WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: ANOTHER TRY IN THE OFFING?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 13, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
-secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Caribbean Integration: Another 7"ry in the Offing?
056 nl~ r,#IPYSi
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UOCUMET SER111-N-S BRANCH
FILE COPY
no NOT D2STROY
-Sesrat_
N9 695
13 March 1970
No. 0361/70B
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CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: ANOTHER TRY IN THE OFFING?
For the second time in recent years, the Caribbean region may be approaching a
crossroad in its history.
Landmark decisions on regional cooperation have been taken in the last two years,
including establishment of a Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and the inauguration of a
Caribbean Development Bank. These initial steps could easily open the door to wider
economic and political cooperation. Some of the Caribbean members probably see the
establishment of CARIFTA and the strengthening of ties as the first moves toward formation
of a federation similar to the West Indies Federation that existed from 1958 to 1962. Within
the last few months leaders of some of the smaller states have publicly voiced the need for
another attempt at partial politic.! federation.
Any such attempt, however, would take place in the shadow of the failure of the earlier
effort. The West Indies Federation was an ambitious political and economic union that
eventually satisfied none of its members and split apart after four years of bickering,
misunderstanding, and unfulfilled expectations. In addition, the area must contend with
trends toward fragmentation. This tendency is exemplified by the case of Anguilla, which
declared its independence from St. Kitts in 1967 and still exists in a twilight zone of
unconstitutionality.
In any event, further change is certain. The UK is eager to shed its responsibilities in the
area and will look with favor on regional efforts to integrate. Several of the states are moving
toward independence, and even the smaller "associated states" have begun to voice dissatis-
faction with their indeterminate constitutional status. Thus, the success or failure of current
cooperative ventures will have a marked influence on the development of the region as a
whole.
ROOTS OF DIVERSITY the largest of the former British possessions, is
separated from the main chain of the Leeward-
Geographical, political, and sociological fac- Windward Isles by 1,100 miles of water and the
tors have combined to keep the Caribbean* land bodies of Hispaniola and Puerto Rico.
fragmented. The physical expanse alone, more
than 225,000 square miles, is enough to foster The British, the dominant colonial power in
insularity among the far-flung islands. Jamaica, the Caribbean, initially did little to encourage
*In its widest geographical interpretaion, the Caribbean refers to all land areas associated with the Caribbean Sea that
are not part of the mainland of the two American continents. For purposes of this report, however, the tern: will
generally be used to refer to British and former British possessions in the traditional West Indies.
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HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTUAL AND PROPOSED FEDERATIONS IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES
1867-1962
1867 With federation of Canada, Colonial Office policy was oriented toward federation through.
out Empire.
1871 Leeward Islands Federation: Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla, Monterrat,
British Virgin Islands. Lasted until 1956.
1876 Riots protesting Barbados Federation,
1882 Union of St. Kitts - Nevis adopted by Louward Islands Legislature.
1884 Royal Commission advocates separation of Barbados from Windwards and addition ri
Dominica. Dominica lot added until 1939.
1888 Tobago and Trinidad federalized (merged in 1899),
1922 ' Proposal of common governor for Trinidad and Windwards opposed by Trinidad Chamber
of Commerce.
1932 Closer Union Commission report advocates eventual federation of Leewards, Windwards,
Trinidad-Tobago.
1944 Conference of Assoclited Chambers of Commerce, meeting at Barbados, endorses economic
federation.
1945 Secretary of St tte for the Colonies suggests debate in all British Caribbean legislatures for
purpose of calling conference to discuss federation.Caribbean Labor Congress, meeting at
Barbados, endorses proposal.
1947 Montego Bay Conference attended by representatives of all British Caribbean, possessions
except Bahamas. Delegates favor federation; authorize establishment of a Standing Closer
Association Committee (SCAC) to prepare draft constitution.
1948.1949 SCAC meets and prepares constitutional recommendations.
1950 Publication of SCAC report.
1951.1952 Colonial legislatures debate SCAC report. British Honduras and Guiana decide not to
participate in federation.
