SOVIET POLITICS ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100140008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Top.Se.cret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum.
Top Secret
28 April 1972
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Politics on the Eve of the Summit
1. To a Soviet politician who has made it to
the top, the key problem is staying there. The
system provides no alternative jobs in which a man
can survive a run of bad luck. True political come-
backs are rare in Soviet politics. Thus the rela-
tions among the leaders are a matter of unusually
intense concern to them all.
2. While Soviet theory calls for a collective
form of leadership, the present rulers are keenly
aware that in the past collectivity has inevitably
given way to one-man rule. After Stalin's death,
they saw their predecessors fall in a series of
quarrels whicn only Khrushchev (and the careful
Mikoyan) survived. They profited from Khrushchev's
victory, but in the aftermath they proved unable
to hold him to the collective principle, and he
reduced them all to followers. When they finally
combined against him in 1964, it was around the
principle of collectivity that they united.
3. This determination has prevailed beyond
all early expectations, primarily beceuse of the
absence of a politician with enough strength and
ambition to shoulder his colleagues aside. But it
also reflects the insistence of the majority that
one-man rule shall not return. This insistence is
embodied in an agreement--mentioned only once in
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Note: This memorandum was orepared by the Office of
Current InteZZigence and was coordj;nated within the
Directora>,e of InteZZigen.ce and with the Office of
NaticnaZ Estimates.
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the Soviet press--that the two posts of party leader
and government premier may not be held by a single
man. The agreement falls far short of a constitu-
tional guarantee, but Khrushchev's successors have
built upon it to check individual power-seekers and
to create a set of procedures regulating the polit-
ical interplay among them. In the last eight years
they have developed various arrangements and under-
standings which, with the passage of time, have be-
come more binding and less vulnerable to individual
manipulation.
4. One way of doing this has been to build a
sort of balance of power into the Politburo itself.
Nearly all the members represent various important
institutions, interest groups, and regions, such as
agriculture, the government bureaucracy, and the
Ukrainian Republic. Naturally, those who represent
the most important institutions carry the most weight
in Politburo politics, with Brezhnev, who heads the
party apparatus, as the most powerful member. But
it is evident in practice that no one institution
or leader is to be allowed to grow so important as
to squeeze the others out.
5. Another way of keeping the collective prin-
ciple alive has been a scrupulous observance of what
are called "the norms of party life." Thus the di-
vision of responsibility among individuals is more
clearly defined than in Khrushchev's time. The
distinction between the party's guiding, monitoring
role and the government's administrative function
has also been made more clear.
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8. While collectivity remains the norm, this
does not mean that it is never challenged. There
is good evidence that Shelepin, in the first year
after Khrushchev's fall, made a challenge and was
beaten back. At the 24th Party Congress last year,
Brezhnev significantly improved his strength by
adding to the Politburo four new members who were
in various degrees his personal supporters. But
the majority desire for stability and balance has
been strong enough to preserve Shelepin's seat even
after his setback and, last year, to keep Voronov
from being pushed off the Politburo after a rival
group, probably including Brezhnev, deprived him
of his government post.
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9. Over the past 12 months, Brezhnev has been
slowly forging ahead. This is probably clue to a
recognition by his colleagues of the need for a
leader who can resolve issues, as well as to his
success in bringing his prnteges into the Politburo.
Particularly in the field of foreign affairs, he
has succeeded in staking out a personal role by
taking charge of relations with West Germany and
France. At the summit, he will want to sharpen
this image in J:he ceremonial portions of the visit,
impress the President with his pre-eminence, and
identify himself publicly with a successful out-
come. But his strength does not appear to be so
great that he would be able, if he wished, to par-
lay thE: summit proceedings into a political drive
that would give him the powers which Khrushchev
enjoyed in his heyday.
