WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE THIRD NONALIGNED SUMMIT: THE SWAN SONG OF YUGOSLAV PREDOMINANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: September 4, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIC-FNCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Third Nonaligned Summit
The Sn'irn Song of Yugoslav Predominance
DSB FILE Copp
RETURN TO tE-61
Secret
N2 685
4 September 1970
No. 0386/70A
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(ON I"iI)F'N'I'IAI,
THE THIRD NONALIGNED SUMMIT: The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance
l he sound of the q;ivel in I_us;lka un (5 Soptenihel will Illilrk the
successful culmination u l a Iwo-y(!;n o f f o r t Oil the part of Yuglcisluv President
Tito to restore interest in the moribund lionaligiior nlovenu!ul. Whether or
lint Belgrade has hoeii successful in hrcathing new life into Iiii nlovenuinl
will not he known, however, until months---even years-lifter the gollwiln(l.
Beca;ise of the vilryiiul and ultell Coillictiiul interests nod views of thw
participants, the Liisoka sunlrnit nlay possibly he the lost world-wide (lhlther
inp of nonnlliyned nations. I -lit" lout drat it is hein(l held it '.II is;l trihilte to
Tito's prestige uric to the ohility of Belgradc!'s I on!ign Ministry to stinnilatu
illturest ill it illoverll(!Ilt thilt two y('.;irs ;rqo wits curlsl(ler(!d d(!acl.
The first two d;lys of the nlcetin(l Will he devoted to cunsriltill ion
alllung the lorcign ministers, at which lime--hopefully-the thorny problem
of whether or not to soot rival Carnbodian and South Vietnamese dolegatibns
will be resolved. Thu, Iureigrl ministers arc also expected to decide on
whether to seat African liheration rnovenlent cfclegatiorls. The hoods of state
will then meet on 8 Soplerilher.
The Lusaka gatherirq, howev(or, rev(:oals nonalignnuont at it criticll cross-
rood. The aflend;.l is broad enough for oil paiticip;lnis to accept, lour (in-
dolibtedly it number of resolutions will be published-includin~l ;i d,mmiciii-
tion of the will ill Indochina, support for the P;ilostilliali (;;lust!, mid
condellin;ition of the remnants of coloni;llisln in Africa. Cousidorin(I Tito's
aqe (78), he cannot he expected to hold non;iliilnnlent lofiether much lun(ler.
Therefore, the challenge at Lusaka will bo to lay the foundation for i
nonalignment movement drat can survive its most prestigious and foremost
advocate.
Nonalignment is the stepchild of the cold
war. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the dc-
velopirig and newly independent nations con-
sidered themselves at the mercy of the super-
powers. There arose a gradual recognition that the
peoples of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and
Latin America might have a common interest in
promoting peaceful coexistence and in avoiding
an alliance with one or another of the super-
powers. This led to the convening of the first
nonaligned summit nearly ten years ago.
If it were not for Tito, it is safe to say there
would be no nonaligned summit in Zambia. He
alone of the four original supporters of nonalign-
ment (Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia-
both deceased-and Nasir of the JAR) has given
the movement momentum. Nonalignment began
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(X)NIA I k,N'I'IAC,
to take shape as far back as 1947 in the policy
objectives and pi onouncements of India's Prime
Minister Nehru. In the early 1950s President Tito
helped give the movement meaning. In the words
of one student of nonalignment, "Tito, the
Croatian metal worker, accomplished what
Nehru, the Brahmin aristocrat, thought beyond
reach--the vitalization of nonalignment."
Tito is the most gaveled nonaligned leader,
and his personal diplomacy has been a key to the
movement's success. The first inkling of Tito's
future role on behalf of the nonaligned Cause
came during his 1954 visit to India. In an address
to the Indian Parliament, Tito called for active
cooperation among states with different social
systems "to remove all elements liable to impede
a broad cooperation between states, large and
small,"
The concept of nonalignment was aided by
the Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and African
countries, held in Indonesia in April 1955 to
promote peaceful coexistence. The Bandung
gathering was strictly a regional conference, in-
cluding representatives from some states that were
clearly aligned. The decisions adopted, however,
fitted Tito's own foreign policy objectives as
much as if he had taken part in drafting them.
