WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CUBA: A NEW ERA BEGINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: September 25, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Cuba: A New Era Begins
flSY f[!?E COPY
C 6
Secret
N2 666
25 September 1970
No. 0389/70A
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CONFIDENTIAL
Cuba's zugar harvest of 1970 was a record breaker. Production of Lugar, by far the
country's most important product, exceeded by more than 1.2 million tons the oid record
of 7.29 million tons harvested in 1952. It has been a Pyrrhic victory for the Castro regime,
however, because it interfered seriously with other sectors of the economy and because it
fell short of the goal of ten million tons that had been set-and adamantly reaffirmed on
many occasions-')y Fidel personally. Also, massive mobilizations of the population resulted
in almost chaotic conditions in society generally. The population, spurred on by a monu-
mental propaganda campaign, put forth an unprecedented effort only to find that, aespite
all the strains and sacrifices, no improvement in living conditions is in sight.
It is now obvious that most Cubans have suffered a letdown and are dissatisfied. Castro
himself has acknowledged the existence of dissension, and refugees arriving in Miami have
reported open displays of popular displeasure with shortages and governmental restrictinr.s.
One objective Western observer who spent a week in Cuba in early August reported seeing,
on three occasions, unprovoked attacks on policemen by crowds of people who were
dispersed only by gunfire over their heads. This dissent, however, poses no threat to the
stability of the,government. Demonstrations of dissatisfaction seem to be spontaneous, and
those Cubans who become disaffected have no nucleus around which they can gather to
offer effective resistance. Furthermore, Castro is acutely aware of the situation and is taking
steps to redress some of the more outstanding grievances.
Certain of Castro's ambitious economic plans have been curtailed, and there are
tentative indications that, at least in the immediate future, fewer demands will be made on
the people. Some of the new measures have popular appeal and will F.,rve to buy time for
the regime. Nevertheless, they are not the fundamental changes required to stimulate the
economy tc an adequate rate of growth. Castro's economic difficulties and concomitant
political problems will probably remain with him indefinitely.
Despite his promises of administrative and personnel changes, during this critical phase
of the revolution, Castro has demonstrated hesitancy and vacillation that adds up to a
serious and uncharacteristic lack of leadership. Castro may indeed be groping for solutions,
or he may be finding it difficult to swallow his pride and accept the suggestions pressed
upon him by his most important economic prop, the USSR. He may be waiting for the
completion of upcoming Cuban-Soviet economic negotiations before making decisive moves.
This year's talks presumably will be more extensive than the usual annual deliberations
because the 1965-70 bilateral agreement runs out this year. For the time being, Castro
appears to be following the Soviet line much more closely than previously, both in domestic
matters and in international relations.
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25 September 1970
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CONFII)EN'1.'IAL,
Early attempts by the regime to free Cuba
from the restrictive confines of a one-crop econ-
omy by means of rapid and diversified industriali-
By January 1970, the regime's political com-
mitment to achieving the ten-million-ton goal had
become so great that the harvesting of "even one
pound less" was to be considered "a great moral
defeat." In addition, many Cubans apparently
We have reu//v worked for the ten-million-Ion
harvest and we won't he sutisffled with a pound less
I/tan tell million touts. So if? we wind up with
9,999,999 tons, it would be a great effort, very
praisewort/nv and all that. But wr must hottest/t' .sgr'
that it would be a moral defeat. We aren't satisfied
with incomplete victories. We have worked for the
ten-million-tour harvest and we won't be sulisifed with
a pound less. A pound less than ten million tons
would be- and we ?sc{v it altead of time a moral
do f cctt. It would be a c/c JL'at, not a victory.
zation were unsuccessful. By late 1963, plans for
industrialization had been substantially modified
downward, and the predominance of sugar had
again been recognized. In the new economic
scheme, the planners optimistically set a produc-
tion goal of ten million metric tons of sugar fc.
