THE CHILEAN ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160038-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
The Chilean Elections
CIA
DOCUMENT SEA VICES &'RNCH
FILE OIY
D9 NOT DIESiROV
Secret
1 March 1973
No. 1630/73
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SE,RFT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1 March 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Summary
The outcome of the congressional elections in Chile next Sunday will
have a bearing on the pace of socialization, but it is unlikely to change the
balance of political forces significantly or to relieve the growing tension
between President Allende and his opponents.
There is little question that the opposition coalition will will a majority
of the vote; the questions pertain to the size of its margin and how it is
interpreted by the parties and other interest groups.
The President takes the public position that success would be any vote
above the plurality (36.3 percent) he got in 1970. If candidates associated
with him get over 40 percent, as he and the Communist Party anticipate, he
will claim a mandate for more rapid socialization. As a precaution, however,
he is formulating plans to adapt his tactics to a return as iuw as 33 percent.
Such an outcome would fuel animosities between the Socialists and Com-
munists that already weaken the Popular Unity coalition.
Members of the opposition coalition, led by the Christian Democratic
and National parties, are encouraged by the widespread economic discontent
and hope to get over 60 percent of the vote. They would portray this as a
repudiation of Allende, but in fact they need that much of the vote to
maintain their present simple majority in congress.
Regardless of the outcome, Allende will try to broaden his power base
for the remaining three-and-a-half years of his term and thus reduce his
dependence on his quarreling Popular Unity coalition. He has benefited by
bringing the military into his government, and he will probably seek to
prolong this arrangement. The military, in turn, is likely to see continued
involvement as a means of ensuring political order and perhaps reducing
economic dislocations.
Beginning on page 7 we examine several possible outcomes.
NOTE: Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome. The j, ma be
directed to ~f the Office of Current Intelligence,
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Changes on the Election Scene
Four and one-half million Chileans, nearly half the population, are
registered to vote on 4 March for all 150 members of the Chamber of
Deputies for 4-year terms and 25 of 50 senators for 8-year terms,
The electorate this year is at least 40 percent larger than in 1969 and 17
percent larger than in the last nationwide elections, the municipal contests in
April 1971.
For the first time illiterates and those 18 to 21 years of age can vote in
other than local elections.
Each voter can cast a ballot for only one deputy, whether his district
has two or eighteen, and for one senator, if it is his district's turn to elect its
quota of five.
Other major election changes will alter the effects of the complicated
proportional system of vote computation used in previous elections:
? All but one of the political groups running candidates
are combined into two coalitions, each comprising two
strong rival parties and ambitious lesser groups.
? Each coalition is limited to the number of legislative
seats open.
? Surplus votes for a strong candidate in a district will
accrue to his coalition list as a whole and to its
best-running candidates, rather than to candidates from
his own party as in the past.
? A vote may be cast for a list or an individual, but not
both, an innovation that may produce many nullified
ballots, clouding the post-election atmosphere.
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How They See It
Chileans will go to the polls on 4 March to elect all 150 members of the
Chamber of Deputies and halt' the 50 senators. The chief question about the
elections is the size of the majority the opposition emerges with and the
interpretation given that margin by the opposing sides. Victory will be in the
eye of the beholder. Most Chilean politicians, President Allende and leaders
of his Popular Unity coalition included, are already offering their inter-
pretations.
The President maintains publicly that lie would be pleased with any
vote above his own 1970 plurality of 36.3 percent and 17 supporters, a
"blocking third," in the 50-man senate. By retaining a blocking third, lie
would preclude his impeachment, which he claims is the real goal of the
opposition. Since nine of the 25 senators not running this year are pro-gov-
ernment, a blocking third is probably within reach.
If Popular Unity candidates get over 40 percent of' the vote, he would
consider it an "absolute victory," a mandate for more rapid transformation
of Chile into a socialist system. Allende and the Communists now are
estimating a vote of 40 percent or more, although the President is formulat-
ing plans for a return as low as 33 percent.
As for the other leading figures in the Allende coalition, they will
measure their success by the showing made by the candidates of their
individual parties. The Communists, for example, savor the possibility of
winning 20 percent of the vote, more than ever before. To them this would
be incontrovertible proof that theirs is a major party. The Socialists, coali-
tion partners but rivals of the Communists, recognize that they may lose
their position of primacy in the coalition. If so, extremists may leave the
party to set up a radical front. Coalition leaders are disparaging their
chances, a tactic that, as in the past, may be lulling the opposition into
over-confidence.
