WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE MACEDONIAN SYNDROME-THE CHRONIC CRISIS IN YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 15, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Macedonian Syndrome-The Chronic Crisis
In Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations
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15 January 1971
No. 0353/71A
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THE MACEDONIAN SYNDROME?The Chronic Crisis in Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations
During the past four years Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have exchanged a torrent of
invective over a seemingly obscure historical issue?the ethnic and linguistic ancestry of the
peoples of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Yugoslays claim that all the clamor,
when stripped of its academic pretensions, reveals a strident irredentism on the part of the
Bulgarians.
For Sofia, the Macedonian question is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is
exploited for domestic Bulgarian consumption, affording the regime the only safe outlet for
Bulgarian nationalism without fear of intervention by Moscow. Not even the Yugoslays
believe that Sofia, at the present time, intends to retake Yugoslav Macedonia by force. On
the other hand, it is equally clear that the Bulgarian leadership will be alert to any
opportunity to loosen Belgrade's hold over Macedonia in the post-Tito era, and it has
already prepared the way with strong claims of inherent rights in Macedonia.
Yugoslavia looks on Bulgaria's refusal to recognize the existence of a separate Mace-
donian nationality as a potential threat to Yugoslav territorial integrity. The Yugoslays have
also recently become uneasy over what they consider the Kremlin's tacit approval of Sofia's
claim that Macedonia is inhabited by Bulgarians. In Belgrade, for example, it has been noted
that Bulgarian pressures in Macedonia have at times peaked when tensions have been
unusually high between Belgrade and Moscow, as when Yugoslavia voiced its opposition to
the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The intensity of the Yugoslav reaction to the argument over Macedonia must be viewed
against a backdrop of serious internal economic problems and the pending major govern-
mental reorganization. There has been no attempt to hide the seriousness or magnitude of
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111) A IA
YUGOSLAVIA
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Tuna,'
7"
.***
4.2
Yugoslavia
VARDAR MACEDONIA
(Macedonian Socialist
Republic) ,
?
Skopje
9,928
1,641,000
(1970 est.)
7.6
550776 1-71 CIA
Special Report
MILES..
Bulgaria
PIRIN MACEDONIA
(Blagoevgrad Okrug)
CAPITAL Blagoevgrad
AREA (sq mi)
POPULATION
PERCENT OF
NATIONAL
POPULATION
301,000
(1965 est.)
3.7
PERCENT OF REGION.
ETHNIC. ? ETHNIC
MACEDONIANS
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the problems that confront Yugoslavia, and Tito's age adds a note of urgency to the
situation. In many respects, therefore, the Macedonian problem and Bulgaria's vague threat
to regain the region are an intrinsic part of the succession problem. The Yugoslays, most of
whom wish to hold their federation together after Tito, are keeping an eye on the potential
for political instability and disintegration that could come with Tito's passing, which
Bulgaria might try to exploit.
To the Yugoslav leadership the dispute is not without its positive aspects. By over-
dramatizing the immediate threat, Belgrade apparently hopes to minimize internal dis-
sension and rally support for the new federal system, as well as to keep world attention
focused on Yugoslavia and on the "implied" Soviet threat.
Actually, the ebbs and flows of the Macedonian problem have not always reflected the
status of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Party and government boss Todor Zhivkov provoked the
present crisis in late 1967 at a time when Belgrade and Moscow were on fairly good terms.
Historically, the Macedonian question has always had something of a life of its own,
reflecting traditional Balkan hostilities and Bulgarian and Yugoslav internal requirements, as
well as the prevailing winds in the Eastern European political arena.
Through 1967 and early 1968, Bulgaria took the initiative in the dispute, promoting its
claims to Macedonia. But in mid-1968, because of festering problems in the Kremlin's
relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviets became active in the confrontation. Then, in late
1969, when both Moscow and Sofia desired a temporary abatement in the intensity of the
dispute, the beleaguered Yugoslays verbally threw down the gauntlet to their two antago-
nists and have been on the propaganda attack ever since. Thus the future direction of the
Macedonian conflict depends now on the preferences of Belgrade.
