THE BRAZILIAN "REVOLUTION": STAGE THREE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 6, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Brazilian `Revolution " Stage Three
DSS FILE COPY
RETURN TO 1E'61
Secret
N2 683
6 March 1970
No. 0360/70A
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The Brazilian 'Revolution". Stage Three
President Emilio Medici is the third former military man to govern Brazil since
the armed forces removed leftist-nationalist Joao Goulart in April 1964. Like his
predecessors, Humberto Castello Branco (April 1964 - March 1967) and Arthur da
Costa e Silva (March 1967 - October 1969), Medici came to the presidency without
actual civilian consultation. He was chosen by, and has his oower base in, the
military establishment; and he inherited some well-established policy lines and
practices identified with the 1964 "revolution." Medici now holds unprecedented
authoritarian powers, and he has cited a return to democracy, as well as long-
overdue rerorms in education, health, and agriculture, as major goals of his adminis-
tration. His programs face many potential hazards, however. Lack of communication
and a gulf of mistrust continue to separate the military from civilian politicians, and
Medici will need great imagination and diplomacy to bridge the gap by the end of his
term in 1974.
Emilio Medici is a tough-minded, retired
career army officer who has spent mr^` of his life
in the service. His only important ...tact with
political affairs prior to assuming the presidency
occurred during the period from March 1967 to
March 1969, when, as chief' of the National In-
telligence Service (SNI), he served as one of the
President's most trusted confidants. Medici con-
tinued to advise Costa a Silva following his assign-
ment to command the Third Army in Rio Grande
do Sul, the native state of both men. When the
President was incapacitated by a stroke last Au-
gust, Medici's closeness to the infirm chief execu-
tive was one of the reasons for his selection as
successor by the military leadership.
The new president is a taciturn, deliberate
individual whose style of governing Brazil un-
doubtedly derives from his 45 years of study and
practice of the principles of military command.
He almost invariably backs his subordinates and
Special Report
protects them from external pressures as long as
their loyalty to him is untarnished and lie con-
tinues to find them useful. At the same time, he
would act swiftly against anyone whom lie sus-
pected of disloyalty or dishonesty, or of per-
mitting news of bickering in the official family to
become public. The value Medici places on per-
formance and technical competence was reflected
in the selection of officials for his administration.
Most of them are capable civilian and military
technicians who have no personal political
"By the end of my
administration, I hope
to leave democracy
definitively installed
in our country, as -vell
as firm bases for our
social and economic
development."
President Emilio Medici
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followings. Medici largely reserves the role of
dealing with politicians for himself. In announc-
ing his cabinet selections, Medici stressed that he
intended them to work as a united team and that
lie would not tolerate any "solitary or errant
stars" who would use their posts to further their
political ambitions. Six ministers are holdovers
from the Costa e Silva cabinet, and ten are new
appointees. Two of the holdovers-Education
Minister Passarinho and Transportation Minister
Andreazza-are young, -politically astute, retired
army colonels, who.-military backgrounds and
civilian tics caused them to be considered possible
"transition" candidates for the presidency after
Costa e Silva. Under Medici, however, both ap-
pear to have set aside, at least for a while, their
political aspirations and are concentrating on the
considerable problems facing their departments.
The new ministers of health and agriculture
should perform much better than their predeces-
sors in these key areas. The new justice minis-
ter, Alfredo Buzaid, is the cabinet's most conserva-
tive member. He is heartily disliked by liberals
and students for his alleged role in the purge of
more than 60 professors at the University of Sao
Paulo last spring. He has recently been sharply
attacked by the already semicontrolled press for
issuing a decree authorizing the federal police to
censor books and periodicals before distribution
in order to eliminate "publications and outward
expressions against morality and accepted cus-
tom." More than 100 new censors are being hired
to handle the increased workload.
