IMPLICATIONS OF THE COUP IN CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160049-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: September 14, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
Implications of the Coup in Chile
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14 September 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
14 September 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COUP IN CHILE
Summary
Chile's military leaders are consolidating their
hold on the country in the wake of the take-over on 11
September. Despite a new-found sense of unity and deter-
mination, the junta government faces challenges in its
effort to restore public order. The immediate outlook
is for some further violence as the armed forces root
out remaining pockets of resistance. The new regime
will try to move quickly to bring some order to the
chaotic domestic situation it has inherited and to
come up with at least temporary answers to Chile's
urgent economic problems, but meaningful remedies will
take time. Over the longer term, there is a reascn-
able prospect that the country will gradually achieve
a greater measure of stability than it has experienced
during the past three years.
This memorandum attempts a preliminary assessment
of the new government and its leaders, considers their
problems and prospects, and examines the impact of the
coup on US-Chilean relations.
Comments an queries on the contents of this publication
are welcome. They may be directed to of the
Office of Current InteZZigence, 25X1
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The Military Moves In.
On 10 September the past-master of Chilean
politics ran out of room to maneuver. President
Allende was scheduled to address the nation that
evening and was expected to disclose a compromise
with the opposition, to call for a plebiscite, or
to announce some other move to ease the tense situa-
tion and allow him to resume the political offensive.
The speech was postponed, probably because
Allende could not get the Sor9.alis t Party to go along
with a compromise plan. He feared the Socialists
would make good their threat to withdraw from his
Popular Unity coalition and set off widespread armed
violence. The speech was rescheduled for the next
afternoon, but by then Allende was dead, apparently
having taken his li"e in the bombed and burning presi-
dential palace.
Military officers who had long been plotting to
bring down the government had finally secured the sup-
port of the service commanders, key Santiago and
Valparaiso-based military units, and the bulk of the
carabineros (uniformed national police). The coup
action seems to have been meticulously planned and
was well coordinated. Opposition came from isolated
carabinero units, Allende's unofficial bodyguard
corps, armed workers occupying factories, and snipers
in downtown Santiago. Despite preparations for a coup,
pro-government paramilitary groups did not take to the
streets to defend the regime.
The junta is determined to eliminate pockets of
resistance, but does not expect Santiago to be totally
pacified for several days. Snipers holed up in gov-
ernment buildings and armed groups in the industrial
sector have effectively used rocket launchers, mortars,
and machine guns against military and police units.
Army commander Pinochet has assumed the presidency
of the four-man military-police junta and expects to
stay at least a year, after which the post reportedly
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will be rotated among the military service chiefs.
Pinochet is an intelligent, respected officer whose
forceful assumption of leadership since succeeding
General Prats in late August has surprised observers.
Pinochet has not been closely linked to any polit-
ical faction,?but is a friend of former President
Frei. Air Force General Leigh, a popular leader in
his service, has no love for the Christian Democratic
Party. Admiral Merino, who assumed command of the
Navy as the coup began, is a sometimes arrogant, but
strong officer. He is conservative and is inclined
toward the National Party. Carabinero General Mendoza's
partisan preferences, if any, are unknown, but he
has taken command over three senior generals who sup-
ported Allende to the end. He has closer ties to the
military than most top police officers and apparently
helped plan the coup. All but two members of the new
1.5--man cabinet are military and police officers.
Congress has been dissolved and "politicking" is
banned, but the junta has pledged to return the nation
to institutional order and normalcy. Preliminary indi-
cations are that it will be some time before Chile
reverts to civilian rule and that there will be sub-
stantial changes, including a new constitution that
could provide for a congress with Sunctional repre-
sentation.
Defense of the nation and its constitution and
avoidance of direct involvement in government and
politics are deeply rooted traditions in the Chilean
military and police. But a new military-carabinero
ethic may grow within the services, as the failure of
the old political system is used to justify the new
equation of traditional military duties with govern-
ment administration.
The long genesis and cathartic effect of the
coup and the military's distrust of politicians augur
against the armed forces and carabineros soon return-
ing power to those they hold responsible for the na-
tion's plight. In very practical terms, the use of
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a mailed fist against die-hard leftists will make the
new regime reluctant to depart until it is convinced
that those who would take revenge could never again
come to power.
The junta appare;;tly intends to remain in power
long enough to oversee the rebuilding of the nation's
economic, social, and political structures. At present,
early elections seem unlikely. The next scheduled bal-
loting is in 1976. Current plans could changeg however,
if the problems of government seem intractable or if
frustration erodes determination. In any case, the
Marxist parties probably will not be permitted to par-
ticipate in elections--and indeed may soon be outlawed.