1953 First London Conference. Freedom of movement and continuation of British aid are
paramount issues.
1955 Conference or. Freedom of Movement at Trinidad successful.
1956 Second London Conference. Standing Federation Committee det up to prepare for federa.
tion.
1957 Standing Federation Committee selects Port of Spain as site for federal capital.
1958 Governor-General arrives at Trinidad; first federal legislature is elected.
1961 Jamaica 6 .draws from federation.
1962 Trinidad Tobago withdraws from federation. British formally dissolve West Indies Fed-
eration.
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cooperation among the islanders. They estab-
lished a mercantile system under which the
islands traded primarily with Enf,land and almost
not at all among themselves, and this fostered
competition rather than cooperation. The islands
were essentially producing the same products for
the same market. On the administrative level, the
British ruled through a separate governor for each
island. In general, they sought to keep the prob-
lems of one island from spilling over to another.
Racially the Caribbean presents a mix.
Negroes, Bushnegroes, mulattoes, East Indians of
several types, and European whites populate the
islands in widely var;~ing percentages. In most
areas, the Negro or mixed Negro group now doer
inates the political scene, although various racial
minority groups still hold a disproportionate
share of the economic wealth and occupy the top
rung of the social ladder. In addition, geographi-
cal isolation has produced local differences among
the islands in speech, outlook, and custom.
In an attempt to cope with their far-flung
and diverse colonial empire, the British did take
some steps toward developing a federal franme-
work in the late 19th century, but these were
largely ineffective. In 1871 the British Parliament
declared the Leeward Islands a federal colony,
but the move created dissatisfaction among the
islands and never progressed much beyond a
paper entity. In 1876, an attempt was made to
combine Barbados with the Windward Island
chain, but this unpopular effort sparked wide-
spread and serious rioting and was soon aban-
doned. In large measure, the Caribbean status
duo-a geographical entity with little political,
economic, or social cohesion-continued until af-
ter World War II.
FEDERATION EFFORTS
In the last two decades, the British have
adopted a policy of pragmatic decolonization in
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the Caribbean designed to promote a federalist
concept and to facilitate UK withdrawal from
former territorial possessions there.
In 1947 a conference in Jamaica laid the
foundation for the federation venture a decade
later by establishing both constitutional and re-
gional economic committees. Following further
conferences and negotiations, the West Indies
Federation (WIF) finally came into being in 1958.
At its founding it included Jamaica, Trinidad-
Tobago, Barbados, St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla,
Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, and Grenada. The Turks and Caicos
Islands and the Cayman Islands were dependent
territories in the federation but were not repre-
sented in the legislature.
The WIF survived formally for four years,
but the major problems impeding its functioning
were obvious from the outset. There were deep
differences of opinion as to what sort of structure
it should have, and the union amounted to a
political federation without independent sources
of revenue and with no major departments of
government as a responsibility. It existed without
a customs union and without the right of freedom
of movement of its citizens. Its effective death
knell was signaled in 1961 when Jamaica, the
largest and most populous member, withdrew to
seek unilateral independence. Trinidad followed
this lead a year later, and the British dissolved the
federation in 1962.
Jamaica's withdrawal was in part prompted
by internal political maneuvering, but even with-
out domestic political considerations the federal-
ist concept probably would not have survived.
The larger states believed they were being called
upon to contribute a disproportionate share to
the venture. They were reluctant to grant author-
ity to the central legislature and feared that their
more developed economies would be drained by
the needs of the smaller islands. The smaller and
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13 March 1970
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poorer islands gave the greatest amount of sup-
port to the federation but at the same time
moved toward greater local autonomy. This ac-
tion was in turn attacked by the larger states as
costly administrative duplication. To some ex-
tent, similar apprehensions and doubts exist to-
day.