1912?One of five wars in modern times over Macedonia
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Background
Bulguia's campaign questions the Yugoslays'
right to sovereignty over Macedonia, one of the
Yugoslav federation's six republics. Sofia claims
that all Macedonians are really ethnic Bulgarians
cut off from the motherland. This position pre-
dates the Communist era in Bulgaria. In 1878, the
Treaty of San Stefano gave the modern Bulgarlan
state control of the lands of Macedonia for the
first time. A few months later this territo;y was
expropriated by the great powers and given to
Serbia (now part of Yugoslavia). Most Bulgarian
governments since then have continued to lay
claim to this province, although since 1878, Sofia
has held the land for a total of only four years.
Belgrade's commitment to a separate Mace-
donian republic within the Yugoslav state dates
from the postwar establishment of the Commu-
nist regime. Tito's personal involvement in Mace-
donia goes back at least to January 1943. At that
time he appealed to the Macedonians in Yugo-
slavia to fight for their independence and to seek
national identity through self-determination, i.e.,
through the establishment of a Macedonian Re-
public in union with the Yugoslav peoples. Fol-
lowing World War II, Tito put his words into
action and a separate Macedonian Republic was
created in 1944 as an integral part of the Yugo-
slav federation. This republic did not include Pirin
(Bulgarian Macedonia).
The Communists' seizure of power in both
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia seemed to mark the end
of the Macedonian issue as a point of contention
between the two countries. Bulgarian party lead-
ers condemned the actions of past Bulgarian gov-
ernments in Macedonia and proclaimed the prov-
ince an integral part of Yugoslavia. Belgrade and
Sofia?stressing reconciliation?agreed in 1947
that, in the long run, a reunion of the Macedonian
peoples might be possible.
The charismatic Yugoslav leader, however,
had plans for a "greater" Macedonia. He pressed
the concept of a larger Yugoslav-Bulgarian con-
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federation headquartered in Belgrade. Sofia was
receptive to the idea of forming a federation of
"Southslavs" in the Balkans?the Dimitrov Plan?
but balked at the suggestion that Pirin Macedonia
be initially joined to its Yugoslav counterpart as a
separate republic. For a time, Macedonians from
Yugoslavia were even allowed to open schools and
bookshops in Pirin, and the Yugoslav Mace-
donian-language newspaper was freely sold in
Bulgaria.
Even after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948,
when Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations also took a
turn for the worse, there was no resurrection of
past claims to Macedonia. This, however, may
have been due to the fact that in the period
between the executions of the Bulgarian national
Communists in the 1950s and the emergence of
the Zhivkov clique in the early 1960s, any expres-
sion of nationalism was looked upon with great
suspicion in Bulgaria and the USSR.
There was some minor fencing over Mace-
donia between Belgrade and Sofia in the late
1950s, when the Bulgarians again began to remon-
strate over the loss of this province after San
Stefano. This vocalizing was usually limited to
academic circles in both countries. Scholarly
articles on Macedonia were exchanged by social
scientists, who debated the true cultural and his-
torical heritage of the people. In the course of the
Tito-Zhivkov talks in 1963 and 1965, as well as in
Zhivkov's discussions with Yugoslav Macedonian
chief Crvenkovski in 1967, it was agreed that
"these differences" should not be used as an
excuse for polemics; rather, "experts should dis-
cuss them and establish the historical truth about
them."
The Macedonian issue was revived in a cam-
paign, not very well thought out, that Zhivkov
launched in early 1965. The idea was to develop
an ethos of patriotism and national spirit in the
youth of the then emotionally stagnant country.
The dispute over Macedonia became a kay means
of building national pride, which had been stifled
by the Bulgarian Communist Party's subservience
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Selected Boundary Changes,
187B-1970
Independence from Turkey with Russian aid
(Treaty of San Stefano, March 1670)
Victory in First Balkan War
(Treaty of boon, May 1013)
NOT( Southereiltrn
bounden y nal drAnod
6 foray
Gains for siding with Germany in World War I
BULGARIA
0SOFItA
Ltirbge
Gains for siding with Germany in World War II
BULGARIA
?SIM
550777 1-71
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Signing of Treaty of San Stefano, March 1878
to the Soviet Union. Studies were launched "ana-
lyzing" the past relationship of the Macedonian
people to Bulgaria. The party re-evaluated its past
stand on the Macedonian issue and concluded
that it had taken an incorrect and "non-Leninist
position" by dropping Bulgarian claims to Mace-
donia. The party then reasoned that "in doing so,
Bulgaria had accepted foreign rule for an area that
had a predominantly Bulgarian population." The
head of the Bulgarian Writers' Union went so far
in the autumn of 1966 as to deny the existence of
a separate Macedonian language, concluding that
it really was a variant of Bulgarian (a statement
with which many Western linguists would agree).