Medici's actions during his four months in
office suggest that he will place much less reliance
on the cabinet as a consultative body and on the
National Security Council (CSN) than did Costa e
Silva. Currently, in the day-to-day operations of
the government and in advising the chief execu-
tive, the most important official organs are the
SNI and the Presidential Military Household, both
of which are headed by dedicated supporters of
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Medici. SNI director General Carlos Fontoura
served as chief of staff of the Third Army until he
replaced Medici as head of the SNI in March
1969. Military Household chief General Joao
Figueiredo followed Fontoura as Third Army
chief of staff, and as such was then Medici's
principal assistant and probably now is his closest
adviser. In addition to his army experience,
Figueiredo served as chief of the SNI's predeces-
sor agency, and from 1964 to 1966 headed the
SNI's Rio de Janeiro office. Figueiredo has
brought together in the Military Household a
highly structured group of able young officers of
a somewhat moralistic bent. These officers, and
similar military counterparts in the SNI, have
mainly been responsible for drafting most of
Medici's important policy statements. A new Spe-
cial Presidential Advisory Office apparently will
have increasing responsibilities for coordinating
matters coming before the executive. In contrast,
Medici thus far has given only a minor role to the
Presidential Civil Household, which was quite ac-
tive under Costa e Silva.
An unknown factor in the administration is
Vice President Rademaker, a controversial retired
admiral who made many enemies during his naval
career. A staunch conservative, Rademaker helped
plan the "revolution" against Goulart, and sub..
sequently had an important part in purging sub-
versivo elements from the service. As Costa e
Vice President
Rademaker
Silva's navy minister, he
became the senior mern-
ber of the triumviirate
that ruled in Costa e
Silva's name following
his incapacitation. Rade-
maker reportedly re-
jected the vice presi-
dency at least twice, and
accepted it only at
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M edici's insistence. The President apparently
chose Rademaker as a symbol of the continuity
of the "revolution," but now may regret this
decision. Although Rademaker has assembled a
large personal staff, with military officers pre-
dominating, his official role remains unclear. The
revisions of the 1967 constitution in 1969 took
from the vice president his principal, traditional
duty of presiding over the Congress. Nonetheless,
Rademaker has worked hard to make new con-
tacts with civilian politicians and to keep up his
ties with military figures such as General Portella,
former chief of Costa e Silva's Military House-
hold.
Like that of his two predecessors, ivledici's
power base lies in the military establishment, and
lie must constantly be concerned i about
preventing any signs of division within the armed
forces. For the present, lie holds several strong
cards. His election by top officers was largely due
to his excellent army record and reserved per-
sonality, which made him acceptable to a broad
sector of the armed forces. His selection also
provided a welcome solution to the threat to
military unity posed by ambitious generals ma-
neuvering for the presidency. Costa a Silva's plans
to reopen Congress and overhaul the Constitution
had been bitterly opposed by a substantial sector
of the military, but these steps were taken by the
triumvirate as essential parts of the process of
installing Medici, creating a narrow political open-
ing that Medici can expand if he chooses. He has
achieved a balance among the military factions by
appointing followers of Castello Branco to such
high positions as Military Household chief and
army minister. The latter, General Orlando Geisel,
is a !.trict disciplinarian who will brook no dissent
in the service. Even malcontents such as General
Albuquerque Lima, who bitterly attacked the
military chiefs for failing to consider him for the
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presidency, appear to have been brought into line,
at least for the present. The triumvirate gave
Medici a powerful tool to curb any military dis-
sension with the issuance of Institutional Act 17,
which authorizes him to transfer to the reserves
any military man whose actions he believes pose a
threat to discipline or to hierarchical principles.
in more serious cases, he can permanently sep-
arate such an individual from the service under
the earlier Institutional Act 5. Medici prof ably
has also earned some armed forces favor by au-
thorizing pay increases that will mean an approxi-
mately 20 to 25 percent rise in real wages this
year, following a similar increment in 1969.
Immediately after Medici's selection for the
presidency, he said that one of his principal goals
would be to establish democracy firmly in Brazil
by the end of his term. In order to achieve this
goal, he must chart a course through dangerous
waters. The President's powers will have to be
reduced, military support must be maintained,
and a legitimate role for civilians must be found.