Federation efforts have left few constructive
remains. The most important remnant is the Uni-
versity of the West Indies (UWI). This oldest of
RANGE OF OPINION ON FEDERATION
"Whether federation is more costly or less
costly, whether federation is-more efficient or less
efficient, federation is inescapable if the British Carib-
bean Territories are to cease to parade themselves to
the twentieth century as eighteenth century anach-
ronisms. "
Prime Minister Eric Williams
of Trinfdad
"I think, regrettably, that in the next five to :en
years the West Indies will not yet have learned that a
political federation is the only salvation of the West
Indies. It was only sheer necessity that forced eco-
nomic integration. "
Sir Gran t.ey Adams, elder leader
of the opposition in Barbados and
former premier of the unsuccessful
West Indies Federation (1958-62)
"Sentiment no longer has any meaning here. Our
basic approach on integration will be, Yam in it only
if it suits and will benefit cur country ...e!"ery man for
himself and let the devil lake the hindmost.' "
Premier Bradshaw of the Associated
State of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla
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the common institutions received a new lease m
life last year when the heads of government of the
Caribbean Coninmonweal th, amidst rumors that
one or more countries would withdraw to found
their own national universities, voted to maintain
the school's regional character for at least nine
years after its present charter expires in 1972. In
addition to the UWI, other vestiges of the federa-
tion are a shipping service owned and subsidized
by all the Commonwealth members except
Guyana, interchangeable currencies, and a cony
mon West Indies cricket team.
The Associated States and some of the in-
dependents as well have left the constitutional
door open to future political unions. The consti-
tutions of the Associated States (they are asso-
ciated with the UK, not with one another) make
it easier to move toward federation than toward
independence. Barbados' constitution also per-
mits union with other countries by a simple legis-
lative majority.
Since the breakup of the union, however,
political integration has made little headway, de-
spite some economic advances. During 1962-65
the eight smaller territories discussed organizing a
small federation, but the scheme was eventually
shelved as a result of stresses and strains similar to
those that afflicted the larger union. Grenada's
sometimes-' oiced intent to seek unitary state-
;.vut' with Trinidad also made little progress. In-
dividual political development has occurred, how-
ever, and change has been the watchword of the
last decade. The former British colonial wards are
now a hodgepodge of independent countries, as-
sociated states, crown colonies, and territories.
Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados are
independent members of the British Common-
wealth and members of the Organization of
American States. Guyana, a geographical entity of
the South American mainland but still primarily
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l._i.'i,11Unllc POW[)! i:11
I y: ribhcan ;1111
`Y'11(1' 1 j\1n('riCwI ,'\i';';IS
Imports
(million US dollars)
$2,710 Exports
(million US dollars)
$168
Imports per capita
(US dollars)
Exports per capita
(US dollars)
Data for 1964.65
978.5 7.70
involved in the Caribbean, is a republic and a
member of the Commonwealth. Associated state-
hood, a novel form of semi-independence, has
been conferred upon the triune state of St. Kitts -
Nevis - Anguilla as well as upon Antigua,
Dominica, St. Lucia, and Grenada. In October
1969, St. Vincent emerged from colonial status to
join the ranks of the associated states. The Ba-
hama Islands have a form of internal self-govern-
ment similar to that of associated statehood.
Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the
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Population
(million)
Inhabitants
(sq, mile)
Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)
(billion US dollars)
Cayman Islands, nd the British Virgin Islands
remain colonies. No immediate change in the
status of any except possibly Montserrat is likely.
British Honduras, a Central American appendage
somewhat outside the pale of the British Carib-
bean and occupied with its own special problems,
is still a colony but is fast approaching independ-
ence. These changes and prospective changes,
combined with the enthusiasm generated by the
establishment of new economic institutions, have
helped to revive talk of a political merger.
170,000
74
$3.59
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EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
On the positive side of the integration
ledger, the Caribbean countries have taken major
steps forward in economic cooperation in recent
years. The formation of the Regional Develop-
ment Agency in 1968, the Caribbean Free Trade
Area (CARIFTA) in the same year, and the inaug-
uration of the Caribbean Development Bank
(CDB) in January represent definite advances.
