WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE EVE OF THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 19, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DOCUMENT SI!S BR1!1
L
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
'VEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Soviet Leadership on the Eve
of the 24th Congress of the CPSU
DSR FILE COPY
RETURN TO 1E-61
Secret
N! 678
19 March 1971
No. 0362/71A
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THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE EVE OF THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU
The 24th Soviet party congress will convene on 30 March, one year past the
statutory time limit and five years after the last congress. As the party's most
authoritative forum, the congress will endorse policy guidelines and realign the top
political hierarchy to fit changes in power relations that have taken place since the
last session.
As the meeting approaches, there have been signs of fierce pulling and hauling
among opposing factions within the party to influence the general tone and direc-
tion of the congress. To some extent this involves bureaucratic competition among
important interest groups-regional as well as central-for more money and greater
power. But the main cleavage is between those who would like to see the congress
endorse an acceleration of the present conservative drift in Soviet policies and those
who would have it mark a return to a more flexible and innovative approach. The
leadership appears to be fairly evenly divided between moderates and conservatives,
and there is still no clear evidence as to what direction the congress will take. There
will certainly be no major shift in policy unless there is a major shake-up in the
leadership, and that does not appear to be in the offing.
General Secretary Brezhnev, the most powerful figure in the leadership and
spokesman for the generally middle-of-the-road faction, has markedly enhanced his
authority since the last congress. It would be surprising if some of his followers did
not improve their positions at this session. But existing checks and balances still
appear to be strong enough to safeguard the system of collective decision-making
and to prevent Brezhnev from establishing the kind of domination enjoyed by Stalin
and to a lesser extent by Khrushchev.
It has indeed appeared difficult for the leadership to make any changes in its
ranks. There have been no alterations in the composition of the eleven-man polit-
buro since the last congress, although several members at the very least seem due for
retirement. This meeting will therefore determine whether such changes will be
made on a timely basis or whether immobility will persist.
Functions of the Congress tion. According to the script, it is composed of
delegates elected in a democratic manner at re-
gions by wh in
According to party texts, the congress is the been al
n s.o In tpra have
elect daalt di trict elegate
meets
"indisputable authority of party power," the however, the delegates are carefully selected ce
in
formal apex of the party's hierarchical organiza- advance by Moscow.
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19 March 1971
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STRUCTURE OF TOP SOVIET PARTY BODIES
(on Eve of 24th Party Congress)
PARTY CONGRESS
APPROX. 5,000 DELEGATES
Democradnally elected
by party members
(indirect election through
lower party organizations)
Supreme party body
meets every lour year,,,
I
CENTRAL AUDITING
COMMISSION
73 MEMBERS
Checks on speed and correctness
of activities of central party
bodies and condition of
party finances
Frequency of meeting unspecified
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
190 FULL (VOTING) MEMBERS
148 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Directs work of party
between congresses
Meets at least once every
tae months
Directs current work of the party
chiefly checking on
unplennnl ation of party decisions
and selection of personnel
Functions con:nuously
II FULL (VOTING) MEMBERS
9 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Directs work of central
committee between plenums
PART Y CONTROL
COMMITTEE
Trial and apperils board for
cases if party declpllne
-- ELECTS
-- INSPECTS
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In the early years party congresses partici-
pated actively in policy making, but under Stalin
they degenerated into a rubber stamp forum de-
signed to give the leadership a semblance of
democratic legitimacy and to propagate the re-
gime's policies. Although congresses have been
convened with greater frequency and regularity in
recent years, their role and operations have not
essentially changed.
The convocation of a party congress is, nev-
ertheless, an event of great importance in Soviet
political life. It is the occasion for reviewing party
activities and for authoritatively defining basic
policies. It is also a primary reference point in
party annals and historiography. Pronouncements
of the 23rd party congress are frequently cited as
basic guidelines, and even those held during the
Khrushchev era are occasionally mentioned.
The convening of a congress also helps to
bring into the open the crosscurrents of political
and policy disagreements within the leadership.
Furthermore, it forces a review of the member-
ship of the ruling bodies-the politburo, the secre-
tariat and the central committee-and thus is a
time when individual leaders seek to place their
followers in positions of influence.
As general secretary of the central commit-
tee, Brezhnev will deliver the "accountability re-
port," which, in theory, is an accounting to the
party's highest body of the activities of the cen-
tral committee since the preceding congress. This
keynote address reviews developments in the in-
terval, defines the current situation, and outlines
a program for the future. It is usually divided into
three major sections-the international situation,
domestic affairs, and the state of the party-and is
followed by discussion.
If there are any "dramatic" moments at the
congress, they are most likely to occur in Brezh-
nev's speech itself or during subsequent discussion
of it. Kosygin's report on the five-year plan, the
only other significant report scheduled, seems
likely to be an exposition of the draft directives
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of the 1971-1975 plan published in the Soviet
press in mid-Fehruary.
The session, which is expected to last more
than a week, will close with the election of a new
central committee that in turn will meet to elect
the other ruling bodies, the politburo and the
secretariat. In both cases decisions concerning
membership will already have been made. The
congress will be attended by representatives of
foreign Communist and some left-wing parties.
The foreign representatives will present greetings
from the various "fraternal parties" but will not
participate in the deliberations.
