PUSHTUNISTAN--AN HISTORICAL SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160081-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: November 6, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 November 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PUSHTUNISTAN-AN IiISTORICAL SURVEY
SUMMARY
Pushtunistan has once again become a bone of
contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
roots of the problem can be traced back to 1893,
when a nritish mission to Kabul under Sir Mortimer
Durand was able to reach an agreement; with the Af-
ghans on a bonder, subsequently known as the Durand
Line, which runs 1,200 miles from Sinkiang to Per-
sia. Unfortunately, the line cut in two an ethnic
community-the Pushtuns, a Muslim tribal society
which had 1i~ved in the area between the northern
reaches of the Indus River and the Hindu Kush moun-
tains for centuries. The Pustuns have a proud mili-
tary history and are fiercely independent. Today,
some 8 million Pushtuns form about half of the popu-
lation of Afghanistan; another 6 million live in
the Northwest Frontier Provi~ice of Pakistan.
'The Pushtuns have dominated the political life
of Afghanistan since it achieved independence in
the 18th century. Since then, political leaders in
Afghanistan have looked to the Pushtuns for sup-
port and have provided subsidies to tribal leaders
to gain their loyalty. Tn Pact, all Afghan rulers
for the past 200 years have been Pushtuns.
25X1 Comments an queries on the contents of this ubliea-
tion are raeleome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Currant Intettigenc e,
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lPushtunistan
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Afghan intoxest in the future of the Pushtun
tribes to the east of thc~ Durand Line increased as
the British prepared to leave the subcontinent. I'n
1947 some Puehtun leaders in the Northwest Frontier,
afraid they would be incorporat~ad iri a Pakistan dom-
lnatod by the hated Punjabis, proposed an independ-
ent state of Pushtunistan. The British-sponsored
referendum, however, allowed fcr a choice only be-
tween Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, and in August
1947 the Northwest Frontier became part of Pakistan.
The Afghans reacted strongly, voting against Paki-
stan's admission to the United Nations, refusing to
recognize the validity of the Durand Line, and loudly
endorsing an independent Pushtunistan.
Some Afghans would doubtless like to absorb
Pushtunistan into Afghanistan. The Afghans controlled
the area during the 18th century. Moreover, it is
agreed in Kabul that the proposed state would not
be viable and would probably soon be incorporated
in a greater Afghanistan. Proposals that other
tribal groups, such as the Baluchis be absorbed
into a larger Pushtunistan are attractive to the
Afghans largely because Baluchistan would presumably
have access to the sea.
The Pakistanis argue that they inherited the
Durand Line and accuse the Afghans of meddling in
Pakistan's internal affairs. They deny that the
great majority of Pushtuns in tl~e frontier region
want independence. Neutral sources tend to agree
that this is true, although the Pushtun minority
as a group has long pressed for increased political,
economic, and cultural autonomy. The Pakistanis have
allowed the tribes considerable rreec~om to adhere to
their traditional laws and procedures. Nevertheless,
the tribes have occasionally resisted by force ex-
tension of centralized control--even such limited
intrusion as the development of new roads. In these
cases, the government has responded with punitive
expeditions.
Relations b?twaen Afghanistan and Pakistan grew
worse in the decade af!:Er 1953. Prince Mohtuwnad Daoud
3chan--an ardent advocate of Pushtunistan--was virtual
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dictator of Afghanistan. In 1955 and again in 1961,
the trouble reached crisis proportions when Palcistan
moved to integrate the tribes--Pushtun and others--
mare closely into the nation. During the 1961 crisis,
diplomatic and economic relations were broken, t:o
the eventual economic disadvantage of Afghanistan.
This was a factor in the decision by King Zahir to
remove Daoud from power in 1963.
Ten years of relative calm ensued. The Afghans
were not premising for an independent Pushtuni:etan,
although they continued to maintain interest in the
?tribes. The return of Daoud in the coup last July
has led once again to a rapid deterioration in Afghan-
Pakistani relations.
Daoud's return to power coincided with an up-
surge of internal problems across the border. Prime
Minister Bhutto faces a minor insurgency in Baluch-
istan--caused in part by political strains with his
Baluchi opponents--and a bitter wrangle with his op-
position in the Northwest Frontier Province. One o.f
Bhutto'a main political foes, a Pushtun, has come
close to calling on the Northwest Frontier and Baluch-
istan to secede.
With Bhutto under attack in Pakistan and Daoud
trying to establish full control in Afghanistan,
neither side was disposed to be conciliatory about
Pushtunistan. The Pakistanis have been furious when
Afghan officials urge the tribes in Pakistan to re-
turn to the "fatherland." Dauod, in turn, has denounced
the Pakistani Government for encouraging platting
against his regime in Kabul.
