WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT YUGOSLAVIC THE NEW REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 18, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEEKLY SUMMITRY
Special Report
Yugoslavia.- The New Revolution
OS FluE COPY
Bau tO1E-61
Secret
N2 664
18 June 1971
No. 0375/7113
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Yugoslavia: The New Revolution
President Tito, Yugoslavia's undisputed leader,
has over the last few years forged a unique political
structure, gradually discarding some of the more
doctrinaire tenets of Communism in favor of a
freer, more open system. The movement in this
direction was dramatically accelerated last Septem-
ber when Tito-with an eye toward his eventual
demise-called for the creation of a collective presi-
dency representing all interests, and invited nation-
wide discussions of his proposal.
The ,esponse was far broader than the 79-year-old chief executive had ex-
pected. Tito's invitation to talk about succession surfaced a wide variety of long-
smoldering demands for political reform, for greater republican and provincial
autonomy, and for the extension of personal freedoms. The ensuing debates,
arguments, and give-and-take-unlike anything anywhere else in the Communist
world except perhaps in Czechoslovakia in 1968-resulted in formal moves to adopt
a far-reaching political reform that is nothing short of a new revolution.
The frank, open discussion of ideas and interests beyond those of the Com-
munist Party is far more akin to that occurring in Western political life than to
anything currently known in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. in the months
that have followed Tito's proposal, the Yugoslav federation has shown a high degree
of resiliency in the face of assaults by separatists and an unprecedented tolerance for
the new politics. During recent weeks even Tito wondered whether the process was
not getting out of control and used his great personal prestige to silence the most
outspoken critics of the reforms.
If Belgrade creates the decentralized socialist state it is aiming at-one that
takes for granted wide-ranging freedom of expression not only for individuals but
for groups such as trade unions and student and mass organizations that are
increasingly powerful politically-the impact on the Con munist world will ulti-
mately equal and probably will surpass that resulting from the Tito-Stalin hreak of
1948. Such a development probably would ensure the continuation of a democ-
ratized, Westward-leaning but nonaligned Yugoslavia no longe dependent on Tito's
presence or survival. The road ahead will be long and arduous, because Yugoslavia is
a complex state with chronic economic difficulties, a residue of orthodox Commu-
nists who still have a modicum of influence, nationality hatreds, and a young
generation that is looking for democracy on the West European socialist model.
Nevertheless, the chances are good that Belgrade will succeed in making its projected
new system work.
Special Report
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1.
Josip Broz Tito
2.
3.
4.
To be elected
11
01
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
5.
6.
7.
Croatia
Croatia
Croatia
8.
9.
10.
Macedonia
Macedonia
Macedonia
11.
12.
13. _
Slovenia
Slovenia
Slovenia
14.
15.
16,
Bosnia
Bosnia
Bosnia_
17.
18.
19.
Montenegro
Montenegro
Montenegro
2U.
21.
_
Vojvodina
Vojvodina
22.
23.
Kosovo
Kosovo
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEC)
The FEC, the present cabinet, will be reduced
in size. The prime minister will be nominated
by the Presidency and he and the FEC mem-
bers will be responsible to the Federal As-
sembly. Each republic will have equal mem-
bership in the FEC.
A. Tito will retain the titular position of
President of Yugoslavia for an indefinite
period.
B. Once Tito is no longer president, a presi-
dent will be chosen by annual rotation
among the 22-member executive body.
C. A vice president will be chosen annually
from the 22 members of the executive
body. Under Tito, he will be in charge of
day-to-day executive duties.
D. Each republic will have three representa-
tives on the presidency and the provinces
two each.
E. The president of each republic or pro-
vincial assembly will by virtue of his
office, be a member of the presidency.
Other meoibers will be elected for non-
successive, five-year terms by majority
vote in these bodies.
1. Foreign Affairs
2. National Defense
3 State Security
These bodies will serve as advisory organs to
the Presidency.
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The aging, 79-year-old President Tito, whom some
describe as the "first and last Yugoslav."