During the same year, a leading ethnographer
publicly took exception to an article in a Soviet
journal treating the Macedonians as a separate
nation or people.
San Stefano Revived
By 1967 many Bulgarian academicians and
politicos were engaged in turning out and
articles supporting the contention that Macedonia
belonged ethnically, historically, and spiritually
to the Bulgarian nation. Long-dead irredentist
authors and their works were "rediscovered" and
republished.
In January 1967, Sofia celebrated the birth-
day of Gotse Delchev, a departed Macedonian
patriot declared for the occasion to be a "Bul-
garian patriot." In December, an article in the
party newspaper by an eminent historian?corn-
menting on the upcoming anniversary of the
treaty of San Stefano?concluded that the pact
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was based on "generally recognized ethnographic
frontiers of the Bulgarian people at that time." In
Zhivkov's Theses on Youth, also published in
December 1967, a whole chapter was devoted to
the need for an expansion of patriotic education.
Bulgarians, he said, do not make "sufficient use
oi our glorious historic past in order to educate
the youth in a patriotic spirit." The Yugoslays
consider that the present Macedonian crisis dates
from the winter of 1967, and accrued from these
Bulgarian actions.
The dispute was raised to the level of official
bilateral relations on 29 January 1968, when the
Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade was advised by
the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry of the "harm"
Sofia's pursuit of the Macedonian issue could
have on relations between the two countries.
Nevertheless, on the 90th anniversary of San
Stefano, in February 1968, the Bulgars held a
massive ceremony in Sofia, during which the par-
ticipants lamented Bulgaria's loss of Macedonia.
After the San Stefano celebrdtions, neither
side showed an inclination to let the issue drop;
instead, outside events heated the quarrel to seri-
ous dimensions. The occupation of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 increased Belgrade's suspicion of
Soviet-Bulgarian'collaboration on Macedonia. As
Yugoslav support for the Dubcek regime con-
tinued throughout the spring and summer of
1968, the Kremlin became increasingly unhappy
with Belgrade. At the same time, the Bulgarian
communications media mounted a loud assault on
the policies and programs of the League of Yugo-
slav Communists, and the threat of Bulgarian ir-
ledentism became real to Belgrade. In mid-1968,
the Bulgarian military newspaper, echoing the
Brezhnev Doctrine, announced that it was the
"duty of the Warsaw Pact to help every country
where socialism" was "in danger," implying that
what was true for Czechoslovakia could also be
true for Yugoslavia. In August, after the Czecho-
slovak invasion, a Bulgarian deputy minister of
defense (who had fought alongside Tito as a par-
tisan) pointedly reithrated the threat, stating that
Bulgaria was ready to go "anywhere else" to
rescue socialism.
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Zhivkov Gives Speech Fostering Bulgarian Nationalism
An objective analysis of historical fact shows that
Macedonia has never existed, ethnically or nationally, as a
separate state. Macedonia is a geographical region, just as
are Thrace, Moesia, Dobruja, and others. The name
Macedonia is a geographical term which has undergone
many and momentous changes....
The Bulgarian Communist Party and the People's
Republic of Bulgaria recognize the existence of the Social-
ist Republic of Macedonia as a component part of the
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and strive to
strengthen their friendly tics with it. But the I3CP and our
country cannot ignore the fact that a stubborn policy of
forceful denationalization of the Bulgarian population is
being implemented in the Socialist Republic of Mace-
donia. Feelings of nationalist and great?nation chauvinism
are being incited, for the purpose of turning the people in
Macedonia against the Bulgarian nation.
The Macedonian Problem: Historical-Political
Aspects Historical Institute, Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences Sofia, November 1968
Our foreign policy in the Balkans is based on the
fundamental idea that there should be no controversial
questions among the Balkan countries, inherited from the
past, which could not be solved peaceably by way of
negotiations and protection of mutual interests. It is our
position that emphasis must be placed on positive things
which the Balkan countries have in common and which
unite them, and not on the things which divide them.