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Medici inherited far greater powers than
those held by his two revolutionary predecessors
at their inaugurations. Castello Branco's legacy to
his su,?cessor was four institutional acts-decrees
with the force of law-and a constitution incor-
porating broad executive authority. By October
1969, however, Costa e Silva and the triumvirate
had expanded these powers greatly by means of
13 additional institutional acts, a substantial revi-
sion of the 1967 constitution, and a new National
Security Law authorizing trial by military courts
for persons accused of a wide variety of subver-
sive activities. Medici also inherited a list of over
1,000 Brazilians-including three former presi-
dents-whose political rights have been canceled
for ten years on the grounds of corruption or
subversion. In many cases the charges were justi-
fied; in others, however, the sanction was used to
neutralize outspoken opposition spokesmen or to
remove political rivals. The President now has the
authority to add to this list; to apply additional
penalties to persons who have already been de-
prived of their political rights; to confiscate the
property of anyone who has ever held political
office; to suspend the right of habeas corpus and
most other traditional liberties; and to declare a
state of siege for an unlimited time. In order to
carry out his directives, he c,-ti rely on the armed
forces with their individual intelligence services,
on the SNI and on the Federal Police, an ,J on the
Police-Military Inquiry (1PM), a formal iact-find-
ing body that has played an important role in the
purging of individuals at many levels on suspicion
of corruption or subversion.
These powers and institutions give Medici a
wide range of options within parameters accept-
able to the military in governing Brazil. He can
operate within the constitution or exercise almost
absolute authority. Medici is said to have a pro-
found belief in representative government and in
the principles of democracy, and these convic-
tions may lead him to preserve democratic forms
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and appearances even when democratic practice
proves impossible. Because Medici has largely re-
mained aloof from politics during his military
career, there is little information on what his goal
of democracy means or how he intends to achieve
it. Public statements suggest that he views politics
as a means of producing national consensus
around high ideals and "great 'rational goals" that
have universal accepiance. and that he believes
personal ambitions and conflicting pressures by
special interest groups have no constructive func-
tion in
he is
sincere in his desire to turn the government back
to civilian politicians by the end of his term.
however, lie will do so
only politicians demonstrate to him that they
are responsible citizens, that they share most of
the ideals of the revolution, and that they will not
allow a return to the political turmoil that existed
prior to March 1964.
Medici has said that his joining the progov-
ernment National Renewal Alliance (ARENA)
party shortly after his inauguration represented
the start of the reconstruction of Brazil's political
life. He declared at that time that ARENA's func-
tion was to give political support to his govern-
ment and to the "revolution," and lie made it
clear that his role in the party would be that of a
"firm captain and not of an agile politician," He
rapidly implemented his command role by hand-
picking a president for ARENA, as well as its
leaders in the two chambers of Congress. This
departure from tradition surprised party stalwarts
who had expected to get the jobs.
Many facets of Medici's political program
will be tested in the Congress. Under Costa e
Silva, the unexpected refusal of the Chamber of
Deputies to allow the lifting of the parliamentary
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immunities of a member accused of slandering the
armed forces was a prime cause leading to the
imposition of broad new authoritarian powers in
December 1968. This executive action resulted in
the suspension of Congress, which was reopened
only last October to ratify the armed forces'
selection of Medici. The Congress that will func-
tion tinder Medici has been reduced both in size
and authority. Cancellations of political rights
have eliminated 88 members (27 from ARENA
and 61 from the opposition Brazilian Democratic
Movement-MDB) from the 409-seat Chamber of
Deputies, and five legislators (all from the MDB)
have been removed from the 66-scat Senate.
During an abbreviated session from 20 Octo-
ber to 30 November, the members of Congress
concentrated on avoiding incidents that might
cause the government and the military to retaliate
and on staking out positions on which they could
build a role for the two political parties. The
MDB accepted Medici's guidance that it act as a
loyal opposition, "pointing out errors, agreeing
with correct points, indicating paths." It called
for repeal of the institutional acts; for an end to
arbitrary and punitive political acts such as can-
cellation of political rights, confiscation of prop-
erty, and censorship; for termination of the re-
cently adopted death penalty and banishment; for
full popular participation in the national deci-
sion-making process by means of direct, universal,
secret suffrage; for the restoration of full in-
dividual and political rights and liberties; for the
restoration of the power and autonomy of th'
legislative and judicial branches vis-a-vis the exec-
utive; and for greater economic and social justice.
