WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILIA TODAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 22, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
special Report
The Latin American Guerrilla Today
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N9 693
22 January 1971
No. 0354/71
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For more than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin
American revolutionaries to take to the backlands and mountains of their own countries
to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory. Today, however, there are fewer than
1,000 rural guerrillas holding out in only a few countries. They are weak, of declining
importance, and do not pose serious threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in
the hinterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latin Ameri-
can countries in the decade of the 1960s as societies urbanized and modernized at
accelerated rates.
As rural guerrilla fortunes have faded, however, a new breed of revolutionary has
appeared in the cities. In Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas
have engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism and violence. Six foreign ambassadors have
been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two were murdered. About a dozen
other diplomats and a large number of government officials also have been kidnaped.
Robberies of banks and arms depots, airline hijackings, arson, sabotage, and killings of
police and security officials have reached unprecedented proportions in several coun-
tries. Terrorism is likely to increase in at least a half-dozen Latin American countries this
year and could challenge the governments of Uruguay and Guatemala.
Prominent students of the Cuban revolution
believe that Castro never intended to wage a rural
guerrilla war when he landed in Cuba from
Mexico in 1956, but that he hoped to join in a
quick urban putsch. His experience during the
preceding ten years as a student radical, ad-
venturer, and violent revolutionary was acquired
in the cities. Even after Castro was forced into the
sierra after his expedition foundered, he con-
tinued to rely heavily on urban support groups.
His radio appeals were beamed mainly to middle-
class, nationalist audiences, and in April 1958 he
helped organize an abortive national strike in the
towns and cities.
Castro's small guerrilla band won some
skirmishes with regular military forces, but ul-
timately the Batista regime collapsed because
Castro captured the imagination of an oppressed,
disenchanted middle class through highly effec-
tive public relations. Once in power, however,
Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his
radical appeals to peasants and workers. The
regime exaggerated and glorified the accomplish-
ments of Castro and his guerrilla colleagues, and
created a rural, agrarian mystique for the revolu-
tion.
In the months following Castro's victory,
exiles and revolutionaries from a number of Latin
American countries unsuccessfully attempted to
initiate guerrilla struggles in their own countries.
By 1960 Castro and Che Guevara were giving
support to such revolutionaries on a large scale.
Misinterpreting their own experiences, they
recommended that rural guerrilla methods be
employed and gave little consideration to urban
tactics. Large numbers of Latin American youths
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traveled to Cuba for training in rural guerrilla
techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was
widely distributed and used throughout the
hemisphere. In fact, the Cuban leaders and their
revolutionary disciples were so confident of these
methods that from 1959 through 1965 almost
every country in Latin America skirmished with
revolutionaries inspired or supported by Havana.
A few of these efforts endured, but by mid-
decade most of the remaining guerrilla bands were
of declining importance.
These efforts failed principally because the
Cuban leaders themselves refused to understand
the true dynamics of how they came to power
and because they imposed an unworkable strategy
on their followers. As rapidly as new guerrilla
efforts were conceived, however, security and
counterinsurgent forces in many Latin American
countries were expanded and became more effec-
tive. The rural guerrillas also failed ':ecause of
ineptness and disputes over leadership, tactics,
and ideology. Generally, they were poorly trained
and equipped despite Cuban efforts, and, desiring
quick results, were unprepared psychologically
for protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have been
unable in virtually every instance to attract sig-
nificant middle-class support, mainly because
their programs and campaigns have been directed
at rural groups.
In 1966 and 1967 Cuba attempted to re-
vitalize waning guerrilla fortunes in the hemi-
sphere through an intensified, reckless commit-
ment to continental rural guerrilla war. The Latin
American Solidarity Organization was founded as
a hemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first
conclave the summer of 1967. In the meantime,
Che Guevara with 16 other Cubans was spear-
heading a new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban
advisers were also operating with guerrillas in
Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in
Colombia. Castro insisted more stridently than
ever that meaningful change could result only
from violent struggle in the countryside. The
French Marxist, Regis Debray, earlier had pub-
lished a treatise expanding the point, asserting
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that guerrilla action must be an exclusively rural
phenomenon without significant aid from the
cities. His Revolution Within the Revolution be-
came the new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.
Cuba's efforts to "export" the revolution
reached their zenith during this period. Guevara's
summary defeat in Bolivia in October 1967 and
the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere
demonstrated more clearly than before the bank-
ruptcy of Havana's approarh. Young revolu-
tionaries throughout Latin America began to
reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally
contributed to an acceleration of this re-evalua-
tion by publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's
poignant memoire of ineptitude, hopeless
meanderings in dense jungles, and flight from
encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedly con-
vinced many young revolutionaries that other
tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results.
It is ironic that Che's detailed account of his own
defeat is likely to endure as a more permanent
legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches.
Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian author of the
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has replaced
both Guevara and Debray as the primary theo-
retician of violent revolution in the hemisphere.
Debray, who was recently released from a Boliv-
ian prison after serving more than three years of a
30-year term for his part in the Guevara fiasco,
admitted on 30 December that he had under-
estimated the importance of urban terrorism. He
now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on
guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban terror-
ism.
Guevara's precipitate failure also led to a
reappraisal of tactics in Cuba. During 1968 and
the first half of 1969, Havana appeared to be
withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons in Latin
America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in
Venezuela and Colombia terminated, and guer-
rillas in other countries were told to acquire their
own funds and arms. Castro, however, was reluc-
tant to amend his rural guerrilla strategy and was
loath to share the spotlight as foremost
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revolutionary in the hemisphere with Marighella.
Nevertheless, during the second half of 1969
there were signs of a gradual-if grudging-Cuban
acceptance of urban methods as urban terrorists
accelerated their activities in a number of Latin
American cities. In November 1969 Marighella
was killed, and two months later Castro came out
in support of his line by publishing the Mini-
rnanual.