Conflicting Policy Directions
The collective leadership that succeeded
Khrushchev has proved to have considerable polit-
ical staying power. The group has avoided any
open, destructive struggle for power, but it has by
no means been free of internal disagreements. As
the congress approaches, jockeying to influence
its tone and direction has become apparent. Es-
sentially the struggle involves the question of how
far Soviet policy should move away from Khru-
shchev-symbolizing change-and back toward
Stalin-symbolizing the old way of doing things.
At one extreme of the Soviet political spec-
trum are those Who would like to return to tough
Stalinist policies in domestic and foreign affairs.
They are not represented in the politburo, al-
though their voices may well be heard in the
Kremlin. They consider Khrushchev's de-Stalini-
zation drive a grave mistake that has led to the
erosion of Soviet power in the Communist world
and to unrest at home. They favor stern measures
against domestic dissident elements and distrust
any innovations that might tend to weaken party
and government controls. They are obsessed with
the dangers of ideological subversion from the
West and doubt the wisdom of closer rela-dons
with capitalist countries, particular!, if it entails
more than minor concessions on the Soviet side.
They put much stock in the importance of recon-
ciliation with the Communist Chinese and seem
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to have been able to convince themselves that this
is simply a matter of removing revisionist ele-
ments from Soviet political life.
At the other extreme are those who believe
that, without some basic economic reforms and a
further democratization of political and social
institutions, it will not be possible to get the
country moving and to solve its economic ills.
Members of this persuasion believe that if the
Soviet Union is to make rapid progress in modern-
izing its economy, it will have to accelerate the
use of Western technology. They favor a flexible,
essentially nationalistic, foreign policy. Moreover,
they tend to see Communist China, rather than
the West, as the greatest potential threat to the
Soviet Union, not only from a military point of
view, but because Chinese arguments play into
the hands of the neo-Stalinists at home.
The range of views represented at the top
policy-making level does not encompass these ex-
tremes, and certainly no one leader wholly em-
braces either of these programs. The two ex-
tremes do, however, help to define the limits
within which policy debates take place and to
identify the ingredients that go into the "mix" of
Soviet policy.
There is a fairly even balance in the leader-
ship between conservative and moderately liberal
interests, but it is evident from the direction that
Soviet policy has taken since Khrushchev's ouster
that the conservatives have generally come out
ahead in the argument. They are now clearly
pushing their advantage in hopes of achieving
some major gain at the congress, possibly even the
further rehabilitation of Stalin. Their capability
Politburo Lineup
Front row (left to right)-Voronov, Suslov, Podgorny, Kosygin, Brezhnev
Back row-Pelshe, Shelepin, Mazurov, Kirilenko, Polyansky
(the empty chair belongs to Shelest)
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INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE: PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
PARTY GOVERNMENT
POLITBURO OF
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT OF
COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
GENERAL
MEMBERS SECRETARY
CHAIRMAN
(Titular Chief
of State)
FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMEN
Pelshe
Shelmt
CANDIDATES
Ardropov
Udinov
Demidev
Grirhin
Marhorov
Kunoyev
Shaherbihky
Rorhidov
Mrhavnnodro
PARTY CONTROL
COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN
CHAIRMAN
Sholepin
PRESIDIUM OF
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPREME SOVIET
PRESIDIUM
CHAIRMAN
Dymshits
Novikov, 1. T.
Boybokov
KIrI11in
Letechko
5mirnov
Novikov, V. N.
Tikhonov
lefty too
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
(The Chairmen of the
Supreme Soviet
Presidiums of the
15 Ropublia)
MEMBERS
--- Brenhnev
Members Ea Officio
(the 15 Republic Premiers)
69 Ministers and
other Officials of
MlnltmrIal Rank
--- Demichev
Kafuthev
Kulokov
Solomenttev
Kopitonon
Ponomarev
-- crirh~n
-- Modyrov
KuonVer
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ALL-UNION
CENTRAL COUNCIL
OF TRADE UNIONS
19 March 1971
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to do so without a major change in the composi-
tion of the politburo is problematical. Such a step
would have a severely inhibiting impact on all
domestic policy innovations and an adverse effect
on the political fortunes of those in the leadership
who have been associated with a push for change.
Shifting Political Alignments
The alignment within the politburo and even
the position of some of the individual members
have changed fairly dramatically in the five years
since the last party congress. General Secretary
Brezhnev, as "chairman of the board" and its
most powerful member, still hews to the middle
ground, but this ground has gradually shifted
toward the conservative end of the political spec-
trum. Those in the leadership who appear to
make up the hard core of his political support-
the "Ukrainian group"-have increasingly come to
be identified with a tough line on domestic and
foreign policy matters. The independent members
of the 11-man politburo, including both past and
present rivals and critics of Brezhnev, now seem
to have landed in the moderate sector.
On the eve of the 23rd party congress, held
in 1966, the leadership was still united in its
resolve to back off from many policies associated
with Khrushchev, particularly his drive against
Stalinism. The leadership had not given up hope
that, with Khrushchev out of the way and with
the taking of a decision to stop all criticism of
Stalin, the major problems in relations with Com-
munist China might be ironed out without further
ideological concessions. The two leaders who had
been closest to Khrushchev and who had appar-
ently disagreed with this line on Stalin-Mikoyan
and Podgorny-had already been moved to posi-
tions of lesser importance. Furthermore, the new
leadership's self-styled, "business-like" approach
to economic problems embodied in the agricul-
tural and economic programs of 1965 was still
too new to come under fire. Even so, three groups
could be discerned in the politburo.