The general climate of discontent is indeed lifting the expectations of
the opposition coalition (CODE) led by the Christian Democratic and
National Parties. The two parties label the vote as a referendum on Allende,
and they hope to get 60 percent of the vote. This, they claim, would amount
to a repudiation of the Popular Unity government, although the opposition
needs a vote of at least this size just to maintain its congressional majority.
Even the most sanguine of Allende's opponents recognize how slim is the
possibility of raising their legislative majority to two thirds, which could be
used to override presidential vetoes, limit Allende's ability to manipulate the
constitution, or even impeach the President.
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COMPOSITION OF ELECTION COALITIONS
FOR 175 LEGISLATIVE SEATS
Number of
Candidates
Government
Federated Party of
Popular Unity
PFUP
158
Communist Party of Chile
PCCh
39
Socialist Party
PS
44
Radical Party
PR
30
Christian Left
Unified Popular Action
IC
14
Movement
Independent Popular
MAPU
20
Action
API
11
Pro-Government
Popular Socialist Union
USP
32
Opposition
Democratic Confederation
Christian Democratic
CODE
170
Party
PDC
76
National Party
PN
57
Radical Left Party
PI R
18
Democratic Radical Party
National Democratic
PDR
15
Party
PADENA
4
Total 360
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The r:.u tant creation of the CODE Confederation was tacit recogni-
tion by Allende's uncongenial opponents that they had no other choice if
they were to mobilize dissatisfaction with the government and defeat it by a
significant margin. Chilean politicians usually avoid committing themselves
when faced with hard decisions, but this time, once the hassling over
composition of the single slate was over, the party leaders have worked
surprisingly well in concert.
CODE candidates themselves are proving less practical; many of them
are putting more energy into competing with each other than with their
Popular Unity opponents. Another negative factor is the Popular Unity's
apparently greater diligence in registering new voters. It is probable that
most of the newiy eligible voters have a greater natural affinity for the
Popular Unity than for the more conservative opposition. The extent to
which CODE can overcome these deficiencies by bringing out disgruntled
but cynical Chileans to vote for its candidates will have a large impact on
the outcome.
The only group competing outside the two big coalitions is the pro-gov-
ernment Popular Socialist Union. Neither the union nor the small parties in
either coalition are expected to fare very well. The contest is essentially
between the pairs of major parties that dominate each coalition. In a few
cases, the personal popularity of minor party members in certain legislative
districts may help.
The existence of only two slates epitomizes the extent to which Chile
has polarized since Allende's election. In the last legislative election-. in 1969
there were eight slates. This polarization is also reflected in the intensely
political media and in the persistent efforts of "ultras" on both right and left
to incite violence on the grounds that it is the only way to defeat their
enemies.
BACKGROUND: ELEMENTS IN THE EQUATION
New Factors
The armed forces and the economy, which is in bad shape, are casting a
far longer shadow over this election than over previous ones.
Last November, to end a prolonged opposition strike, the three service
chiefs accepted Allende's invitation to place three officers in his cabinet.
They reasoned their presence would help ensure public order and fair
elections. Since then, the military's political role, if not always its influence,
has expanded.
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SJ GRET
D
The government's extension of control over most aspects of economic
life has enhanced its power, at the cost of severe disorganization and
pervasive shortages. The situation affects most Chileans and has aroused
strong anti-government sentiment among some Chileans. Even the low-in-
come groups which benefit most by the administration's actions are im-
patient over shortages and inflation.
Allende has moved, not very successfully, to reduce the impact of
economic problems by appointing military officers to organize the distribu-
tion of large stockpiles of scarce food just before the election. This was,
nonetheless, a shrewd political move bringing practical political advantages.
So was his recent series of hardhitting talks to workers. Only a small
percentage of Chileans are members of any political party, but most people
at all social and economic levels identify strongly with certain interest
groups. The Communists and Christian Democrats, the only parties with
extensive political organization, are devoting their greatest efforts to such
groups-soccer and mothers clubs, as well as professional, neighborhood,
student, and worker organizations.
Allende gambled that he could socialize Chile by using broad presi-
dential powers and flexible constitution, e"ien though he had a minority
mandate and the legislature was controlled by the opposition. He has already
achieved many of his socialist goals, albeit at the expense of pervasive
economic dislocations. He apparently realizes that he must take strong
measures if he is to get Chile in working order.
The congressional elections at this juncture are for him an inconvenient
test of public acceptance of his programs. Allende's response to the challenge
proves again that he is, above all, a canny politician. He has admitted his
administration's faults; openly castigated supporters he blames for weaken-
ing him, his program, and his coalition; imposed a program to step up food
supplies just before the elections while blaming shortages, the rampant black
market, and Chile's many economic woes on his opponents; and lent his still
very considerable prestige and popularity to Popular Unity candidates.