Since then, Havana has been more flexible
and cautious about endorsing revolutionary
groups. Both urban and rural tactics now are
supported, and in view of events in Chile, the
nonviolent path to power is also publicly ac-
cepted-at least there. Underlying the pragmatism
of this approach, however, is the same enduring
commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has
characterized the Cuban revolution since the early
1960s. Cuban loaders continue to predict that in
most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in
the long run and that urban tactics should be
employed to create favorable conditions for rural
conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to
initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goias State prior
to his death.
Today, Guatemala may be the only country
receiving material support from Cuba for guerrilla
operations. A few Cuban advisers are in the
Guatemalan countryside, and Cuban funds have
been provided. In other countries, Havana appears
to be giving little more than training and propa-
ganda support to revolutionaries. Cuban intelli-
gence agents have been active in Chile since Al-
lende's inauguration, and it is possible that Cuba
could increase its contacts with South American
terrorists under Chilean cover. In the long run,
however, rural guerrilla methods increasingly will
be , riplaced with activities in the cities.
The urban guerrilla groups that have sprung
up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia are di-
rect-albeit more sophisticated-descendants of
the rural guerrillas of the 1960s. They have
learned from Havana's mistakes of the last
decade, but because most of them operate in
highly urbanized societies, they realize that rural
methods are not applicable anyway. They are
young-most of them are believed to be in their
early twenties-from middle-class backgrounds,
and are frequently either university or former
university students. Except in Argentina the
urban guerrillas generally profess to be Marxists.
In the few instances where they have discussed or
publicized their political programs these are vague
but ultranationalistic. Today's urban revolution-
ary desires quick remedies for social and eco-
nomic ills and has chc3en the tactics of terrorisrr,
in the cities to achieve rapid results-or at least to
make dramatic headlines.
In general, the urban guerrilla endorses
Havana's theoretical line by ascribing long-term
importance to the rural struggle and to the peas-
antry, but in practice he concentrates or confines
his activities in urban zones. In an interview pub-
lished in October 1970 in the Cuban Communist
Party daily, for example, a Tupamaro admitted
that plans called for ex'.ending the struggle into
the countryside, but "not with the characteristics
of typical rural-guerrilla warfare." He emphasized
instead that, at least in Uruguay, future opera-
tions in the countryside would consist of brief,
commando-type raids launched from the cities.
Thus, although urban revolutionaries look to
Havana as the spiritual center of revolution in
Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic
and prefer to maintain tactical and financial in-
dependence. Cuba has provided training for some
urban guerrillas, backs them with propaganda sup-
port, and grants haven to revolutionaries and
political prisoners, but there is no evidence of
more extensive contacts. There are indications
that Havana would like a larger share of the
action, but it is probably known among young
revolutionaries that Cuba has been heavy-handed
and arrogant in dispensing aid in the past.
While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the
rural nature of its revolution and has
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o Over 1,000,000
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concentrated on rural tactics for revolutionaries,
the rest of Latin America has been urbanizing at
accelerating rates. In 1940 there were five Latin
American cities with more than a million inhab-
itants; in 1960 there were nine. It is estimated
that today there are 17, and that in ten years
there will be 26. Mexico City, Sao Paulo (Brazil),
and Buenos Aires already have more than five
million residents, and four other cities have more
than 2.5 million. By the end of this decade five
more cities will surpass the five-million level, and
another five will have more than 2.5 million
people. The accelerating rate of urbanization is
also reflected in the growth of cities of a quarter
million inhabitants or more. In 1970, 19 Latin
American cities had between 500,000 and one
million inhabitants, and another 32 had between
250,000 and 500,000 residents.
The new revolutionary in Latin America
comes from these cities. In his Minimanual,
Marighella said that it is "ideal" when the urban
guerrilla "operates in his own city." In Uruguay
and Brazil, and possibly in other countries, guer-
rillas follow Marighella's advice, organizing them-
selves into four- or five-man "firing groups." Each
group is a largely autonomous tactical squad that
initiates its own operations and has little contact
with other groups. Marighella also emphasizes in-
dividual action, suggesting, for example, that as-
sassinations should be performed by one guerrilla
"in absolute secrecy and in cold blood." Such
rigid compartmentalization accounts in large part
for '.he ability of urban terrorists to resist police
raids.
Urban terrorists have been responsible for
the kidnapings of six foreign ambassadors since
August 1968-two were murdered. Three US mili-
tary officers have been killed by terrorists during
the last three years, and at least eight other for-
eign diplomats or officials were kidnaped for
ransom in 1970. Local officials are also targets of
terrorist action-particularly in Guatemala. Air-
plane hijackings have become common, and in
October 1970 the first combined hijacking-
kidnaping occurred when a Costa Rican airliner
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was hijacked to Cuba. Five US citizens aboard
were threatened with death unless several revolu-
tionaries-including a top Nicaraguan terrorist
leader-were released from Costa Rican jails.
Urban revolutionaries also struck in the Domini-
can Republic last April when the US Air Attache
was kidnaped and later released in exchange for
prisoners. Terrorists have stolen millions of dol-
lars, ransacked arms depots, engaged in various
kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign
officials. They contributed directly to the col-
lapse of the Ongania government in Argentina,
and have undermined stability in several other
countries.
As urban terrorism has increased, contacts
and collaboration among urban-based activists
have also been on the rise. Bolivia is the principal
focus of insurgent interest in South America, and
a nL'mber of foreigners have participated iii ELN
activities since last summer. Individual UI?ugL.ayan
and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist
techniques were in Bolivia last September. Three
Chilean revolutionaries, rumored to be members
of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (M I F25X1
were killed in Bolivia last summer, and three
others were allowed to return to Chile after being
captured.
25X1
The Tupamaros and _CK t e clean MIR are the two groups most likely
to engage in proselytizing. If the MIR or the
Altamirano faction of the Chilean Social'st Party
is permitted to aid terrorists in other countries, in
fact, Santiago could become the primary revo-
lutionary capital in Latin America. Although
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Havana has provided some training and backs
urban guerrillas with propaganda, the Cubans ap-
parently have few contacts with South American
terrorists.