The gathering strongly condemned colonialism,
advocated universality of membership in the
United Nations, and called for disarmament as
well as the prohibition of nuclear testing.
The first nonaligned surnrnit was held in
Belgrade in September 1961. Attended by 25
countries as full members, three countries as
official observers, and 19 national liberation
movements and Socialist labor splinter groups as
unofficial observers, the summit adopted a pro-
grz,m whose tenets have become standard non-
aligned rhetoric-world disarmament, the closing
of foreign military bases, a condemnation of
imperialism, and the restoration of the rights of
the Palestinians. In addition, the summit called
attention to the needs of the developing nations
and urged that Communist China be admitted to
the UN.
The initial achievements of nonalignment
were impressive. The various nations accelerated
their move toward decolonization through lobby-
ing efforts at the UN and in bilateral talks around
the globe. Moreover, as a result of a united stand
by tine nonaligned countries, the UN Dis-
armament Committee was enlarged in 1962, and
by their implicit rejection of Moscow's "troika"
proposal for leadership of the UN when Dag
Hammarskjold was killed in an airplane accident,
they contributed to the solution of that crisis.
Participants at the first nonaligned summit, September 1961, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
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Tito, Ben Bella, and Nasir in Cairo on the
eve of the second nonaligned summit in
October 1964.
The cohesion that marked the initial phase of
nonalignment. and promised so much, was, how-
ever, short lived.
By the time the second summit was held ill
Cairo ill October 1964, the earlier harmony and
unity were gone. Forty-seven nations were on
hand as full members and ten as observes, but
along with the increased dumber of participants,
contradictory regional interests and rivalries
flared. Indonesia's President Sukarno spearheaded
a pro-Ch:nose, anti-inlperialist,and anti - peaceful
coexistence platform that clearly wrecked the
meeting. Through the united efforts of Tito,
India's Prime Minister Shastri, and Nasir, the con-
ference was able to end on a positive note by
condemning colonialism acld stressing the eco-
nomic needs of the third world.
The diversity of interests displayed at Cairo,
the growing detente in East-West relations, as well
as the end of most colonial rule in Africa tool<
much of the punch out of nonalignnrenl. In the
succeeding years, the movement waned and ap-
peared to be on the verge of extinction. A. nunl-
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her of world events, however, convinced T1 ito that
nuIt it ligmnMI It dii in Id he revived acrd actively
pursued, These inchidecl the Soviet occultation of
Czechoslovakia, the continuation of the Will in
Indochina, and the failo e to resolve the Middle
Last crisis. Beginning in 1968, Yugoslavia re-
newed its activity ill sccpport of convening it third
nonalignment scnrurlit.
Yugoslavia's call for a viable nonaligned
nroven-rent brought hope to the third world by
offering an alternative to leaning on either the
Last or West. Furthermore, f rte's message is
based on the example of Belgrade's past successes
as well as on an appeal to emerging governments
as cu-equals. Yugoslavia's problems are much ill(,'
same as those of many third-world nations. Large
parts of the County remain backward, and it is
still struggling for national identity, intecrlal
collesioo, and political independence. In spite of
all this, however, Belgrade has made great strides
both economically and socially. Moreover, antler
Tito's leadership, Yugoslavia's neutrality toward
the superpower; is backed up by its actions:
Belgrade does business with both the Last and
West, but it maintains an independent foreign
policy.
\5,nulicoomcen1 (111(1 ) tic(P.sluriu
Belgrade owes a great deal to rlonalignnrent.
Not only is it time vehicle by which Yugoslavia
emerged from diplomatic isolation in the early
fifties, but it has enabled Tito to play an active
and far greater role ill international politics than
he otherwise could have nrauagecl. As a i e'.rill,
Oonalignnrent gave Yugoslavia a source of pi isle
and acconrplishnrerlt no other policy could Offer.
Belgrade, however, has of ferecl the third
world sonlethiog Olore tangible than just the
theory of nonalignment. Since the mid-1950s, it
has extended slightly over `900 million in credits
and other assistance to some 40 less developed
countries i0 Africa, Asia, and Latin Acucr ic.a.
