WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT COMMUNAL POLITICS IN MALAYSIA: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW BEGINNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020055-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: November 13, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Communal Politics In Malaya:
The Search For A New Beginning
. DSB FILE COPY
RETURN TO A-61
Secret
N4 680
1", November 1970
No. 0396/70A
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Communal Politics
In Malaysia:
The Search For A New Beginning
zwom
With the resignation last month of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and the installa-
tion of a new cabinet headed by the Tunku's long-time deputy and heir apparent, Tun Abdul
Razak, Malaysia is approaching the end of the emergency rule imposed after the racial
conflagration of May 1969. These political ceremonies predictably were accompanied by public
expressions of confidence and national reconciliation. Despite the brave words, however,
everyone in Kuala Lumpur is painf,Ally aware of the bitter legacy of 1969, and no one is under
the illusion that the political life of the nation can simply be picked up where it left off some 18
months ago. On the contrary, the ruling Alliance Party, its previous policies discredited and its
new leadership a question mark, is venturing into political no-man's land without enthusiastic
support from any significant quarter.
The government's uncomfortable position is a direct result of the national elections of May
1969 and the days of anti-Chinese violence that followed. The basic contradiction between the
concept of Malay political supremacy and the government's liberal, democratic posture finally
surfaced; the Chinese and Malay comrnuni;ies backed away from each other and any meaningful
dialogue. Since then, the alienation of the two communities from each other and from their
government has grown. The ruling Alliance Party, with its communal policy of moderation,
compromise, and, at times, hesitation, has been left high and dry. Under these difficult
circumstances, it is somewhat surprising, but hopeful, that the government has opted for a
gradual return to the pitfalls and uncertainties of open political life. Malays hacked the
imposition of emergency rule and would undoubtedly favor its continuation if they were
convinced that the government was ready to adopt strong pro-Malay policies. The moderate
Malay leadership, however, has chosen a different and far more hazardous road. The government
must recapture its disaffected Malay constituency and at the same time find a way to halt the
mounting alienation of the Chinese community. Given the political and social vise in which the
government finds itself, the rebuilding of some form of multiracial political system will be
difficult. Whether the new government can muster the wisdom, skill, and strength to keep its
balance remains very much an open question. The good intentions of Tun Razak and his
lieutenants will not by themselves be enough. There is a seeming willingness on the part of all
parties, however, to let the new Razak government have a fair chance to succeed.
Special Report
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S F C` R F'T'
Widespread Malay disenchantment with the
United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the
principal component of the ruling Alliance Party,
is at present the single most important reality of
Malaysian political life, UMNO leadership, com-
plain the Malays, has not done enough to
strengthen their "special position" in their native
land. They argue that the time has come to rec-
oncile the Chinese community to the fact that
ultimate political power in Malaysia is a Malay
prerogative and that this power will be used to
obtain for the Malay a proper share of the na-
tion's wealth. If this can be done at no significant
expense to Chinese interests, all the better. But if
not, they contend, the Chinese will simply have
to pay the price required to remain in a Malay
land. Any assessment of the political situation in
Malaysia must take into account this new Malay
assertiveness and its implications for the future
direction of events.
Since Malayan independence in 1957, politi-
cal power has been held by a handful of Malay
elite, molded by English education and tradition,
and dominated by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Al-
though the Tunku and his colleagues expected
non-Malays to accept voluntarily the dominant
political position of the Malay, they preferred to
down-play this touchy subject and to emphasize
the concept of a multiracial democracy in which
the political, economic, and cultural rights of all
citizens are protected. Under this style of leader-
ship Malaysia became known as a model of com-
munal and political stability; but, in retrospect,
one suspects that the unifying effect of two suc-
cessive security threats-the Communist
emergency of the 1950s, and the Indonesian con-
frontation of 1962-65-was in large part responsi-
ble for Malaysia's enviable record. At any rate,
Malay discontent with the government's even-
handed communal policy was always near the
surface. As they became more and more embit-
tered and frustrated over their inability to over-
come the legacy of centuries of feudalism, pov-
erty, and ignorance, growing numbers of Malays
Special Report -2-
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came to see the Tunku's highly publicized British
sense of fair play as evidence of treachery and
betrayal of their interests.
Obscured by the nation's over-all economic
growth and prosperity and the Tunku's tendency
to dismiss signs of unrest as the work of a few
"ultras" or extremists, the depth of Malay disaf-
fection went unnoticed until the parliamentary
elections of May 1969 and the ensuing anti-
Chinese violence. Although much has been made
of the unexpected success of Chinese opposition
parties in the 1969 election, gains by the Pan-
Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), a small right-wing
party harshly critical of the government's "soft"
approach toward the Chinese, were actually more
significant. The PMIP captured three UMNO
seats, but far more importantly, it captured over
40 percent of the total Malay vote. The UMNO
managed to retain a comfortable majority of
Malay seats, but it had come close to electoral
disaster. In the past eighteen months the UMNO's
foundations within the Malay community have
continued to erode, and today few observers
would care to place much money on the party in
a head-on test of strength with the PMIP. Pres-
ently, the government is refusing to schedule two
overdue parliamentary by-elections in Selangor
and Malacca because its own private survey in-
dicates that both seats, now held by UMNO,
would fall to the PMIP.