The new breed of urban revolutionary has
been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argen-
tina. These countries had almost no difficulties
with rural guerrillas during the 1960s and few
manifestations of urban violence until the last few
years. Guatemala, however, has had a long history
of rural and urban violence, which intensified
during much of the decade of the sixties. Urban
terror recently has become more important there
than has Castro-line guerrilla struggle, but revolu-
tionaries maintain a significant capability for both
kinds of action. In Bolivia there have been two
abortive guerrilla episodes since 1967, and revolu-
tionaries appear increasingly interested in adopt-
ing new urban methods. In Colombia and
Venezuela rural guerrillas continue to operate in
the countryside, but they are the weakened and
disheartened remnants of large and important
guerrilla groups that were threats in the mid
1960s. The current status of the revolutionaries hi
each of these countries is described in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
Uruguay
The National Liberation Movement
(MLN)-better known as the Tupamaros-is a
revolutionary Marxist organization that has had a
spectacular and rapid rise to prominence during
the last few years. Since late 1969 it has been the
most active and successful insurgent group in
South America. It has kidnaped a total of seven
Uruguayan and foreign officials during this
period, and three of them-the, British ambas-
sador, a US agronomist, and the Brazilian con-
sul-are still in captivity.
The Tupamaros are highly organized and
disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious
offensives have been a disruptive force far out of
proportion to their numbers. They initially en-
joyed considerable public sympathy, but lost
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much of this support after they murdered a US
AID official last August. Nevertheless, they are
likely to remain a significant disruptive force for
some time to come, especially in the tense politi-
cal atmosphere that probably will precede the
presidential election in November.
Named after Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian
Indian who organized an important uprising
against Spain in 1780, the movement was
founded in northern Uruguay in 1962 by Raul
Sendic. It was not active until 1966 when it began
to conduct sporadic robberies for money, arms,
and supplies such as police uniforms and identifi-
cation papers. Until 1967, the movement con-
centrated its activities in areas outside of metro-
politan Montevideo, but later turned more and
more to urban violence.
From 1967 through 1969, the Tupamaros
succeeded in portraying themselves as romantic,
quixotic revolutionaries. They attempted to
minimize personal violence and excesses, and
gained considerable popularity and publicity as
selfless Robin Hoods. In elaborate public relations
efforts, the Tupamaros redistributed to the poor
some of the money they had stolen, as well as
food, milk, and other provisions. They also "ex-
posed" alleged financial frauds through the dis-
semination of compromising stolen documents,
which did cause considerable alarm in government
and financial circles. By daring daylight robberies,
they accumulated large sums of money, often
robbing banks by recruiting employees or by dis-
guising themselves as policemen or guards.
On 8 October 1969, about 40 Tupamaros
raided the small town of Pando, robbing three
banks, taking over the police and fire stations,
and severing communications. There were casual-
ties on both sides, and the Tupamaros claim that
members captured by police were tortured and
killed. The Pando raid marked a major turning
point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned
increasingly to murder and other extreme forms
of urban violence.
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Their activities-especially the murder of
police and security officials-increased in late
1969 and early 1970. In late July 1970, an
Uruguayan judge was kidnaped but later released
unharmed. On 31 July, US AID official Daniel
Mitrione and the Brazilian consul were kidnaped;
on 7 August, US agronomist Claude Fly, was
abducted. Mitrione was killed on 10 August after
the Pacheco government refused to negotiate with
the terrorists. Tupan;aro demands for the release
of all imprisoned guerrillas in exchange for Fly
and the Brazilian gradually faded in the face of
government intransigence. By mid-September the
terrorists retreated further and agreed to release
the captives if major news media publicized their
political manifesto. Although two Montevideo
papers and a magazine subsequently printed the
treatise-in violation of government censorship
laws-the hostages have not been released.
The government's determination not to
negotiate with the guerrillas has been com-
plemented by a considerable show of force. Ag-
gressive counterinsurgency campaigns-especially
an unprecedented crackdown following the
August kidnapings-have resulted in significant
guerrilla losses. In August, Congress authorized a
20-day, limited state-of-siege as thousands of
soldiers and poicemen scoured the Montevideo
area in search of the terrorists. A number of
important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic,
were apprehended. As a result, an estimated 250
to 300 Tupamaros are currently imprisoned. Ac-
cording to some estimates, only about 150
Tupamaros remain active.
A hard core of the Tupamaro organization
weathered the government's counterterrorist cam-
paign, however. During the last few months of
1970 terrorists remained very active. They took
over cinemas to make political promulgations,
assaulted important communications facilities,
robbed banks, and in early November they carried
out one of the largest robberies in the country's
history. In conjunction with these spectacular
operations, they have also conducted a persistent
campaign of low-level harassment designed to
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attract constant publicity and to keep security
forces off balance. Finally, on 8 January 1971
they added another hostage to the list of for-
eigners being held, when UK ambassador Jackson
was kidnaped. Uruguayan police estimate that
about 50 Tupamaros participated in this elab-
orately coordinated kidnaping in the streets of
Montevideo.
The Tupamaros have a fairly extensive base
of support among students and youths, who form
a potentially large reservoir of new recruits. Stu-
dent and faculty federations at universities and
secondary schools are dominated by extreme left-
ists and Communists who sympathize with or
overtly support guerrilla demands. In late August,
for example, secondary school students demon-
strated violently in Montevideo in favor of the
Tupamaros. This resultcd in a government decree
closing the schools until the beginning of the new
academic year this March. Students have been
relatively quiescent in recent months, during the
Uruguayan spring and summer, but student Com-
mittees for the Support of the Tupamaros have
appeared.
The Tupamaros also have been supported by
fairly large numbers of middle-class professionals
who increasingly are disenchanted with the
quality of life and economic stagnation in
Uruguay. Middle-class support probably has con-
tinued to diminish, however, since the Pando raid,
mainly because of the terrorists' increased
emphasis on murder and other extreme forms of
violence. One Tupamaro leader has stated pub-
licly that the chivalrous tactics employed before
the end of 1969 have been replaced by greater
revolutionary militance. There have been reports
of division within Tupamaro ranks over this de-
cision, and it is clear that if it is followed, much
middle-class support will be lost.