As relai:ions have worsened, the Pakistanis have
adopted a "forward" policy toward the Afghans. Troops
have been moved up to the border, in some cases oc-
cupying camps vacant since 1947, and paramilitar
forces alonca the border have been strengthened.
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One small clash has already occurred a~.ong the
border; others are probable. In the prevailing atmos-
phere of fear and distrust, tie threat of a major
new crisis between the two South Asian neighbors is
growing.
Background
Pushtunistan as an issue dates from 1.947, al-
though the antecedents of the problem can be clearly
traced bank well into the 19th century and more
tenuously to the 18th. When Afghanistan became a
separate state in the middle of the 18th century,
it was under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durani, a
member of an ethnic community known as the Pushtuns.
The Pushtuns are an Indo-European, nomadic people
who have resided in an area that stretches from the
northern reaches of the Indus River to the southern
end of the Hindu Kush Mountains since the beginning
of recorded time.
The ti~~tshtuns, or Pukhtuns, are Muslims who
speak the Pushtu, or Pukhtu, language. The name
is sometimes rendered as "Pa~shtuns" or "Pakhtuns."
On the Pakistani side of the border these people
are called "Pathans," a word taken over by the Brit-
ish from an Indian vernacular.
During Ahmad Shah's reign, the Afghan nation
grew until it included all of present-day Afghanistan
and nearly all of what was to .become Pakistan. When
Ahmad Shah died, the ?mpire began to fall apart, and
the British eventually extended their control north-
ward through the Sind and Punjab into Baluchistan and
the Northwest Frontier. In 1893, the British, anx-
ious to obtain an agreed boundary in northwest
India, sent Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul to nego-
tiate with the Amir of Afghanistan. Sir Mortimer
was able to negotiate a border, called the Durand
Line, which runs some 1,200 miles, from Sinkiang
in China to the Iranian border.
The Durand Line was based on no logical geo--~
graphic or ethnic consideration. It simply marked
a rough approximation of the area under A~ghan and
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British control at Lhe time of Durand's mission. Un-
fortunately for the future, it divided in two one
mayor ethnic community--the Pushtuns. Slightly more
than half the Pushtuns (some 8 million toda~~) ended
up west of the line. Some 6 million Pushtuns live
east of the Line, and most are in what the British,
and later the Pakistanis, termed the Northwest Fron-
tier Province.
Political boundaries meant little to the Push-
tuns, and they continued to roam freely across the
border. Following the Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 (the
third in less than a century), a treaty was signed
which, inter a1ia, stipulated that each party would
inform the other of any contemplated military action
considered necessary to maintain order in each side's
Pushtun tribal aria. The British attached a letter
to the treaty recognizing Afghan interest in the con-
dition of all the frontier tribes.
While the government in Kabul had an interest
in various tribes on the eastern side of the bound-
ary, its focus has always been on the Pushtuns. Not
only do the Pushtuns form the largest ethnic com-
munity in Afghanistan, (about 50 percent) but all
Afghan rulers for the last 200 years--up to and in-
cluding President Daoud--have been Pushtuns. Push-
tun tribal leaders on both sides of the border have
looked for generations to the political leaders in
Kabul for subsidies; not surprisingly, the tribes,
including those east of the Durand Line, have had a
large role in installing and removing Afghan gov-
ernments. On occasion, Kabul has encouraged its
fellow Pushtuns to rise up against the government
in power east of the Durand Line. When thESe gov-
ernments have responded with punitive expeditions
against the tribes, Afghanistan has served a:~ a ref-
uge for the Pushtuns.
Birth of the Pushtunigtan Idea
During World War II, the Afghans, alarmed by
the possibility of an early departure of the Brit-
ish from the subcontinent, sought and apparently
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received from London a promise to consult with Kabul
about the future status of the Northwest Frontier
Province if and when a change appeared imminent. In
the haste and confusion surrounding the 1947 parti-
tion of India, however, the British apparently failed
to discuss the issue with the afghans.
In the months immediately preceding partition
a political dispute erupted in the Northwest Fron-
tier Province. The Red Shirt Party, led ;by Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and allied to Mohandas Gandhi's
Congress Party, found itself in danger of losing
power in she province to the Muslim League. The
latter, under Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was advocating
the partition of India and ?;:he creation of a sepa-
~ate Pakistan for India's Muslims. The Red Shirts
responded by introducing the idea of an independent
Pushtun state, called rushtunistan. As originally
conceived, the state would have roughly the sane
boundaries as the present Northwest Frontier i~rov-
ince of Pakistan. No attampt was m-ade to defend the
viability of the state; instead, the appeal was di-
rected to the Pushtun's fear of being dominated by
the hated Punjabis. When the British ~-arried out a
referendum in the province, giving a choice between
India and Pakistan, the Red Shirts boycotted the
poll, allegedly because it did not provide for a
third choice--independency..