What all of this means is that the top eche-
lon of UMNO is no longer in a position to dismiss
Malay criticism of its communal policies as the
reaction of a few "ultras." Indeed the term
"ultra" has probably lost much of what meaning
it ever enjoyed in the Malaysian political lexicon.
Although nationalist Malay opinion may be
judged "ultra" or extremist by an absolute stand-
ard, it is by no means limited to the PMIP. It
presently runs the breadth and depth of the
Malay community, including UMNO itself.
In the past UMNO has been run in an ex-
tremely authoritarian manner; the views of the
top echelon were simply imposed on the rank and
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file. Many senior officials of UMNO, although
perhaps not sharing the PMIP's desire for a rigid
Islamic state, have sympathized with the PMIP's
blunt pro-Malay posture. At the Kampong level it
would probably be quite difficult to distinguish
the politics of the local UMNO organizer from
those of his PMIP counterpart. In the future there
is likely to be much more give-and-take between
Razak and these secondary echelons of UMNO,
long ignored by the Tunku. The top leadership is
bound under the existing political circumstances,
to become more receptive and vulnerable to pres-
sure from below.
Identifying the specific sources of such pres-
sure is not easy, because Malay nationalists within
and outside UMNO have always been short of
forceful and articulate spokesmen. Perhaps the
single most important figure to watch in the
coming days is Dato Harun bin Idris, a senior
UMNO official and chief minister of Selangor.
Although apparently loyal to Razak, Harun has
been an outspoken critic of UMNO's communai
policies and has lines out to Young Turks in
U11,41NO and the military. In May 1969, Harun
delivered a fire-eating speech to a large assembly
of young Malays in Kuala Lumpur-one of the
developments that led directly to the anti-Chinese
rioting.
Another Malay nationalist who may assume
a position of influence is Musa bin Hitam, a
former assistant minister to Razak. Following the
May 1969 riots, Musa openly advocated the re-
tirement or dismissal of the Tunku and was as a
result relieved of his assistant ministership. Sub-
sequently, Musa went to London to study, but
when the Tunku announced in August that he
intended to retire, Musa quickly reappeared in
Kuala Lumpur. There is an air of vindication in
Musa's sudden return, and he is reportedly slated
once more to become one of Razak's assistant
ministers in the new government. Another Malay
frequently identified as an "ultra" leader is Dr.
Mahathir bin Mohamed, a 45-year-old physician
from Kedah. Mahathir was known in mid-1969
for his opposition to the Tunku, and for this was
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dismissed from the central executive committee
of UMNO and later from UMNO itself. In addi-
tion to practicing medicine, Dr. Mahathir is a
journalist and has frequently contributed articles
on Malays and politics to various Malaysian publi-
cations under the pseudonym of C. H. E. Det.
Mahathir is also the author of "The Malay
Dilemma" published in Singapore in 1970 and
banned in Malaysia. In this hook Mahathir points
out the essential differences in background, cul-
ture, political systems, and acquisitiveness be-
tween the Chinese and Malays. Because of these
factors, he questions whether the Malays could
ever compete with the Chinese on an equal basis
and suggests that the only way to close the eco-
nomic gap is for the government to weigh the
scales heavily in favor of the Malays. Mahathir has
been generally politically inactive since his expul-
sion from UMNO, but he remains a potential
leader of those favoring Malay supremacy.
Another influential channel of Malay na-
tionalism is "Utusan Melayu," the UMNO's unof-
ficial press organ. The Jawi script edition of
"Utusan Melayu enjoys by far the largest circula-
tion of any newspaper in Malaysia and is widely
read at the Kampong level. For years, "Utusan
Melayu has been notoiious for its chauvinistic
Malay tone-a fact that kept its UMNO editors
perpetually in the Tunku's doghouse. Last spring,
for instance, "Utusan Melayu" raised the Tunku's
ire by implying that the Malay military establish-
ment might take over the government and do a
better job of protecting Malay interests than the
previous administration. In the months ahead the
restraint or excess of "Utusan Melayu" polemics
may shed some light on the degree of nationalist
sentiment and influence within UMNO and the
new government.