Tudor Zhivkov
April /969
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Tito's open criticism of the events of August
1968 apparently prompted Zhivkov?undoubt-
edly with Soviet endorsement?to adopt an even
stronger propaganda and diplomatic campaign
against Yugoslavia. The polemics were primarily
based on the Macedonian issue but they also
contained hostile references to Yugoslav political
and economic practices, emphasizing the social
and economic problems of the country. It was
naively hoped that the Bulgarian campaign would
put enough pressure on Belgrade to distract the
Yugoslays from events in Prague and moderate
their response to the invasion.
In November 1968, the Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences, under party direction, issued a pam-
phlet claiming that Macedonia had never existed
ethnically, nationally, or linguistically as a nation
apart from Bulgaria. The publication stated that
all Macedonians, even those in Yugoslavia, actu-
ally were Bulgarians. It denounced Belgrade for
forcing the integration of the Macedonian people
with the Yugoslays, who were accused of wishing
also to lay claim to the "Macedonians" living in
Bulgaria. It said that Bulgaria would continue to
seek a "constructive solution" to the Macedonian
problem that would let Macedonia "freely deter-
mine and express its nationality and its national
feelings," implying, of course, that these "na-
tional feelings" were Bulgarian. This tract was
widely distributed in Bulgaria, was broadcast to
Yugoslavia, and was circulated in Eastern Europe.
Belgrade later reported that several people were
arrested in Yugoslav Macedonia for distributing
this "irredenti'st pamphlet."
The following month, in a further sign of
their antipathy, Bulgarian leaders boycotted
Yugoslav national day celebrations in Sofia, and
rumors began circulating in Moscow that Pact
maneuvers would soon be held in Bulgaria near
the Yugoslav oorder. These stories inspired in-
creased tensions in Yugoslavia. Polemics became
vitriolic,
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A contemporary dimension
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was added to the dispute by Bulgaria's claims that
it had liberated Macedonia in 1944?a claim Bel-
grade categorically denied but viewed as an im-
plied threat.
In September 1969, it appeared that some
progress might be made in the Macedonian dis-
pute. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
first visited Yugoslavia, and the President of the
Yugoslav National Assembly's Chamber of Na-
tionalities, Mika Spiljak, then went to Sofia.
Whether there was any connection between the
two journeys is not known, but with things in
Czechoslovakia then quiet, the Soviets apparently
desired an aura of tranquility in East Europe. If
so, little was accomplished, and the Spiljak mis-
sion proved a failure. The Yugoslays, as they had
in the past, demanded an end to the Bulgarians'
campaign, but Zhivkov declared that he would
discuss outstanding problems only with Tito.
Spiljak, originally hopeful of compromise after
the Gromyko trip, left Sofia "disgusted with the
platitudes and generalities" into which the meet-
ing had degenerated.
Despite the fiasco, the Bulgarians showed a
willingness to discus, the problem. A meeting
between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian foreign min-
isters at the UN, however, led to a disastrous visit
by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev to Belgrade
in December 1969. This incredibly undiplomatic
trip revealed that neither side was ready to mod-
erate its stand. The talks nearly ended before they
started when Bashev let it be known th.tt Bulgaria
was willing to renounce all territorial claims on
Yugoslavia if Belgrade would admit that the
Macedonians were ethnically Bulgarians. The pro-
posal, which was of course rejected, only con-
firmed Belgrade's suspicion of Bulgaria's sinister
designs on Yugosiav Macedonia.
Bulgarian Twists and Tunis
In general, the old-line Bulgarian apparat-
chiks, who had severed rather close ties to the
Yugoslav party in 1948, are still nervous about
their independent neighbor and the r,,sidual
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The Greek Macedonia
(according to 1961 official figures
of 1%-41,017?of the Greek Population)
Athens acknowledges the existence of a few
"south Slays" in its northern border areas, but con-
siders the Macedonian minority problem "non-
existent." Yugoslavia claims that a Macedonian mi-
nority does exist in Greece, and perioeJcally makes
reference to its suppression and forced assimilation by
the national majority. Since the Athens-Sofia detente
of 1964 Bulgaria has made no mention of the Mace-
donian minority in Greece, and apparently considers
the issue closed.
common interests that might still prove attractive
to some nationalistic Bulgarian party members.