Premier Kosygin, with his overriding interest
in improving the performance of the economy
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and his general willingness to deal with the West
on a businesslike basis, was the leading figure of
the moderate faction. He had a very influential
voice in policy-making and had gained a relatively
free hand in the administration of the economy.
A gentlemen's agreement had been reached after
Khrushchev's ouster that the top party and gov-
ernment posts would not be held by one man
and, although Kosygin has never seemed per-
sonally ambitious, this agreement on separation
of powers made him a natural counterweight to
Brezhnev.
At the other end of the spectrum were two
conservative groups-an ideologically motivated
one headed by veteran party secretary Suslov and
a neo-Stalinist wing led by Shelepin. The Shelepin
group favored a return to the use of fiat, as in the
Stalin era, in directing the economy, but without
the old reliance on terror and on the personality
cult. Brezhnev was seen by many observers at that
time as a weak leader-a compromise candidate
upon whom all factions could agree.
Shelepin's association with the neo-Stalinist
wing seems to have been more politically than
ideologically motivated. He has always been por-
trayed as dynamic, driving, and
impatient with inefficiency, but above all ambi-
t;ous for power. In the period following Khru-
shchev's ouster he apparently tried to use the
issue of Stalin as a political device to weaken
Kosygin's influence and to unseat Brezhnev. In
any event, he seems to have underestimated
Brezhi,ev's political skills, as others have. 25X1
Brezhnev bested Shelepin by an age-old tac-
tic-he moved to protect himself against political
attack from the conservative wing by adopting
Shelepin's position one number of issues, while
at the same time maneuvering to oust Shalepin's
supporters from positions of power on charges of
factionalism. Brezhnev was assisted in this by the
general fear among the other politburo members
of Shelepin's ambition and by their suspicion that
his commitment to the principle of collectivity
was not strong. As a result, at the 23rd congress
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Shelepin was stripped of his key responsibilities
on the party secretariat, and one of Brezhnev's
closest associates-Kirilenko-was brought into
the organization.
While Shelepin's
base of support was be-
ing steadily chipped
away, he continued to
be identified as head of
the neo-Stalinist wing.
There were even reports
that, at the nadir of rela-
tions with Communist
China in early 1967,
Shelepin was still criti-
cizing senior members of
the politburo for failing
to achieve an accommo-
Shelepin-A New Man?
dation with their "frater
nal" ex-ally.
The turning point apparently came at the
central committee plenum following the June
1967 Arab-Israeli war, when the ranking members
of the politburo put down a challenge by Shel?,
epin's ally-Nikolay Yegorychev, then head of the
Moscow party organization-and Shelepin himself
was transferred to the relatively powerless post of
head of the trade union organization.
Since then there have been indications that
Shelepin has gradually moderated his views. With
his former power base eroded and Brezhnev and
his supporters solidly holding down the conserva-
tive position, Shelepin was much in need of a new
constituency and new issues.
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~It is not clear that Shelepin has formulated
any coherent domestic program, or that he has
been won over to the merits of economic reform,
but he no longer seems to be at the opposite end
of the political spectrum from Kosygin.
Party secretary Suslov also seems to have
moderated his views, becoming more flexible and
less doctrinaire. Shelepin's transformation appears
to have been the result of po!itical factors, but
Suslov's change of heart may have been the result
of his growing concern over the threat from Pe-
king and his constant exposure to diverse and
frequently revisionist opinions within Western
Communist parties. The emergence of Suslov and
Shelepin as members of the more progressive wing
of the party was evident during the Czechoslovak
crisis. In the reporting on the divided counsels in
the Soviet leadership at that time, therc was al-
most total agreement that Kosygin, Suslov, and
Shelepin opposed the military invasion.
Moreover, Suslov still stands as the only So-
viet leader since: 1964 to criticize Stalin publicly
for a political mistake. In a speech in March 1969,
he accused hirn of having erroneously branded the
social democrats as the main enemy in the 1920s
and 1930s, rather than Hitler's Nazism. Suslov's
initiative thus laid the theoretical groundwork for
an overture to West Germany that became possi-
ble after Brandt's election in late 1969 and ulti-
mately led to the treaty signed with West Ger-
many in August 1970.
It is probably no coincidence that Su,~iov's
peace offering to Western social democrats came
only a few weeks after the Sino-Soviet border
clash on the Amur River island of Damansky.
Suslov, by failing to identify the West as the main
enemy, seemed to be trying to mute ideological
disagreements in that quarter so as to permit the
Soviet Union to concentrate on the "main
danger" from the East.
With Shelepin and Suslov playing leapfrog in
the political arena, the mantle of leadership of the
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conservative faction that once belonged to Shel-
epin now seems to be worn by Ukrainian party
boss Shelest.
Shelest questions peaceful
coexistence with the West
e recent publicity given t e dis-
covery o new" evidence of another wartime
Nazi atrocity in the Ukraine looks very much like
an attempt to stir up sentiment against the So-
viet - West German treaty.