The Tupamaros have demonstrated remark-
able resiliency, determination, and skill since last
summer, and it is likely that, because they enjoy
extensive support from students and youths, they
will remain a formidable force in Uruguay for
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some time. The boldly executed Jackson kid-
naping shows that the terrorists retain the capa-
bility to carry out complex and important as-
saults and that the government's refusal to nego-
tiate and police dragnets have had only limited
results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their
full capabilities are not known, but it is likely
that the terrorists will remain active in the coming
months, perhaps building toward a concerted,
large-scale campaign of urban terrorism to coin-
cide with the period preceding the presidential
elections.
Since September 1969, Brazilian security
forces have moved aggressively and effectively
against suspected leftist terrorists. A substantial
number of terrorists have been rounded up, and
Carlos Lamarca Engaging in Guerrilla Training
two of the most important Brazilian guerrilla
leaders and theoreticians have been killed and
others exiled. In early November 1970 the gov-
ernment launched a massive counterterrorist
operation in several major cities in an attempt to
frustrate a terrorist campaign they had learned
about from captured documents. Estimates of the
number of persons arrested in the operation vary
from 500 to more than 5.000, which has pro-
voked widespread criticism of the police and the
military.
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Terrorists are still able to carry out major
operations, however. This was demonstrated
dramatically on 7 December when Swiss Ambas-
sador Bucher was kidnaped in Rio de Janeiro and
held nearly six weeks for ransom. After pro-
tracted negotiations the government on 14 Janu-
ary released 70 political prisoners, who were
flown to Chile in exchange for the ambassador.
For the first time, however, the government
forced the terrorists to reduce their original de-
mands significantly by adhering to a firm nego-
tiating posture. The guerrillas dropped ,their
demands for the publication of communiques and
for free railroad transportation and yielded when
the government refused to release a total of 37
other prisoners. The terrorists, in fact, were the
net losers in the Bucher affair, inasmuch as their
credibility and their image of invincibility in kid-
nap cases were undermined seriously.
The National Liberating Action (ALN), one
of the two most important terrorist groups in
Brazil, has been active for about three years.
Former officials of the Soviet-line Brazilian Com-
munist Party (PCB) who split off in opposition to
the party's nonviolent policies form the core of
the ALN's leadership as well as that of most of
the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Mari-
ghella, the author of the Minimanual of the Urban
Guerrilla and the foremost Brazilian revolutionary
of recent years, was the ALN's leader until he was
killed by police in November 1969. His deputy,
Joaquim Camara Ferreira, took over, but died in
October 1970 resisting arrest. In September 1969
ALN members, working jointly with a student
group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnaped
US Ambassador Elbrick. He was released un-
harmed when 15 terrorists were flown to Mexico.
Most of them went on to Cuba, where they were
greeted by Fidel Castro.
The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard
(VPR), a second important terrorist group, is
headed by Carlos Lamarca, a former army captain
and counterinsurgency specialist who deserted in
January 1969. The VPR was responsible for the
first significant terrorist action against a foreign
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national in Brazil when, in October 1968, they
killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao
Paulo. In March 1970 VPR militants kidnaped the
Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He was later
released in exchange for five imprisoned terror-
ists. In April 1970 the US consul in Rio Grande
do Sul foiled an abduction attempt by the VPR
when he ran down one of the terrorists in his car.
In June 1970 \/PR terrorists working with the
ALN kidnaped the West German ambassador.
Forty prisoners were flown to Algeria to secure
his release. The Bucher kidnaping in December
was the most recent example of VPR capabilities.
there is now a growing tendency toward t e unifi-
cation of Brazilian revolutionary groups. The rob-
bery of $100,000 from an armored truck last
September may have been an early indication of
such cooperation. Members of the ALN, VPR,
and the smaller M3-G (Marx, Mao, Marighella-
Guevara) group reportedly took part. It is likely
that as security dragnets have become more effec-
tive this year and several leaders have been lost,
terrorists have begun to pool their diminished
resources.
The number of militants taking part in ter-
rorist operations is probably not more than
1,000. Most are former university students, but
many are cashiered military and police personnel,
extreme leftist labor figures, and professional
criminals. There is a good deal of sympathy for
some of the terrorists' goals among intellectuals
and the radical clergy. Several priests have been
accused of assisting the ALN's support sector, and
military and security officials are convinced that
terrorists have important contacts among the
Brazilian clergy. Marighella devoted a paragraph
in the Minimanual to the clergy, saying that "the
priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingre-
dient" in the struggle.
Some terrorists-particularly in the ALN-
have received training in Cuba, and Uruguayan
terrorists have assisted Brazilians in illegal border
crossings and in obtaining passage to other coun-
Special Report
tries. Brazilian revolutionaries are probably
largely self-sufficient as a result of robberies of
financial institutions. It is possible that Havana
also has provided some financial backing, but
there is no firm evidence of this. Marighella was
long one of Castro',, favorite revolutionaries. He
attended the conference of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization in August 1967, and he
may have returned to Brazil with definite com-
mitments of Cuban support at a time when
Havana was still relatively generous in dispensing
aid.
Urban terrorism appears to be becoming a
less serious problem in Brazil, even though kid-
napings, robberies, and sabotage are likely to con-
tinue. Terrorist capabilities appear to have de-
clined during 1970 as police became more effec-
tive in apprehending and killing important guer-
rilla leaders as well as a significant number of
militants. The government's performance in the
recent Bucher kidnaping enhanced its prestige,
just as the terrorists' capitulation on many im-
portant points during the negotiations probably
strengthened the hand of those military and
security officials who advocate a stronger line in
dealing with terrorists. It is possible, therefore,
that urban terrorism has already reached its peak
in Brazil and may now be declining in importance
and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to
carry out many types of assaults and acts of
sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedly will
remain a destabilizing factor in Brazil for soma
time.
