to their own positions in Europe and more importantly, will
presumably be less able to maintain or increase their continuing diplomatic effort
against, and military encirclement of, China.
The Chinese, of course, recognize that geography, as well as their comparative
lack of political and economic resources, precludes anymajor catalytic or leadership
role for China in directing European nations away from Washington or Moscow.
Peking nevertheless plans to expand its discreet but growing position on the
continent. The positive results of Chinese efforts over the past two years, together
with the likely growth over the long term of the desire and potential of European
states to be free from great power influence, seem to augur well for further Chinese
progress.
Peking's Perspective on Europe
China's recent active approach to Europe
stands in sharp contrast to its unenthusiastic and
sparse effort there over the past two decades. For
many years, Peking's European policy remained
strictly constrained by a lack of common interest
between China and the countries of Europe and
by the wide divergence of Peking's ideological
views from those of most European states. By and
large, Peking remained preoccupied with its na-
tional survival and developments in Asia and
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devoted overwhelming attention to events there.
Ideologically, Peking generally viewed Western
Europe as a bastion of capitalist states aligned
closely with China's chief enemy, the United
States. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, was
seen at first as a private Soviet domain; later, as
the Sino-Soviet dispute developed, it was regarded
for the most part as a collection of lackluster
regimes obediently following the lead of Kremlin
"revisionists." Although there were some note-
worthy instances of Chinese attention to Euro-
pean affairs, such as Peking's brief efforts to
cultivate East European regimes following the
Polish and Hungarian uprisings in the mid-fifties
and its attempt to entice diplomatic recognition
from France in the early sixties, China generally
viewed the continent as an area of low priority.
By the mid-sixties, China's European inter-
ests were confined chiefly to small footholds in
East and West Europe. Among Communist states,
China remained on close terms only with Albania.
Peking's increasingly heavy-handed posture in the
Sino-Soviet dispute rapidly undermined all but a
facade of good relations with the fence-sitting
Ceausescu government of Romania. In Western
Europe, Peking focused Lhiefly on maintaining
correct diplomatic ties with a few chosen states,
notably the Scandinavian countries and France,
while gradually developing commercial ties with
economically more important states such as West
Germany and Great Britain.
This selective but weak position was further
undermined and disrupted as China retreated into
an isolated and rigidly ideological shell during the
Cultural Revolution. All Chinese ambassadors in
Europe were recalled, and diplomatic activity in
Peking and abroad came to a virtual halt, re-
moving even the thin veneer of diplomatic cour-
tesy that had previously covered Peking's strong
differences with most European states. More
important, shrill Chinese protests and violent
demonstrations in China seriously tarred Peking's
international image and resulted in severe strains
with a number of important European states.
British officials, for example, were driven out of
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their chancery in Peking, and the building was
stIcked and burned in August 1971 by a Chinese
mob protesting British policy in Hong Kong. The
Red Guard Diplomacy: Chinese demonstrators in
front of British chancery; interior of chancery
after it as burned by demonstrators in August 1967.
following year, sharp Chinese attacks against the
De Gaulle government because of its suppression
of antigovernment disturbances all but destroyed
previous efforts by Paris to keep a cordial face on
Sino-French relations.
In East Europe, Peking's increasingly stri-
dent position vis-a-vis the USSR made it ex-
tremely difficult for any bloc state to maintain a
working relationship with the Chinese; the inde-
pendent Tito regime remained alienated because
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of persistent Chinese diatribes against Yugoslav
"revisionism." Consequently, it was hardly sur-
prising that tentative plans by states such as Italy
and West Germany to establish more effective
trade ties or formal diplomatic relations with Pe-
king did not get much beyond the planning stage.
Toward a New Policy
This implacable and almost completely un-
productive Chinese posture changed abruptly fol-
lowing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968. Peking, concerned over possible
similar Soviet action against China, adopted an
increasingly pragmatic and conventional foreign
policy approach to deal with what it now saw as
menacing Russian pressure directed against it. Al-
though the prime portion of China's new effort
was diverted to parrying Soviet military and po-
litical pressures in Asia, Peking also began to take
some small but significant steps to improve its
position in Europe. Peking voiced particular con-
cern at the time that the USSR and the US were
about to achieve a political detente in Europe
that not only would exclude China's influence
from the continent, but also would free both
powers to devote greater attention to their
mutual adversary, China.