On domestic affairs, however, Shelest hardly
fits the conventional image of a Soviet conserva-
tive. His views on matters inside the Soviet Union
stand in striking contrast with those, for example,
of Polyansky, who is a strong advocate of central-
ized management and takes a tough line toward
intellectual ferment. Shelest has consistently pro-
tected a revival of Ukrainian nationalism in :;t-
erary and cultural life and has pushed for greater
authority and independence of action for local
officials. In fact, his reactionary stand on Soviet
relations with the West may be inspired, in part,
by the need to cover for his political vulnerabili-
ties on the domestic front. Shelest has clearly had
a strong influence on Brezhnev, but their relation-
ship is ambiguous. There are signs that Shelest
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aspires to a higher post in Moscow, and he may
not have been among Brezhnev's supporters in
recent political struggles in the leadership.
An extended period of tension in the leader-
ship was precipitated in the early months of 1970
when the final figures on the 1969 plan fulfill-
ment showed a disappointingly poor economic
performance, which resulted in disagreement over
the draft five-year plan for 1971-75 up for pre-
liminary review at that time.
As the year wore on, the thorny issue of
resource allocations-specifically the question of
agriculture's share of the investment pie in the
draft five-year plan-spilled over into public view
in an argument between Polyansky, the regime's
leading agricultural administrator and a close
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supporter of Brezhnev, and Voronov, the premier
of the Russian Republic. If not actually aligned
with other critics of Brezhnev's leadership, Voro-
nov at least had their sympathy. He may even
have had Kosygin's blessing for his assault on the
agriculture lobby, for the Soviet premier had
seemed concerned previously about the high cost
of investment in agriculture.
Statements by th- two antagonists appeared
within days of each other at the end of March and
had every appearance of a bitter personal ex-
change. Polyansky forcefully stressed the im-
portance of giving priority attention to the needs
of agriculture in the draft five-year plan, leaving
the impression that he was quite unhappy with
the share allotted to agriculture in the draft ver-
sion then under discussion. He insisted that it was
the lack of machinery that had made agriculture
inefficient, an anticipated retort to Voronov's
speech. Voronov, for his part, was strongly criti-
cal of the failure of the farms to provide suffi-
cient food for the cities. He said nothing about
the need for more money and machinery, imply-
ing instead that the answer lay in better use of
existing resources. This, incidentally, was a theme
that had been frequently sounded by Shelepin.
Furthermore, Voronov sponsored his own
proposal for organizing farm labor at a number of
meetings during March, and it was clear that he
viewed it, if not as an alternative to Polyansky's
call for higher investment in agriculture, at least
as a necessary corollar .
By mid-April, Brezhnev had clearly regained
the initiative. It is not entirely clear how he
managed to shake off his critics. His renewed
vitality may indeed have been due to the fact that
two of his reported challengers, Shelepin and Sus-
lov, were ill during the crucial period of March
and early April.
Apparently as one of his earliest steps,
Brezhnev decided to back Polyansky in his de-
mand for higher investment in agriculture. The
occurrence of widespread meat shortage; in the
winter of 1969-70 undoubtedly had something to
do with his decision, but basically it seems to
have been a political move-a reflection of his
renewed strength and of the weakening of the
opposition.
Brezhnev apparently sold the politburo on
agriculture's need for more funds in late May. He
then made an unusual foray into the Council of
Ministers, apparently to inform them that the
plan would have to be revised to allow for a
bigger share for agriculture than previously agreed
upon. And in July, he got the central committee's
approval for these revisions and their incorpora-
tion in the draft five-year plan.
Brezhnev's offensive seems to have rocked
the collective ship in another direction. His bla-
tant intervention in the planning process in May
undercut Kosygin's authorii.y and may at least
have ruffled the feathers of some other leaders.
Rumors of Kosygin's impending retirement that
had started in April reached flood proportions. If
Kosygin were to leave, the obvious choice for his
replacement would lie between his two first dep-
uties-Polyansky and Mazurov. Polyansky, with
his agricultural victory under his belt, looked like
an increasingly dangerous competitor. Whatever
Kosygin's intentions, there does seem to have
been an attempt to block Polyansky's chances of
taking over his job. This may well have been one
of the motivations in Voronov's attack on the
agricultural lobby earlier in the spring. In any
event, Kosygin did not step down at the Supreme
Soviet session in July, and in fact, his entire
government was reconfirmed.
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Kosygin (center) and his two deputies, Mazurov and Polyansky
Kosygin scheduled as the main reporters. And,
although there was to be further confusion in
working out the draft five-year plan even after the
rough treatment it had received earlier, the main
decisions concerning the congress probably had
been made.
The Business of the Congress
The congress will be focused primarily on
domestic problems and is unlikely to serve as a
forum for any dramatic initiative i th f
n
s
e oreign
With the confirmation of Kosygin as pre- policy field. Its over-all tone and mood are
mier, the period of crisis seemed to have passed, bound, however, to affect the way specific for-
and collective leadership returned to an even keel. eign policy issues are treated by individual speak-
At the same time, the 24th party congress was ers and, indirectly, to affect future Soviet initia-
finally set for March 1971, with Brezhnev and tives in the international arena.
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Speakers at the party congress will probably
adopt self-congratulatory and fairly predictable
language regarding Soviet policy in most areas of
the world. Advances by the Soviets in the Medi-
terranean area will be heralded if balanced by a
restatement of their desire for a political settle-
ment. Moscow will evince satisfaction at the shift
from fighting to talking with China, but will
couple this with routine condemnations of "Mao-
ism." The Soviet treaty with West Germany will
come in for particular praise.