`i:?e View from Afghanistan
The failure of the British to consult with the
Afghans prior to partition so irritated Kabul that
it voted against Pakistan's admission to the UN and
enthusiastically adopted the Red Shirts' call for
Pushtunistan. At the same time, the Afghan Govern-
ment announced that the departure of the British
abrogated the 1893 agreement demarcating the border.
(Subsequently, Kabul charged that the Durand Line
had been accepted under duress and was therefore
void.) Since 1947, the Afghans have consistently
refused to accept the line as a legal international
border, although in practice, they have not attempted
to exercise control beyond it.
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The intensity of the Afghan campaign for crea-~
tion of Fushtunis+an has fluctuated considerably
over the years. Unquestionably, the ethnic tie
that binds together the Pushtuns on both sides of
the border is strong, and the Afghans believe that
all Pakistani governments suppress their Pushtun
minority. There is also a degree of irredentism.
Most Afghans in candid moments admit that Pushtunistan
would not be a viable state and would quickly be
absorbed into a greater Afghanistan. The borders
of the .proposed state, as seen in Kabul, have varied.
At times, "Pushtunistan" has been expanded far beyond
the Northwest Frontier Province to embrace the Paki-
stani province of Baluchistan, although few Pushtuns
live in that province and the Balu chic, while also
a tribal society, are a separate ethnic community
with a different language. The addition of Baluchistan
would, of course, give the new nation (and ever~tua3ly,
in all probability, Kabul) access to the sea. At no
time have the Afghans proposed that the state take in
the Pushtuns of Afghanistan; yet a true Pushtun state
would logically include them too.
Ambitious politicians in Kabu 1 have found the
Fushtunistan iss~ie useful for gaining popular :~+up-
port. No major Afghan politician in the past 25
years has been able to oppose a proposal that carries
so much emotional appeal. Of all Afghan leaders,
none has more vigorously supported the Pushtunistan
campaign than Prince Mohammad Daoud Khan.
He was vs.rtua icta or
of his nation between 1953 and 1963, and he is again
the leading figure following the coup against King
Zahir on 17 July X973. Daoud has consistently pressed
his Pushtunistan crusade. The result was two serious
crises with Pakistan during his first period in power
and in recent weeks a rapid deterioration of relations
between the two countries.
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The View from Pakistan
The Pushtunistan issue is the most important
foreign policy problem facing Afghanistan; it is but
one of many foreign policy problems confronting Paki-
stan. Kashmir, the threat from India, the loss of
East Pakistan have all occupied more attention in
Islamabad than has Pushtunistan. The Pushtuns of
Pakistan are a small minority in a nation of 64 mil-
lion, although they do occupy a strategically im-
portant and geographically large area. Pakistan
claims that, as successor state to the British, it
inherited the Durand Line as its border. Various
governments and constitutions have provided that
tribes living along the border, including hose
Pushtuns who have not moved to the settled .areas
nearby, may retain some of their traditional ways,
particularly in their system of law and government.
Other than that no particular privileges are granted.
Pakistan regards its handling of the tribal provinces
of the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan as an
internal matter. Efforts of Afghanistan on behalf
of the Pushtuns or'other tribes are re arded as
mecldlin Pakista is cla'
a ere
s no wi esprea suppor or Pus tunistan as defined
by Kabul among the Pushtuns in Pakistan. Many of the
Pakistani Pushtuns who support Pushtunistan inter-
pret the concept as simply greater provincia' autonomy--
F~19.tical, economic, and cultural--within a united
Pakistan.
Pakistani rule of the tribes has never been easy.
Attempts to introduce the centra] or provincial gov-
ernment into the tribal districts, e.g., by extension
of roads into the areas, have often been resisted by
force. =unitive expeditions by the Pakistani armed
force:, Piave followed. The result is a residue of
bitterness on both sides. The temptation in Kabul
to assist the dissiuent tribes, whether Pushtun or
other, has occasionally not been resisted in Kabul.
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When Daoud bec,asne prime minister in 1953, he
had the support of the most fanatic advocates of
Pushtunistan. Relations with Pakistan, which had
been bad since 1947, deteriorated even fu?-ther in
1955 following Daoud's stron7 reaction to the Paki-
stani Government's decision to reoz~gani~e all..ex-
isting states and districts of West Pakistan into
one province. Relations became so strained that
the border was closed for several months. Some im-
,~rovement in relations followed, but in the late
1950s President Ayub Khan tried to integrate tribal
areas more fully :;.nto Pakistan. The Afghans objected,
and diplomatic relations were severed in 1961, and
all trade between the two countries ceased. Trade
routes to India and to the port of Karachi were cut
off and the resulting problems in Afghanistan con-
tributed to the King's decision to remove Daoud from
office in 1963.