Significantly, the impetus for these moves came
in substantial measure from the states themselves
as opposed to the unsuccessful 1958-62 Federa-
tion, which was largely a case of reluctant acces-
sion to determined British diplomatic prodding.
Economically the total Caribbean area pre-
sents a potential that in some respects compares
favorably with that of the Central American re-
gion, which has experienced the most successful
economic integration in recent years. The various
economies of the present CARIFTA countries are
quite small and still competitive in many respects,
however, and they stand to gain less from integra-
tion than have the Central American republics. In
addition, the possible inclusion of such areas as
the Dominican Republic and Haiti in CARIFTA
are still proposals and probably years from frui-
tion. That the new cooperative economic efforts
under way have given the cause of integration a
transfusion cannot be denied, but their success,
on which hinge further area-wide efforts, is hardly
ensured. Some difficult problems are already aris-
ing.
CARIFTA is the oldest of the regional eco-
nomic institutions, dating from an initial three-
member union formed in 1965 that blossomed
into the current eleven-member participating
group in the summer of 1968. The ec-)nomic bloc
represents a free-trade area, although number of
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products are on a reserved list and will not be
freed of tariff restraints by the larger countries
until 1973 or by the smaller members until 1978.
The market has yet to amount to very much
substantively, however, although talks and studies
have proceeded apace on further steps such as the
imposition of a common external tariff and allo-
cation of monopoly industries with rights to the
entire market.
Jamaica, for instance, in the first full year of
CARIFTA membership in 1969 has seemingly
fared well, with exports to the area up 63 percent
as compared with a 10.9-percent decline in 1968
and imports up 45 percent as compared with a
1.7-percent increase the year before. Jamaica's
CARIFTA trade, however, still only amounts to
an insignificant 2.8 percent of total exports and
1.4 percent of total imports This highlights a
CA R l F TA-wide difficulty-namely, that the
countries are not producing many products for
sale to one another.
In addition, Jamaica's increased imports
were principally from another of the larger is-
lands, Trinidad. A good part of Jamaica's exports,
on the other hand, were shipped to the smaller
islands that have nothing to sell to Jamaica. The
trend, if continues d, is likely to substantiate the
fear of the smaller states that CARIFTA was not
designed to benefit them. Even the larger islands,
which seem likely to gain the most from the
CARIFTA arrange,:.ent, are still in the honey-
moon period of economic cooperation when the
easy gains of integration are most apparent. They
have yet to face knotty problems such as the
complete removal of tariffs or the possible estab-
lishment of a common external tariff', a necessary
neat step if the arrangement is to progress to a
customs union and to an eventual common mar-
ket.
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Partly to protect their own interests, the
small islands have formed their own subregional
Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM)
within CARIFTA. The ECCM's functions are not
entirely clear. Not only does it offer long-term
complications to the functioning of CARIFTA,
but it also presents only a very limited economic
potential. It could serve a useful purpose, how-
ever, if it facilitated cooperation and understand-
ing among the traditionally rivalry ridden eastern
Caribbean states.
OTHER INSTITUTIONS
The Regional Development Agency (RDA),
like the ECCM, was also set up in 1968 to cater to
the needs of Barbados and the smaller states. The
RDA, established to provide an integrated ap-
proach to economic development, ostensibly
filled an organizational void. Its performance to
date, however, has been lackluster owing to a
variety of problems. Expectations may have been
too high because of the unrealistic anticipation
that the US and the UK would use the organiza-
tion for funneling a greatly increased flow of aid
funds and technical expertise. A lack of technical
personnel to staff the organization and poor co-
ordination among the several states have also
hindered its efforts. A $240,000 grant from the
UK has not been utilized because of lack of
agreement on a specific project. More to the
point, in February of this year the executive
secretary of the RDA, charging that there had
been a complete absence of enthusiasm and qup-
port on the part of the member governments,
recommended either strengthening or abolishing
the institution. The representatives of the mem-
ber sates at the meeting believed that the agency
should be preserved, but no concrete steps have
been taken to ensure its survival as a meaningful
body.