Almost all of the credits have been given to
finance Yugoslav exports of capital equipment
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CON F I DEN'I'IAI,
and for associated technical assistance. The largest
recipients have been India, Indonesia, Pakistan,
the UAR, and Iran. Included in the wide variety
of complete projects financed are hydroelectric
and thermal electric power stations, food pro-
cessing plants, building-materials factories, textile
pftnts, ships, port facilities, water-supply systems,
and geological exploration.
Most recently, the Yugoslavs signed a two-
year program of technical cooperation with the
East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tan-
zania, and Zambia. In connection with the sum-
rnit itself, Belgrade is picking up the bill for the
physical plant in Lusaka. The 60 "prestige"
houses as well as the c-nference hall are being
built with Yugoslav money and by Yugoslav tech-
nicians. Although the Yugoslav aid program does
not depend directly on Western grants and
credits, the large volume of such assistance to
Yugoslavia has put it in a, better position to con-
tinue its own economic aid program.
Backed up by the extension of credits, Bel-
grade's policy has called for a rising share of trade
with the less developed countries, both to provide
outlets for exports that cannot compete in West-
ern markets and to acquire needed raw materials.
The results of this policy have been far less than
hoped. Many of the recipients of Yugoslav credits
have been slow to draw upon them-only $300
million had been drawn and an additional $140
million definitely contracted for by the end of
1967. Moreover, difficulties in arranging mutually
satisfactory exchanges of goods have led to a near
stagnation of Yugoslavia's clearing trade with less
developed countries in recent years. Trade turn-
over with this area last year accounted for only 9
percent of total Yugoslav trade compared with 11
percent in 1966.
The aid program itself is not without its
critics and problems. A number of Yugoslav of-
ficials ask why Belgrade offers technical assistance
to developing countries when large parts of Yugo-
slavia remain backward and woefully in need of
assistance. Moreover, Belgrade's assistance has not
Special Report - 4 -
always been well planned or smoothly executed.
Yugoslav businessmen have in the past committed
themselves to projects they were totally unpre-
pared to handle and haveshown naivete in thinking
that Yugoslav responsibility ended with the com-
pletion of the projects. As a result, the Yugoslavs
have left finished plants and projects in the hands
of totally unprepared and unqualified bureau-
crats.
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These problems will not prevent the Yugo-
slavs from continuirig their assistance program,
however, inasmuch as it has enhanced their image
and political influence in the third world.
the Yugoslavs are the most
appreciated whites in Africa-they are able,
conscientious, and do not come as missionaries of
a particular cause." Moreover, the Yugoslav brand
of socialism holds some appeal for new nations.
Not only is "socialism" a potent political word-
rightly or wrongly conjuring up thoughts of social
justice, economic improvement, and political
democracy, but Yugoslavia's decentralized system
of enterprise management holds a great deal of
fascination for the third world. The UAR's
Corporation Law, adopted in early 1966, may
well reflect Yugoslavia's experience with
autonomy for plant managers.
Belgrade has given a great deal to nonalign-
ment, but it has also taken much. Because of it,
Yugoslav influence and prestige have grown out
of proportion for a country its size. Psychologi-
cally at least, this has helped make it difficult for
Moscow to bring overt pressure on Belgrade to
rejoin the Communist bloc.
In Moscow's eyes, nonalignment has only
compounded the sins of Yugoslavia's erring ways.
The Soviets are well aware of the attraction Bel-
grade holds for the developing nations and view
its nonaligned activity as working at cross pur-
poses and undercutting Soviet influence. How-
ever, as long as nonalignment attacks colonialism
and imperialism in terms acceptable to the Soviet
Union, the Kremlin must tolerate it. The prob-
lem, as Moscow sees it, is than. Yugoslavia takes its
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CON 1 II)1~;NTIAI,
nonaligned neutrality seriously. It not only criti-
cizes US involvement in South Vietnam but de-
nounces the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia,
and insists that both the US and Soviet fleets
withdraw from the Mediterranean in the interest
of peace.