the harvest of 1970. This was to be achieved by
gradually increasing production through the use
of harvesters, combines, and other devices until
1970, when the entire sugar industry would be
mechanized. Although production goals of 7.5,
eight, and nine million tons were set for 1967,
1968, and 1969, respectively, the propaganda
machine concentrated primarily on achieving the
goal of the harvest in 1970. The undue emphasis
placed on achieving ten million tons in 1970
worked to the detriment of earlier harvests-par-
ticularly that of 1969-and was pushed at the
expense of other sectors of the economy. It did
serve as a useful diversion, however, when the
harvests in 1967 and 1968 fell short of the speci-
fied targets and when the disastrous harvest of
1969 barely produced 50 percent of the goal.
correlated success in achieving the goal with suc-
cess in improving the economic plight of the
individual. This correlation was unfounded from
the beginning; most of the surplu' ;production was
earmarked for the USSR to redo :e the level of
Soviet economic assistance rather than to finance
the import of consumer goods. Even had the ten
million tons been realized, the position of the
consumer would have remained substantially un-
changed.
For a variety of reasons, the harvest fell
short of the goal. These included transportation
bottlenecks, equipment failures, mill maintenance
and refurbishing problems, mismanagement, ab-
senteeism, low labor productivity, and general
inefficiency. A series of incidents in April and
May 1970 involving the infiltration of an anti-Cas-
tro guerrilla team into eastern Cuba and the sub-
sequent kidnaping of 11 fishermen by Miami-
based cohorts of the would-be guerrillas provided
Castro with a convenient occasion to inform an
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aroused population on 19 May that the much-
publicized production goal would not be met.
This was followed by the prime minister's annual
speech on 26 July in which he noted the detri-
mental impact that the harvest had had on other
segments of the economy. Castro even admitted
that conditions might get worse in the next five
years.
In presenting the dismal picture, Castro
made no excuses and sought no scapegoats. He
Beef: production reached 154,000 tons in 1968;
143,000 tons in 1969
Milk: production during January-May 1970 was
down 25 percent over the same period in
1969
Fish: production was up by 8,000 tons in the
first quarter of 1970 compared with the same
period in 1969
Cement: production in the first five months of
1970 was 23 percent below the same period
in 1968
Steel ingots: production in the first five months
of 1970 was down 38 percent from the same
period in 1969
Nickel: production as planned with no problems
Fuels and lubricants: production as planned
with no problems
Electricity: demand has outstripped production
Tires: production plan only 50 percent fulfilled
Fertilizers: "backlog up to June of 32 percent"
Farm machinery: only 8 percent of the plan
fulfilled
Soap and detergents: "production plan shows a
backlog on the order of 32 percent"
Textiles and clothing: "production backlog of
16.3 million square meters of textiles as of
June 1970"
Transportation: a decrease of 36 percent in the
number of railroad passengers from January
to April 1970
Fidel Castro, 26 July 1970
Special Report
announced that personnel changes would be made
because "some extraordinary comrades" had been
"exhausted" by the strain of their efforts and the
weight of their responsibilities, but he gave no
hint that a "purge" was in the offing. Contrary to
past practice, he announced no spectacular new
political drive with which to mesmerize the
people and inspire them to greater dedication. He
merely made vague references to unspecified local
self-help programs, new organizational changes in
the party and the government, and greater partici-
pation by the workers in the decision-making
processes. None of the details of these innova-
tions was spelled out either in this speech or the
one that followed on 23 August. As a result, a
general aura of uncertainty has now deve'oped
within the government as officials wait for the
next move. This feeling also has spread to the
population, which is looking to Fidel for a way
out.
The structural changes that Castro spoke
about on 26 July apparently consist primarily of
the establishment, within the Cuban Communist
Party (PCC), of a Bureau of Social Production on
a level with the party's Political Bureau. This
bureau theoretically will be the political instru-
ment charged with coordinating the activities of
the administrative branches of the government.