Prospects for economic cooperation have
been enhanced by the recent inauguration of the
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Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). The very
existence of this bank, following Jamaica's initial
reluctance to participate and after a year-long
wrangle over its site, represents a significant stride
forward.
That the Caribbean area had been one of the
few developing regions without easy access to
lending institutions was due in part to the de-
pendent status of many of the islands. The new
bank will have a $50-million initial capitalizatio,i
divided in a 60:40 ratio between regional borrow-
ing members and the UK and Canada. The avail-
ability of previously scarce loan funds should
provide added impetus to integration efforts, at
least initially. The smaller countries have viewed
the bank as an institution primarily designed to
help them achieve self sufficiency, and once again
they have high hopes. If the bank does not live up
to their expectations, the members will increas-
ingly seek bilateral rather than multilateral
avenues of assistance.
Several other regional institutions are shared
by the smaller states. In addition to the RDA,
ECCM, CDB, and CARIFTA, the six West Indies
Associated States (WIAS) territories participate in
an informal Council of Ministers of the WIAS,
share a common juridical institution in the WIAS
Supreme Court, and use a common currency is-
sued by the East Caribbean Currency Authority.
Because these countries also have generally weak
economies with little prospect of improvement,
they probably offer the most favorable climate
for federation. Yet at the same time, these tiny
islands manifest many of the traits that impede
substantial progress toward integration.
The extreme view has sometimes been ex-
pressed that without a federated Caribbean, a
Balkanization of the area might take place. This
fear, voiced at the time of the breakup of the
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University of West Indies (UWI)
1947
West Indies Federation (WIF)
1958:dissolved in 1962
West Indies Associated States Supreme Court
1967
Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA)-
1968
Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM)
1968
Regional Development Agency (RDA)"
1968
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) ---
1970
'British Honduras has signified her intention to join.
-'U,e, UK, and Canada, und representatives to the organizations meetings.
-"Canada and the UK will be non?regionaI member, contributing to equity base.
US has indicated intent to loan funds to the bank.
West Indies Federation, has not been realized, nor
is Balkanization a likely prospect for the region as
a whole. The leaders of the prospective nations,
however, have allowed personal rivalries and polit-
ical immaturity to black integration efforts and,
at least in one instance, to lead to de facto politi-
cal fragmentation. The British, although still re-
sponsible for the defense and external affairs of
the associated and other semi-independent states,
have been reluctant to intercede forcefully. The
Caribbean states, for their part, have backed off
from grappling with thorny political problems on
a regional basis.
Events such as the drawn-out Anguillan crisis
raise the prospect of endemic, if sporadic, insta-
bility in the islands, and serve to dampen pros-
pects for cooperation and integration. The An-
guillans, some 6,000 strong and representing a
third of the state of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla,
seceded from what they believed was an arbitrary,
overbearing, and unresponsive central administra-
tion in St. Kitts in May 1967. The British tempo-
rarily stabilized the situation by dispatching a
frigate in August, but matters were pretty much
allowed to drift until 1969. At that time island
leader Ronald Webster threatened to declare total
independence and to expel British officials. In
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response, the British launched a well-publicized
and somewhat comic "mini-invasion" to re-estab-
lish control.
Attempts by the British to promote a Carib-
bean consensus on whatever action would prove
necessary were unsuccessful. Jamaica announced
it would under no conditions ever participate in a
peace-keeping operation in the Caribbean. Even-
tually, both Jamaica and Trinidad publicly de-
nounced Britain's use of force. The states were
unable to reach an accord even when it was to
their mutual advantago to guarantee jointly a con-
stitutional solution co protect the -egion's
vaunted reputation for stability-upon which a
good part of the important tourist dollar depends.
Meanwhile, Anguilla continues in an. undefimal
constitutional status.