Although it is unlikely that anything will be
said at the congress that would close the door to
continued US-Soviet negotiations on various is-
sues, relations with the US will probably be made
to appear particularly gloomy in contrast with
other areas of foreign relations, which will be
viewed optimistically. Congress speakers will
probably see no improvement in these relations in
1971 and will flay the US for its actions in
Indochina and for its continuing arms build-up.
By all accounts, the congress will concen-
trate on economic matters. Although 1970, the
last year of the curre,,t five-year plan, was gen-
erally a good year for Soviet industry and agricul-
ture, the growth rate of the Soviet economy has
continued to disappoint the leadership, and the
technological gap between the East and West has
not narrowed. The necessity of coming up with a
new five-year plan on the basis of these results has
presented the leadership with some hard decisions
and has generated intense debate over the past
year.
The five-year plan is a crucial blueprint for
future Soviet economic development. Though
subject to change, it nevertheless sets the goals of
the regime and ties up investment funds and labor
for lengthy periods. The formulation of plans
always generates intensive infighting by individual
leaders to protect vested interests in the alloca-
tions of scarce resources.
Special Report
After a long delay and numerous revisions,
draft directives were published in mid-February.
Essentially these directives appear to be a con-
tinuation of the past plan and do not reflect any
major shifts of allocations from one sector to
another. The absence of some crucial figures and
the unorthodox and hurried way the draft was
issued, however, suggest that some aspects of the
plan may still have been undecided at the time of
its publication. The murkiest area seems to be the
gap between the lofty promises in the preamble
of priority attention to consumer goods and the
figures in small print. The projected growth of
consumer goods output at a faster rate than
producer goods is unprecedented in a five-year
plan, but the few statistics given suggest a some-
what lower rate of , -r'-Tess in consumer welfare
as compared with 1966-i0.
Questions of administrative reform have
been even more intractable and politically sensi-
tive for the leadership than the debate over alloca-
tions. Soviet economic growth has been seriously
impeded by an outmoded administrative structure
and a system of management that is not suf-
ficiently flexible for running a modern economy
and promoting technological progress.
The basic problem confronting the Kremlin
is how to get better returns on capital investments
and labor resources in industry and agriculture.
The leaders have been hampered in their search
for new methods, not only by bureaucratic in-
fighting and political rivalries, but by their fear
that reforms could lead to a loss of the party's
monopoly of power. Events in Czechoslovakia in
1968, where pressure from liberal elements for
economic reform quickly led to a dissolution of
party control, forcefully brought home to the
Soviet leaders the dangers of such reform. On the
other hand, more recent events in Poland point
up with equal vigor the dangers in failure to get
the economy moving. In Poland it was protests by
the vaunted working class over food shortages and
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the high cost of living that forced changes in the
political hierarchy. Thus Soviet leaders are, in a
way, damned if they do and damned If they
don't. Certainly, the verbiage devoted this winter
to future production of consumer goods suggests
that the Kremlin has boon trying to road the
"lesson" of the December strikes in Poland, but it
is by no moans clear that he leaders agree on
what that "lesson" is.
It is a measure of the frustration of the
leadership in this dilemma that the proposals for
"reorganization" of the economy recently under
discussion are extraordinarily anemic in compari-
son with measures discussed in Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, even those wan Soviet gestures of
"experiment" manage to generate partisan debate
in the Kremlin and suggest the regional political
pressures to which the politburo is subject, in
addition to the more conventional institutional
ones.
late of the 1965 Economic Refonn
The 1965 econon is reform was only half of
a curiously complex ley'slative package that also
involved the dissolution of Khrushchev's terri-
torial economic administrations (sovnarkhozes)
and tf a re-establishment of central ministries. The
package was the product of an unlikely alliance
between the central government bureaucracy and
liberal economists. It aimed at stimulating the
economy by giving individual enterprises greater
operational freedom and by shifting from admin-
istrative methods to greater reliance on economic
levers and material incentives for the workers.
Some of the more radical aspects of the
original scheme were never implemented-they
fell victim to the growing caution and conserva-
tism of the leadership and to the fears aroused by
the Czechoslovak experiments. Reform-minded
elements within the leadership were put on tiie
defensive after the invasion, and they have never
regained their forward thrust.
The reform has now been introduced in
most of the larger Soviet enterprises, but the
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results have boar disappointing in terms of rro-
duction figures and costs. hligh?lovel support for
the principles of the reform has seriously eroded.
Few members of the politburo gave more than a
passing nod to the subject In their election
speeches last June. Premier Kosygin, who was
most responsible for the adoption of the reform,
was the only one to discuss it at any length.
Although he defended it vigorously for what it
had already accomplished, he :aid nothing about
carrying it any further. An article in the January
issue of the party's loading theoretical journal,
Kommunist, contained an unusually warm de-
fense of the 1965 principles, however, suggesting
at least that the issue is not yet (load.
!yanks in 1t,Ntical 1'lutfr,rrus
As hopes for this reform have dwindled,
Soviet politicians have squabbled about a number
of other proposals in economic management.
These schemes are not of far-reaching economic
significance, but they do reflect a certain measure
of innovative spirit, as well as the historir.al pro-
clivity of Soviet leaders to believe that some rear-
rangement of the administrative structure can
solve basic economic difficulties. Perhaps more
important, these proposals are usually designed to
favor special bureaucratic or regional interests,
and they therefore become a basis of political
competition. Thus the way in which they are
treated at the congress will provide clues as to the
political fortunes of their promoters in the lead-
ership.