Problems and Prospects
Restoration of public order and economic recovery
are the chief problems confronting the new government.
Both tasks will be difficult.
The junta repeatedly has assured workers that
their economic gains are secure and that they have
nothing to fear, but at the same time it is demon-
strating that resistance will be smashed mercilessly.
The tough junta line has also included rigid curfews,
the declaration of a state of siege (which suspends
certain constitutional guarantees), and strict media
censorship. Some members of the former government have
been arrested, and the junta has ordered a long list
of Popular Unity and other leftist luminaries to sur-
render.
The armed forces and carabineros are hoping that
their impressive show of unity and willingness to use
force will have an intimidating effect on their oppo-
nents. The Popular Unity reportedly was caught off
guard by the coup, and some leaders felt resistance
would be futile and suicidal. Some extremist groups,
such as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
and hard-line Socialists may no longer have wanted
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to defend Allende. The extent to which current at-
tacks on government forces are being centrally or-
ganized and coordinated cannot be determined. The
junta has the upper hand, but the resistance may not
be quelled immediately,, Both the Popular Unit parties
and extremists such as the MIR
may eci e to go underground and prepare to fight another
day. Even those who had come to see Allende as an ob-
stacle to their goals will be quick to proclaim him a
martyr and use his memory as a rallying point.
The junta may deal successfully with the current
armed resistance and still find itself faced with
strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of protest.
In this event, stronger threats and repressive measures
could become the order of the day. The junta has shown
no inclination to commiserate or compromise-.-even with
its civilian supporters.
The new government cannot count on indefinite,
unconditional support of all groups that opposed the
Allende regime. The Christian Democrats have declare-1
their support for the junta, but will be worried about
its intentions regarding Congress and elections. The
junta's moves to date will not be reassuring to the
party. Declaration of a state of siege, for example,
is constitutionally a congressional prerogative.
The armed forces and carabineros probably feel
that they owe the Christian Democrats little or nothing,
and over time the party is likely to become increasingly
restive. The left wing of the party will be the most
disturbed, but a break between the junta and the bulk
of the Christian Democrats appears unlikely unless there
is continuing extreme repression or the junta exhibits
a desire to stay in power beyond 1976.
The National Party and the private business and
professional guilds will be less demanding. The junta
is likely to rely on private businessmen and others
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not closely associated with any political party for
advice and assistance in the setting of policy and
the performance of various governmental tasks, espe-
cially in the economic sphere.
The junta is confronted with an economy in chaos
as it attempts to restore order. The economic deteriora-
tion has been particularly severe over the past few
months, as the truckers' strike exacerbated an already
tight supply situation. if public order is secured, the
new goverment should be able to make rapid distribution
of commodities on hand, but imports of foodstuffs, fuel,
raw materials, and spare parts will be critical. Short-
term financing is urgently needed because Allende ex-
hausted Chile's foreign exchange-reserves and under-
mined its credit worthiness. Chile may be able to
pledge gold or to mortgage future copper earnings to
obtain financing, but it will require a forthcoming
attitude on the part of new creditors. Chile will also
need a consolidation of the massive short-term debts
run up by Allende and continued-long-term debt relief.
Over the longer run, Chile will need financing for
large-scale capital-goods imports to rebuild the econ-
omy.
The junta will make every effort to ensure un-
interrupted--and increased--copper production. The
many employees put on mining payrolls under Allende
probably fear for their featherbed jobs. They are almost
certain to be fired and may try to disrupt production.
Reports that there has already been sabotage in the
mines are unconfirmed.
The new government faces even more serious long-
term economic problems. To rehabilitate the economy,
consumption will have to be reduced substantially from
the levels of the past few years while investment in
productive sectors is increased. Such a move would
not square with the junta's promises to the workers,
who are sure to oppose an austerity program.
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The junta will also have to address the coun-
try's grave agricultural problems, which will be very
difficult to solve. Much of Chile's farm capital has
been destroyed, and there has been little incentive
to produce. Many skilled farm managers and technicians
have left the country. Managerial talent also is in
short supply in the manufacturing and mining sectors.
The go,,-rrnment will appeal to expatriate Chilean pro-
fessionals and technicians to return home.
The coup probably will not mean complete reversal
of Allende's poli^ies. The ideal of "Socialism" in
Chile is based on widely held political and social be-
liefs and is suppf ':ed by a large part of the electorate.