Belgrade began preparing for the upcoming
summit early in 1968 but did not succeed in
mustering enough support for a preparatory con-
ference until 1969. In July of that year, 51 non-
aligned nations met in Belgrade in what was a
well-managed and low-key affair, but they hesi-
tated to call a summit.
The next step was a meeting of the foreign
ministers of the nonaligned states in New York
last September during the 24th UN General As-
sembly session. I t was then decided to proceed
with plans for a summit, and a second prepara-
tory conference was set for this April in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania.
Tito and wife on arrival in Tanzania last Febru-
ary as Yugoslavia's charismatic president continued
his drive to drum up support for nonalignment.
Before the Dar es Salaam gathering, how-
ever, Tito began to use the power of his personal
diplomacy to gain support for the summit. In late
January and February lie toured eight east
African nations, praising the merits of nonalign-
ment at every stop. Tito's tour was paralleled by
that of Dimce Belovski (head of the Yugoslav
mass organization SWAPY) through seven west
Special Report - 5 -
President of the Revolutionary Command
Council of Sudan, Jaafar Numayri,welcoming
President Ti`o to Khartoum last February.
African nations, and by Foreign Minister
Tepavac's excursion to southeast Asia in March.
Tito's tactic apparently worked. The meet-
ing in Tanzania was attended by 51 countries and,
to the surprise of many, proceeded swiftly and
efficiently, side-stepping potential pitfalls and
postponing settlement of the Cambodian and
South Vietnamese representation problem until
the summit itself.
In all, approximately 74 nations have been
approached on attending the meeting in Lusaka,
and the latest count indicates 45 will be repre-
sented. An anticipated additional 17 would raise
this total to 62. Among the government heads
committed to attend are Tito, India's Prime Min-
ister Gandhi, and Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia. Representatives of most of the African
national liberation movements are expected to be
on hand, as are delegates from the Palestinian
Liberation Movement.
The motives of those attending the Lusaka
gathering are as varied as are the participants. For
Cairo, as well as most of the Arab world, the
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DELEGATIONS EXPECTED TO ATTEND THE NONALIGNED SUMMIT
Position on
Cambodia
Heading Delegation
Afghanistan
Premier Nur Ahmad Etemadi
Algeria
S
Foreign Minister Bouteflika
Botswana
L
President Seretse Khama
Burundi
President Micombaro
Cameroon
Vice President Muna
Central African
Republic
President Bokassa
Ceylon
s
Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike
Chad
President Tombalbaye
Congo (B)
Congo (K)
L
President Mobutu
Cuba
S
Cyprus
N
President M akarios
Ethiopia
Emperor Haile Selassie
Equatorial Guinea
President Macias
Ghana
N
Prime Minister Kofi Busia
Guinea
S
President of National Assembly Leon Maka
Guyana
Prime Minister Burnham
India
N
Prime Minister Gandhi
Indonesia
L
President Suharto
Iraq
Vice President Hardan Abd al-Ghaffar
Kenya
Vice President Moi
Laos
L
Prince Souvarna
Lenanon
Foreign Minister Majdalani
Liberia
L
Vice President Tolbert
Malaysia
L
Deputy Prime Minister Razak
Mali
N
Foreign Minister Sory Coulibaly
Mauritania
S
President Ould Daddah
Morocco
Foreign Minister Abdelhadi Boutaleb
Nepal
King Mahendra
Rwanda
L
Foreign Minister Sylvester Nsanzimana
Senegal
Both
Foreign Minister Gueye
Sierra Leone
N
Prime Minister Stevens
Singapore
L
Premier Lee Kwan Yew
Somalia
S
Foreign Minister Omar Arteh
Sudan
S
President Numa,ri
Swaziland
Prime Minister Dhlamini
Tanzania
S
President Nyerere
Tunisia
UAR
S
Foreign Minister Riad
Uganda
President Milton Obote
Yugoslavia
S
President Tito
Zambia
President Kaunda
S = Sihanouk
L = Lon No[
N = Neither Cambodian Representative
Also expected to attend as official or unofficial observers are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Equador,
Gambia, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malawi, penu, Jamaica, Somalia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, the Vatican,
Colombia, the Yemen Arab Republic, Turkey and Venezuela.
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AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE AT THE SUMMIT"
African National Congress Popular Movement for the.