Although Argentina experienced a brief epi-
sode of Cuban-supported rural guerrilla action in
late 1963 and early 1964, urban terrorism did not
become a problem until 1969. Some Peronists
and other extremists in the labor and student
sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of
urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena of
bank robberies, kidnapings, and other spectacular
acts of urban terrorism are relatively new. Unlike
terrorists in neighboring countries, most of
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whom identify with Castroite or Maoist doctrines,
the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim
to be left-wing Peronists. Very little is known
about their structure and membership. There may
be as many as a dozen small groups, some of
which reportedly are attempting to form coali-
tions or to merge forces. The Peronist Armed
Forces group appears to be the most active.
During the early months of 1970, terrorists
concentrated on raiding small police and military
posts and on robbing banks. In March, members
of the Argentine Liberation Front, a group
formed in late 1969 or early.1970 from the union
of three earlier revolutionary groups, seized a
Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires and dema:ided
the release of two imprisoned leftists. The govern-
ment rejected the demand. Paraguayan President
Stroessnbr, who was vacationing in Argentina at
the time, endorsed the Ongania government's
decision and the terrorists later released their
captive. This was the first case in Latin America
in which a government successfully defied the
demands of kidnapers of a foreign diplomat.
An almost immediate reaction to this esca-
pade was the attempted abduction of a Soviet
diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led
by an official of the Argentine Federal Police.
The effort was foiled by the police, One of the
most spectacular events of the year was the kid-
nap and murder of former president Pedro
Aramburu. He was abducted on 29 May, ? the
kidnapers, who later identified themse: re., as
Montoneros, said on 2 June that he had been
tried and executed for crimes allegedly com-
mitted when he. headed a provisional government
from 1955-58. The military government of Presi-
dent Ongania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted
by the armed forces a week later.
Terrorism has continued during the admin-
istration of General Levingston. On 1 July 1970 a
15-man commando group, whose members iden-
tify themselves as Montoneros, terrorized a small
town near Cordoba. They robbed a bank, occu-
pied the police station, and sevared communica-
Special Report
tions. Four weeks later, a similar raid was made
on a town near the capital. In October, the home
of the US Defense Attache was fire-bombed, and
other explosive devices were found at the homes
of two other US officials. Later in the month
terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US
military officers and made off with arms, uni-
forms, and identity documents.
Terrorism in Argentina is less spectacular
than in Uruguay or Brazil, but the Aramburu
murder and its aftermath demonstrate what a
small and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely
that terrorist bands will increase their activities
this year, aiming especially at US officials. Al-
though they have not demonstrated many of the
capabilities of the Tupamaros or of one or two
Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands
are slowly increasing their potential both by
experience and probably through their contacts
with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR. Argen-
tir:e security and police forces have not yet had
much success in halting them, and relatively few
guerrillas have been imprisoned.
Little is known about the extent of support
and sympathy for the-terrorists, but as in Brazil
and Uruguay, youths and students probably ac-
count for a substantial portion. Elements of
Argentine's highly politicized labor federations
probably sympathize generally with terrorist
objectives, and it is also known that some radica,
priests, members of a group known in Argentina
as the Third World Movement, have contacts in
terrorist circles. Last December a "Third World"
priest was given a two-year susper?Jed prison sen-
tence for his alleged contacts with terrorists in-
volved in the Aramburu murder. Measures an-
nounced by the government late last year were
designed to move Argentina gradually toward
consticutiona! government during the next four or
five years, but they are not expected to have a
major impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is
likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue
to increase during the next few years and may
pose a more serious problem to the government.
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ately, and counterinsurgency forces picked off
the guerrillas systematically in skirmishes during
the next few months. By early September, when
eight guerrillas were killed in a fire-fight, the ELN
probably had been reduced to half its original
size. By the end of October, Chato Peredo had
been captured and about 55 guerrillas killed. A
few remained in the countryside and eight, in-
cluding Peredo and three Chileans, were granta.:d
safe conducts to Chile. Rural guerrilla activity
ceased.
Because of its geographic location in the
center of South America and the weakness of its
political institutions, Bolivia has long been a
target of cross-border subversion. In 1970 revolu-
tionaries from Bolivia and other South American
countries, with Cuban support, attempted to
avenge and vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his
National Liberation Army jEL:'v). Even though
ELN rural guerrilla efforts failed a second time,
revolutionaries have continued their attempts to
give the impressic,n that a continental guerrilla
movement is being forged in Bolivia. There were
reports last November that a "South American
Liberation Army" was trying to begin operations
in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continues to
place heavy emphasis on the international char-
acter and support of revolutionary activity in
Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric,
efforts to revive rural guerrilla action have been
completely frustrated. In recent months, more-
over, the ELN appears to be taking an increased
interest in urban guerrilla methods, and it is likely
that rural efforts will be abandoned, at least
temporarily.
The present ELN is the offspring of the
movement founded and led by Guevara until it
was all but obliterated in 1967. Inti Peredo, one
of the survivors of that effort, began to reorganize
revolutionary cadres in 1968 and 1969. About 50
Cuban-trained guerrillas infiltrated Bolivia in
1969, demonstrating Havana's continued interest
in guerrilla warfare. In September 1969, however,
Inti was killed in a police raid, and leadership
passed to his brother Chato.
On 19 July 1970, the resuscitated ELN be-
gan another phase of guerrilla activity by over-
running a mining camp at Teoponte, north of La
Paz. About 75 guerrillas, many of them students
from La Paz, dynamited the installation and
seized two German employees as hostages. The
Bolivian Government later released ten political
prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN
was forced to take the defensive almost imniedi-
Special Report
The ELN is unusual in the recent history of
insurgency in the hemisphere because of the sig-
nificant level of cooperation and support it re-
ceives from revolutionaries in nearby countries.
The original pronouncement of the ELN, left at
the site of the Teoponte raid, indicated that six
Chileans, four Argentines, two Brazilians, and two
Peruvians were ELN members. Subsequent infor-
mation and body counts show that at least the
majority of these were with the guerrillas. The
present ELN, unlike the original, however, has
Bolivians in command, and there are no con-
firmed reports that Cuban personnel are currently
in Bolivia.