The bureau will function through several sub-
groups, and each of these will be responsible for a
particular segment of the economy. One group,
for example, concentrates on those administrative
branches concerned mainly with consumption,
and thus controls the National Institute of the
Tourist Industry and the ministries of Domestic
Trade, Light Industry, and Food Industry. An-
other group concerned with manpower oversees
the ministries of the Interior, Armed Forces,
Labor, and Education. A third group responsible
for construction presumably supervises and co-
ordinates the activities of the Construction Minis-
try and the National Agricultural-Livestock Devel-
opment Agency.
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The development of the Bureau of Social
Production seems to be in line with the "creation
and improvement of a new economic organism"
described in a Soviet publication last year by two
economic officials serving in the Soviet Embassy
in Havana, and therefore probably has the bless-
ing of Moscow. All the same it is questionable
The revolutionary government and the Cuban
Communist Party have devoted, and are devoting,
much effort and attention to the creation and im-
provement of a new economic organism which Jiutc-
tions, and is governed, on the basis of socialist
principles. In the operations of industrial and agri-
cultural enterprises, special emphasis is placed on
centralized planted guidance, on the development of
direct economic links within the government sector
by means of direct product exchange and state
budget financing, on eliminating at the same time
bureaucratic phenomena in the economic areas by
cutting back on the administrative apparatus, ex-
tending the authority of administrators in production
proper, and supporting local initiative. The over-all
economic management plan being drafted and in-
troduced in Cuba proceeds from the definite im-
portance of planning principles, and from the
practical possibility of exercising such guidance and
direction over all enterprises, taking into account the
country's relatively small size, the existence of a
well-developed system of roads and communications
and the highly centralized character of the sugar
industry-Cuba's main production branch.
B. V. Gorbachev and A. I. Kalinin,
LA TINSKA YA AMERIKA, No. 3, 1969
whether the formation of a new layer of bureau-
crats in an already top-heavy administrative struc-
ture will do much to overcome production bottle-
necks and improve the economic situation. Also,
there is no indication that Castro will be any
more willing to delegate authority now than he
has in the past. So long as he insists on making all
major decisions and many minor ones, the econ-
omy will be seriously impaired.
Special Report -4-
CONFIDENTIAL
In his speech of 26 July, Castro indicated
that many economic priorities had been revised.
This probably signifies only a modification of
goals rather than a basic change in economic
strategy. For example, he has apparently revised
the plans for industrialization he hoped to carry
out during the 1970s. It has been evident for
some time that major industrial projects such as
the cement plants at Nuevitas and Siguaney and
the fertilizer factories at Cienfuegos and Nuevitas
are being completed but that there are no large
new projects in the planning state. Industrial in-
vestment evidently is being shifted to what Castro
termed "micro investments" (i.e., purchases of
lathes, precision instruments, machine tools,
motors, and other equipment) designed to achieve
maximum utilization of the present industrial
plant.
The annual sugar production schedule,
which called for a minimum of ten million tons
per year from 1970 to 1980, has also been dis-
carded. Castro admitted this when he said that
the 1970 production record would be "really
difficult to surpass" and that "some day" the
record may be broken. His current realistic atti-
tude contrasts with the adamant stand he took
previously whenever anyone dared to challenge
his assertion that the goal of ten million tons
would be met.
In the aftermath of this year's harvest, Cas-
tro has made several high-level personnel shifts in
addition to the structural changes and goal mod-
ifications. First to go were Sugar Industry Minis-
ter Francisco Padron and Education Minister Jose
Llanusa Gobel. Their replacements, Marcos Lage
Cuello and Major Belarmino Castilla Mas, are in
line with the current pattern of appointing ex-
perienced technicians and capable military of-
ficers to key positions. Lage formerly served as
vice rector of scientific research at Havana Uni-
versity, and Major Castilla Mas, was formerly
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Annual Cuban Sugar Production Under Castro.
(in millions of metric tons)
5.20
4.4 4.45 4.54
armed forces vice minister for military techno-
logical training. Another armed forces vice minis-
ter, Major Jose Fernandez Alvarez, later joined
Castilla Mas as first deputy education minister.