To forestc11 this, Peking acted quickly to
restore its strained relations with key European
states. Specifically, the Chinese strove to develop
what they now considered an important common
cause with European states that were similarly
attempting to protect their interests against So-
viet or US might. Immediately following the
Czechoslovak crisis, for example, high-ranking
Chinese officials publicly reassured the Romanian
Government?another Larget of Soviet pressure?
of China's continued political support. At the
same time, China began the first step of what was
to become an unprecedented improvement in
Sino-Yugoslav state relations by ceasing its long-
standing vituperative attacks against the Tito gov-
ernment. In West Europe, the Chinese backed
away from their hard position against the De
Gaulle government and started to publicize
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favorably the French President's criticism of US
and Soviet pressure on European states.
In the following months, Peking underlined
its support for Romania by sending an emissary?
the first high-ranking official to travel abroad
since the start of the Cultural Revolution?on a
well-publicized visit to Bucharest. Peking then
warmly received a visiting Yugoslav trade delega-
tion and signed its first formal trade agreement
with the Tito government in ten years. Elsewhere
in East Europe, Peking resorted chiefly to well-
timed and relatively sophisticated propaganda
criticizing Moscow's heavy-handed policy, hoping
to capitalize on anti-Soviet feeling following the
Czechoslovak crisis. Meanwhile, Peking began a
cosmetic restoration of its diplomatic ties with
West European states, and started to return
ambassadors to diplomatic posts there.
China's policy initiatives toward Europe
truly accelerated after the start of Sino-Soviet
border talks in Peking and the Sino-US ambas-
sadorial discussions in Warsaw in late 1969. In
undertaking these talks, Peking apparently judged
that it must first reduce its dangerous frontier
problem with Moscow and assess the seeming
rapid change in US intentions vis-a-vis China's
critical interests in Asia before devoting lame-
scale attention to a less immediately important
area such as Europe. Apparently reassured, fol-
lowing the start of these discussions, Peking began
to increase the pace and scope of its new Euro-
pean approach.
Recent Gains in West Europe
Perhaps the most significant departures in
Chinese policy have been made toward the eco-
nomically and politically powerful states in West
Europe. Most notably, the Chinese have greatly
expanded their diplomatic contacts with France;
they gave a warm reception to a visiting French
cabinet minister in July last year, and later re-
ceived former foreign minister Couve de Murville.
As a reciprocal visit, the Chinese this July an-
nounced that they would send a high-ranking
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official delegation to Paris later this year. More
recently, there has been speculation in France
that President Pompidou may visit China in late
1972 or 1973.
Peking also has increasingly muted its previ-
ous unproductive support for noisy Maoist politi-
cal groups in France and elsewhere in West
Europe in an apparent attempt to improve fur-
ther its image with the ruling governments. While
some signs of French discontent with China
remain, particularly over the continuing meager-
ness of Sino-French trade, Peking continues to
give a top priority to enhancing and publicizing
its cordial political ties with the Paris government.
More surprisingly, over the past year the
Chinese have shown an unprecedented interest in
improving their long-cool relationship with Great
Britain. Late last year the two sides began a series
of high-level diplomatic discussions designed to
remove outstanding disagreements and open the
way to raising their diplomatic relations to the
ambassadorial level. Although some bilateral
problems remain, considerable progress has been
achieved in eliminating ill feeling caused when the
British detained Chinese Communist agitators in
Hong Kong in recent years. London, for its part,
now appears to be willing to close its consulate on
Taiwan and adopt a pro-Peking posture in the
United Nations?two preconditions China has
long demanded before the establishment of
ambassadorial relations. The Chinese press has
muted many of its previous allegations that the
British blindly follow Washington's lead in inter-
national affairs. With increasing frequency it now
casts London in the role of an independent Euro-
pean power, safeguarding the interests of the
continent against US pressure. In line with this,
Peking has dropped its previous public ideological
opposition to the Common Market, and has hailed
British efforts to join the European Community,
citing this as a further step in the development of
a European force capable of asserting inde-
pendence from the US and USSR.