In July 1970 the Uruguayan press published
the text of a letter allegedly written by Chato
Peredo and addressed to the Uruguayan
Tupamaro terrorist group. It announced the es-
tablishment of "formal" relations between the
Tupamaros and the ELN. Chato said that "in the
near future we must give more and more proof of
integration, not only in the sense of help, but also
in the interchange of militants." In January 1970
a committee for the support of the ELN was
formed in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos Alta-
mirano was named director and the then presi-
dential candidate, Salvador Allende, was identi-
fied as a member. This committee was publicized
heavily by Cuba's official media, but thus far
Havana appears to have done no more than pro-
vide psychological support.
Following the collapse of its rural guerrilla
operation, the ELN appears to be shifting
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emphasis to urban tactics with the help of in-
dividual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilecin advisers.
Within the last few months ELN propaganda
as been giving greater notice to the urban strug-
gle. Published statements new warn that the ELN
will "fight to the final victory in the mountains
and the cities." Earlier statements did not refer to
urban activities. So far, however, the ELN has
demonstrated a limited capacity for urban activi-
ties. It robbed a payroll truck in La Paz in Decem-
ber 1969 but lost several trained guerrillas in the
process. It has carried out weli-pub,,rized murders
of several of its political opponents in the last 18
months, including two in the capital recently. It is
probably also responsible for some of the bomb-
ings that occur sporadically in La Paz, and the
dynamiting of the USIS office in Santa Cruz on 7
December 1970.
Like the FAR in Guatemala, the Cuban-
oriented ELN is not the only violent revolution-
ary group in Bolivia. The pry-Chinese Communist
Party began its own militant operations in Octo-
ber when party members seized a cattle ranch and
handed it over to peasant groups. The action was
designed to gain sympathy from the peasants and
to create a base for future guerrilla operations.
The government's subsequent seizure of the
property practically annulled the party's gains,
however.
One faction of the Trotskyist Revolutionary
Workers Party is also committed to guerrilla ac-
tivities, but some of its better trained members
have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist
Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and, as a
result, many of its more activist members have
joined the ELN.
Because of the continued interest of Bolivian
and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining an ac-
tive insurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will
Special Report
continue to be active. Significant numbers of
university students are ELI members or sympa-
thizers, and the labor unions, which have a long
tradition of radicalism, may also contribute mem-
bers. The ELN has made it clear in repeated
announcements that it intends to persevere in the
struggle, and propaganda support from Cuba has
continued. It is likely that individual Chilean and
Urujuayan revolutionaries will continue to
donate their services. Havana provides propaganda
support and is in close contact with ELN cadres,
but it is not known if material backing has been
provided.
t.)uring the last two or tnree years there has
been more violence and terrorism in Guatemala-a
country of only five million people-than in any
other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated
that terrorist activities since 1967 have resulted in
an average of about 90 deaths a month-a third of
whim have been policemen. It is also believed
that about 50 prominent businessmen have been
abducted for ransoms averaging about $200,000.
The major perpetrator of the violence is the
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), a pro-Cuban revolu-
tionary group with both urban and rural wings. In
January 1968, two high-ranking members of the
US military group in Guatemala were murdered
by the FAR, and in August US Ambassador Mein
was killed resisting a kidnap attempt. The FAR
was the first Latin American terrorist group to
resort to kidnapings, assassinations, and other ex-
treme forms of urban violence.
Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activi-
ties. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-drill-
ing camp near the Mexican border, occupied a
rural town, temporarily seized farms in outlying
areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas.
In December, the FAR launched a particularly
violent but unsuccessful campaign to disrupt the
March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres
killed more than a dozen security officials, the
right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala
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City, and a highly regarded editor of the coun-
try's leading newspaper. Fire bombings in down-
town Guatemala City caused damage estimated in
the millions of dollars.
In 1970, urban terrorism largely supplanted
rural offensives. On the eve of the election the
FAR secured the release of a captured colleague
by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister,
and a week later it obtained the release of two
other guerrillas in exchange for the abducted US
Labor Attache. After the election in March, West
German Ambassador Von Spreti was kidnaped.
He was killed on 5 April when the government
reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate
with the terrorists.
In the latter part of 1970 the FAR suffered
a debilitating leadership crisis and splits over the
choice of tactics; it is now being reor anized
radically Rural
guerriI a opera ions apparen y ave been
minimized temporarily, but guerrilla _zfe zones
have been established in the hi terlands, perhaps
as havens for urban terrorists on the run. In
mid-September 1970, a two-month lull in urban
activities ended with dozens of bombings, assas-
sinations, kidnapings, and various scattered acts
of sabotage.
Guatemala has been one of the top countries
on Havana's list of targets since the early 1960s,
and today it is probably the only country in the
hemisphere where Cuban guerrilla advisers are in
the field.
The Cubans apparently are teach-
ing of urban and rural methods.
Havana's expectations from the FAR are
commensurate with its investment
Special Report
the FAR-with Cuban coaxing-has attempted to
coordinate revolutionary activities among several
Central American counts ies. The FAR has 125X1
periodic contacts with the Sandinist National
Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua and the
Honduran Francisco Morazon Movement.
Only in Nicaragua, however,
w ere a sma and harried FSLN is active
sporadically, have revolutionaries dared to bring
their embryonic units out into the open.
In October 1970 the hijackers of a Costa
Rican airliner identified themselves as members25X1
the United Revolutionary Front of Central
America. This was the first public mention of this
sobriquet,
I t is not
1TW tt at a united or coordinated Central Ameri-
can revolutionary group exists at this time in
more than a propaganda context.
The FAR has engaged in some cross-border
operations, mainly into neighboring Mexico and
Honduras in search of safehavens. It was in such a
Mexican hideout, however, where Marcos
Antonio Yon Sosa, a veteran of Guatemalan guer-
rilla struggles since 1960 and leader of the now
moribund 13th of November Revolutionary
Movement, was killed by a Mexican Army patrol
in May 1970.