The need to institutionalize the succession
process, rather than court chaos, has led directly
to the dramatic new developments in Yugoslavia's
political life. President Tito, long cognizant of the
problems that will accompany the transition
period after his retirement or death, cver the last
few years had already begun to delegate some of
his once-absolute powers to trusted colleagues. He
nonetheless stunned an audience in Zagreb on 21
September 1970 when he called for the creation
of a coll:tive executive body to replace his own
lifetime presidency. He indicated that he was
wearying of the duties of the office, looking
ahead to possible retirement, and desirous of cre-
ating a collective presidency that could begin to
relieve him of some of the rigors of his post.
=our days later, Tito called into session the
powerful party executive bureau along with
representatives of the Federal Assembly, the
popular front organization (SAWPY), the trade
unions , and the constituent republics. The result
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was an endorsement of the collective presidency
plan. The next step came on 4 October when
Tito's close adviser, Edvard Kardelj, in an address
to the party presidium, gave his peers a glimpse of
what was envisaged.
Kardelj's remarks stressed urgency in im-
plementing Tito's proposed collective government
leadership. He expanded the concept by bringing
up the need to define clearly the relationship
between the federation and the constituent
republics, as well as the limits of authority of the
self-managing organizations on the one hand and
the government administrative bodies on the
other. 'KCardelj's proposal meant basic constitu-
tional revisions that were bound to antagonize
those whose rights and privileges accrue from the
present system. This fact was evident when
Slovenian party boss Franc Popit rose at the pre-
sidium to agree with Kardelj's basic analysis of
the problems facing Yugoslavia but took excep-
tion to the alleged need for constitutional reform.
Popit's objections notwithstanding, a commission
was established to draft a set of constitutional
changes. Thus, within two weeks of Tito's original
proposal for the creation of a collective presi-
dency, the reform was reaching proportions be-
yond what he originally contemplated. Tito
publicly admitted as much in March of this year
to a gathering of party officials, but he also
indicated that hu saw the logic of the additional
reforrris.
Yugoslavia, as envisioned in the pending gov-
ernment reforms, will be a union of nearly
autonomous socialist republics, with the federal
government's authority restricted mainly to con-
ducting foreign policy, providing for national
defense, achieving a unifi- d econom;c system, and
channeling funds from the more developed re-
publics to the backward regions-Bosnia-Her-
cegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
All other functions, duties, responsibilities, and
considerable financial resources will be passed to
the republics.
Tito recognizes that an attempt to recon-
struct a highly centralized country, as Yugoslavia
-3- 18 June 1971
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GREECE
Thess:
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-"- Republic boundary
Zes
-- Autonomous area boundary
 troduced over the next year or two in a second
package of amendments.
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was between the two world wars, would be fore-
doomed to failure. Such a system would mean
either Serb or Croatian dominance (most likely
the former) would again set in motion ancient
national feuds, would invite foreign meddling,
and most likely would lead to a period of civil
war with the ultimate destruction of the federa-
tion.
Tito wants none of this. He opted for a bold
course of action he hopes will ensure the survival
of the federation after his passing. Under his plan,
demands of the regions for a greater voice in
running their own affairs are to be met. Un-
spoken, but nevertheless vitally important to the
proposal, is the hope that allowing extensive de-
centralization will give the country's diverse
nationalities the feeling that they have a decisive
voice and a stake in the future as members of a
federation.
The first formal step taken in carrying out
the program was the introduction of proposed
constitutional amendments on 28 February.
Despite the extensive decentralization outlined in
the constitutional reforms, the amendments on
balance are weaker than originally expected and
the federal government is retaining more author-
ity than first proposed. There are several reasons
for this. First, Tito has encountered more inter-
republic squabbling and difficulty than he ex-
pected in winning clear-cut support for his plans
to decentralize the state; and second, the govern-
ment, by having to cope with the problem of
drafting major constitutional reforms while
simultaneously dealing with increasing economic
difficulties, learned something about the dangers
of too much decentralization.
The prolonged debates and arguments on
both the political and economic issues have made
time critical because bureaucrats have tended to
become immobilized in the face of drastic change.