(ANG or SAANG) Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
South West African People's Zimbabwe African National Union
organization (SWAPO) (ZANU)
Mozambique Liberation Front Zimbab African Peoples Union
(FRELIMO) (ZAPU)
Mozarnbiquo Revolutionary African Pa-:y for the Indo-
Committee (COREMO) pendency, of Guinea and Cape
Verde (PAGIC)
Lusaka summit marks a return to overt support
for nonalignment. Obviously the Arabs hope to
gain support for their cause against Israel. It also
provides them with a convenient forum from
which to gain a strong endorsement of the rights
of the Palestinians. Nasir, originally a major sup-
porter of the movement, has had little time to
devote to nonalignment since the June 1967 war,
and he only returned to the fold after meeting
with Tito last February at Aswan.
India, by virtue of its historical ole in non-
alignment, is committed to attend. New Delhi,
however, even before Nehru's death, had begun
changing its concept of nonalignment. Although
its basic principle-zvoiding commitments to any
great-power alliance system-has been maintained,
Indian interest in association with a nonaligned
bloc has waned, and the country's interests are
now concentrated on South Asia. It is going to
Lusaka with a view toward protecting its own
particular interests and to see what benefits there
may be for it in refurbishing its fading image as a
leader of the nonaligned nations.
For Indonesia, Asia's other giant neutral, the
summit at first held out prospects of reasserting
its international posture after several years of
preoccupation with domestic policy following
Sukarno's ouster. The overthrow of Cambodian
Prince Sihanouk and Djakarta's strong support for
Lon Nol has-to many who will be gathered at
Lusaka-undercut Indonesia's credentials as a
nonaligned nation.
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The Black African states take a particular
pride in the summit because it is being held in
Zambia. The attitudes of the various countries
concerning the merits of nonalignment vary, but
there is a general consensus that with Lusaka as
host, the entire region has gained new prestige.
Economic cooperation will be foremost in the
minds of many Africans attending. Furthermore,
for a few short days the world will be focusing on
an international conference in which they will
play a vital role. The Black African states, there-
fore, have a vested interest in the success of the
conference and will work toward this end.
Some 12 Latin American countries may be
in Lusaka. Each has its own reason for attending,
but all view their presence as a means of self-
expression. As the nations of Latin America move
away from the United States politically, nonalign-
ment becomes more attractive. Most of them are
leery of both the USSR and the US, and therefore
are willing to explore nonalignment as an al-
ternative.
In an effort to avoid the friction and tension
that marred the Cairo summit, a broad, clearly
defined agenda has been drafted for the Lusaka
gathering. The major points for discussion will be:
1) a general review of the international situation;
2) the democratization of international relations
as well as tha safeguarding and strengthening of
peace, freedom, development, and cooperation;
3) the safeguarding of national independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality
among states-including support for liberation
movements and a strong anticolonial stance; and
4) the economic development and self-reliance of
the nonaligned states.
More iarrowly d3fined issues will include a
strong restatement of support for the rights of the
P;,lestinian Arabs. Portuguese, Rhodesian, and
South African policies toward the blacks will
come under strong attack as will Britain's decision
to resume limited arms sales to South Africa.
There also may be some movement toward
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developing a program of closer economic and
technical cooperation between the nonaligned
states with an emphasis on self-reliance. In addi-
tion, support for Communist China's admittance
to the United Nations is anticipated.
The summit is expected to praise the first 25
years of the United Nations. Moreover, a special
resolution calling for the strengthening of that
organization (to be presented at the 25th UN
General Assembly jubilee session) will be drafted.
Among other things, the resolution is scheduled
to call for the implementation of the 1960 UN
Declarations on Decolonization, a statement of
respect for national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the formulation of an international de-
velopment strategy for the 1970s, a proclamation
to make the 1970s the "Decade of Disarma-
ment," and a "Declaration for Peace, Freedom,
Development, and Democratization of Interna-
tional Relations."
A number of problems will have to be dealt
with, however, i * the gathering is to be a success.