Terrorism is not the work of the FAR alone.
The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is also
committed to armed revolution even though its
long-term strategy calls for preparing the masses
prior to violent operations. Since 1962 the party
has tried to gain control over its own guerrilla
factions, and it has had a history of rivalry with
the FAR, interspersed with occasional abortive
periods of :iniflcation. Party leaders reportedly
are afraid tnat the political gains they have made
might be lost by an all-out terrorist campaign, but
this has not prevented them from applauding and
masterminding acts of assassination and other
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violence. In Augt'st 1970, for example, the party
publicly commended terrorists in Uruguay who
had nxudared a US AID official.
The upsurge of terrorist activity In Novem-
ber resulted in one of the harshest crackdowns in
memory. On 13 November President Arana de-
clared a 30-day state of siege that was extended in
December for another month. Stringent counter-
insurgency measures were adopted that resulted
in the death of at least one guorrilla leader and
the capture of another. The government's actions
wore so exaggerated that the Air Force mis-
takenly attacked a fleet of Salvadoran shrimp
boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in
illicit activity. Four boats were sunk, two
Salvadorans were killed, and 15 wounded.
Right-wing counterterrorists have also been
active on a large scale. Their operations were
responsible for many deaths during the recent
state of siege. President Arana has admitted pri-
vately that the government is unable fully to
control counterterror, for most of which police
and security of fici a , are responsible. Government
and right-wing sources are believed responsible for
the recent murders of two prominent politicians.
On 15 January congressman Adolfo Mijangos--a
well-known intellectual who had been confined to
a wheelchair--was killed. On 17 January one of
Guatemala's leading labor officials was machine
gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent
political figures on the government's clandestine
assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of
retributory violence in motion.
Neither the government nor the left-wing
terrorists are likely to achieve a decisive victory in
the near future. US citizens and other foreigners
will continue to he major targets. A US bu:in.ss-
man was beaten and killed-perhaps by right-"ing
Special Report
S.1?('A IZE'I'
terrorists in early Docomber, and US officials
have escaped kidnaping in recent month..; l rgoly
because of hoightoned security precaullons, f-Alt
terrorists spent almost two clays in early Decem-
ber following and atton)pting to kidnap a US
diplomat. They woro dot or red because of the of.
festive security n)oasures ho used, hcrt the. FAR
can be expected to persevere in such of forts.
Since the peak of activity from 1962
through 1964, insurgency has ...Ilen to such insig-
nificance in Venezuela that there are now prob-
ably less than 100 guerrillas divided into several
rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acts of
urban violence occur. Plural guerrillns continue to
decline in importance and pose no direct threat to
the government. They have conducted a few small
raids and ambushes during the last few years, but
are not capable of sustained operations and are
expected gradually to abandon the struggle or
resort to banditry. Low-level violence and crime
could increase in the cities this year, but this will
not he a serious problem,
The Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) was one of the primary recipients of
Cuban support for many years, as well as one of
the most active and formidable guerrilla groups in
the hemisphere. From 1962 through 1964 it coni.
biped a high level of urban terrorism with rural
operations. In 1963, the 13etancourt administra.
tion probably was more beleaguered and threat-
ened by terrorists and guerrillas than any Latin
American government since f3atista's in Cuoa.
From 1962 through 1964 urban terrorists burned
factories, murdered police and security personnel,
kidnaped a popular Spanish athlete, and engaged
in Various acts of sabotage. In early 1962 the t'S
Embassy was bombed, US businesses were raic'ad,
and two US milit,ry advisers were kidnaped.
Rural operations were carried on simultaneously,
.'nd spectacular acts such as the seizure of a
Venezuelan merchant ship on the high seas were
carried out.
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Guerrilla fortunes (let:Iined steadily under
the L.eoni administration (1964-1969), however,
and in 1966 the Venezuelan Communist Party
(PCV) forinally abandoned violent tactics. Under
the leadership of Douglas Bravo, some FALN
cadres split with the PCV over this decision, en-
deavoring with Cuban aid to revive rural guerrilla
insurgency. By 1967, however, the FFALN had
fallen into such lassitude and incompetence, that
Castro publicly denounced Bravo AS a "pceuclo-
revolutionary." Cuban guerrilla advisers, including
at least two members of the Central Committee
of the Cuban Communist Party who had been
attached to the FALN, were withdrawn by early
1969. Other forms of Cuban support also dried
up. The Pro-Castro Movement of the Revolution-
ary Loft (MIR) has been active since 1960. In
September 1969 it split into three rival factions,
two of which compete with a total of about 40
guerrillas in the field. The MIR has received
Cuban aid in the past, but today it is inactive and
unpromising from Havana's point of view.
Guerrilla fortunes were so dim by 1969, in
fact, that Pre-ident Caldera instituted a wide-
ranging paciSication program in March aimed at
absorbing Communists and guerrillas into the
legal t)oliti,al framework. He offered an amnesty
to guerrillas who would lay down their arms,
lei * ,llized the Communist Party, established rela-
tions with the USSR, reorganized the security
forces and restrained aggressive armed forces
operations against the guerrillas. The pacification
plan has been successful in attracting Snore guer-
rillas away from their mountain redoubts and
probably has undermined morale and added to
the divisions among those who remain in the
field.
Some Venezuelan officials appear to be ap-
prehensive that small bands of revolutionaries
may seek to emulate the successes of terrorists in
Caracas, and an attempted bombing. -1 he 1)S
Lnibassy in Caracas has speculated that the recent
split of the PCV into two factions could result in
sharper competition among extremist groups and
an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents,
Including_ about a third of the party's leaders, are
for rning a new party less subservient to Moscow.
Thi. faction could resort to robberies irl order to
fund its activities, oven though the use of violent
rnethocls would be a departure from the peaceful
approach that all factions of the PCV have en-
dorsed since 1966. Thus, despito the current low
level of violence and crime and the possibility
that it will increase somewhat this year, there is
virtually no chance that terrorise) or guerrilla
activity will be renewed on levels comparable to
those of the raid-1960s.