One scheme that has been advanced as a way
of streamlining the economy is the creation of
regional production associations. The concept es-
sentially involves the grouping for planning and
management purposes of enterprises in a given
geographic area that manufacture similar products
or use similar technology. Advocates of the
scheme promise increased efficiency through
specialization as well as savings in manpower and
money. Regional officials have promoted it as a
way of recapturing the power lost to Moscow
when Khrushchev's decentralization scheme was
abandoned. Associations were promoted in
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Mazurov (left), an advocate of assoclations and
integrated planning
Leningrad in the early 1960s, and the Lenin.
graders fought unsuccessfully to get the concept
firmly established in the 1965 legislative package.
Former Leningrad party boss Tolstikov, now
ambassador to Communist China, was oooe of the
strongest advocates of the associations. His suc?
cossor in Leningrad, Romanov, has continued this
support. Experiments with associations also have
a long history in the Ukraine and presumably
have the backing of Ukrainian party boss Shelest.
The idea has also caught on strongly in Belorussia
and the Baltic, and has bean publicly endorsed by
former Belorussian party boss Mazurov, who now
serves as onk.,if '1,osygin's first deputies.
The main opposition t.a production asso..ia-
tions has come from the central ministries, which
could lose considerable authority and control.
Recent efforts to create ill-union, rather than
territorial-based associations, even though the
former have a valid economic rationale, also
smack of an attempt by the central bureaucracy
to turn the scheme to its own advantage. Oppo-
sition has also come from enterprise managers
v ho, in joining an association, could lose son!_ of
their recently acquired operational freed., n.
Kosygin's equivocal comments on thn subject sug.
gest that he sees little virtue in the idea.
Special Report
The present leaders have made considerable
progress In improving farming Conditions by In.
creasing the flow of money, machinery and fer?
tilizers. The cost of agricultural production Is
exceedingly high, however, and this has generated
debate and pressure for reform.
The administrative system for agriculture
clearly needs improving. Part of the reason for the
disappointing return on investment is the lack of
coordination in the plat-ling and performance of
the various br)nches assuciated with agriculture.
As a result the farms do not receive the ki.,J of
machinery they need, and crops rot in the fields
for want of processing facilities while food queues
grow longer in the cities. Persistent disagreement,
rivalries, and jurisdictlotoal disputes between
various regional and central agricultural interest
groups, however, have hin ferod the finding of
solutions. The search for answers is complicated
by the existence of two types of farms, i.e.,
state run farms and the nominally peasant?man?
aged cooperatives (kolkhozes), which create prob-
lems in working out a now form of adrninistra?
tion. As in the case of the industrial sector,
programs approved at the 23rd party congress
have since been watered down, and consensus has
yet to be reached on new directions.
One of the schemes advanced and ultimately
defeated was the concept of collective farm
unions. At the 23rd party congress Brezhnev en
dorsed a proposal, put forward by several regional
party organizations, to establish a hierarchy of
elected unions to look after the interests of the
collective farms. The proposal was backed by
Shelest's Ukrainian party organization and by
leaders of other republics where collect~.re farms
crmsiaorably outnumber state farms. E3rezhnev
presumably sponsored the proposal it the con.
grass because of his political ties with the Ukrain?
ian leaders, but he may also have seen an oppor-
tunity to advance the authority of the party at
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the expense of the central state bureaucracy. The
Ministry of Agriculture stood to lose considerable
authority if the scheme was approved, and the
minister made no bones about his opposition.
Polyansky, the regime's top agricultural adminis-
trator, evidently also sided with the ministry.
Despite the decentralization feature of the
proposal that should have appealed to regional
leaders, there was considerable opposition to the
idea from areas such as Belorussia and Estonia,
whore the loaders apparently felt that a kolkhoz
union would conflict with a local interest in inte-
grated regional planning. It foil to the outspoken
Estonian party boss, Kebin, to present publicly
the arguments against the scheme. The combined
weight of these republic leaders and central min-
istries smothered the proposal at the Collective
Farm Congress in the fall of 1969.
Agricultural Rr riranf:arfrr-r Srhnnrs
Tie issues of agricultural organization are
hardly significant enough to be the focus of a
disruptive dispute. If they surface in disputes at
the congress they will most likely be -symptomatic
of deeper divisions within the leadership.
The problem of how to bring some order
into relations among farms and associated state
S; ecial Report
enterprises still remains, and out of the wreckage
of the collective farm union scheme came now
bursts of interest In the concupt of agro-industrial
complexes. This proposal involves the grouping
together of both farms and enterprises within a
given region to produce, process, aril market one
or several related products. The scheme has found
favor with the Belorussians and Baits, whose load-
ers may hope that the regional basis for planning
and management will load to some decentraliza-
tion of power by Moscow. In a sense the agro-
industrial complex is the logical companion to
industrial associations.
Several recent articles in the Soviet press
have proposed that planning and administration
at the national level should be accomplished on
the basis of the agro-industrial concspt, rather
than by using the present narrow nranch ap-
proach. The authoritative tone of the articles sug-
gests that they had high-level suppor'. It is tempt-
ing to see Deputy Premier Polyansky's hand in
this. As things now stand, he is responsible for
agricultural production but he has no direct au-
thority over the industries that produce the
machinery and material for agricultural produc-
tion or over the industries that process agricul.
tural products. The creation of an agro-industrial
sector would give Polyansky the opportunity to
extend his "empire" significantly.