As a result, the constitutional reforms have been
pared down to a basic package for speedier
implemen'ation (see amendments at annex). The
remainder of the original program will be in-
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Simultaneously with Tito's proposal to cre-
ate a collective presidency, Yugoslavia's chronic
economic problems began to assume alarming
proportions. The nation's first party conference
met in October 1970 and examined the proposed
government reorganization. By far the largest part
of the conference's time, however, was spent on
economic difficulties, and a temporary stabiliza-
tion program was outlined to the delegates.
Thereafter, economic and political problems more
and more began to dovetail as regionally based
differences of opinion over the best courses of
action to follow were introduced and openly
debated in the context of the contemplated con-
stitutional reform. In the weeks and months that
followed, the stopgap stabilization measures did
nothing to cool spiraling inflation or reduce the
rising balance-of-payments deficit. The nation's
economy quickly became a political hot potato.
By mid-November the highly charged debate
over the economic stabilization program pro-
duced the sudden and dramatic resignation of
Vice Premier Nikola Miljanic. At issue was
whether to devalue the dinar, a move that
Miljanic at the time was unsuccessfully backing.
His unprecedented resignation overshadowed the
devaluation issue; no other high-level, federal
leader had ever voluntarily resigned because his
policies were not being followed.
By late December, the Federal Assembly was
flexir!i new political muscles, more like Western
parliaments than its counterparts elsewhere in
Eastern Europe. The issue, just as in the case of
the Miljanic resignation, was over an aspect of the
economic stabilization program-a government
proposal to limit personal income growth in 1971
to 11 percent. Presentation of the proposal to the
Federal Assembly caused an uproar. T'ie result
was a compromise in which the government short-
ened its originally proposed time span on the bill
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from one year to four months. The issue was not
resolved, however, until a majority of the As-
sembly delegates had labeled the original proposal
"repressive" and "incompatible" with self-
management.
The dispute underscored the growing role
trade unions play in Yugoslavia's political life.
Throughout 1970 they had sought to dispel the
impression that they were mere "transmission
belts" for party policy, and union officials wasted
no time in denouncing and lobbying in parliament
against the proposed wage limitation. Trade
Union secretary Marijan Rozic personally and
vigorously addressed the Assembly arguing against
the measure in its original form.
Worker support for the government's pro-
posed constitutional reforms, however, was evi-
dent at the second self-management congress,
held in Sarajevo the first week in May. The 2,100
delegates strongly endorsed the reforms and used
the occasion to press for greater political and
economic power for the workers. They urged
more worker influence over the investment deci-
sions of their firms, equal pay throughout the
country for those working on the same job,
across-the-board wage and pension increases, and
extensive social welfare projects. In a move antici-
pating a second phase of Tito's constitutional
reforms (tentatively slated for introduction some-
time in 1972), the congress called for further
decentralization of government with specific con-
stitutional recognition of worker councils and of
the municipalities as the basis for the self-manage-
ment system.
During the first half of 1971, public partici-
pation in government has grown rapidly, infusing
new vigor and vitality into the country's political
life. The once quiescent mass organization, the
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugo-
slavia (S.AWPY), has suddenly become a forum in
which the voice of the people can be heard. Long
merely a vehicle for implementing party policies,
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SAWPY is in the thick of the constitutional de-
bate because of its responsibility for arranging
public meetings on the proposed amendments. In
1966, the late Milentije Popovic, then SAWPY's
vice president, advocated for the mass organiza-
tion a more prominent role approaching that of a
second political party. At that time, however, his
words fell on deaf ears. Subsequent, similar pro-
posals were also disregarded by the party leaders.
The use of SAWPY meetings as the forum for
open debates on the constitutional amendments
and the organization's concomitant drive to
strengthen ties with socialist parties throughout
the world and with Communist parties in the
West indicate that SAWPY is now becoming a real
factor in Yugoslav politics, separate from the
party. It could become a major political force in
"legal opposition."
Nowhere is evidence of Yugoslavia's new
revolution more apparent than in the press and
other media. Always an anomaly in the Commu-
nist world because of their objective, critical
reporting, the Yugoslav media have in the last
year discarded most of their remaining restraints
so that they are often hard to distinguish from
many of their Western counterparts.
