THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160042-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 3, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
The OAS General Assembly
Secret
April 1973
No. 1639/73
0
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2 April 1973
TuE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Summary
The Third OAS General Assembly that convenes
in Washington on 4 April will provide yet another
forum for a number of Latin American nations to
criticize both the OAS and US policies. Few con-
crete proposals are likely to emerge.
Although the agenda lists some 37 items, three
issues are expected to provide most of the fireworks
during the ten-day session. Probably the most divi-
sive will be the Cuba sanctions policy. Although the
group that opposes continuing the sanctions is un-
likely to get the two-thirds majority it needs to
lift them, the opponents will probably be able to
mobilize much stronger support than last year. In-
deed the final vote will be close, and, depending
on the wording of the resolution, it could be a tie.
The other major issues to be discussed are a
call by Venezuela for an examination of the "ulti-
mate purpose and mission" of the OAS and a request
by OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza for a review
of the system of inter-American cooperation for
development. The former will generate complaints
over "excessive US influence" in the OAS, and the
latter will spark criticism of US trade and aid
policies.
Peru, Chile, and Panama are likely to provide
most of the anti-US rhetoric; on certain issues
they may be joined by Ecuador. Nevertheless, given
the routine nature of past assemblies, the climate
may be somewhat less hostile to the US than the
recent United Nations Security Council meeting in
Panama.
Comments and queried on the contents of this pub-
lication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office 7!f--Y rrent Intelligence,
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Sanctions Imposed Against Cuba by the Organization of American States
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, January, 1962
Resolved that adherence to Marxism-Leninism by any OAS member Is incompatible
with the Inter-American system....
That the Government of Cuba, by officially identifying itself as Marxist-Leninist is
incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system....
That this incompatibility excludes the Government of Cuba from participation in the
Inter-American system....
That the Government of Cuba be excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board....
That all OAS members will suspend trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war....
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, July, 1964
Declared that Cuba was guilty of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of
Venezuela and agreed to apply the following measures:
1. OAS members would not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba.
2. OAS members would suspend all their trade with Cuba, except in foodstuffs,
medicines, and medical equipment.
3. GAS members would suspend all sea transportation with Cuba except when
necessary for humanitarian reasons.
The 12th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, September, 1957
Condemned Cuba for its repeated acts of aggression against Venezuela and for its
persistent policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and other American
States....
Requested non-member states to join the OAS in the economic sanctions previously
called for; called upon OAS members to carry out a series of measures relating to control of
propaganda and to restrict funds and arms destined for Cuba; called for increased control of
the movement of persons to Cuba, for additional frontier controls, and for continued
vigilance in respect to subversive activities; recommended the coordination of counter-
measures and a tightening of CAS economic sanctions.
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The Cuban Issue
The General Assembly is expected to review the
diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed against
Cuba in 1964 and 1967 (Figure 1.). The sanctions
were imposed following charges by Venezuela that
Cuba was sponsoring subversion in Venezuela. Sig-
nificantly, Venezuela now appears the most likely
sponsor of an initiative to repeal or at least
weaken the sanctions.
Since Peru sponsored a similar initiative at
a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council last
June, Latin American's have become more opposed to
the maintenance of the sanctions against Cuba. Sev-
eral factors have contributed to this trend:
--The decline of visible Cuban support
for local revolutionary groups.
--The growing conviction of some govern-
ments, despite assurances to the con-
trary, that the US may embarrass them
by suddenly reversing its Cuba policy.
--The desire to avoid the appearance of
being last on the bandwagon.
--The intention of some leaders to build
domestic support by demonstrating their
independence of the US.
--A perception by some countries of Cuba
as a "sister American nation."
Even in this changing atmosphere the 16 votes
needed to repeal are unlikely to materialize. Rec-
ognizing this, the sponsors will probably opt for
a vaguely worded resolution designed to gain at
least a "moral victory" by attracting a simple ma-
jority. Peru tried this tactic last year, recom-
mending that each member be allowed to establish
the kind of relationship it desired with Cuba. The
resolution failed to gain a majority, though it did
attract seven votes (Figure 2). Whi)2 a simple
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Voting on Peruvian Initiative Permitting OAS Members
To Re-establish Relations with Cuba, June 1972
Chile
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Trinidad-Tobago
TOTAL 7
ABSTAIN NO
Argentina Bolovia
Barbados Brazil
Venezuela Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Paraguay
United States
3 13
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majority vote would not legally rescind the sanc-
tions, it would bring the OAS a step closer to doing
so and would be an important psychological victory
for the anti-sanctions forces. If they do get a
majority, they might well seek to convoke a special
session of the Permanent Council to press for the
requisite two-thirds vote.