Another barometer of nationalist pressure is
the Malay university student. One of the most
dramatic indicators of the change in political
climate in Malaysia has been the radicalization of
the Malay student movement and its turn toward
political activism. In the past, student politics
were dominated by the University of Malaya
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Student Union, a left-of-center, multiracial organ-
ization with little real strength or appeal. Follow-
ing the events of May 1969 it was quickly pushed
into the background by the Malay Language
Society, which soon gained a degree of national
political importance as the spearhead of the effort
to force the Tunku's resignation. Student agita-
tion against the prime minister, ignored by the
Tunku himself, was a source of serious embarrass-
ment for the government, even though demon-
strations were usually confined to the campus
premises.
Now that the students' prime objectives have
been achieved, it is uncertain what impetus their
movement will retain. The vision of some of the
movement's more ambitious leaders that Malay
students will assume the same influential role
played by Indonesian youth during and following
the overthrow of Sukarno seems highly unreal-
istic. Malay students do offer an enticing vehicle
for opportunistic Malay politicians, but close
surveillance by the police of student activities will
probably keep the situation in hand.
Perhaps the most significant Malay interest
group is the military. The Malaysian military es-
tablishment, through its participation in the emer-
gency government, has for the past year and a
half been involved in political affairs to an un-
precedented degree. How and to what degree the
military has sought to influence political decisions
up to now is unclear. There is little question,
however, that the military establishment reflects
parochial Malay interests. Regardless of the politi-
cal role the military chooses or is forced by cir-
cumstances to assume, it is likely to remain an
instrument of Malay nationalism.
The top command structure of the armed
forces is dominated by Malays as are the 12 royal
Malay regiments, the backbone of the Malaysian
Army. Aware of the Maoist adage that political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun, the
government has carefully preserved the exclusive
Malay make-up of the regiments as a symbol of
Malay political supremacy. Within the officer
corps, there is considerable evidence of nationalist
Malay dissatisfaction, especially at the junior and
middle levels. According to one report, 60 of-
ficers of one Malay regiment signed a petition last
year calling for the Tunku's resignation. The rank
and file of the regiments are recruited from Malay
peasant stock and are narrowly racist in outlook.
Depending on which accounts are believed, the
regiments at best did little to curtail the anti-
Chinese violence of May 1969 and, at worst,
actively participated in it.
Presently the top command structure of the
military is dominated by the "Johore clique," a
close-knit and influential association of senior and
junior officers connected by marriage and place
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of birth. The Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Gen-
eral Ibrahim, is the number-one member of the
group. For the past year and a half Ibrahim has
also been ac influential member of the National
Operations Council (NOC), the executive organ of
the emergency government. Although he is not
politically ambitious, he possibly could be per-
suaded at some crisis point that military interven-
tion might be needed to "save the nation." Of the
63 top positions in the armed forces-from gen-
eral down through colonel, including navy and air
force equivalent ranks-the "Johore clique"
holds approximately 20 percent. The individual
and collective influence of this group of like-
minded, closely associated officers even though it
has no formal organization is unrivaled within the
military. Another key figure associated with the
"Johore clique" is the army commander, General
Nazaruddin, who comes from Pohang. Naza-
ruddin is known to hold and to have openly
expressed strong Malay nationalist views. None of
this means that the military establishment is dis-
loyal to Razak. On the contrary, the new prime
minister is generally regarded as the civilian poli-
tician most favorable to the military's desires and
aspirations.
There is a deadly symmetry at work today in
Malaysian politics. If the government faces a hard-
ening of Malay communal feeling and diminished
support within the Malay community, its prob-
lems and prospects on the Chinese front are at
least as grim. Essentially the government is con-
fronted with Chinese rejection of the time-
honored Malaysian recipe for political and social
stability. This traditional formula tacitly provided
for Malay political domination and special priv-
ileges in such areas as government jobs, education,
and land ownership in return for which the Chi-
nese would be awarded citizenship. The political
vehicle for this arrangement between the Malay
and Chinese establishments was an "Alliance" in
which UMNO shared political power on a token
basis with its client party, the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA). Chinese voting strength was
Special Report
restricted by the assignment of disproportionally
heavy representation to rural Malay districts and
by the MCA's willingness to contest only a
mutually agreed-upon number of "Chinese" par-
liamentary seats.
