IMPACT OF AFGHAN COUP IN THE REGION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: July 24, 1973
• Content Type: IM

25X1
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
 OCI-2158/73
24 July 1973
SUBJECT: Impact of Afghan Coup in the Region
summary
Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and Iran may be
seriously and adversely affected by President Daud's
assumption of power. The Soviet position in Kabul may have
been enhanced--but only marginally--and there will probably
be no significant change in relations. Other countries in
the region--with the possible exception of India--have
little or no stake in what goes on in Kabul.
Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
SBCRET
Pakistan
Before Daud came to power, relations between Islamabad
and Kabul were already cooling, and further deterioration
is likely. The basic issue is Pushtunistan. President
Bhutto's difficulties with opposition leaders in the two
frontier provinces were aeen by many in Afghanistan as an
attempt to oppress closely related people in Pakistan.
Prime Minister Shafiq apparently wanted good relations with
Pakistan and wasn't very interested in Pushtunistan. Never-
theless, popular and paramilitary sentiment forced him to
increase anti-Pakistani propaganda, and Pakistan, in May,
accused the Afghans of blatant interference in Pakistan's
domestic affairs.
Daud--unlike Shafiq--is concerned about Pushtunistan,
and when he was prime minister he sent tribesmen and some
regular troops into Pakistan in an attempt to stir up a
rebellion on the frontier. ~l~ension peaked in the early
1960s, when the two countries appeared close to war,
diplomatic relations were broken, and the border closed.
Daud's efforts were almost a total failure. Pakistani
tribesmen generally did not respond, the closure of the
border (originally designed to hurt Pakistan) cut off the
bulk of Afghanistan's foreign trade, and the end result
of this policy was an erosion of Daud's prestige which
contributed greatly to his dismissal as prime minister
in 1963.
Since that time, the Afghans have kept alive their
propaganda, but gradually shifted their position from
advocating independence for Pushtunistan to advocating
increased autonomy for the Pakistani frontier provinces.
We have no good indication of what Daud now plans to do
about Pushtunistan. Presumably he is more aware now of
the dangers to Afghanistan and to him of an activist Push-
tunistan policy. On the other hand, if Shafiq, who didn't
care, could be pushed into an increased propaganda campaign,
Daud, who cares deeply, could pursue a policy which would
,create serious problems with Pakistan.
Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
The Pakistanis have announced that they want to
continue good relations with the Afghans and has accorded
early recognition to the new government . They were con-
cerned that Daud, in his first radio address, singled out
Pushtunistan as the only political dispute Afghanistan
has with any country.
OnA factor in determining future course of Afghan-
Pakistani relations could be the reaction to the Afghan
coup in the Pakistani frontier provinces. If anti-Bhutto
leaders there think they are likely to get increased
support from Afghanistan, they could increase their agita-
tion for provincial autonomy. Bhutto might well react by
clamping down harder in the two provinces, thereby increas-
ing sentiment for aiding Pushtunistan in Kabul. So far,
neither Bhutto nor his opponents have sought to exploit
the coup .
Daud's assumption of power threatens the continued
improvement of relations between Tehran and Kabul.
Prior to the coup, relations appeared to be improving.
-- After years of negotiations, the two countries
agreed on the apportionment of the waters of the
Iielmand Rivr~r, solving their major bilateral problem.
-- Tehran agreed to complete a paved road from the
Persian Gulf port of Bar:dar Abbas to Afghanistan, and
to let the Afghans use the road free of charge and
the port for a token payment. The completion of this
project would have relieved Afghanistan of its
dependence on Pakistan as the route for the bulk of
its exports .
The Helmand Agreement--the main symbol of improved
. relations--had been approved by the Afghan parliament, but
had not yet been decreed by the King, s o Afghanistan
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
could still scrap it. Some Afghans regard it as a sell ~~..it
to the Shah. If Daud refuses to complete the ratification
procedure, he would jeopardize the road and port facilities
Iran has promised. If he gets into serious difficulties
with Pakistan he will need the alternate route to the sea,
but there is, of course, no guarantee that the Shah would
let him use it in such circumstances.
Daud's relations with Pakistan will affect his relations
faith Tehran, Both Dauds predelictions and the pressures
on him--such as sentiment for Pushtunistan and anti-Iranian
acenophobia--make it doubtful that he will ,pursue policies
the Shah will like.
India
For the Indians, the change in government will have
both advantage and disadvantates.
-- Daud's accession increases Pakistan's problems.
-- He has promised real democracy, and, even if the
Indians don't believe him, they like to hear such
statements.
-- They may find it a little easier to work with him.
Shafiq and Zahir were trying to improve relations with
Iran and--despite some problems--with Pakistan, and
the Indians are currently displeased by policies of
both countries.
-- On the other hand, the Indians will not welcome
a situation that could decrease stability on the sub-
continent with possibly unforeseen adverse results
i'or New Delhi, and is 'likely to make dealing with both
Trax~ and Pakistan. more complicated.
Daud presumably regards India as a useful cc+unterweight
to Pakistan. His assumption of power may wel]. lead to closer
relations between New Delhi and Kabul, although such a
'development will probably not be of great significance for
Dither country.
Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6
scow was the first to recognize the Daud regime.
ambassadors in ICabu1 subsequently did the same .
convey his government's decision. The East European
The Soviet ambassador there met with Daud on 19 July to
The Soviets may have had some forewarning of the coup
Soviets instigated or were actively involved in the coup.
There is no evidence at this stage, however, that the
and advisers in Afghanistan, many of them worlcing with the
army units that provide the backbone of the coup group.
because there are more than 200 Soviet military technicians
Tn fact, there is no apparent reason for the Soviets
but the Soviet press treated the visit in ecstatic terms,
noting that "for than half a century not a single cloud
had darkened the horizon of Soviet-A!'ghan relations."
endorse this scl:aeme for an Asian Security Conference,
Soviets undoubtedly were disappointed that Zahir did not
both Afghan and Soviet officials as having gone well. The
Podgorny's visit to Kabul in late May was described by
grants of economic aid in 1968 and 1972, and military
assistance--both in terms of hardware dnd training--has
continued steadily. On the political front, President
over 40 percent by 1971. Moscow extended substantial
from 33 percent of Afghanistan's total trade in 1963 to
Zahir over the past 10 years . Trade with the USSR grew
inroads into Afghanistan during the rule of Daud prior to
1963, but they have maintained good relations with King
to encourage a change in government. They made substantial
Soviet media have reported Daud's statements on Afghan
lems in its relations with Pakistan and Iran should Daud
choose to pursue a more assertive policy in this area.
This suggests that Moscow is aware that it will have prob-
Pakistan and his reference to the Pushtunistan problem.
foreign policy with the exception of his remarks on
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160058-6