Padron's ouster was to be expected after the
failure to meet the harvest goal. Llanusa lost favor
because he failed to produce the teachers and
technicians that Castro's ambitious development
schemes required.
Also removed was the aging "old Commu-
nist," Manuel Luzardo, the ineffective domestic
trade minister. An experienced armed forces sup-
ply officer who had received specialized training
abroad, First Captain Serafin Fernandez Rod-
riguez, replaced him. In addition, a new cabinet
post, the Ministry of Merchant Marine and Ports,
was established on 21 August in hopes of solving
some of Cuba's maritime transportation prob-
lems. Major Angel Joel Chaveco Hernandez, who
had served in various capacities in the armed
forces air and air defense systems, was named
minister.
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25 September 1970
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Many more changes will be forthcoming;
Castro said as much on 26 July. He warned,
however, that a reshuffling of personnel would
mean only little in the battle for greater produc-
tion because the problems that must be overcome
cannot be solved by a few people alone but only
by the concerted efforts of the entire population.
Ministers are being replaced, he said, because they
"are worn out and have lost their energy and
cannot cope with the load."
Aleetbng the Neecls of the People
In the aftermath of the harvest, Castro has
come to realize that the people have legitimate
demands and needs that can no longer be brushed
aside as they have been for years, particularly
during the heat of the sugar production campaign.
His remarks and those of Labor Minister Risquet
indicate that at least a modest effort will be made
to ease the lot of the workers. In relation to their
needs, however, the effort will be only a begin-
ning.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Events (probably public disturbances) in
Cuba's second largest city, Santiago de Cuba, in
early July led Castro to visit the city for three
days, mingling with the people and listening to
their complaints. Although he obviously was im-
pressed with their plight, the measures he has
announced so far are small-scale, stopgap solu-
tions that will do little more than whet the ap-
petite of those in need. For example, he has made
no plans for a massive campaign to produce the
one million houses he admitted are needed, and
he spoke only vaguely of giving the peop;e the
means to build houses, shops, and stores so they
might provide for their own needs instead of
waiting for the government to do it.
In addition, Castro acknowledged that the
government can no longer continue to demand
that workers put in 14- or 15-hour workdays over
extended periods of time, but he insisted that
production goals must be met and that on oc-
casion overtime is absolutely necessary. He prom-
ised that, as they become available, buses will be
assigned to certain areas in acute need of public
transportation, but he took no steps to increase
either domestic production of vehicles or their
importation from abroad.
In the same vein, Risquet said that produc-
tion of consumer goods at the Santa Cara dom-
estic utensils factory and the Ariguanabo textile
plant could be improved if the work forces were
not reduced to provide agricultural labor for the
1971 harvest, but he would not flatly rule out
that possibility. He also announced that plans for
sending deserving workers and their families on
brief vacations were being drawn up but admitted
that in some cases the plans could not be imple-
mented because of a lack of transportation or a
need to maintain production.
It is clear then that years of continued ra-
tioning and shortages face the average Cuban and
that no basic change is contemplated in the policy
of sacrificing the supply of consumer goods in
favor of capital goods. It is also clear that the
regime's adherence to "moral" incentives (the
Special Report -6-
CONFIDENTIAL
awarding of pens, banners, etc., rather than ma-
terial awards) will continue. Risquet paid lip serv-
ice to moral incentives in his television interview
on 30 July, but some of the measures both he and
Castro have advocated, namely hoLises and vaca-
tions for outstanding workers, are in reality ma-
terial incentives. In permitting such a dual system
to develop, Castro is probably hoping to maintain
his ideological purity by holding fast to moral
inducements while at the same time submitting to
Soviet urging to provide material incentives as a
means of increasing production.