On the other hand, the need to move from
branch planning to integrated planning is a theme
sounded by First Deputy Premier Mazurov and
favored by his follow Belorussians. A possible clue
that he may be involved in the initiative was the
insistence in one of the articles on the subject of
agro-industrial complexes that the consumer in.
dustry should have the leading role. the consumer
sector comes under Mazurov's purview.
Another approach attacks the problem of
lagging agricultural production at the lowest
level-the organization of labor and the payment
of wages on the farms. This is a proposal for the
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establisllnlent of small.
farce p10(Icrctlon subdi-
visions called "links." A
numlior of kinds of
"I inks" are being widely
experimented with, but
the basic form is one in
which a section of the
farin and the machinery
rlece,sary to farm it are
assigned to a small group
of farmers for an ox-
temled period of time.
Unlike the usual farm
brigade paid on a piece-
work basis, the members
5]?,CRJi'I'
Shelepin have been no- Suvlov warms up
1 iceably cool in their
of the "link" are respon- Voronov, critic of
sible for the full cycle of agricultural lobby
work, from sowing to harvest. Their wages ate
then tied to thm site of the harvest.
The proposal has been vigorously pushed by
Votonov, premier of the Russian Republic. He is
the only member of the politburo who has
spoken out on the subject. The "link" has been
widely introduced into the Russian Republic and
in Belorussia, but there are important pockets of
opposition. The Shelest-led Ukrainians are
strongly opposed to the idea, and the USSR min-
ister of agriculture-probably representing Pol-
yari.sky's views has also strongly resisted it.
There is also in Obvious personal-pulitirit
aspect to the debate. Voronuv is a lung-time rival
of Polyansky and a Irequent critic of the agricul-
ture lobby. He has used the issue of the "link" as
a political device to embarrass the agricultural
administators and through them Polyansky, and
to drive home the need for more reform and less
money in agriculture.
Voronov's campaign for "links" seems to be
one aspect of a larger but less clearly articulated
movement to develop socialist democracy, specifi-
cally by encouraging greater worker participation
Special Report
public treatment of economic reform, and there
are hints that they, as well as politburo member
Pelshe, are all to one extent or another behind the
new emphasis on socialist democracy. Pet she, who
is believed to be a close associate of Suslov, (lis.
cussed the subject at length in a speech in Milan
last fall, and several calls for greater worker par.
ticipation have appeared in 7'rnil, the official
newspapr t of Shelepin's trade union organization,
In two recent Speeches Suslov also has
treated socialist democracy and the need to ill.
volve workers in management affairs at some
length. Characteristically he casts the issue in a
larger ideutoyicai framework. There are, for exam-
ple, hints that he is attempting to shape his views
into a program that could be represented an, 3 new
advance in the building of Communism possibly
a move "furwar(1" from the present stage of
building its material and technical base to one
emphasizing equal concern with btlil(Iinq its social
base.
Suslov has strongly endorsed a 01010 impiu-
tant role for the hierarchy of Soviets as a counter-
weight to the state apparatus. It is evident that he
views the Soviets with the party it the' el.
bow-as vehicles to temper the state administra-
tion's overriding concern with production matters
and as a vehicle for increasing citizen involvement
in communal affairs. A party decree published in
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in management. In a
sense, this push for
worker participation,
while falling far short of
anything like the Yugo-
slav experiment, seems
to be aimed at giving ,1
IIeW emphasis of (lirec-
tion to the economic re-
forrn to overcome criti-
cism that it merely on-
tourages management
and workers to "chase
after rubles." Suslov and
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mid-March outlining measures to increase the
authority of local Soviets suggests that this will be
a significant theme at the congress.
The 1970 tension in the leadershp) was ap?
parently resolved, or at least brought tinder con-
trol, without ripping the collective leadership
apart. Although Sholepin and Voronov have
clearly lost ground politically, they remain on the
politburo. The sharp rivalries and personal ani-
mosities that surfaced during 1970, however, sug-
gest that there has been some hardening of differ.
ences within the collective, Whereas in the past
there was evidence of considerable fluidity from
issue to issue and from one moment to another,
this no longer seems to be the case, to the same
degree. This could make Brezhnev's position as
the "chairman of the board" more dif f icult in the
future.
It has also become clearer that it is now
Suslov, rather than Kosygin, who is the main
counterweight to Brezhnev and the man in the
leadership to whore the moderates turn. This is
partly because Kosygin's authority has diminished
in the years since the last congress as a result of
the failure of his economic reform to live up to its
original promise and also because of 13rethnev's
repeated incursions into his field, f=urthermore,
Kosygin has taken a less independent stand on
policy issues in recent years, and his views seism
more in harmony with Brezhnev's now than in
the past.
Suslov's rumored willingness to take the lead
in criticizing Potyansky last July is illustrative of
The -'Senior"
Left to right tfrom 1 Pod3onty, Elrczhncv, krnygin. SuJuv
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his now role. His unusual participation in Nowlin)-
bar at a nlenting on Ilse work of rural Soviets
sponsored by Voronov, served, wholher Intention-
ally or not, to give a much-needed lift to the
latter's sagging political for to tins. Suslov is, never-
theless, a frail reed.