The Alliance arrangement, in other words,
was based on a racial myth-that Chinese don't
mind who owns the cow as long as they can milk
it. This myth has achieved considerable currency
in Southeast Asia because of the remarkable
ability of the outnumbered Chinese to make
necessity a virtue. In Malaysia, however, where
Chinese are roughly equal to Malays in number, it
has been wearing thin for a long time. No longer
willing to limit voluntarily their political leverage
for the sake of communal harmony, the younger
generations of Chinese have become increasingly
dissatisfied with the leadership of the MCA. More-
over, the Chinese, seemingly more aware of grow-
ing Malay nationalist sentiment than the govern-
ment itself, have come to view the full exercise of
their political rights as the best means to protect
themselves and. their hard-earned economic posi-
tion from eventual Malay encroachment and sup-
pression. The expulsion of Singapore from
Malaysia in 1965-the result of Lee Kuan Yew's
attempt to extend his political organization to
Malaysia and offer an alternative to MCA repre-
sentation-served as a catalyst for this growing
Chinese political restiveness. The full force of
Chinese discontent was dramatically reflected in
the strong showing of two relatively new and
underorganized Chinese opposition parties in the
elections of May 1969. The Democratic Action
Party (DAP) and Gerakan captured between them
nearly a fifth of parliament's seats, winning in the
process 14 of the 27 seats formerly held by the
MCA.
At present, the DAP and Gerakan are taking
a cautious approach to the resumption of political
activity, concentrating on repairing the damage
done to their organizations by the last year and a
half of inactivity. Eventually, however, both par-
ties intend to get on with the job of building a
base of support throughout West Malaysia. In this
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OVERSEA-CHINESE
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the STRONGEST and LARGEST
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SINGAPORE:
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Road, Malacca Street, Selegle Rood,
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Office of Nrryang University.
Geylong Road, Woodiville Circus
Airport New . Terminal Building,
East Coast Rood and Robinson Rd
MALAYSIA:
West Malaysia:
Alor Star, Batu Pahat. Bukn
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Bohru, Kiang, Kluang, Kota Bhoru,
Kuala Lumpur (4 offices), Kuantan
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The Bank for All - Big and Small
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EVERY DESCRIPTION OF BANKING & EXCHANGE BUSINESS TRANSACTED.
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Special Report 13 November 1970
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effort, the DAP, which ran ahead of Gerakan in
the elections, will probably make the greatest
gains.
The DAP, spiritual descendent of the Peo-
ple's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, was
formed after Singapore's expulsion from the
Federation. Although the DAP ostensibly opposes
racial politics, a very definite tone of Chinese
chauvinism creeps into its noncommunalism. The
party calls for democracy "with no precondi-
tions" and multilingualism in education and gov-
ernment. It views Malay royalty as a feudal drag
on the nation and condemns the system of special
Malay privileges incorporated into the constitu-
tion as an example of the paternalism that has
kept the Malay in a backward economic condi-
tion. The DAP does not participate in the Na-
tional Consultative Council (NCC), an appendage
of the emergency government set up to consider
the problem of national reconciliation, because
the government refused to accredit the DAP
candidate, who was then in jail. The party's press
releases during emergency rule, the only form of
political activity allowed, remained strident, how-
ever, and there is no indication that the DAP is
now prepared to back away significantly from its
strong opposition to the government.
The DAP's platform is without doubt an
accurate reflection of popular Chinese opinion.
Yet it could be a tragedy of the first order if the
party continues to grow in appeal and becomes
the clear-cut choice of the Chinese electorate. To
the government, the DAP is anathema. It strongly
suspects that the party's strings are pulled from
Singapore, although there is no foundation to this
as far as is known. Further, the government con-
siders, with a certain degree of justification, that
the DAP is an unreconcilable agent of communal
divisiveness. At the moment it is impossible to
imagine any cooperation between the DAP and
the Razak government or any other future Malay
government.
The Gerakan Party shares the democratic
socialist precepts of the DAP and many of its
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communal views, but it has adopted a far dif-
ferent tactical approach to political survival in a
Malay-dominated state. Although it remains es-
sentially a Chinese party, it has made a genuine
effort to assume a multiracial character and has
been moderately successful in attracting non-
Chinese recruits. Unlike the DAP, Gerakan has
adopted a cocperative posture and has gone out
of its way to avoid antagonizing the government.
The party participated in the proceedings of the
NCC and last summer was seriously considering a
government invitation to move into the Alliance
and take part in the new cabinet.
Gerakan discovered, however, that its policy
of cooperation was weakening its support within
the Chinese community, one more indication of
the polarization of communal feeling in Malaysia.
This, plus the realization that the new Razak
government will be emphasizing Malay benefits
rather than concessions to the Chinese com-
munity, forced Gerakan to the conclusion that
collaboration with the government wouid amount
to political suicide. In late August the party with-
drew from its discussion with the government;
Gerakan participation in the Alliance now seems a
dead letter. As political activity gets under way
again, Gerakan is likely to move a little closer to
the DAP position and to the center of Chinese
opinion.
This leaves the government holding an
empty bag. Although the MCA still functions as
the Chinese component of the Alliance, it is po-
litically bankrupt and firmly identified in most
Chinese eyes as an organization of millionaire
Chinese "Uncle Toms." The MCA's leader,
Finance Minister Tan Siew-Sin, has publicly ad-
mitted that he can no longer speak for the Chi-
nese masses, a candid statement that has caused
the government considerable embarrassment. Al-
though talk is still heard of pumping new blood
into the MCA, there seems small chance that it
will be resuscitated to any significant degree.