Strengthening the iilass Organizations
One of the many detrimental results of con-
centrating too much attention on the sugar har-
vest in 1970, according to Castro, was the neglect
suffered by the mass organizations, i.e., those
groups that have been organized on a national
scale to regiment the population. Although the
Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) under the
leadership of Vilma Espin, Raul Castro's wife,
performed well during this period, the Cuban
Workers Central Organization (CTC) and the Na-
tional Association of Owners of Small Farms
(ANAP) did not. Both are earmarked for substan-
tial overhauling.
Changes in the structure of ANAP are re-
quired because the nature of the country's
227,000 small farms is changing. These farms
represent the largest remnant of private owner-
ship still in existence in Cuba and are now in the
process of being incorporated into state lands.
Although many of the small-farm owners received
their land as a result of the redistribution of large
estates in the early stages of the revolution, they
have demonstrated a reluctance to cooperate fully
with the government's agricultural policies. This,
in turn, has become irritating to Castro per-
sonally. The first sign of this came in December
1969 when, in discussing the mechanization of
agriculture, he complained that "small land-
holding is not a proper method of exploiting the
land; it is prehistoric....Modern technology and
highly productive machinery require expanses of
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Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
(CD Rs)
National Coordinator: Luis Gonzalez Marturelos
Membership (1970): 3,222,000 in 67,200 com-
mittees
Composition: men and women from all walks of
life who wish to participate in activities in
support of the government
Federation of Cuban Women (FMC)
President: Vilma Espin Guilloys, wife of Armed
Forces Minister Raul Castro
Membership (1970): 1,324,751
Composition: women with a revolutionary ori-
entation who wish to demonstrate their sup-
port of the government
National Association of Small Farm Owners
(ANAP)
President: Jose Ramirez Cruz
Membership (1970): 227,000
Composition: all peasants who own their own
lands
Young Communist League (UJC)
President: Jaime Crombet
Membership (1969): 153,000
Composition: young males and females who
aspire to membership in the Cuban Commu-
nist Party
Central Organization of Cuban Workers (CTC)
Secretary General: Hector Ramos Latour
Membership (1970): 1,895,000 (estimated)
Composition: members of Cuba's 14 remaining
labor unions
land. A month later, ANAP president Jose
Ramirez Cruz, who was visiting the USSR to
study collec.:ive farms, told a Soviet audience that
"we are only beginning the transformation of our
agriculture." Later, criticism was leveled publicly
Special Report
at ANAP members in Matanzas, Las Villas, and
Oriente provinces for absenteeism and poor work
discipline, and by April, refugees leaving the
country began reporting incidents of confiscation
of livestock.
In July, the Cuban radio announced that the
first farmers to merge their lands with a govern-
ment development project had been given new,
furnished houses in the town of San Andres. This
presumably is the first in a series of "mergers"
that eventually will see all small farms absorbed
by the state. This would leave a handful of taxi-
cabs, trucks, and coastal fishing boats as the only
vestiges of private ownership, and there are indi.
cations that even these are gradually disappearing
because of government pressure.
ANAP originally was founded to help the
farmer get the most out of his land-for example,
by financing seed and equipment purchases, pro-
viding organized labor during planting and har-
vesting seasons, and assisting in marketing the
produce. It also served to guide the farmer in
planting crops to suit the government's agricul-
tural production plans. The association now ap-
parently is to be revamped to engineer the ac-
quisition by the state of all agricultural lands still
in private hands. If the pace of construction of
replacement housing governs the rate of acquisi-
tion of the farms, however, the process of "merg-
ing" them with government lands will take many
years. Although Castro might well prefer that all
land be relinquished immediately to the state, he
probably realizes that any atterrirt to divest the
farm owners of their property in the lightning
fashion in which 58,000 small businesses were
confiscated during the "revolutionary offensive"
of 1968 could have disastrous political repercus-
sions. He most likely will be satisfied accom-
plish the task gradually.