Over the years Breohnev has been able suc-
cessfully to play one faction off against another
and has been the chief beneficiary of the Krom-
lin's delicate balance of power, He has emerged
from last year's political low in a far stronger
position than before. The p1onlotional campaign
ill the Soviet press in his behalf in recent months
and his forceful assumption of the trappings and
substance of authority are clear signs that he is
determined to put himself in the strongest posi-
tion possible as the coelgress approaches.
Although there is little reason to doubt that
he will remain the dominant figure in the leader-
ship, existing check; and balance:, still appear
strong enough to quarct the system of collective
(let ision-nhakirng and to prevr-nt him from corn-
pletely dominating the leadership as Khruchchev
did. Collectivity rests on a number of organi;a-
tional and procedural safeguards that were in-
formally argreecl upon by Khrushchev's successors
and have become increasingly instilutionaII;ed
with the passage' of time.
thew safeguards include not only the (fact-
stun to keep the two !op posts in dtiffererht
hinds - ccrIarnly one of the marl obstacles to the
re?ernergencr of one-man tole--but also an appar-
ent agreement to limit political patronage by
denying any one leader Control over key party
anti government posts it all l vols. This has led to
the development of a mote bureaucratic approach
to the assignment of petseninel, one r ather akin to
a civil service system. As a result, t3rczhnev has
been able to tiring about the removal of various
supporters of Shelepuh and of other rivals, but he
has clearly not had a free hand in selecting their
Special Report
successors. Thus prelinlinnry information on the
new central committee to be elected at the con-
gloss suggests that it will include n SorrleWlult
larder number of l3roziinev's associates than he-
fore but not an overwhelming majority.
'I lle system of collectivity is also protectemI
to a cur lain extent by in elaborate system of
mutoal checks that pievent any one institution
from dominating the policy-rnaking process, or
oar! individual from establishing a foothold in
more !flat) one institution. '1 his inhibits a member
of one faction from moving against his rivals or
his boss, Thus the membership on the eleven-man
politburo is evenly distributed among the leading
institutions for instance, there are three rhlenl-
bers front the party secretarial and three members
from the council of ministers. A careful effort has
been node to avoid any dangerous overlapping of
membership between the various institutions,
Thus when Antlropov was appointed to the qov-
ernment post of KGB head, he was irnnhediatrly
dropper' front the party secretariat; Ibis promotion
.it the came time to candidate member of the
politburo, however, broadened Ills access to all
eleven full member;, Finally, there is the main.
tenance of a balance of power among individuals
at all the levels of the party and (love Intlivill, Vow
instance, the influence of Ure,hilev's associate,
Kit ilenko, in the party set retat rat is balanu vd by
the presence of Suslov. Again, there ate twor first
deputy, premiers, Polyansky and Ma;urov, both of
whom are associated with rival political and if'.
gional nroupings.
In fact, the systrrn appears to have worked
almost too we'll, There have been no alteration; in
the composition of the politburo since the last
congress, suggesting that the delicate balance of
power has made! it exceedingly difficult for the
leaden slip to make any change in its own rnrni-
tiership, Even the most routine change might e'h-
danget this balance. Thus sever at members of the
politburo who appear tiue for retirement i,ec.iuw,
of advanced age or poor health may be held in
office because of problems in replacing them. At
the very least the congress should make a decision
. 18 - 19 March 1971
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concerning the ambiguous status of Suslov and
Kirilenko, Suslov was given protocol ranking as
the sucrelary second to t3rethnev at the last party
congress, but since then KirIInnko has gradually
taken on most of the responsibilities is I3reth-
nc+v's second-i n?COn1m.llld,
It would appear, however, that there will be
no significant personnel actions or shift in thro
present balance of the leadership's power. this
Ix?inq the rase, t3rethnev will have to continue to
search for the middle ground and to work for
compromise-, among the same factions and gloup-
inqs that presently exist. While Shelepin, his prin-
cipal rival in the past, has lost considerable
ground politically, many Soviet officials still see
him as potentially the strongest leader, 5hoflepin
has now apparently joined with others in pressing
t3rethnev to adopt more flexible, innovative poli-
cies. t3rethnev in the future must either get rid of
him or pay heed to his views.
The seeming stalemate in the leadership is
symbolized by the ambiquotrs status of Stalin's
image. Since the 1965 "rehabilitation" of his
rotor (I as the marl Who led the Soviet Union to
victory in World War 11, there have been various
low-key attempts to hroadar- Ibls to include other
facets of his career. Both his collectivization of
agriculture and his indushialitation program of
the 1930s have been branded "successes" and
declared off-limits to (1 itici5111. These "successes''
are usually credited to the party and not to Stalin
by (Cattle. It has not heels possible, however, to
erase ftom Soviet nmmories Khrushchev's revela-
tions of the bloodshed and injustice that were Ilia
price for these achievements. Tile excesses of col-
lectivization and the bloodshed of the Great
Purge apparently has proved loo difficult to treat
publicly, and the long version of the official party
history published this winter simply skipped the
years from 1930 to 1937.
Ira the past, Soviet liberals used Stalin's "mis-
takes" as argumerits J..r change. Conservatives
now would like to trse his "successes"- and
Khrushchev's "mistakes" - as atquments against
change. The two main participants at the 24th
party congress may be the shades of Stalin and
Khrushchev, engaged in .1 struggle for the soul of
the congress.
Special Report
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