The government's abortive attempt to bring
Gerakan into the Alliance clearly indicates the
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moderate Malay leadership's awareness of the
need to provide for more meaningful Chinese
participation and representation in the govern-
ment. Given the present degree of communal
polarization, however, there is no readily appar-
en! solution to this problem. As a result, Razak
reportedly is said to be considering scrapping the
Alliance in favor of a single integrated party open
to all races. Although such a move could be a first
step toward repudiation of communal politics in
Malaysia, it is not likely to solve the government's
immediate racial problems. 1 he evolution of a
truly multiracial and democratic party will be a
slow process at best. For the time being an,' new
government party would be dominated by the
former UMNO leadership; the problem of attract-
ing meaningful Chinese participation would not
be significantly lessened.
Perhaps one limited move in the right direc-
tion would be to seek an improvement in rela-
tions with the Singapore government of Lee Kucn
Yew. Lee remains a popular figure among
Malaysian Chinese, and even his indirect endorse-
ment of the new Razak government might help
reduce Chinese alienation and apprehension. It
will be difficult for the government to move in
this direction, however. Last August, Lee can-
celed his first trip to Malaysia since Singapore left
the Federation after Kuala Lumpur had reacted
bitterly to a trivial incident between Singapore
police and a group of visiting Malaysian hippies-a
good example of the role paranoia and suspicion
still play in Malaysian-Singapore relations.
Cosying up to Lee would also be likely to
exacerbate tensions between moderate and radical
Malay elements, and, in fact, there has been no
visible extension of an olive branch in Lee's di-
rection.
The caliber and stability of the government
caught within this communal vise is difficult to
judge. The greate::t unknown is Tun Razak him-
self. Although groomed for years as the heir ap-
parent, Razak never developed any of the
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Tunku's charisma or shared any of the respect
enjoyed by the Tu;-iku within the non-Malay
population. Following the May 1969 riots, when
the Tunku went into a period of semi-retirement,
Fcdzak wil have to prove
himself equal to the difficult tasks ahead. Fortu-
nately he will have the able assistance of the
Deputy Premiar and Home Affairs Minister Tun
Dr. Ismail. Ismail is without question the most
effective and widely respected politician in the
The most interesting aspect of the new
cabinet is the central role to be played by Ghazali
bin Shafie, formerly the permanent secretary of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ghazali was ap-
pointed to the se;'._ite last month in order to make
him eligible for a cabinet position. As minister
"with special functions he has been given the
crucial task of coordinating and implementing the
government's efforts to restore national unity and
to expand Malay participation in the nation's
economic life. Ghazali's performance in this
crucially delicate role is presently a matter of
great conjecture in Kuala Lumpur. An oppor-
tunist with long-standing political ambitions,
Ghazali in the past has oscillated between the
camps of Malay moderates and chauvinists.
Ghazali is also known for his abrupt and abrasive
manner and his proclivity for making enemies.
Although a long-standing member of UMNO, his
entry into the cabinet via the back door has
already raked the hackles of a number of UMNO
politicians. Whether o. not his widely recognized
intellectual brilliance and ability can outweigh his
disruptive manner remains Lo be seen.
After Razak, Ismail, and Ghazali, there is
little to be said about the new cabinet members.
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SFCR?FT
The New Leaders
ob,
Deputy Prime Minister Ismail
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Minister with Special Functions
Tan Sri Ghazali
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A lack of leadership depth is a real problem for
the Razak government just as it was for its prede-
cessor. Largely because of the authoritarian man-
ner in which UMNO has been run in the past,
adequate second-level leadership simply has not
developed. Ghazali bin Shafie, for example, has
for years been considered the only young "up and
comer" in UMNO worth mentioning.
Razak has brought two other Malays into his
cabinet. Education Minister Hussein bin Onn is
distinguished mainly by his loyalty to Razak, but
he is regarded as a racial moderate and brings into
the cabinet the magic of the Onn name-his father
was the founder of UMNO. The other Malay is
Mohamed Khir bin Johari, the minister of com-
merce and industry. Although Khir has somewhat
blotted his copybook as former minister of educa-
tion and as UMNO manager of the 1969 elections,
he nonetheless has the ear of the UMNO Execu-
tive Committee. If Tun Dr. Ismail-for health or
other reasons-should become unable to continue
to serve as deputy prime minister, Khir could lay
strong claim to that position, probably with the
support of the party hierarch . Razak and Khir
are not particularly close,
Only one member of tf,: previous cabinet
was dropped from the new one, an MCA minister
whose notorious corruption had become an in-
tolerable burden for the government. The cabinet
thus remains loaded with ministers closely as-
sot.iated with the Tunku. Most of them will even-
tually go as Razak seeks to give his new govern-
ment a more dynamic character. The timing of
their departure, however, may depend at least in
part on how much influence the Tunku can still
exert or intends to exert from his retirement
residence in Kuala Lumpur. Most observers be-
lieve that there will be no further cabinet changes
until after parliament convene- iii February.