The press has pulled few punches in its ex-
tensive coverage of the polemics over the eco-
nomic stabilization program and the constitu-
tional reforms. Reporting has been so candid and
critical of Yugoslav officials and policies that Tito
himself has recently castigated it for lack of
responsibility.
The aging Yugoslav leader was undoubtedly
shocked by the free-swinging fight that developed
between the Belgrade daily Borba and the Zagreb
journal Vjesnik early this year. The two hotly
debated the seemingly innocuous question of the
national census. Vjesnik took issue with a new
regulation permitting a variety of responses to the
question on nationality affiliation; the paper
charged that the regulation was a threat to the
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integrity of Croatia. This dispute degenerated into
a Serb-Croat name-calling contest, and before it
was over Federal Assembly Vice President Josip
Djerdja (a Croat) resigned from the editorial
board of Barba for what he considered the
paper's unjustified attack on his republic.
A further relaxation of formal restrictions
on the press may be achieved if the Yugoslav
newsmen's current demand for greater access to
foreign wire services is met. Slovenia in particular
is taking the lead in urging uncensored access to
these services because its press has to compete
with the Austrian and Italian papers, which circu-
late freely in Slovenia. Those responsible for what
appears in the Yugoslav press will, however, still
be expected to show self-restraint and use dis-
cretion on what to print.
Yugoslavia's students, always outspoken,
have found new encouragement in the nation's
more open political climate. In late December,
the students at the University of Zagreb suc-
ceeded in defeating a party-backed candidate for
student prorector of the school. The election of
Catholic, Croat nationalist Ivan Cicak, dumb-
founded university party officials. Subsequent
pressure to nullify Cicak's election failed. Flushed
with victory, the vast majority of the student
body rallied to Cicak's support and ousted the
party-backed leadership of the Zagreb student
federation. This action came in a turbulent ses-
sion on 4 April, which saw the federation's presi-
dent carried from the podium, after which he and
his cohorts were voted out of office. As a result,
only four of the nineteen-man student board,
previously dominated by Communists, are now
party members.
Yugoslav students support the constitutional
reforms in princ.ple, but criticize some aspects of
the proposed ;,ranges. The Croatian student body
in particular has taken an exaggerated stand in
pressing for nearly full republic autonomy and in
opposing the federal government's retention of
such powers as the right to assure a unified eco-
nomic system and market th;?oughout the nation.
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Thrr., stand of the Croatian students in favor
of grep.ter republic autonomy has even colored
their relations with the Yugoslav Student Federa-
tion. On 8 June the Croatian student delegation
to the Federation's gathering in Novi Sad refused
to agree either to a common platform or to the
body's new organizational statutes. Instead, the
Croats insisted that the Student Federation be
reconstituted along more autonomous lines, i.e., a
loose association of independent student bodies.
Regional Chauvinism: A Sobering Note
The new revolution is not without its dan-
gers. The interplay of government reforms, the
nation's economic problems, and the freer politi-
cal climate have contributed to surfacing deep-
rooted, bitter regional and nationality animosi-
ties. Dark events of the past have not been for-
gotten. During the Nazi occupation in the Second
World War, for example, the Yugoslav peoples
turned on each other with a vengeance. Hundreds
of thousands of Croats and Serbs lost their lives in
a civil war fought over fascism, Communism, and
national hatreds. This same penchant for blood-
letting is prevalent among some members of the
Yugoslav emigre community today-as witnessed
by the recent assassination of the Yugoslav am-
bassador to Sweden.
The forceful and. genuinely respected Presi-
dent Tito has brought a halt to the more drastic
expression of internal antagonisms in the postwar
period. Moreover, because of the government's
system of rotating officials every two or three
years in and out of federal offices, a large body of
well-informed leaders attached to the concept of
federation has developed. Clearly, however, no
one has an accurate reading on the depth or
potential virulence of latent republic nationalism.