Sofia has never been comfortable about having
Yugoslavia, an unorthodox yet successful Com-
munist country, on its border, especially because
of the sharp contrast it affords with Bulgaria's
economic and political stagnation.
The Macedonian issue thus seems to have
been contrived by the leadership partly to keep
Yugcslavia and things Yugoslav at arm's length,
and at the same time to rekindle a spirit of
Bulgarian nationalism that could be useful to the
regime. The nationalism campaign of 1966 fizzled
out in two years, but the Macedonian issue has
always had a character of its own, and has from
time to time been exploited by Moscow. Cer-
tainly, Bulgaria's Macedonian Policy was de-
veloped haphazardly and ha moved ahead in an
erratic fashion. Some of this can be ascribed to
fluctuations in Soviet policy, but some of it must
also be related to Sofia's political vicissitudes and
ineptitudes in the pursuit of traditional Bulgarian
foreign policy goals.
The vehement diplomatic and public re-
sponses from Yugoslavia over the Macedonian dis-
pute?particularly after the Czechoslovak crisis?
caused Sofia to hesitatP 7.nd re-evaluate the direc-
tion and force of its Macedonian policy. This was
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so partly because by early 1969 the Soviets were
interested in reducing tensions in Eastern Europe.
In March an editorial in the Bulgarian party news-
paper disclaimed any territorial desires in Yugo-
slavia. This was followed by a public statement by
First Deputy Premier Zhivko Zhivkov that his
country "did not have any interest in land expan-
sion."'
In April 1969, in a talk with Austrian jour-
nalists, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev said
Macedonia remained a "historical legacy" but
concluded that it was not a "topical political
matter." He accused unnamed "imperialist"
circles for "fostering nationalist passions" in the
Balkans.
For Belgrade, nevertheless, such platitudes
were not reassuring, and Yugoslav propaganda
continued to hammer away at the issue. In re-
sponse, Bulgaria ended its moratorium on polem-
ics in June 1969, though without making Mace-
donia the direct issue. Sofia's antipathy toward
Tito's regime again surfaced, but it was directed
at "revisionism" in Yugoslavia rather than at
Macedonia. On 28 June, for example, the Bul-
garian army paper stressed the "anti-Soviet"
nature of Tito's programs and policies. A week
later Zhivkov delivered an anti-Yugoslav speech in
a similar vein. In July Yugoslav-Bulgarian rela-
tions took a further turn for the worse when
Sofia restricted the traditional free movement of
people from Yugoslav and Bulgarian border vil-
lages across the frontier.
Yugoslav Reaction
On 12 February 1969, Belgrade sent its
second diplomatic note of protest within one yeN?
peppering Bulgaria for "fomenting an atmosphere
of disquiet and tension in the Balkans." That
same day acting Yugoslav Foreign Minister Miso
Povicevic gave a speech in the Federal Assembly
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? Two examples of Bulgarian Macedonian propaganda published
In 1969. The first, a photo hum BULGARIA TODAY, Is from a
story on how "the Bulgarians liberated Macedonia during the
!.;:uond World War." The Yugoslays call this a "transparent lie."
The second example, a poem, Is by a long dead Macedonian
poet whom the Bulgars have brought back to "life" as a Dui.
garlan literary figure.
Macedonia, wondrous land,
Greek you shall never be;
For forests and woods and mountains,
Thy very stones,
Birt!s, and fish in the Vardar River,
All things on this earth
Will rise to their feet to declare
To the whole of Europe, the whole world:
"Bulgarian 'tis what I am,
And it is Bulgarians who inhabit this land."
Alinstrel at a County Fair, by
Rako Zhinzifott (circa 1850)
in which he said Bulgarian policy could not be
"understood any different than as the feeding of
territorial pretensions toward integral parts of
Yugoslavia." The Legue of Yugoslav Commu-
nists' newspaper expressed the fear that thu
Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty"
would be used as a justification for an invasion. In
March 1969 over 2,000 people demonstrated in
the Macedonian town of Ohrid, protesting against
the Bulgarian "anti-Yugoslav campaign." By May,
the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister spoke of a
"Balkan confrontation," accusing the Bulgars of
territorial aspirations, interfering in Yugoslav in-
ternal affairs, subversive propaganda, and plan-
ning to hold military maneuvers in border areas.