Future Policy Directions:
Political Restrictions and Malay Benefits
Although the caliber of the new leadership
remains a question mark, its mcdus operandi is
Special Report
slowly emerging. First of all, the government is
intent on preventing another round of racial vio-
lence. There are still clear sio;is of underlying
communal tension in Kuala Lumpur and large
numbers of police still patrol the streets, but in
most aspects life has long since returned to
normal, and the government has been remarkably
successful in p?evc;iting inevitable minor racial
incidents from turning into serious trouble.
Aside from effective police work, the gov-
ernment has attriouted its success in maintaining
order to the absence of communal polemics
during the past year and a half of emergency rule.
Accordingly, it is in no hurry to give up all of its
emergency powers. Razak has pledged that parlia-
ment will once more be the supreme political
authority when it reconvenes next February. The
National Operations Council will be abolished and
a new "National Security Council" established.
This group will be concerned with both internal
and external security matters, and, as planned,
would be an advisory group only, with neither
executive nor legislative authority. The govern-
ment, in conjunction with the return to open
political life, has, however, placed extensive re-
strictions on future political debate. In essence
the restrictions forbid public discussion of the
provisions of the constitution relating to citizen-
ship, national language, Malay rights and benefits,
and the sovereignty of Malay rulers. The govern-
ment is empowered to proscribe entire political
organizations that habitually violate these restric-
tions. Going one step further, when parliament
reconvenes in February, it will be greeted by a
government-sponsored constitutional amendment
removing the members' - irliamentary immunity
from punishment for infractions of the new re-
strictions on political debate.
The essence of the government's position
seems to be that Malays cannot be pacified if
non-Malays are allowed to question the political
status quo; the curbing of political debate is
necessary to prevent :l recurrence of the May
1969 disturbances. Nevertheless, it is hard to
escape the conclusion that the restrictions are also
designed to handcuff or possibly destroy the gov-
ernment's Chinese opposition. If the new
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restrictions are given a broad interpretation, the
public platform of the DAP will for all practical
purposes be swept away. Needless to say, this has
given a somewhat hollow ring to the resumption
of open political activity and the convening of
parliament. Public reaction thus far has been re-
strained, but resentment is bound to grow and
could reach a dangerous level if the government is
tempted to use the restrictions as an outright
weapon of political suppression. Whether in the
long run the restrictions will help achieve their
stated objective of racial peace remains very much
an open question.
As the curbs on political debate suggest,
future domestic policy will have a pro-Malay cast.
This, of course, has been a foregone conclusion.
Razak and his colleagues are, after all, Malay
politicians, and their Malay constituency must be
recaptured, soothed, and reassured if the present
government is to survive. Unanswered are the
questions, can the government achieve this end
and maintain its balance in the process, and how
far will it be willing to go in satisfying Malay
aspirations at the expense of Chinese interests?
In the sensitive area of language policy the
government has already made its move. Beginning
this year English-track schools in the Malaysian
educational system will start to convert to Malay,
on a stair-step basis. In 1986, English instruction
at the fourth-year university level will end, thus
completing the process. This action has not fully
satisfied Malay opinion but hopefully will be ac-
cepted as a step in the right direction. Many
Malays are unhappy that similar action was not
taken in regard to Chinese-track schools. The
Chinese are more unhappy. They have been the
primary user of the English-track system, but,
more important, they view the government's ac-
tions as being the prelude to Malayanization of
the Chinese school system. The government's ac-
tion has been tempered, however, by a recent
official statement that implied that scientific and
technical subjects will still be taught in the ap-
propriate language-generally interpret:?d as
English.
Special Report
The compromise decision to scale down in-
struction in English has allowed the government
to maintain a degree of communal balance in its
educational policy and still satisfy nationalistic
Malay interests. In doing so, however, the govern-
ment ironically has undermined more important
long-term Malay interests. An obvious way to
remedy the existing economic imbalance between
Chinese and Malay is to produce more Malay
graduates who can compete with the Chinese in
the English language - oriented world of business.
The fact that the nation's language policy is now
headed in the opposite direction is a perfect
example of the problem the Razak government
faces in reconciling emotional Malay nationalism
and Malaysian national interests.
The same phenomenon also can be seen at
work in the current effort to Malayanize the
government bureaucracy. Although most senior
positions in the civil service are staffed by Malays,
the rest have been filled primarily by non-Malays
who think out and implement government policy.