The two nations, aided by the Shah of Iran, re-
sumed trade and diplomatic relations shortly after
Daoud's removal. In the ten years before Daoud:~re-
turned to power, relations between the two countries
were relatively placid. Ayub visited Kabul in 1966,
ana King Zahir visited Pakistan the following year.
Kabul ceased demanding full independence for the
Pushtuns, although it continued officially to es-
pouse self-determination. Afghan leaders, while
never openly abandoning the concept of P;~shtunistan,
began to talk more about the "welfare" of their
brother Pushtuns and Afghanistan's "special interest"
in the future of the peoples in the border provinces.
Partly as a gesture of accommodation, President
Yahya Khan in 1970 decided to break up the single
unified pro~:~~ince of West Pakistan into four prov-
inces, one of which was the Northwest Frcntier Prov-
ince, and to grant each considerable autonomy. The
present government, under Z. A~ Bhutto, has continued
to support a federated nation of four provinces; the
rights of the provincial governments are spelled out
in the new constitution.
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llaoud--Phase II (1973- )
Daoud, in his first speech to the nation after
the coup in July, noted that Afghanistan's only prob-
lem in foreign relations was with Pakistan over the
Pushtunistan issue. He promised to work for a solu-
tion to the problem. In succeeding weeks, however,
relations with Pakistan have steadily worsened.
Both countries have contributed to the deteri-
oration. Since last winter, President Bhutto has
been feuding with the major opposition political
parties in Pakistan. He was able to remove an oppo-
sition-led government in the Northwest Fzc~ntier by
constitutional means; in Baluchistan, however, his
ouster of the opposition-controlled government was
arbitrary and of questionable constitutionality.
In retaliation for Bhutto's action, against the pro-
vincial government of Baluchistan and also for ef-
forts by the army to expand a road into tribal areas,
Baluchi insurgents have been carrying on a low-level
campaign for several months. The government has re-
sponded with a major counterinsurgency operation,
using both paramilitary and regular troops. Afghan
leaders since ~7uly have repeatedly expressed their
concern over these efforts to suppress their "Baluchi
brothers."
Tn the Northwest Frontier, there is no open in-
surgency, but the political problem there is becoming
more and more serious. The major opposition party
in Pakistan, the National Awami Party, is led by
Abdul Wali Khan, son of the old Red Shirt leader,.
Abdul Chaffer Khan. He and Bhutto (like most Paki -
stani politicians) tend to engage in demagogic and
bitter personal exchanges. In recent weeks, Wali
Khan has been especially vitriolic, and his fulmina-
tions against further repressive acts by the Paki-
stani Government have come very close to calling for
secession of the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan.
The government, ,with the me::ory of 'East .Pakistan
still fresh, has responded with arrests and other
acts which will further stir up Kabul.
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Other incidents have contributed to the deteri-
oration in relations between Kabul and Islamaba3. In
September the Afghan delegate to the nonaligned con-
ference in Algiers denounced Pakistani actions in
Baluchistan and called for a return of alb tribal
peoples to the "fatherland." The sharp Pakistani
protest that followed was rejected by Kabul, and the
Afghans have acc;tsed the Pakistanis of assisting a
group of Afghans who were recently arrested on charges
of plottinc; a counter-coup.
There is no question but that Daoud is still
emotionally committed to the concept of Pushtunistan.
Whether he would be satisfied with greater autonomy
for the tribal peoples, as distinguished from inde-
pendence, is not clear. It is possible that Daoud
has revived th.e Pushtunistan issue mai?ril~r. to. unito,
his nation and to divert attention from government
inefficiency and economic stagnation. Presumably,
Daoud recalls that Pushtunistan was a major cause
of his downfall in 1963, and he may well prove more
reluctant this time around to permit the issue to
reach crisis proportions. Unfortunately, once
launched, the Pushtunistan issue seems to build up
a momentum of its own.
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There are no indications that the Afghans have
moved their forces closer to the border
Iso a e nci en s ave occurre a ors
t e or er. One resulted in an ex:hancle of fire,
casualties, and the capture ~f several Pakistanis by
the Afghans. The prisoners have not yet been re-
turned despite requests from Islamabad.
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n e
p~.~v~zing a mosp ero o ear and distrust, a mr~jo.r
crisis between the two South Asian neighbors could
erupt at any time.
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