First and foremost is the question of seating the
rival Cambodian delegations. The preparatory
meetings simply avoided the issue by referring it
to the summit. At the moment neither the
Sihanouk no,, the Lon Nol representatives appear
to have enough support to win a seat, and a large
number of prospective participants are in favor of
recognizing neither. Many of those going to
Lusaka who might otherwise favor seating
Sihanouk or his group are concerned about the
danger of setting a precedent in recognizing a
government in exile.
Despite rumors to the contrary, there is no
evidence that Sihanouk intends to put in a per-
sonal appearance at Lusaka. The possibility, how-
ever, cannot be ruled out. Just what the impact of
his presence would mean is difficult to say, but
Lon Nol supporters are concerned that it could
start a stampede on Sihanouk's behalf that would
end in the seating of his government.
For its part, the Lon Nol regime is actively
lobbying for admission at Lusaka. Two delega-
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lions have been dispatched to Africa to present
the Cambodian Government's case for a seat at
the summit. The effort appears to be in vain, and
best indications are that few, if any, converts will
be made. All Lon Nol can realistically hope for is
that these governments will abstain on the Cam-
bodian question. At the moment, a quick count
of the delegates committed to Lusaka indicates
Lon Nol simply does not have enough support to
gain a seat. The best bet now is that the issue will
die in committee.
Also touchy is the problem of seating the
Communist Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam. As in the case of the
Sihanouk delegation, a large number of those
countries planning to attend the conference are
wary of setting a controversial precedent.
Furthermore, a great many of the delegates main-
tain ties with Saigon, and the seating of the Viet
Cong could cause the conference to Lreak down
by making it impossible for nations such as
Indonesia to continue its participation. It is un-
likely, therefore, that any South Vietnamese
delegation will be seated.
The Lusaka summit will probably end on a
positive note, with the nonaligned nations suc-
cessfully drafting a program to present to the UN
jubilee session in October. The final results, how-
ever, will undoubtedly reflect the lowest common
denominator upon which the participants can
agree. Just as in Cairo in 1964, this will mean
heavy emphasis on the broadest possible issues
and a de-emphasis of specific problems.
A major question for this meeting, however,
is the future of nonalignment itself. As it was
conceived and practiced in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, nonalignment is no longer applicable
to today's world in a meaningful way. It has
limitations, and even Tito recognizes that his
once-cherished dream of a large, cohesive bloc of
nonaligned states dramatically ',nfluencing the
course of world events has not borne fruit. If
nonalignment is to survive and play a role in
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world affairs, it obviously will have to undergo
some basic changes.
One possibility is to organize along regional
lines. Most recently, the Ugandan Foreign Min-
ister, Sam Oclaka, has suggested that future co-
operation follow the example of the East African
community-a loose organization providing a
number of common services for and economic
cooperation between Tanzania, Kenyc, and
Uganda.
The Lusaka summit could also be the end of
Yugoslav predominance in the nonaligned move-
ment. From the beginning, this has been Tito's
pet pi oject; the rest of the Yugoslav leaders are
somewhnt less enthusiastic, although they are
nearly unanimous in recognizing the merits of the
movement. Tito's years at the helm in Belgrade
are numbered, and whoever follows him is un-
likely to have the qualifications cr the drive to
lead nonalignment. Moreover, most Yugoslav
leaders are looking for more immediate and more
relevant returns.
Furthermore, Yugoslavia itself has changed
drastically. Belgrade now feels its security and
future lie in a loose association with the West, and
it is actively and successfully cultivating a wide
range of political and economic contacts in
Western Europe-including a recent and signifi-
cant agreement with the Common Market. Al-
though the new generation of Yugoslav loaders
will undoubtedly continue to cultivate Belgrade's
political and economic ties in the third world,
nonalignment will no longer hold center stage in
its foreign policy.
The real challenge for the delegates gathered
at Lusaka will be to lay the foundation for a
movement that can transcend Tito's personality
and survive with a smaller Yugoslav commitment.
Chances are that neither Nasir, Mrs. Gandhi, nor
Suharto has the time or interest to lend prestige
to such an endeavor. If a new moving spirit is to
appear, it will probably come from among one of
the better developed but smaller states that pro-
fess nonalignment as a policy.
25X1 25X1
Special Report - 9 -
4 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020044-2