This has long been a sore point for Malays, and
the government is now attempting to correct the
situation by accelerated promotion and hiring of
Malays. What this can do to the morale of better
qualified non-Malay civil servants who remain es-
sential for the effective functioning of the bu-
reaucracy goes without saying.
Malayanization appears to be taking a par-
ticularly ominous turn in the Special Branch of
the Malaysian Police, the nation's internal
security service. The Special Branch has always
operated primarily against Chinese targets, es-
pecially the Malaysian Communist Party. As a
result, it is hardly surprising that its make-up is
over two thirds non-Malay, the majority of whom
are Chinese. Recent promotions, however, have
been heavily weighted in favor of Malay officers,
and the Malay director of the Special Branch has
been under heavy pressure from above to ter-
minLte contracts of many Chinese officers and to
restrict further Chinese recruitment. That a pre-
dominantly Chinese security force is now sus-
pected and unacceptable to growing numbers of
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Kota
Kinabalu.
SELECTED ETHNIC GROUPS
Malay
Chinese
Indian (predominantly Tamil)
Other
bleat 444
116""
-MALAYSIA
Spocial Report
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Malays sadly reflects the present degree of racial
polarization in Malaysia. Nevertheless, if Malayan-
ization is allowed to continue at its present pace
in the Special Branch, the effectiveness of
Malaysia's internal security apparatus will de-
teriorate. That the government would flirt with
this possibility in order to appease communal
sentiment is not a hopeful sign for the future.
Another area in which the government could
easily lose its balance is that of economic policy.
Chronic Malay resentment and dissatisfaction is
based in large part on the economic disparity
between the Malay and Chinese communities.
Malays, for example, account for only 9.1 percent
of managerial and professional personnel and only
13.8 percent of the technical and supervisory
workers in the labor force, and Chinese income
per capita exceeds Malay income by 75 percent.
The Razak government has publicly committed
itself to reducing this imbalance, and its survival
could depend on the results it obtains.
Last March the National Operations Council
announced general guidelines for a "new eco-
nomic policy -the first major step in the govern-
ment's attempt to convince Malays that it is ready
to embark on a vigorous program to better their
economic lot. In August, the economic com-
mittee of the National Consultative Council in-
corporated these guidelines in its recommenda-
tions to the government. The proposals chart out
a number of general areas of effort. First, govern-
ment reform and participation in the rural
marketing and credit facilities are called for. The
flow of rural Malays into the urban sector is to be
encouraged and facilitated by government infor-
mation, welfare assistance, and massive "job
corps" programs. Industrial firms are required to
hire a certain percentage of Malay staff at all
personnel levels under mandatory employment
quotas. And direct government participation in
the private sector-through joint government-
Malay ventures, the blanket reservation of certain
pioneer industries for Malay capital, and govern-
ment loans or capital-holding for Malay ven-
tures-is suggested as a possible way to guarantee
Malay opportunity.
Special Report
Everyone on the Malaysian political scene,
including the Chinese opposition, agrees that high
priority should be attached to attac''ing economic.
imbalance. There is little agreement, however, on
exactly how this should be done; and, not sur-
prisingly, the government's future economic
policy has become a matter of considerable con-
troversy. Critics of the government guidelines,
including most of the non-Malay economists and
planners within the bureaucracy, complain that
such blatantly preferential trea'ment will be
deeply resented by the Chinese and only worsen
the nation's racial problem. More specifically,
they fear that rigid employment quotas and gov-
ernment intrusion into the private sector will slow
down the rate of economic growth and inevitably
lead to a sharp hike in urban Chinese unemploy-
ment-something that could result in a dangerous
rise in communal tension.
Recently various government spokesmen, in-
cluding the man on the spot, Ghazali bin Shafie,
have attempted to defuse such criticism by
pledging the government's determination to work
on the behalf of all economically deprived citi-
zens regardless of race, a program that would on
the face of it affect poor Chinese also. Exactly
what Ghazalis rhetoric means, however, is un-
clear. Most economically deprived citizens are
Malay. As a matter of political expediency, if
nothing else, the government must come up with
a program that primarily benefits the Malay. The
damage done to Chinese interests will depend on
the specific legit ation introduced in parliament
next February and the manner ir, which the legis-
lation is implemented. In the meantime, govern-
ment economic planning will remain the source of
considerable Chinese apprehension.
In the months ahead, the effort to restore
Malaysian political and social stability will right-
fully absorb most of the government's attention
and energy. But there ; re other problem areas.