The Popular Unity
The Communists are waging their usual well-organized and dogged
campaign to secure the highest vote in the Popular Unity, which they
consider their own creation. The Communist Party is the most stable force in
the coalition, and Allende depends on and agrees with Communist leader
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more often than with the leaders of his own Socialist party. On the other
hand, the Communists basically mistrust him, and he in turn is suspicious of
letting them acquire too much power. Although they make the most of their
long-sought role in the administration, party leaders are painfully aware of
the widespread aversion to communism as an alien force and conduct
themselves with this in mind.
Despite mutual antagonisms, the Communists accepted the military's
presence in the cabinet as necessary. They even work reasonably well
together, thanks to the discipline in both groups. Frictions could develop
after the elections if either considers the other's influence is becoming too
great, but every effort would probably be made to set aside differences in
order to combat any violence that might develop from the ultras of the right
or left.
The Socialists, Allende's own party, are intensely nationalistic Marxist
Leninists. They are even more disorganized than usual, and their campaign
reflects this. The 22.4 percent share of the vote they received in 1971 came
more from nationalistic appeal and Allende than from hard work. Despite
this, extremists controlling the party's top leadership have pulled no punches
in attacking Allende and the Communists, both of whom they regard as
compromising reformers whose aversion to violence is scuttling the revolu-
tion. The Socialists' rantings reflect the deep animosities that are at the root
of Much of the government's inefficiency. It is heightened by the Socialists'
corruption, irresponsibility, and slicer ineptitude, traits that are equaled by
their extreme leftist allies. The Socialists and their friends have several times
brought the Popular Unity to the brink of open rupture.
The Radicals have weakened so obviously since joining the Popular
Unity that they are no longer the usefal non-Marxist facade they once were.
The party's influence, which has always been limited, is now minimal. Half
its legislative bloc defected to the opposition in 1972 and the masons, white
collar unions, and other pockets of Radical support reportedly are moving in
that direction.
The Christian Left and Unificc: Popular Action Movement have been
dominated by Marxists and extremists since their founders split from the
Christian Democratic Party. Disenchanted by this trend, many of the original
leaders of these parties are estranged, while the revolutionary bigots who
replace deem make common cause with the extremist Socialists and the
Movement of the Revolutionary Left. The combination is the source of
unwelcome pressure on Allende to move toward violence and class warfare in
order finally to defeat the "enemies of the revolution.
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The Opposition (CODE) Confederation
The Christian Democrats remain the largest party in the country and
their expectation of electing as many as four fifths of their 76 congressional
candidates has been bolstered by a string of successes in recent student and
union elections. Former President Eduardo Frei, who is expected to draw
more votes than any other candidate, is campaigning on behalf' of most of
them. The hope is that his image as the champion of Chilean democracy will
carry many to victory. The campaign has resuscitated parts of the extensive
party organizational network that iii 1964 and 1965 rolled up election
victories unequaled before or since.
The present Christian Democratic optimism over the party's prospects
ignores several real problems. Frei's administration was weak, and it made
many enemies and lost many of its original supporters. The Allende govern-
n'ient's largesse seems almost certain to have eroded the Christian Democrats'
hold on slum areas that were once party strongholds. Many leftist voters are
disillusioned by Allende, but they may prefer not to vote rather than give
approval to the Christian Democratic alliance with the conservative National
Party. Moreover, at the peak of the campaign, strong internal animosities
that have always plagued the Christian Democrats are surfacing as are those
between the party and the Nationals.
The National Party, an amalgam of conservatives, expects to win about
a fifth of the vote. It may reach this goal, or close to it. The Nationals have
been hard-hitting opponents of Allende. Although they appeal to right-
of-center voters, they have resisted the trap of close association with rightist
terrorists. As the 1970 three-way presidential election proved, National Party
support would be necessary to the success of any opposition effort to
overcome Allende's basic strength.
The Leftist Radicals and Democratic Radicals will draw their votes
from the Radical Party, of which they were once a part, but like t they now
hate too little support to be a real political force. Personal following, rather
than party affiliation, will be the basis for t:,e election of Radical candidates,
and they will be few.
The legal responsibilities of the Chilean armed forces to ensure fair and
orderly elections gives them special broad administrative powers at election
time. Public security measures are already set up for every district, military
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computers checked the registration of new voters, and military communica-
tions will carry official voting; results. With army chief Prats as interior
minister and with other officers in civilian posts, the military is more deeply
involved in politics than during any election for many years.