As debates on the reforms have gone into
full swing, ea'.h republic has maneuvered for the
largest possible share of the considerable political
and economic power that will be transferred to
local levels. With the exception of Croatia-and to
a lesser extent Serbia-all the republics have
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demonstrated a willingness to compromise. In the
case of Serbia there appears to be an undercurrent
of opposition to decentralization by unspecified
officials who prefer a more orthodox, centrally
controlled Communist state. In addition, many
other Serbs still sentimentally look back to inter-
bellum Yugoslavia, when Serbia dominated the
country. Neither centralism nor Serbian domi-
nance, however, will be possible under the pend-
ing constitutional reforms.
The Croats, on the other hand, loathe the
interbellum period as a time of subjugation to the
Serbs, and they are determined never to be put in
this position again. Numerically weaker than the
Serbs, the Croats, because of their historical ties
with the West, feel culturally 'iperior to the rest
of the nation (Slovenia excluc ed) and are deter-
mined to push for nearly ful autonomy in the
reforms. As a result, executive bureau member
Mika Tripalo and to a lesser extent Croatian cen-
tral committee president Savka Dabcevic-Kucar
have become the champions of national integrity
and regional particularism as an integral part of
reform.
The words of these two outspoken Croatian
leaders have caused concern in Belgrade and ap-
parently were key factors in Tito's recent call for
a clampdown on nationalism. Equally unnerving
to many loyal to the federation are the other
outbursts of Croatian nationalism that have oc-
curred throughout the republic in the last year-
soccer riots, demands for a Croatian "national
airline," and inflammatory press stories calling for
the Croatian people to again "prove" their na-
tionality.
Tito, admittedly surprised at the forces un-
leashed by his invitation to debate the reforms,
convened the party presidium in late April. After
a three-day, closed-door session, which apparently
included some head-knocking, the party leader-
ship emerged calling for stricter discipline to over-
come regional chauvinism and implement the
reforms. The Croatian party's commission on
ideology and organization subsequently recom-
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mended that the republic party oust all elements
opposed to the reforms. The Croatian central
committee has echoed this call, but as yet no
heads have rolled.
To some observers, the presidium's call for
stricter party discipline amounts to a reversal of
the reform movement, but in fact it testifies
mainly to Tito's intention to direct the reforms
from above.
A key to the success of the new revolution
will be the regime's ability to find a way out of its
third inflationary crisis since 1960. Belgrade
knows that a healthy economy is critical to the
smooth introduction of a more democratic po-
litical system. For the 1970s the Yugoslavs
ambitiously hope to achieve growth without seri-
ous inflation and trade difficulties, to reduce the
gap between the nation's "hava" and "have-not"
regions, and convert the dinar into hard currency.
Past attempts to achieve these objectives have
failed.
Last fall the government began a stabiliza-
tion program with curbs on inflationary spending
by banks and government, particularly republic
and local bodies. In February, there was a belated
devaluation aimed at discouraging imports and at
spurring exports. The government has had trouble
getting the program off the ground, however. In
addition to the dispute over devaluation, im-
plementation has run afoul of fights over the
degree to which the federal government could
intervene in the economy, and of footdragging by
republics, which are charged with a considerable
role in the stabilization effort. As a result, the
program has hardly made a dent in the economic
problem. Republic and local spending has been
rising more than twice as fast as the legal maxi-
mum, domestic price increases already have
eroded most of whatever impact the devaluation
might have had, and imports have been soaring
and exports stagnating.
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Help appears to be in sight, however. Recog-
nizing its past errors, the magnitude of the prob-
lem it faces, and the need to move quickly, Bel-
grade, as it did in 1965, is seeking and apparently
getting financial assistance from the West. The
Yugoslavs have asked for some $600 to $700
million in assistance for 1971 and 1972.\
The Role of the Party and the Military
Under the proposed government decen-
tralization, the burden of maintaining national
cohesion and a feeling of unity will fall heavily on
both the party and the military. This, in fact, was
the dominant theme of the 18th party presidium
that met in early June.
In the postwar history of Yugoslavia the
party has been viewed as a key unifying force in
the country This aspect of party activity now
will be intensified, either by returning some
power to Belgrade from the republic pasties, or at
the very least by Hiving teeth to the party ap-
paratus concerned with enforcing discipline.