In setting forth this all-inclusive program, the
MDB was careful not to blame Medici for the
present authoritarian political situation and ap-
plauded his aspirations to correct it. The MDB
spokesmen stressed the party's intention to act
exclusively within the law and expressed its
abhorrence of any sort of violence.
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ARENA leaders in Congress often were torn
between a desire to act with some degree of
independence and their need to demonstrate to
the President that they were loyally defending his
programs and the "revolution." As a result, thlr
MDB seized the initiative and adopted positions
that in fact often were held by the entire "politi-
cal class."
The great majority of the 92 million Bra-
zilians have little knowledge of politics and do
not believe that anything they do will signifi-
cantly affect those who govern them. Those who
are politically aware-mainly professional politi-
cians and the economic decision-makers- look
upon the present government with views ranging
from firm approval to resignation. There is, how-
ever, a small minority completely alienwted frcm
"the system" and willing to use violence to ex-
press opposition to it. This nebulous and frag-
mented sector, probably numbering not more
than a few hundred, includes some purged politi-
cians, former military men cashiered because of
their leftist political or subversive activity, stu-
dents expelled from universities for similar rea-
sons, and members of the radical wing of the
Catholic Church who consider the military a reac-
tionary force. In addition, there is probably a
considerably larger sector of society that does not
engage in violence, but at times expresses consid-
erable sympathy-and at times gives concrete as-
sistance-to those who do.
Some of the individuals who have turned to
violence claim they have adopted this course be-
cause all channels of peaceful opposition have
been closed off by the government's authoritarian
measures. Others say they have resorted to clan-
destine activity because they found their live-
lihood cut off as a result of government action.
These individuals, particularly former students,
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have formed the nucleus of several subversive
organizations that have carried on an extensive
campaign of antigovernment t rrorism over the
past two years. In several cases, the leadership has
been provided by professional extreme leftists,
many of whom have been expelled from the Mos-
cow-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) be-
cause of their espousal of violent tactics and their
admiration for the revolutionary theories of Mao
Tse-tung and Fidel Castro. Terrorist activities,
which have hit Sao Paulo hardest, have included
bombings, kid;iapings, robberies of banks and
stores selling arms, and airliner highjackings.
Following the kidnaping of US Ambassador
Elbrick last September, security forces went on
an all-out campaign to wipe out these subversive
groups, and they recently claimed to have neu-
tralized some of the most important ones. The.;e
include the National Liberating Action (ALN),
the Revolutionary Armed Vanguard-Palmares
(VAR-P), and the Revolutionary Brazilian Com-
munist Party (PCBR). Numerous arrests of mnem-
bers of the PCBR and Popular Action (AP) mili-
tants in the northeast may have prevented an
outbreak of rural violence in that potentially vola-
tile area. The security forces' greatest triumph
was the killing last November of dissident Com-
munist Carlos Marighella, chief of the ALN and
the country's most effective terrorist leader. Sev-
eral key figures in other terrorist groups have
been arrested, and others have been forced to go
into hiding or flee the country. Marighella's heir
apparent, Joaquim Camara Ferreira? received a
warm reception in Cuba. The fact that terrorism
does continue, even though on a considerably
lower scale, indicates that remnants of these
groups remain at large. Probably the most dan-
gerous of their leaders is renegade Army Captain
THE CHURCH AND SUBVERSION 25X6
Carlos Lamarca, who heads the Popular Revolu- Although many observers have long been
tionary Vanguard (VPR). aware that individual priests openly sympathize
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with the need for a social, perhaps even violent,
revolution in Brazil, the police investigation that
resulted in Marighella's death led to the conclu-
sion that there are Catholic clergymen willing to
go beyond sympathy and into the ranks of those
actively involved in acts of terrorism. The investi-
Cardinal
gation revealed that
many clerics, especially
from the Dominican or-
der, were deeply in-
volved in supporting
Marighella's organiza-
tion. Their arrests were
followed by additional
ones in other parts of
the country. Several cler-
ics, including at least one
bishop, have been in-
dicted.