Organized Labor
Because the labor unions constituted a
strong base of potential-and at times actual-op-
position to his regime, Castro moved early and
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quickly to seize control of the CTC, the national
body to which all major unions belonged. He was
completely successful in dominating the CTC and
in turning it from an organization that pressed the
workers' demands on the government into an
organization that pressed the government's de-
mands on the workers. He now seems to be trying
to modify this process, at least to the point of
finding some middle ground between the two
extremes.
Instead of merely being responsible for
mobilizing the workers to suit government needs,
the CTC is now supposed to act as a watchdog to
ensure that regulations established by the Labor
Ministry and other government agencies relating
to worker health, safety, and well-being are
properly observed. At the same time, the CTC
will play a much more important role in the
regimentation of the workers. Although no spe-
cific plans for reshaping the structure and mission
of the CTC have been publicized, Castro seems to
have in mind some vague idea of tying the work-
ers closer to the mill, factory, or other work
center. A system of workers' councils apparently
is to be organized under the aegis of the CTC,
with one council in every work center. The coun-
cil will assist and advisa the work center's ad-
ministrator on hew best to achieve the produc-
tion goals assigned to the center by the govern-
ment. Responsibility for final decisions, however,
will rest with the administrator.
The council also will be charged with provid-
ing for the needs of the workers assigned to the
center, a function that currently is the responsi-
bility of the local government apparatus. If, for
example, a worker is in desperate need of housing
and none is available, he will place his problem
before the counci' at his place of work. The
council then will try to arrange for the construc-
tion of a new house, using whatever materials,
labor force, and facilities are at hand. If workers
have difficulty in getting to and from work via
existing transport facilities, the council will seek
better transportation, using, if necessary, vehicles
normally assigned to the work center. If the
Special Report -8-
8 -
workers at a sugar mill do not have adequate
workers
medical facilities, the council will supposedly take
upon itself the task of building a clinic.
Each council is to be made up of "vanguard"
workers representing youth, party members,
women, and other sectors of the work center's
labor force. The council will be chosen at mass
meetings organized by the CTC ar.d attended by
dl the workers at each center. The system of
councils seems sound theoretically, but it will
probably not operate any more smoothly in pro-
viding for the workers' needs than does the pres-
ent system of local government. In addition, the
practice of having the factory administrator con-
sult with the workers through the council before
making decisions seems more likely to impair
than improve the decision-making process.
Full mechanization of the 1970 harvest was not achieved;
most of the cane was cut by hand.
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Although Castro gave kudos to the watchdog
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
(CDR) as well as to the FMC, the CDRs will
probably soon undergo changes both in structure
and leadership. The national chairman, Luis Gon-
zalez Marturelos, may well be replaced by a more
dynamic leader, but other changes will depend on
the use Castro plans to make of the organization.
It probably will retain responsibility for vigilance
against counterrevolutionary activities as its ori-
mary mission and will continue to carry out an
important administrative role in the local govern-
ment apparatus. More information on what
Castro has in mind will probably be forthcoming
when he makes his usual address on the occasion
of the anniversary of the formation of the CDRs
on 28 September.
The Young Communists League (UJC) will
undoubtedly receive a thorough housecleaning,
although here, too, Castro appears to be vague
about what changes he has in mind. He spoke of
the desirability of eliminating the UJC's profes-
sional cadres, but this wo:aid seem to be detri-
mental to his best interests because the profes-
sional cadres are the very individuals that
mobilize the youth and students on Castro's be-
half.
Castro raised several key points in his annual
speech on 26 July that seem to be significant
shifts in policy. His statement about the workers'
being the "true" revolutionaries, for example,
suggests that he has found the farmers-who for.
merly enjoyed this distinction-too conservative.
Because he individual farmer-in the old sense of
the term "campesino"-is gradually passing o+.tt of
existence, Fidel seems to be turning to tha worker
as both the justification and the basic building
block of the revolution.