Tito has announced that after the first series
of constitutional reforms is implemented in Au-
gust d major party reorganization will take place.
Speaking to a party presidium session on 2 March,
he strongly emphasized that there can be no
boundaries for the party in Yugoslavia-"neither
republican, local, nor any other." Since then, this
theme has been repeated consistently in nearly all
his speeches. Other than Tito's announced inten-
tions, specifics on the reorganization are not yet
available.
The Yugoslav armed forces, along with the
party, have been a mainstay of the regime. The
military has consistently supported Tito's non-
conformist policies, backed him in times of na-
tional crisis, and traditionally served as a national
unifying force. Most recently the military's sup-
port of Tito's policies was expressed by Col. Gen
Djoko Juric, commander c'f the Zagreb military
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district. On 28 April, the same day Tito opened a
presidium session to whip party (mainly Croat)
dissidents into line for his reforms, Juric delivered
a speech endorsing Tito's policies and con-
demning those individuals who use regional
chauvinism to disrupt and block official policies.
In reaction to the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia nearly three years ago, Yugoslavia has
rearranged its armed forces. Major reforms have
taken place in the military's party organization to
encourage open dialogue between the military
and civilian party personnel and organs. At the
heart of these reforms is an effort Lo close the gap
between the armed forces and the rest of society.
Ul;;;nately, the success or failure of Yugo-
slavia's current revolutionary reforms could rest
on the attitude of the military in the post-Tito
era-specifically its understanding of and support
for decentralization. The armed forces' knowl-
edge that their support has in the past spelled the
difference between success and failure for Tito's
policy undoubtedly has bolstered the feeling,
however, that these forces have a "privileged"
position in the Yugoslav power structure. The
success of the pending reforms, therefore, may in
large part rest on the regime's agility in carrying
through on its program of identifying the armed
forces with the reforms and not treading on their
vested interests.
Significant progress has been made in getting
the military accustomed to a freer political atmos
phere and in encouraging young officers to be
well versed in party policies. Juric's support of
Tito last month indicates that the regime is having
some success in achieving this goal.
The Impact of the New Revolution
on the Communist World
Final judgment on the new revolution will
have to wait for some years following Tito's pass-
ing. In the long run, however, should the new
revolution prove a success in fact, the already
discernible movement toward more democratic
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institutions elsewhere in Eastern Europe will be
accelerated. Success would mean that the Yugo-
slavs were not only the first Communist nation to
carry out a smooth succession adhering to consti-
tutional provisions, but also that they wore not
dependent on a single strong man.
Needless to say, a failure of the new revolu-
tion involving a reorientation of Yugoslavia to-
ward Moscow would remove a chronic irritant
from the Soviet point of view. Tito's successful
defiance of Stalin, Yugoslavia's success in buillfi'ing
its unique style of Communism, and its non-
aligned foreign policy have been bitter pills for
the Soviets to swallow. The existence of an in-
dependent, socialist Yugoslavia from 1948 to the
present has not only given Belgrade enormous
prestige, but Yugoslavia's success has proven a
tempting example for the other Communist
regimes in Eastern Europe, all of which long to
fc':iow their own particular road to socialism. On
two past occasions, Hungary in 1956 and Czech-
oslovakia in 1968, the Yugoslav example was a
key stimulant to abortive attempts to break away
from Soviet domination. If the new Yugoslav
experiment fails, Romania would find its inde-
pendent position vis-a-vis Moscow seriously
undermined.
Not only inside but outside the Communist
world Belgrade enjoys a great deal more prestige
than would be expected of a country its size, and
here too its policies undermine those of the So-
viets. In the case of the "third world," Yugo-
slavia's skillful manipulation of nonalignment has
been the key to its success. I n addition, Yugo-
slavia's socialist experiment is a potent political
concept among developing nations, and Belgrade's
decentralized system of workers' councils holds a
great deal of fascination for the nonaligned na??
tions. Many developing nations that favor social-
ism but distrust Soviet motives and reject the
West see in Yugoslavia an acceptable alternative.