Tactically, the Venezuelans are likely to bring
up the sanctions question within the general frame-
work of the item they inscribed on the agenda to
examine "the ultimate purpose and mission of the
OAS." They may well take the line that no condition
exists that would justify actions to violate the
sovereignty or political independence of any American
state. By implying that Cuban subversion is no
longer a meaningful threat, this approach would
seriously undermine the justification for continuing
the sanctions.
The supporters of an initiative against the
sanctions probably will point to reports that Panama
and Argentina will soon re-establish diplomatic
relations with Cuba. In addition, the supporters
will strongly emphasize the fact that Venezuela was
the original sponsor of the sanctions in both 1964
and 1967 and is now supporting their repeal. Sev-
eral delegations may well waver in their position
until just before the voting. It is upon these
"swing votes" that the chances of Venezuela's get-
ting a simple majority will finally rest. The final
vote probably will be close and might even result
in a tie (Figure 3).
There also may be a move to undermine the basis
for Cuba's exclusion from the OAS. The decision to
suspend Cuba from participation in the Inter-Amer-
ican system was made at the Eighth Meeting of Con-
sultation in 1962. Since then, the concept of "id-
eological plurality" has become increasingly popular
among Latin Americans because of a growing conviction
that ideological differences should not interfere
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Possible Voting on Initiative on Cuban Sanctions
Based on Current Indications
Probable Votes
Favoring Initiative
Probable
Abstentions
Probable Votes
Opposing Initiative
Argentina
Barbados
Chile
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Trinidad-Tobago
Venezuela
TOTAL 10
Colombia Bolivia
Costa Rica Brazil
Dominican Republic El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Uruguay
United States
3 10
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with the greater goal of Latin American unity in
dealing with the US. Consequently, a resolution
calling for "recognition and acceptance of the
ideological plurality of the countries of the region"
would stand a good chance of passage. The sponsors
of such a resolution presumably will ignore the
fact that Cuba's continuing refusal to have anything
to do with the OAS renders their initiative meaning-
less in terms of practical effect.
Because of the divisive nature of the Cuban
issue, there may be parliamentary moves to post-
pone its consideration. One possibility would be
to direct the OAS Permanent Council to study the
question "in light of present circumstances" to
determine whether any country is a threat to the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of any member
nation.
Calvarii and Plaza Items
Apart from its implications for Cuba, the Ven-
ezuelan proposal (the so-called Calvani item), can be
expected to spark a wide-ranging debate featuring
criticisms of US economic policies and the weak-
nesses of the Inter-American system. So can the
initiative sponsored by OAS Secretary General Galo
Plaza.
--The Calvani proposal (Item 9) calls for a
"Consideration of the ultimate purpose and
mission of the organization of American
States and ways of achieving that purpose
and carrying out that mission, under the
international circumstances existing in
the world today."
--The Galo Plaza initiative (Item 10) proposes a
"Review of the system of Inter-American
cooperation for development with a view to
improving it and bringing it up to date,
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and thereby strengthening the action of
regional solidarity in that field and
avoiding acts or measures that serve
unilateral positions or interests, alion
to the objectives of cooperation."
Most of the bombast against US international
economic policies will probably occur during the
debate on the Galo Plaza item. Anti-American state-
ments have become more frequent and aggressive in
recent years and reflect a growing belief among the
Latin Americans that US policy makers fail to con-
sider the impact of their decisions on the rest of
the hemisphere.
Complaints will be raised against US trade
policies. Believing that increased trade is a
prerequisite for economic development, the Latin
Americans deem it vital that the US agree to impose
no further barriers to their products, to eliminate
gradually existing quota and '-,ariff barriers af-
fecting their exports, and to enact legislation for
non-reciprocal generalized tariff preferences for
products of the less developed countries. If the
US were to do all this, it would, the Latin Americans
believe, lead to a significant increase in foreign
exchange earnings, ease their economic problems and
facilitate their development efforts.