Many Christian Democratic programs are socialistr and
even the majority of military officers probably want to
continue welfare-oriented programs that are designed to
distribute the nation's wealth more equitably. Moreover,
the junta probably has little quarrel with government
control of basic industries.
The military does not favor the wholesale elimi-
nation of.small and medium-sized private industries,
however, and there will be guarantees for private prop-
erty and.encouragement of free enterprise. Unauthorized
seizures of farm lands will be stopped, but peasants
may be `given title to some expropriated land in order
to spur production and to build a constituency in the
countryside. Private foreign investment will be en-
couraged, though under guidelines, and perhaps only
in nonstrategic areas of the economy. The junta can
be expected to stress its nationalism and commitment
to the defense of Chilean sovereignty.
The main lines of policy thus could turn out to
look somewhat like those of the military government
of Peru. In governing style and tone, however, there
is likely to be a closer resemblance to the Brazilian
model.
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Foreign Relations
There will be substantial che,nges in Chile's
foreign policy, in its relations with the rest of
Latin America, and in its dealing:3 with the US..
Chile's stance toward the third world will soften
considerably, and relations with the Communist world
will cool sharply. Chile will cease to be a prime
haven for the hemisphere's lef-I'Ast exiles.
Relations with Cuba already have been broken.
The rapid increase of ties with Argentina will prob-
ably level off, but relations with Brazil will improve.
The military regime in Peru will be neither overly
hostile nor particularly friendly toward its tradi-
tional rival and will be wary of signs of increasing
Brazilian influence.
Latins of all political persuasions have long
admired Chilean political dynamics. They have watched
Allende's government with acute interest, many of
them believing that something vital and relevant to
them was being played out. This belief was continu-
ally reinforced by spokesmen of the left and right in
many countries who saw in Chile's political struggle
a contest between ideologies whose outcome would. point
the way for their countries.
Throughout the hemisphere, Marxists may begin to
reexamine their thinking on the peaceful path to so-
cialism in the wake of the failure of the "Chilean
experiment." The, debates that raged.through the
1960s between advocates,of.violent revolution and
peaceful approaches to power are likely to be resumed,
with the former gaining ground. Young militants may
be spurred to more active opposition, and old-guard
Communists will be put more on the defensive. Con-
servative elements in those countries where they are
in power will feel vindicated and will be less in-
clined to compromise with leftist opponents.
Reaction to the coup elsewhere in the world has
been prolific and often vehement. The junta's eagerness
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to round up Allende's supporters may cause it to over-
look the international ramifications of such actions
as its attack on the Cuban Embassy. Failure to re-
spect diplomatic and humanitarian norms may cost the
junta needed international support. Two Western Euro-
pean countries have already frozen previously granted
credits.
General Pinochet has shown himself sensitive to
the problem of too close an identification with the
US, the kind of relationship that would tarnish the
new regime in Chilean eyes and lend credence to
leftist and foreign charges of US involvement in the
coup. He wants friendly, but low-key relations with
,the US, and hopes that for now the US can assist his
country with food, military equipment, and debt re-
lief. Some requests for immediate US assistance in
medical supplies have already been received. More
requests are expected, particularly for spare parts.
Eventually a bid for large-scale economic aid may be
made.
The junta probably will try to find a way to
resolve the copper expropriation dispute, the main
hindrance to better relations with the US, but it
will not be prepared to undo the expropriation it-
self. The expropriation was approved by all. political
sectors and is regarded as a matter of national sov-
ereignty. In the near future, Chile will lack the
resources to make a meaningful payment, but the need
for technical and financial aid may make possible
compensation through "service con+raf:ts" similar to
those worked out between Zaire and Belgium.
Conclusion
It is too early to estimate precisely how the
junta government's policymaking structure, will evolve
and what influences will come to prevail. Younger of-
ficers were in the forefront of those pushing for a
coup;yet the generals and admirals are in control.-
While the armed forces appear unified now, in the
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face of an active enemy, splits could develop over
policy issaes along ideological, service, or genera-
tional lines. Personal conflicts and rivalries are
also likely to cause trouble as time goes on.
In the event of continued violent opposition by
leftist elements, which in turn would provoke stronger
repression, the outlook would not be bright. It seems
more likely, however, that the junta will manage to
overcome the initial round of resistance and bring
some economic relief. The new leadership could then
begin to expand its base of popular support (or at
least tolerance) into the ranks of the less militant
workers, and Chile might be in a position to move
toward increased political,. economic, and social
stability.
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