The Kremlin is clearly keeping close tabs on
developments in Yugoslavia. Belgrade claims that
Moscow is stirring up nationality antagonisms
Special Report
with the idea of keeping the regime off balance
and preoccupied, thus preventing the reforms
from being carried out. Evidence is scant on how
deeply the Soviets are involved. There is little
doubt, however, that Moscow's ultimate goal is to
scuttle the new revolution and to encourage those
Communists inside the country who have views
parallel to Moscow's and whom the Russians
would like to see in power some day.
The obstacles to the new revolution are
great, but recent history has taught that the
Yugoslavs should not be sold short. Yugoslavia's
relatively open political life is both a sign of
maturity on the part of the people and a show of
confidence on the part of the regime. In this
climate, differences are being surfaced and dealt
with while Tito is still alive and can act as a
moderating influence. But not all public problems
are being handled by Tito, and this is what is
encouraging for the future. The populace as a
whole, in one way or another, is being consulted
on some of the problems associated with the
succession period, and some decisions are being
made by consensus by high-level government
committees.
Extremely significant is the flexibility the
Yugoslavs are showing in irtroducing their re-
forms. This indicates a genuine willingness to
listen to domestic cri;icisms and to meet objec-
tions if they appear valid. One instance of this is
the fact that the constitutional amendments
themselves have heen changed since their intro-
duction last February. The collective presidency
has been expanded from two representatives for
each republic to three, thereby meeting a Bosnian
need for a three-way nationality balance-a Croat,
a Serb, and a Muslim-on the collective executive.
Other proposed amendments have been the
subject of a great deal of give-and-take. Leading
Macedonian party official Krste Crverikovski drew
attention to this fact last March when, in speaking
to a party presidium meeting, he defined the real
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value of reform in this whole period as lying not
in the amendments and proposals themselves, but
in the open political climate, with its accompa-
nying controversy, generated by the reforms.
At best, the period ahead will be troubled
and the transition confused, but the chances are
good that even without Tito the Yugoslavs will
carry the program through to a successful con-
clusion and establish a system of government and
economic administration that can transcend the
personality of their long-time leader. There is a
core of trained military, party, and government
officials who will remain loyal to the federation
despite their regional attachments. There is
support from the population for the changes.
There is youthful pressure just strong enough tc,
keep the revolution from stagnating. There is a
national zest for showing up the Soviets, who
claimed a generation ago that an independent,
unorthodox Yugoslavia could not survive.
Special Report
Yugoslav tempers explode easily, and there
will be many minicrises ahead. It appears, how-
ever, that the forces for constructive change prob-
ably will combine to keep the crises manageable.
There is no way of predicting what the new
Yugoslav federation will look like in five years.
The Yugoslavs are already thinking about deeper
changes in years to come, and their national pen-
chant for tinkering with the system probably will
continue to be indulged.
Aside from the constitutional refurms, Tito's
greatest step toward achieving stability and the
future of the republic may have been his clear
shift toward a strong anchor in the West, particu-
larly Western Europe and the US, and his con-
comitant abandonment of any further tries at
rapprochement with the USSR. The added West-
ern economic assistance granted this year is evi-
dence of the stake the hard currency countries
have in the survival of the Yugoslav federation.
Tito is counting on this and on the political
support that is implicit in the economic
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Article XX Defines Yugoslavia as a federal state based on a voluntary union of six socialist
republics, as well as two autonomous provinces that are component parts of
Serbia. Authority in this union ultimately rests on the power and self management
of the country's working class. The constituent republics are recognized as
self-managing communities made up of equal nationalities and national minorities.
Article XXI Stipulates that incomes will be distributed according to the individual's work (in
contrast with standard Marxist phraseology: From each according to his abilities,
to each according to his needs). The rights and duties of the workers and
enterprises in the self-management system are also defined.
Article XXII Describes the ways in which enterprises can invest funds (without possessing
ownership rights), including investing money abroad and accepting foreign cani-
tal-in accordance with federal law.
Article XXIII C'nnrantees private work in the fields of agriculture, handicraft, and other services
within the limits prescribed by law. Such private enterprises may own the means
of production, manag' their own affairs, and exercise the right to dispose )r the
income earned as they see fit. Lifts the 10-hectare limit on private farms for the
mountainous regions of Yugoslavia.