The Latin American delegates will again apply
the term "coercive economic measures" to those US
policies and actions which they interpret a.i pressure
tactics in bilateral relations. They object to
legislated measures such as the Hickenlooper and
Gonzalez Amendments. They also object to what they
call the US use of its influence in multilateral
lending institutions to deny loans to countries
that have expropriated property of US corporations
without offering fair compensation, Peru, Ecuador,
and Chile are expected to be the most vociferous
in depicting these and similar measures as "economic
sanctions contrary to the charter of the United
Nations."
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A few delegates may also raise the issue of
"transfer of technology," defined by the OAS as
the process by which the production system of one
nation acquires the production technology of an-
other. In the view of many Latin Americans, the
US has not demonstrated a sufficient commitment
to this goal. There are likely to be renewed calls
for a plan of action to expedite the infusion of
new technology into the Latin American economies.
In addition to these economic issues, several
other Latin American complaints are likely to be
aired again. These will include protests against
the "increasing influence of multi-national corpo-
rations" and expressions of concern that interna-
tional monetary arrangements are formulated without
the participation of the developing nations.
During the discussion on the. Calvani proposal,
the Latin American delegates will focus on their
perception of the "excessive influence of the US
in the inter-American system." The Peruvian
delegation is preparing to call for a reorganiza-
tion of the OAS. Lima's proposals will probably
call for a restructuring of the OAS into two
separate bodies, a political organization and an
economic organization. Lima may also propose that
OAS headquarters be moved from Washington to a
Latin American country. Peru's primary aim is to
reduce US influence in the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank. Peru objects to the fact that the voting
power of bank members is based on their contributions
and would like to nullify the resulting ability of
the US to block some loans. A proposal to this ef-
fect would receive support from a number of nations,
particularly those whose relations with the US are
strained. It probably would not receive enough sup-
port to become OAS policy at this juncture.
The Peruvians apparently have coordinated their
proposal with Panama, but most of the other delega-
tions will arrive in Washington with no specific
position on the proposal. There are indeed several
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conflicting viewpoints concerning the proper role
of the OAS. One approach would limit OAS business
to matter. of a strictly regional nature, The
defenders of this thesis argue that the organiza-
tion would become more effective by concentrating
its resourceE on a limited number of goals, An-
other approach would broaden the organization to
reflect the growing involvement of both Latin Amer-
ica and the US with world-wide rather than regional
problems. The latter approach might even include
the admission of non-American states as full members
in order to reduce the influence of the US. in
addition, there may be suggestions that the provisions
for joint defense against external aggression--the
Rio Treaty in particular --have been made obsolete by
radical changes in the international system.
Other Issues
In addition to these big issues, the Gensral
Assembly will have to deal with two thorny member-
ship problems. Argentina and Venezuela, together
with Guatemala and one or two others, will vote
against the British request for permanent observer
status. Their opposition is based on their in-
volvement in territorial disputes over current or
former British colonial possessions in the hemisphere.
London's request probably will be approved.
The Assembly also will examine the question of
admitting "mini-states" to OAS membership. By "mini-
states" the members mean the six West Indies As-
sociated States, the Bahamas, and the Netherlands
Antilles when they achieve independence. The prob-
lem has some urgency because the Bahamas will be-
come independent in July. Although their small
size would limit their Fbility to participate in
OAS activities, the main issue is the possible im-
pact their votes might have on issues important to
the "Latin" part of Latin America. Compounding the
problem of where to draw the line on the definition
of a "mini-state" is the fact that Barbados is al-
ready a full. member. This question will probably
be referred to a special committee for further study.
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Several nations are expected to use the Assembly
to air specific grievances. Ecuador may attempt to
gain an affirmation of the "right of permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources" which would include
complete sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over
the seas for a distance of 200 miles. In addition,
there are indications that Panama intends to continue
its canal campaign during the Assembly. Torrijos has
not revealed his plans, but the most plausible ap-
proach would be an effort to gain further symbolic
support for Panama's position.
The Probable Outcome
Although the General Assembly will provide a
forum for ventilating the many problems of the
Inter-American system, the assembly will be unable
to come up with practical solutions for these prob-
lems. The final results will depend a great deal
on the interaction among the delegations in the
corridors, but the most likely outcome is a general
resolution recognizing the existing problems and
creating a committee to prepare specific recommenda-
tions for consideration by the next General Assembly.
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