Elsewhere, the Chinese have attempted to
strike a forthcoming posture in order to pick up
additional diplomatic recognition and advance
their international interests, particularly in the
U N . Peking's compromise on a recognition
formula with Canada last year was widely hailed
in Europe. Italy, Austria, and Turkey have sub-
sequently recognized Peking; Belgium and per-
haps other states are moving in China's directior.
Aside from the recognition angle, Peking is also
interested in trade with certain European states.
This summer the Chinese welcomed a large Italian
economic and trade delegation for talks in Peking.
In contrast to its policy toward the majority
of the larger states in West Europe, China's rela-
tions with its most important European trading
partner, West Germany, remain frozen. Although
China almost certainly sees the West German Gov-
ernment as a potentially useful friend in its search
for international leverage, the Chinese have not
substantially abandoned their previous distaste
for official relations with Bonn. In fact, Peking
over the past year has occasionally criticized the
Soviet Union in strong terms for its attempts to
come to terms with the West Germans. The Chi-
nese apparently hope thereby to generate anti-
Soviet feeling in East Europe, particularly in
Pankow. Ostpolitik remains a sensitive subject for
the Chinese; they see in it a way for the Soviet
Union to consolidate?and expand?its position in
Europe, and there is little chance Peking will
attempt to woo Bonn while the opening to the
east remains the centerpiece of West German for-
eign policy. Nonetheless, China's chief current
interest in West Germany is trade, and Peking has
not let the lack of formal relations with Bonn
interfere with the large Sino-German trade flow.
Slower Advance in the East 25X1
In East Europe, Chinese progress in building
its influence has been less rapid, largely as a result
of the firm control Moscow exerts on the forei n
policy of most of these states. Last year,
China was attempt-
ing to cultivate the East German and Polish gov-
ernments, but these initiatives subsequently
withered on the vine. More recently, China has
shown interest in the Kadar regime's quiet quest
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Mao greeting former French premier Couve de Murville
(above) and Romanian President Ceausescu (below)
for increased freedom for maneuver, but Moscow
in the past month has intervened directly to warn
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Budapest against overly friendly ties with Peking,
leading to the cancellation of a projected trip by a
Hungarian minister to China. As a result of Soviet
obstruction, Peking generally has had to content
itself with consolidating relations with the more
independent-minded governments of Romania
and Yugoslavia, together with China's long-time
ally, Albania. Late last year, Peking signed a large
aid package with Bucharest\
'marking China's
first formal aid to a Warsaw Pact state since 1957.
This spring, President Ceausescu received un-
usually lavish treatment during an eight-day tour
of China, including an extraordinary personal
escort by Chou En-lai. Chinese statements during
the visit not only underlined close government
ties with Romania, but publicly recognized
Bucharest as a true Marxist-Leninist state?an
extraordinary display of Chinese ideological flexi-
bility because Peking privately still regards the
Romanians as "revisionists."
On the heels of the Romanian visit, a Yugo-
slav delegation led by Belgrade's foreign secretary
arrived in Peking for a well-publicized visit. This
meeting consolidated state and economic rela-
tions between the two countries, although the
Chinese earlier drew an idenlogical line by
ignoring Yugoslav suggestions aimed toward re-
establishing party ties. The Chinese, nonetheless,
have shown considerable flexibility even on this
score by scrupulously avoiding any public refer-
ence that might offend the Yugoslays' view of
themselves as responsible Communists. 25X1
With respect to Albania, the Chinese have
continued their large-scale economic and military
assistance program, including the provision of
MIG-21 fighters. The Chinese also have en-
couraged Tirana's efforts over the past year to
expand its diplomatic ties among neighboring
Communist states and in West Europe.
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Peking was actively encouraging closer
ties among Tirana, Bucharest and Belgrade. Al-
though the Chinese almost certainly are well
aware that the governments concerned are chary
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