Article XXIV Defines the concept of a united market. A common economic policy will exist
throughout the country, manpower and capital are supposed to move freely
within the country, branches of enterprises set up in another republic must not be
discriminated against and, finally, no republic, province, or commune will be
allowed to retain a monopoly in any given economic field.
Article XXV Stipulates that the social plan (a common economic policy) will be drawn up
jointly by the representatives of the federal republic and provincial governments.
Article XXVI Empowers the National Bank of Yugoslavia to issue the nc:ions currency. A
Council of Governors made up of representatives of republic and provincial banks
will govern the National Bank.
Article XXVII Gives to the republics and provinces wide-ranging authority to collect and dis-
tribute tax revenue. Grants to the Federation the right, in case of national
emergency, to step in and regulate the nation's tax system.
Article XXVIII Guarantees the rights and equality of every nationality and national minority in
the country and describes their joint economic and social interest.
Article XXIX Spells out in 17 sections the rights of the federal government of Yugoslavia. These
include responsibility for the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity,
the regulation of a unified economic market, control over national defense,
determination and conduct of foreign policy, and arbitration of legal differences
between republics and provinces.
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Article XXX Makes maml?uo;y the implementation of federal laws by the federal, republic, and
provincial governments. Albanian and Hungarian are recognized us official lira
gua' es along with S-Vrbo-Croatian, Croat-Serbian, Slovenian, and Macedonian.
Article XXXI Define;, the procedure for amending the constitution.
Article XX;r1I Deals with the relationship between the federal government on the one hand and
the republics and provinces on the other. l> der-republic committees are to be
formed to discuss problems than arise. The federal government, however, will have
more power than originally thought. 1j' a republic opposes a specific measure, and
federal authorities consider that failure to i?nplememt the measure will harm the
state, then the government caul override the opposition and implement the bill.
Article XXXIII Spells out the sources of federal revenue and areas of spemli':g.
Article X XXIV Stipulates that any international eh,'reement that requires modification of a re-
public or provincial law will have prior approvai'of that republic or province.
Article XXXV Provides for the creation of a collective presidency based on equal representation
of the republics and corresponding representation of the autonomous province:'.
(See chart entitled "The Collective Presidency"). Among other things, the collec-
tive executive is given the right to propose policy direction to the Federal'
Assembly as v.ell as to initiate changes in the constitution. The president is also
designated the supreme commander of the armed forces.
/trtide XXXVI Makes a special exception of President Tito's tenure in the new collective presi-
dency, allowing /hint to retain his position for an unlimited time.
Article XXXVII 1'ro-. ides for a smaller Federal Lsxecu rive Council (cabinet) composed of au equal
number of members from Yugoslavir, six constituent republics and a correspond-
ing number from the two automonn td.: provinces. The council is responsible ju,
the implementation of established govermmemt,jolicy, and for the first little it It'lil
enjoy immnity.
Article XXXVIII Provides for the creation of federal secretariats to carry out the administration of'
federal duties. //cads of the secretariats are directly responsible to the Federal
Assembly.
Article XXXIX Flatly asserts that it is the right and duty of all citizens to defend Yugoslavia.
Under this article no one has the right or authority to sign or recognize'the
capitulation of Yugoslavia or to invite the intervention of foreign troops.
Article XL States that a constitutional law shall be adopted for the implementation of the
above amendments.
(See Timetable next page)
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U NCLASSI F11;D
15 May 1971 Public discussion and debate ended.
25-30 May Four of the five chambers of the Federal Assembly
debated the changes.
The constitutional commission met, considered com-
ments of four chambers and prepared final drafts for
the Chamber of Nationalities.
25 June The Amendments will be approved by ttit: entire
Federal Assembly and will go into effect in ,arly
July.
Between 25 June
and 25 July Members of' the collective presidency will be elected
within 30 d..ys after the amendments go into effect.
31 August Before ti,is date, the Federal Assembly will confirm
the election of the collective presidency.
30 September The new Federal Executive Council will be elected by
this date.
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