The minister also reiterated the charge that a
"third country" was influencing Bulgarian policy
toward his country.
In the years since the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia, the Yugoslays have become convinced
that Moscow has a role in the Macedonian con-
troversy. This was graphically illustrated in an
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article of 25 November 1970 entitled "Ghosts of
the Past," which appeared in both Belgrade's
Borba and the Macedonian republic daily Nova
Makedonija. The article accused Bulgaria of re-
viving bourgeois territorial claims to Macedonia
(and parts of Serbia) as they existed under the
treaty of San Stefano. Tsarist "Russia" is the real
culprit, according to the two journals, because it
"created the fiction of San Stefano Bulgaria."
Into the Seventies
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For a brief period in the spring of 1970, the
Bulgarian media gave Yugoslavia more positive
treatment, and Soviet diplomats told Westerners
that Bulgarian-Yugosl v relations were entering "a
new phase." Indeed, something new did seem to
be in the offing, and in late June the Bulgarian
press talked of all-Balkan cooperation and of im-
proving relations with its neighbors, including
Yugoslavia.
For the Yugoslays, however, there could be
no improvement until Sofia officially changed its
stance on Macedonia. While Sofia talked of de-
tente, the Macedonian government announced it
had uncovered "increased foreign activity" of a
hostile nature in the republic. Contrary to Sofia's
expectaJons, the Yugoslays interpreted Bulgarian
statements on Balkan cooperation as a maneuver
to embarrass them and to give the appearance
that Belgrade was dragging its feet.
Nonotheless, in early July, Belgrade provoca-
tively tested Bulgaria's "new" good will. Three
normally routine documents?a 1971-75 eco-
nomic protocol, a radio-TV protocol, and a bor-
der traffic agreement?were presented in the
Macedonian lango3ge for Sofia's signature. The
red-faced Bulgarians refused to sign, whereupon
the Yugoslav press jumped on the issue, Libeling
the refuse "a revival of greater Bulgarian (claims)
to sovereign Macedonian territory." In early
August, the widely read Yugoslav weekly, .NIN,
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accused Bulgaria of spreading Stalinist propa-
g3nda in Yugoslavia, as well as offering highly
paid jobs to Bulgarians living in Serbia in an
attempt to lure them across the border. The situa-
tion went from bad t,) worse; in September the
Macedonian party central committee called home
all Yugoslav-Macedonian students studying in
Sofia because of hostile Bulgarian 0.opaganda
activity among them.
Three times during 1970 Bulgarian Premier
Zhivkov requested a face-to-face meeting with
President Tito to discuss major points of dif-
ference, but when representatives of the two
countries finally met on 9 and 10 November in
Sofia to lay the groundwork for such a meeting,
the results were disastrous. As they had for the
past year, the Bulgarians came to the meeting
determined to achieve a facade of agreement by
discussing noncontroversial subjects. But the
Yugoslays declared Macedonia the only major is-
sue and stipulated that it be the core of any
negotiations. Party Secretary Velchev, the chief
of the Bulgarian delegation, then pulled a paper
from his briefcase that had been prepared for
such an eventuality. The Bulgarians were willing
to concede that "a Macedonian state- had
emerged after the second World War, but they
rigidly insisted that the Macedonian people of this
state were ethnically and culturally Bulgarian and
that its territory was not conclusively def:ned.
Velchev then declared that, although the present
Bulgarian government now was ready to settle the
Macedonian problem, he was not certain that the
next generation of Bulgarians would be as willing.
The chief of the Yugoslav delegation replied that
this Bulgarian position negated a policy estab-
lished by Bulgarian hero Georgi Dimitrov and the
COMINTERN. Velchev's admission that this was
so ended the discussions, and Yugoslav press
polemics sharply increased. Furthermore, Yugo-
slav Macedonians?with govconment encourage-
ment?began expressing their support for the "na-
tional aspirations" of their brothers in Bulgaria.
In spite of this dismal turn of events, there
are indications that the two countries may yet
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President Tito
Macedonian Chief
Crvenkovski
"Further progress has been made in our relations with our
neighbors, except with the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
with which., despite our efforts, regretfully, no such pro-
gress has been recorded."