Kuala Lumpur faces a potentially explosive situa-
tion in the East Malaysian State of Sarawak,
where local political forces are continuing to
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resist strong federal control. On the international
front, the reduction of British military presence is
forcing the government to reassess its position in
world and regional affairs. There are already clear
signs that the Razak government intends to fol-
low a more obviously nonaligned policy, although
it will probably remain in most respects oriented
toward the West. In addition, the government is
still confronted with a persistent and growing
Communist insurgency, not only along the fros-
tier with Thailand but in the jungles of East
Malaysia as well. It is difficult to exaggerate the
potential Communist threat to Malaysia. Present
Communist capabilities and resources are limited,
however, and, barring a breakdown of Malaysian
political and social order, the insurgent threat can
probably continue to be contained as it has been
for years. But the government is far more con-
cerned with the political communal tasks that lie
ahead than with Communist activity or other
peripheral problems, and it has got its priorities
straight.
Given the many political unknowns and
variables within the present situation, an assess-
ment of the government's ability to hold a mod-
erate and rational course is difficult. Under the
best of circumstances, the Chines,3 community
will probably have little to smile about in the
coming months, and Chinese disaffection is
bound to remain a leading feature of the political
landscape. The Chinese are not likely, however, to
take the lead in a renewal of communal violence
in which they would be the inevitable losers.
Similarly, the specter of a mass Chines: turn to
Communist struggle remains only that-a specter.
The Malayan Communist Party did not pick up
much Chinese support as a result of the riots of
May 1969, and at present there appears to be
little sentiment within the Chinese community
for such a desperate alternative. Furthermore, the
Communists believe that their strong Chinese
image is both an ideological and practical draw-
back, and they have been attempting to put their
movement on a class rather than racial basis.
Consequently-at least so far-they have avoided
the temptation of using Chinese chauvinist appeal
in their recruiting efforts.
Special Report
The greatest danger to stability will come
from within the Malay community. If the govern-
ment proves unwilling or unable to satisfy Malay
demands and rebuild Malay confidence in UMNO
leadership, communal tension will rise while gov-
ernmental authority declines. In such unstable
circumstances the military might well move in to
control the situation. But an array coup d'eta`
against the moderate Malay leadership seems most
unlikely. Any military intervention would be
without the backing of the air, naval, and support
services of the armed forces, all heavily staffed by
non-Malays, and would almost certainly cause in-
stant chaos. A distinct possibility, however, is the
forceful assertion of Malay military influence be-
hind the facade of civilian government. Shortly
after the May 1969 riots, Razak, in his capacity as
chief of the NOC, offered to turn the government
over to the military. In similar circumstances he
could f lirich again. With :.ither a military-
dominated government or the emergence of a
more openly nationalistic civilian regime, the pos-
sibility of an extreme Chinese reaction would
escalate. The outcome could range from a sharp
deterioration in the functioning of the govern-
ment and economy, both heavily dependent on
Chinese participation, to destructive racial civil
war open to Communist exploitation.
Fortunately, such pessimistic speculation is
still premature. Despite the multitude of pitfalls
ahead, there are a few bright spots. The absence
of serious racial incidents during the past year and
a half is a hopeful sign. Another plus is Malaysia's
continuing economic boom. The government has
an economic development cushioi' that should
allow it, with a little balance and finesse, to
improve the Malay economic position at
minimum expense to the Chinese. The greatest
favorable factor, however, is simply the lack of
appealing alternatives to the present leadership.
The Razak government may now be the only
thing standing between the present uneasy situa-
tion and national breakdown-a situation that all
parties on the political spectrum probably realize,
at least in their more car,did moments. At any
rate, the real testing per;od for the new govern-
ment lies ahead. Its righ'L to survive will be judged
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on the basis of how it handles its parliamentary
opposition next February. the specific legislative
programs it comes up with, and the manner in
which it implements its new polir:ies, especially in
the economic area. Although the general outlines
of government policy have emerged, it is still far
too early for anyone to pronounce judgment. The
question of whether a moderate Malay govern-
ment can survive in Malaysia is not likely to be
answered within the next six months.
Regardless of the eventual answer to this
central question, there seems little chance that
Malaysia can return to democracy along pre-1969
lines. The political tight-rope Razak is walking
leads directly to the parliamentary elections due
three and z half years hence-a date far in the
future but nevertheless in the back of everyone's
mind. During this period communalism is almost
certain to remain the driving force of Malaysian
politics. It is difficult to imagine a reversal of the
trend toward greater Chinese political assertive-
ness; the Chinese opposition parties are likely to
compound their 1969 electoral gains in future
elections. A glance at the population chart shows
that the non-Malays will hold the political balance
of power in a truly democratic system. No Malay
government, including the present one, is likely to
consider letting this happen. There is, of course,
plenty of ground between outright Malay political
suppression and total democracy. Hopefully,
what can be obtained is a gradual transition from
executive control to some form of limited
representative government-a process that will al-
low a new beginning for long-term development
of racial reconciliation and a noncommunal politi-
cal system.
Special Report
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