In fact, the enlarged political role of the armed forces almost over-
shadows the elections. To date, the participation of the officers in the
administration has been an advantage to Allende. It strengthens his constitu-
tional image and reassures the public that extremists are being held in check.
Allende's opponents, although reassured by the military's guarantee
that elections will be honest, also see disadvantages. The officers' association
with the administration implies support for controversial government pro-
grams, which the officers are increasingly responsible for executing. It is also
harder for the opposition to maintain it has military sympathy.
Military leaders recognize that Chile is at a crossroads and that they are
playing a significant role in national life for the first time in 40 years. Many
officers are as reluctant to turn their backs on the flattering responsibilities
Allende has entrusted to them as Allende would be to lose the advantages of
their participation. Four months as ranking minister, including a two-week
stint as acting chief executive in Allende's absence, have by all appearances
convinced General Prats that he is both fitted and destined to play a major
role in guiding Chile out of its political and economic r orass. The other
military ministers have been frustrated in their posts, but there is no
indication that the air force or navy commanders would not go along with
i'r. is if he were. to decide the military should stay.
SOME POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
Allende's Popular Unity coalition most likely will garner somewhere
between 33 and 43 percent of the popular vote. Allende and various Chilean
interest groups will be re-examining their options in the wake of the vote.
The outcome is highly uncertain in this year when a number of new factors
have been introduced. The range of the vote Allende could get is broad
enough to give him a variety of post-election options.
The Low Range
President Allende's coalition receives 36.3 percent, his own plurality in the 1970 presi-
dential election, or less.
In these circumstances, the President would probably take the position
that the Popular Unity had let him down. This would make it easier for him
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to resist its conflicting pressures and seek a broader base of support, possibly
precipitating an open break with extremists who are convinced there must be
vioience to realize the revolution. He could advance his socialist policies by
continuing his astute use Of existing legislation; by working within legislative
vacuums; and by shading, evading, or ignoring the law. Having solicited the
larger political role of the military in the first place and improved his
personal position thereby, Allende probably would again ask officers to fill
high civilian posts, including cabinet positions. The service chiefs might well
agree, interpreting a low vote for the government as reason to Sustain or even
increase their pressure on Allende to moderate his administration.
The opposition parties probably would interpret a vote of 64 percent or
more as a signal to increase the pressure on Allende--and the military--to
slow the extension of governmental power. Opposition party leaders prob-
ably would reject suggestions that they join the administration, but individ-
ual politicians, especially moderates, might agree to serve, and arrangements
with some opposition factions in the legislature are possible. Even former
president Frei, a Christian Democrat, shares his party's penchant for accom-
modation. In the unlikely event that the opposition were to will a two-thirds
majority in the Senate, the Christian Democrats probably would not join the
National Party in an impeachment move against Allende unless he changed
his tactics radically.
The Middle Range
Allende's coalition receives from 36.3 to just short of 40 percent of the vote.
Allende would be faced with about the same balance of political forces
as he is now, but he would feel less need to slow the socialization process in
response to public opinion or opposition pressure. In this middle range
outcome, essentially the same considerations would exist for interaction
among power groups as at the lower range. Both Allende and the Commu-
nists would see returns in the high thirties as reason to consolidate their gains
and to resist extremist pressures for more rapid measures that might provoke
counteraction, possibly in the form of economic shutdowns by opposition
elements or a military move against the government.
The High Range
Government candidates get 40 percent or -nore of the vote.
Aliende would take a vote of this size as a mandate to step up the pace
of socialization. He would make more determined efforts to change the
constitution, to adopt a one-house legislature based on revises! 'voting rules,
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and to reform the judiciary to make it more amenable. He would seek
further controls to deal with the mounting economic chaos that is the most
serious threat to the government's viability.
Paradoxically, military commanders might see in such a result good
reason to stay on in the cabinet and other high posts, on the grounds that
the Popular Unity still would be incapable of restoring economic or political
order. Allende is likely to seek continued military participation even with a
reassuring vote. He probably would also try to recruit technicians, independ-
ent politicians and others from groups outside the Popular Unity to improve
administration efficiency and avoid crippling internal coalition squabbling.
Some of them would feel justified in accepting official posts since they
would be getting a share of the action and, hopefully, exerting some
influence.
Should the opposition fall short of 60 percent of the vote, hardliners on
the right probably would renew arguments that the only way to get rid of
Allende is through force. They might get a more sympathetic response in
some quarters. There is little indication at present, however, that they would
do better than in the past in rallying the necessary support from a com-
mitted military to force Allende out.
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