Both the govern-
ment and the church at-
tempted to use restraint
in dealing with the deli-
cate problem, because
neither desired open conflict. The leading church
spokesman was Cardinal Rossi, archbishop of Sao
Paulo and president of the National Conference
of Brazilian Bishops. The Cardinal issued a public
statement expressing the church's disapproval of
all acts of violence, but he emphasized that even
if the clergymen were guilty, they deserved-as
did all Brazilian citizens-humane treatment by
police and competent legal assistance
the linking of clerics with terrorist
groups posed a serious dilemma for the Catholic
hierarchy: the bishops had to oppose violence,
but if they condemned the subversive priests,
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they could lose the support of many progressive
priests and further polarize the church.
The existing friction between the govern-
mnent and the church could be exacerbated by a
document sent to the Vatican oy a group of
Europeans describing alleged cases of torture of
priests and laymen in Brazil. One document in the
report, entitled "Terror and Torture in Brazil,"
apparently came from antigovernment Brazilian
clergymen and students. In January, Brazilian
newspapers carried a dispatch reporting that the
Commission of Peace and Justice of the Vatican
"could not remain deaf to the torture of priests
and political prisoners in Brazil," and that Pope
Paul "follows with careful attention the case of
the church in Brazil." The army quickly clamped
censorship on the topic. Many military men are
convinced that these developments result from a
subversive campaign aided by irresponsible ele-
ments of the Brazilian press to discredit them, the
government, and the "revolution." The reported
intention of the PCB to aid liberal clergymen in
the dissemination of claims of torture may
strengthen this belief.
Competent civilian professionals who have
largely designed Brazil's economic policy since
1964 have achieved considerable success in cor-
recting their predecessors' mistakes and establish-
ing conditions for sustained growth. They have
emphasized curbing credit, halting the inherited
wage/price spiral, and reducing the federal budget
deficit by controlling expenditures and increasing
revenue through improved tax collection a,md
other reforms. Financial stabilization efforts
under Castello Branco reduced the cost-of-living
increase from a projected annual rate of 140
percent in early 1964 to 41 percent by 1966.
Continued austerity under the Costa e Silva team
held the increases under 25 percent during the
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past three years. Exports, previously stagnant,
have increased throughout the period, and grew
by 20 percent in 1969 to the record level of $2.3
billion. Although imports rose sharply, growing
export earnings and capital inflows have enabled
exchange reserves to increase steadily. Invest-
ment. which remained depressed under Castello
Branco, rose rapidly under Costa e Silva. Even
though a recession slowed growth early in 1967,
total output grew by nearly 5 percent that year;
the 8.5 and 9 percent increases in 1968 and 1969
were the highest in Latin America. Many serious
problems remain, however. Some industrial
growth has been attained at the expense of neg-
lecting agriculture. There are great lags in the
development of some regions, and the foreign
debt burden is heavy.
GOVERNMENT-LABOR RELATIONS
Despite these major economic gains, the
austerity programs of the post-1964 governments
have resulted in some decline in the real wages of
many workers. The Medici regime's labor minister
has said that the government plans to increase the
purchasing power of the workers indirectly by
providing more educational scholarships, in-
creased medical assistance, and greater funds for
the acquisition of private housing. He called for
the cooperation of all unions in these endeavors
and urged them to organize consumer coopera-
tives and local schools to assist the government.
Workers were unable to find in his words or in
those of President Medici any indication that rir,;d
governmental cont:?ols over the unions would be
relaxed or that the salary policy would be modi-
fied.
The armed forces appear determined to r.--
main in control of Brazil for at least the next four
years. Although differences exist, the military are
united in the conviction that their principal role is
to control corruption and subversion, and that
the conduct of national affairs must never be
allowed to return to those whom they hold re-
sponsible for the pre-1964 political turmoil. At
the local level, military leaders are confident of
their ability to control and direct the areas under
their command and have little or no fear of the
development of significant opposition to the re-
gime or to themselves. They sympathize with
workers but regard unions and union leaders with
deep suspicion and with a measure of contempt.
The officers are particularly mistrustful of the
ability of the electorate to vote intelligently and
of the capacity of the political parties to organize
and lead the nation.