Rural violence has been an integral part of
Colombian life since 1948 when rampant ban-
ditry and guerrilla strife that Ia,ted a decade were
An ELN Guerrilla 1tshiing Camp
other South American countries. The defense unleasheu. During the 1960s three rival guerrilla
minister said publicly on 11 January that the forces looking In Mnccnw, Havana, and Peking for
government is concerned about a possible increase support emerged from the remnants of earlier
in terrorism. He cited as evidence the murder of a rural struggle. None prospered for long, however,
former guerrilla by FALN members, J bombing in and all have declined aporc:ciably during the last
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SFICOR 111,
few years, They no longer attract young recruits
or receive much publicity in the cities or on the
campuses. In all, there are probably only about
600 guor illas in Colombia a country of 21 mil-
lion people.
"The guerrillas have generally confined their
activities to marginal mountain areas, and they
now engage more in banditry than in guerrilla
warfare. Because of these activities, they still
cause trouble in the countryside and to the
security for,gs, who have groat difficulty counter-
attacking.
The Army of National Liberation (LEN) is
the most active guerrilla group in Colombia. It has
enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the
rest of Latin America since 1966, when it began
guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most
famous son--the guerrilla priest Carnilo Torres. In
early September 1970 the ELN ambushed an
army patrol, killing seven soldiers and wounding
eight. It was the most serious guerrilla action of
any kind in Colornbia in more than a year.
The ELN suffers from internal fissures arid
frequent defections, however, and its urban sup-
port apparatus in Bogota is reported to be in
disarray. Cuban advisors may have been in the
field with the ELN in 1966 and 1967, but Havana
apparently had cut off all aid by 1969. The ELN
is reported to have 135 men under arms. but they
are divided into four groups and operate in scat-
tered areas.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (FARC), the action arm of the pro-Soviet
Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the
ELN but less active. Operating in four main
groups, the FARC's policy since late 1968 has
been to avoid provoking the government, because
Moscow is reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize
newly established Colombian-Soviet relations or
the legal role of the Communist Party. Some
small clashes with military forces take place from
time to time, however
Special Report
25X1
1 ho Popular Liberation Army (LPL) is the
action arm of the pro-Pekinr Communist Party of
Colornbia Marxist-Loninist.
l he LPL
avoids clashes wit) superior orcos, )ut has at-
tacked small, isolated towns, ranchos, and police
posts. Such raids apparently are the product of
the LPL's weakness and its need to acquire pro-
visions and publicity. There is no widonce that
the LPL receives regular financial support from
Poking.
Those guerrilla groups have riot engaged in
significant urban violence and appear to have lit-
tle capacity for such action. They do riot pose
serious challenges to the aovernrnent, and are
likely to continue to fade in importance.
Rural guerrilla insurgency probabl,/ will be
eschewed as a viable method by Latin American
revolutionaries in most countries in the foresee-
able future. Although the Cubans are likely to
continue emphasizing this approach anti some
urban revolutionaries will express the belief that
urban and rural tactics should be e' toyed
simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers are
likely to be enlisted for rural action. Guatemala,
where all forms of violence and terrorism remain
at unprecedented levels, may be the only country
where a resu'gence of rural guerrilla activity is
possible. The GUJteui.liri Rebel Arrned Forces
(FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue to
encourage and perhaps materially support revolu-
tionaries from other Central American countries.
The potential for rc,volution in those countries is
not very great, however, and it is unlikely that
nev, rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the next
year or so.
Urban revolutionaries in South America have
bc-en far more successful than their rural counter-
parts in embarrassing governments and in up-
setting stability. They have won important con-
cessions from the governments-especially in
forcing the release of political prisoners In Argen-
tina, they were able to exploit the weaknesses of
SECRET
22 January 1971
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030003-6
Sl?CltF'I'
the Ongania regime and they contributed to a
change of government after they kidnaped and
murdered a former president. 'This year, terrorist
activities may increase in Argentina and Bolivia,
continue at relatively high levels In Brazil and
Uruguay, and they could be initiated by small,
fanatical bands at any time in several other coun-
trios. Prospects are, therefore, that terrorist ac-
tivity will inrrease in as many as half a dozen
South American countries.
In the entire South American continent,
however, thorn are probably no more than 3,000
active urban revolutionaries. Police and counter-
terrorist techniques became more sophisticated
and effective in 1970, and terrorists have been
dealt hard blows in several countries. Important
guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, and Guato-
mala have been killed or captured, and largo num-
bers of terrorists are in jail. Thus, although in-
ternal security forces probably will not be able to
extirpate terrorist groups, they mm'y continue to
increase their capabilities in neutralizing and sup-
pressing them. Terrorists succeeded at first largely
because governments were surprised, confused,
and unprepared to deal with them. During 1970,
however, as terrorist methods became better
known the Guatemalan Government adopted a
firm policy of refusing to negotiate with terror-
ists, and the Uruguayan Government persisted in
the same policy despite important kidnapings,
Kidnaped foreign officials were murdered in each
country as a result, but guerrillas suffered signifi-
cant losses of popularity for their brutality. Al-
though the Brazilian Government in the past ac-
ceded quickly to terrorist demands, it adopted a
tougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and
undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in
future dealings with guerrillas.
Small bands of violent urban revolutionaries
may be able to harass and embarrass Latin Amer-
ican governments for some time to come, but
they are not likely to pose serious challenges to
any with the possible exceptiv ss of the regimes of
Guatemala and Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-ini-
tiated violence and right-wing counterterror al-
ready amount to a small-scale, bloody civil war
that could increase in proportion depending on
what actions the government takes. In Uruguay,
the Tupamaros continue to demon,trate a re-
markable ability to carry out spectacular opera-
tions. They probably can add other hostages to
the three foreigners they already hold, and they
will undoubtedly sustain and seek to increase
terrorist activities of all kinds in the months pro-
ceding the November 1971 elections -25X1
Special Report - 17 -
22 January 1971
SFC:RFT
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