Although no domino theory of instability
holds true for the Caribbean, certainly other areas
such as Barbuda and Nevis, which are constitu-
tionally linked to Antigua and St. Kitts, respec-
tively, will watch the resolution of the Anguillan
problem with great interest. As recently as Janu-
ary of this year, the 1,000 residents of B2:-buda
again petitioned the Queen for independence.
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Such rivalries are only one facet of the prob-
lems faced by these small islands. A lack of politi-
cal sophistication on the part of sonic leaders
combined with the common, small-state prob-
lem of inadequate security forces poses the con-
tinuing threat of disturbances similar to those
that affected Antigua in 1968 and caused the
dispatch of British forces to the area. Such Out-
breaks, although not likely to result in widespread
death or destruction, will nonetheless chill pros-
pects for cooperation.
Truculence and immaturity are not the ex-
clusive possessions of the small islanders. It was
largely a matter of obdurate pride that delayed
the opening of the Caribbean Development Bank
for a year, with Jamaica insisting upon Kingston
as the only logical site. Similarly, it was J, maica's
reluctance to join CARIFTA that threatened the
economic viability of that fledgling institution.
Jamaica's final decision to participate in the two
institutions has had a salutary effect on prospects
for future efforts but Kingston remains lukewarm
at best to further schemes.
Nationalism may also prove to be an impedi-
ment to integration plans. As is the case in the
rest of Latin America, a sense of nationalism is
unmistakably on the rise in the Caribbean. The
new trend is most apparent in government atti-
tudes toward the foreign community. The admin-
istrations in the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Barbados
are in the process o,' levying new demands for
increased benefits from and greater control over
foreign investments. Another manifestation is the
black nationalism facet of black power, a wide-
ranging if somewhat imprecise philosophy that
has attracted adherents throughout the Carib-
bean. These initial inOications are probably pre-
cursors of a generally more nationalistic stance on
the part of individual governments and of a cor-
respondingly greater reluctance to delegate au-
thority to a multinational body.
Special Report - 10 -
RECENT TRENDS
On the positive side, informal consultations
between the nations on practical issues are on the
rise. Last summer, for example, ministers of home
affairs as well as police representatives from
Guyana, Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica met to
initiate discussions and coordination on security
matters. Although such efforts are promising,
they are, a far cry from dealing on a regional basis
with the obvious need for an area police force to
ensure order on the smaller islands, where over-
burdened and undertrained forces would be no
match for prolonged disorders.
The summer and fall of 1969 witnessed the
most recent flurry of prointegration statements,
concurrent with press rumors of a proposed polit-
ical federation of the West Indies Associated
States. At the same time, Prime Minister Eric
Williams of Trinidad-Tobago offered to federate
with any or all of the associated states. Guyana
was also spoken of as a prospective participant.
Premier John Compton of St. Lucia assumed
the lead in initiating discussions among the several
premiers, but, despite the widespread rmors, lit-
tle progress was made. The premiers differed over
whether the federation would include all or part
of the WIAS, or whether the move would be tied
to an attempt to federate a larger area, including
Guyana and Trinidad. Coupled with a lukewarm
response from representatives of Antigua and St.
Kitts, both preoccupied with internal political
troubles, these problems scuttled the talks.
It is generally accepted that a widespread
sentiment for another try at a political merger
still exists. The depth of commitment of the
member states to such a goal in the near term,
however, is called into question by the quick
waning of last summer's effort. Trinidad has con-
sistently struck the strongest integrationist pose,
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and Prime Minister Williams in the past has been
one of the most ardent proponents of regionalism
as an inevitable solution to the problems of the
West Indies. Williams, among others, envisions an
eventually united Caribbean that would include
all of the area's countries. His recent initiatives
calling for the reintegration of Cuba into the
hemisphere, as well as the promotion of closer
cooperation with the Dominican Republic, are a
part of that perspective. From both a practical
and philosophic point of view, he believes such
cooperation is inevitable in the long run.