Despite the implication in Castro's speech
that he is prepared to delegate a significant degree
Special Report
of authority, he has no intention of removing
himself from any of the important posts he now
occupies. When the final structure of the Bureau
of Social Production is made public-possibly on
the fifth anniversary of the formation of the
party in October-Castro will probably be its
chief and Raul Castro will be his deputy. Raul
presumably will head the group that supervises
the Armed Forces, Interior, Labor, and Education
Ministries. :t is most likely, chat Major Juan
Almeida will chair the construction group and
that President Osvaldo Dorticos will head the
economic-financial group. Others such as Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez and Major Jesus Montane will
probably also held key posts. In short, Castro will
hold the reins and will continue to rely on the
same loyal comrades who already constitute the
upper level of the hierarchy. Similarly, he will
continue to depend on capable military officers
and experienced technocrats to staff the middle-
level positions.
A major implication of the speech is that
Castro is on the defensive. The careful wording of
his rhetorical "offer to resign" and the manner in
which it was delivered suggest that he was testing
the audience, trying to sense the sentiment for
and against him, and that he was somewhat fear-
ful of a negative reaction. He ended the speech on
an unusual note: "I must say in the name of the
party, out leadership, and in my own name, that
we are grateful for the people's reaction, attitude,
and confidence." The fact that he finished the
speech and left the rostrum before remembering
to pass on to the audience 'he sensational news of
the acquisition of Che Guevara's death mask and
hands indicates the depth of his preoccupation
and suggests that he did not really find the
warmth and acclamation he was seeking.
The Security Situation
Despite Cuba's bleak economic picture and
the drop in Castro's popularity, his position is
secure. Minor acts of opposition, such as the
painting of anti-Castro slogans on walls, appear to
be more common, but there are no indications
CON FIDENTIAL
25 September 1970
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 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020049-7
CONFIDENTIAL
that an organized resistance has been formed. The
state security forces are strong and remarkably
efficient and have been successful in eliminating
virtually all organized opposition within the coun-
try and in penetrating most anti-Castro exile ele-
ments abroad. There is no suggestion that either
the armed forces or the security units of t: e
Interior Ministry would fail to support the regime
in a time of crisis. Neither are there any signs of
plotting in high places; loyalty to Fidel always has
been a major criterion in selecting key officials.
The regime has demonstrated consistently its abil-
ity to eliminate quickly and efficiently any infil-
tration attempts by exile teams bent on initiating
a new gu'?rilla war in the mountains. Since late
1968, all such attempts have been wrapped up
within ten days of the date of infiltration.
Castro is deeply concerned about Cuba's
grim domestic situation and probably will remain
so for some time. He seems to realize the full
extent of the detrimental effect of his fanatical
drive to produce ten million tons of sugar in one
year. He realizes, too, that the drive was pressed
forward with such intensity that the failure to
achieve the goal after all his boastful assurances
has damaged his image. His speech on 26 July
was, in part, an attempt to plumb the depths of
Special Report
popular dissatisfaction with his leadership. The
speech produced an air of expectancy that his
address on 23 August did nothing to dispel. He
himself seems confused, or at least uncertain,
about what lies in store for his revolution, and
this is bound to be reflected in the attitude of the
population. Faced with political and economic
facts of life, he appears to be much more willing
to listen to advice than in the past. This will
probably cause him to continue to adopt policies
more in line with Soviet thinking in both the
domestic and international spheres. In addition,
he will probably resort to repressive measures
more frequently as his moral incentives fail to
bring about the increases in wo; xer productivity
that he is now demanding.
Although he is still in firm control and his
position is unchallenged, Castro apparently has
doubts about the level of his p..,: clarity at home.
If he visits the United Nations or Chile, as reports
indicate he might, he probably would do so with
the intention of trying to restore his image at
home by means of a grandstand play. Denouncing
an alleged "invasion plot" against Cuba before the
UN, for example, would serve a double purpose
by casting him in the mold of David fighting
Goliath and by creating an ominous military
"threat" for the purpose of fanning nationalism
and uniting the people against a common en-
emy. 25X1
- 10 - 25 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020049-7