Yugoslav President Tito in a foreign policy report
subndtted to all chambers of the Federal As-
sembly on 18 November 1970
"In order to be better able to understand what is hidden
behind the resuscitation of the vampire of Bulgarian
revanchism, we must ask ourselves what the Bulgarian
claims are based on. There are three explanations: First,
the internal crisis from which it is necessary to divert the
attention of the public by making territorial claims against
Yugoslavia. Sc ;ond, the belief that the Yugoslav Federa-
tion will disintegrate and that this is a unique opportunity
for Bulgaria to profit and third, that somebody else is
hidden behind the Bulgarian claims, that is that the leader-
ship of the neighboring country relies on somebody else's
support.... Time will show huw justified our doubts are,
but, on the basis of everything that we now know, one
should not expect any future change for the better in
Bulgaria's policy toward Yugosbvia."
Noted Croatian cononet:wor Mill/ca Sundic in an
inteiview with the 7ugreb Domestic Service on
27 November 1970.
"The ghosts from the past must be buried forever?(in
other words) tendencies which until now have frequently
been encouraged by other Balkan forces.... I believe that
soon a perspective cn a more progressive, modern Balkans
will open up, a Balkans in which there will be full
tolerance and complete respect for every national in-
dividuality."
Macedonian Party Executive Bureau member
Krste Crvenkovski in an 18 December 1970 inter-
view in the Yugoslav (Albanian language) pub-
lication Rilindja.
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come to terms.
Yugoslav press attacks on Bul-
garia ave su sided somewhat, although party
meetings throughout the country continue their
well-orchestrated denunciation of Bulgarian
policy. Furthermore, Yugoslav party luminaries
have, in the past month, spoken in a conciliatory
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ern nei hbor.
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on ecem-
ber, when President Tito interrupted his vacation
on Brioni to receive the Bulgarian ambassador.
But the Yugoslays now say nothing productive
came from these talks.
Since October the Bulgars have virtually ig-
nored any invective coming from Yugoslavia and
have continued to play for a meeting with Tito to
codify some agreement to disagree. Recent public
statements of the Sofia leaders have been pep-
pered with calls for a Balkan rapprochement. In a
probably related development, the most vocifer-
ous of the Bulgarian newspapers on the Mace-
donian problem, Narodna Armiya, published by
the Defense Ministry, was ordered discontinued as
a daily and converted to a weekly in late Decem-
ber. The paper, however, has continued to appear
on a daily basis, with no explanation of the sud-
den reversal in publication schedules. This could
indicate some disagreement within the Sofia lead-
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ership over the present trends in Bulgarian policy
on the Macedonian question.
Zhivkov with Tito in Belgrade-1967
Last Talks?on Kremlin Wall?November 1967
Prospects for 1971
Todor Z hivkov's present self-abasement
shows an uncommon willingness to improve the
atmosphere. The Bulgarians have made so many
concessions that about the only card they have
left to play is to agree to a settlement or quietly
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to let the issue die?if the Yugoslays will allow it.
This suggests that perhaps the Yugoslays are
partly correct in assuming that the Soviets now
have taken a hand in the matter, if only to try to
cool the situation. It is difficult, however, to
foresee formal repudiation by Bulgaria of its past
Macedonian stand. Rather, a settlement could
provide for a tempering of the more provocative
elements of Sofia's position and a change in the
tone and emphasis of Bulgariln propaganda to
stress points of agreement betwon Belgrade ard
Sofia.
Belgrade now insists that prior to any rap-
prochement, Sofia must specifically recognize the
existence of an ethnic Macedonian nation within
Yugoslavia, demonstrate a willingness to allow
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free expression of Macedonian ndtional identity
in Buigarian Pirin, and puLlicly repudiate its posi-
tion since 1967. If Zhivkov is serious about im-
proving relations with Tito, he will have to accept
the first of these terms. If Tito wishes to recipro-
cate, he probably will have to drop the last two
demands.
Of course, such an arrangement would con-
stitute no more than a return to the tacit arrange-
ment that existed prior to 1967, and it would be
quite embarrassing to Zhivkov at that. If such an
agreement does take shape, it may be due more to
a Soviet desire to avoid involvement in a Balkan
territorial squabble than to a lessening of Sofia's
nationalistic passions/
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