Williams' recent offers of partial political
federation were not clearly spelled out, however,
and may have hinged on substantial funding and
suppori fro:ti outside sources such as the US and
UK. In recent conversations with US officials,
Williams has indicated his dismay with political
events in the Caribbean, citing "irrationality in
Jamaica, madness in Antigua, and danger in St.
Kitts." He proposed to keep Trinidad "out of the
mess." Although Trinidad-Tobago is not likely to
shift its public posture favoring integration, Wil-
liams does not appear as likely to foster any new
movement on his own. New outbreaks of hostility
on the islands would further reinforce this hesi-
tancy.
In Guyana, Minister of State Ramphal has
been a leading advocate of integration, and discus-
sion of a partial Guyanese - West Indian bloc has
cropped up several times in recent years. The
political motivation for such, an initiative may
have been greater a few years ago, however. At
that time Negro Premier Burnham appeared in
greater need of additional votes from the black-
populated islands in order to reinforce his elec-
toral cushion over the large East Indian popula-
tion led by pro-Communist Cheddi Jagan. Guy-
ana, whose efforts were largely responsible for the
birth of CARIFTA., will probably persist in foster-
ing integration. At present, however, Burnham's
Special Report
position is more secure, and the administration is
preocc' hied with border disputes with its neigh-
bors.
Barbados, under Prime Minister Barrow, has
remained generally aloof from integration pro-
posals, and that country probably will not assume
a leading role. Barbados opposed the prospective
merger between the smaller states and Trinidad in
1962. It is disappointed with its present role in
the Regional Development Agency, and could
withdraw from that organization in the future.
Other dependent territories, such as the Bahamas
and Bermuda continue to be oriented away from
the Cariobean and seem even less likely to be
interested in integration proposals.
Finally, Jamaica apparently will continue its
historically laggard role with regard to integra-
tion. The Shearer administration maintains a
strong suspicion of any further cooperative
schemes. The prospective benefits from
CARIFTA, which are in themselves uncertain, are
likely in any event to be a marginal consideration
not capable of overcoming Jamaica's traditional
reluctance. This effectively rules out the prospect
for any near-term attempt at federation on a scale
as grand as that of the defunct West Indies Feder-
ation.
A persistent but somewhat hazy commit-
ment to political integration over the long-term
still exists in the Caribbean. In practical terms,
however, the nascent economic base for such a
move at this point is not a compelling argument
for the majority. The future of intraregional eco-
nomic cooperation is fraught with nettlesome
problems and could be disappointing.
The best prospects for near-term integration
rest with the Associated States. They cannot
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realistically assume that Britain will supply ;.co-
nomic support indefinitely. Tl.e prospective lure
of funds from lending institutions, which would
be more readily available to a federated area,
could be another inducement. The possibility of
some change is enhanced by the associated states'
present constitutional status, which reflects re-
sidual British interest in federation and is more an
interim attempt to fill the void left by the demis^
of the old federation than a lasting solution. Fur-
ther, the prospective British entry into the Euro-
pean Economic Community could mean the loss
of the preferential trade system for the Common-
wealth members and signal a gradual dirninutior,
of British budgetary support.
These inducements could be sufficient to
promote an integration effort that could conceiv-
ably include Trinidad or, less probably, Guyana.
A necessary requirement for success, however,
would be that the island leaders rise above their
petty jealousies and political rivairles, something
they have been unable to do in the past. This
would require a substantial political sacrifice from
people such as Premier Eric Gairy of Grenada,
however, who operates from a localized, well-
known aphorism: "What is good for Gairy is good
for Grenada." The national leaders, despite lip
service to the idea, still appear several steps, and
possibly several years, away from the nuts-and-
bolts decisions that would be prerequisites for
integration.
It may be that a major integration effort will
have to await new leaders or the injection of
another factor into the equation. The UK has
been reluctant to cut the remnants of its empire
adrift before they attain at least a measure of
political and economic maturity. The British may
therefore be resigned, if not content, to maintain
present arrangements for a few more ears.
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