These widely held attitudes will require the
Medici government to be "extremely attentive to
its duties toward its base of. military support,"
according to a leading Brazilian political column-
iEt. Medici will almost certainly continue to use
all methods available, including the issuing of
decree laws, cancellation of political rights, cen-
sorship, and suspension of habeas corpus, to make
certain that he retains control of the limited re-
turn to more normal political processes. He has
indicated that campaigning for the gubernatorial
elections in October and the congressional elec-
tions in November can proceed only when he
gives the green light, and he will rely on the SNI
and on the army's regional commands to assure
him that the political credentials of candidates of
both the two parties are acceptable. Medici will
certainly exercise a veto over candidates not
firmly committed to the goals of the "revolution"
and he in fact will take an active role in selecting
the men who will collaborate with him as gov-
ernors, and possibly in Congress as well. This
decision not to make any rapid move toward
restoring "full democracy" probably is both a
reflection of his own inclinations and a judgment
that his military base will not allow such a course
now.
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The regular sessions of the national Congress
and state legislatures scheduled to open in March
are likely to test whether the civilian politicians
will maintain the cooperative attitude they have
shown the government thus far. Some ARENA
members may grow restive about the
organization's identification as the "1,000 pet-
cent" progovernment party, and not all MDB
members are satisfied with the limited role of
constructive criticism that has been assigned to
the opposition. The politicians generally are
aware of the military's ingrained distrust of them,
and they know that any harsh criticism of the
armed forces or of the government could result in
civilians being denied even the very restricted
participation they now have. The President might
make such a decision on his own initiative, or he
could be pushed intc it, as was Costa e Silva in
1968.
It seems doubtful that Medici can gain much
support among those elements that have become
deeply alienated from the government particu-
larly some of the university youth and professors
and certain liberal sectors of the clergy. Most
activist university students have been cowed by
the possibility that they could be expelled and
prohibited from attending any university for en-
gaging in political activity, but some will probably
continue to engage in clandestine antigovernment
activity through terrorist groups. The implement-
ation of long-needed reforms in education could
reduce their number and influence, bui the chal-
lenge to the government in this area is indeed a
massive one. The arrest of clergymen linked to
the Marighella organization was a severe blow, but
opposition to the government-in some cases vio-
lent-within the liberal sector of the church is
likely to grow and to present an increasing
dilemma for the hierarchy.
Labor remains unhappy about the govern-
ment's restrictive wage policies. The unions tradi-
tionally have been run largely from the Labor
Ministry, however, and because they have little
independent power, it is unlikely that they will be
able to pose any significant challenge to these
policies in the foreseeable future.
Medici's economic team is expected to con-
tinue its predecessors' policies of restraining
credit, controlling wages and prices, and promot-
ing increased investments and exports. Further
efforts to broaden the capital market and to
strengthen regional development will also be
made. Prospects, thus seem favorable for realiza-
tion of the government's goal of maintaining the
annual increase in the gross domestic product at 7
to 9 percent during 1970-73. Administration offi-
cials have said that agriculture, education. health,
and science will receive particular attention from
the Medici government. Brazil's economic prog-
ress since the revolution has provided an increas-
ing capability to tackle deficiencies in these areas,
but such programs will have to compete for scarce
resources with other priorities essential to sus-
tained high growth.
Brazil's long-range plans for becoming an
important world power are likely to result in
adopting some economic policies that frequently
will not parallel those of the US, and at times
may be in direct conflict with them. Friction has
already arisen over issues such as coffee prices,
the allocation to shipping lines of goods carried to
and from Brazil, and some other bilateral ques-
tions.
Thee remains .a possibility that Medici
might not be able to complete his term of office.
ready selected his cabinet and advisers in the
event that he needs to assume the presidency
Special Report
SECRET
Vice President Rademaker has al-
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 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020013-6
SECRET
because of Medici's sudden incapacitation or
death. Rademaker probably hopes that in such a
case he could prevent the military high command
from bypassing him as the presidential successor;
however, he has many enemies even within the
navy, and it is doubtful that the army would
Special Report
allow anyone from another service to become
chief executive. Thus the succession issue could
again provoke serious differences within the mili-
tary, a circumstance that could provide an open-
ing for ambitious officers with some civilian back-
ers, such as General Albuquerque
Lima.
-10- 6 March 1970
SECRET
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