The Standing of the Politburo Members
10. While the composition of the Politburo
has been unusually stable in the past eight years,
there has been considerable change in the ranking
of some of the members. The order in which Brezh-
nev read off the names of members of the newly
"elected" politburo at the close of the 23rd and
24th party congresses provides the best indication
of the relative standing within the leadership and
how it has changed in the period between the con-
gresses.
Brezhnev
Kosygin-
Podgorny
Suslov
Voronov
Shelepin
Mazurov
Polyansky
Shelest
Pelshe
Brezhnev
-r_~Podgorny
Kosygin
Sus by
Kirilenko
Pelshe
Mazurov
Polyansky
Shelest
Voronov
t`t'Shelepin
Four new members
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11. Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin comprise
a senior troika which bears the main responsibility
for carrying out party and state policy, particu-
larly in the realm of foreign affairs. Their public
prestige fax outweighs that of the other members of
the politburo. Despite certain rivalries between
them, they have managed on the whole to work effec-
tively together. Relations between Brezhnev and
Kosygin were quite strained in the early days of
the regime, when their individual power and respon-
sibilities were still unsettled, but their rela-
tions seem to have improved since Brezhnev's pre-
eminence became clearly established.
12. Since President Podgorny lost his power
base as a party secretary in 1965, he has firmly
tied himself to Brezhnev's political star. Pod-
gorny is one of the coterie around Brezhnev made
up of Ukrainian officials or Russians who, like
their mentor, got their start in party work in the
Ukraine. Brezhnev and Podgorny appear to be close
and warm personal friends.
13. There is considerable friction, on the
other hand, between Podgorny and Kosygin, which
is arlgravated by the overlap in their resnnnsihi1-
14. Close behind the troika are the two senior
party secretaries under Brezhnev, Suslov and Kirilenko.
Kirilenko, another member of Brezhnev's Ukrainian
group, has been one of his closest allies and has
increasingly assumed the functions of his second-in-
command on the secretariat.. He still is outranked
by Suslov, however, and thus has not yet been able
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to gain public recognition as Brezhnev's heir-ap-
parent. In keeping with his aspirations, Kirilenko
attempts to maintain good relations with all his
colleagues and, on occasion, is not above criticizing
other members of the Ukrainian group.
15. Suslov, the influential party theoretician
and veteran of over 20 years of continuous service
on the party secretariat, acts as a counterweight
not only to Kirilenko but to Brezhnev as well. He
is the only remaining member of the secretariat who
was not hand-picked by Brezh nev and, as one of the
most highly respected "independents" on the politburo,
has been a key force in maintaining collective lead-
16. Of all the full members of the Politburo,
Shelepin and Voronov have lost the most ground in
political standing in recent years. Voronov, who
appears to be relatively modPrat-P I n r r 1 i rw mmJ-a-
17. Mazurov and Polyansky, Kosygin's two
leading deputies, are close in ranking and b.long
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to rival political. and regional groups. These fac-
tors tend to create the same balance of power in
the government that exists between Kirilenko and
Suslov in the party secretariat and contribute to
the stability, even immobility, in the leadership
ranks. Polyansky has been a close supporter of
Brezhnev and is a member of the Ukrainian group by
virtue of nationality and early career. Mazurov,
on the other hand, represents a rival regional or-
ganization, the Belorussian Republic party machine,
and seems to be cast in the Kosygin mold.
18. Shelest, -Lbe Ukrainian party boss, ranks
just below these two. He was once considered a
member of Brezhnev's Ukrainian group, but in recent
years policy and political differences have soured
Shelest's relationship with the party boss. He is
a fairly outspoken conservative who was an early
proponent of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and has
voiced doubts about the USSR's rapprochement with
West Germany. The four new members of the Politburo
elected at the 24th Party Congress bring up the end
of the batting order. Two of them, the Ukrainian
Premier Shcherbitsky and Kazakh party boss Kunayev,
are proteges of Brezhnev. The other two, party
secretary Kulakov and Moscow party chief Grishin,
appear to have ties with Brezhnev's allies. Shelest
and Shcherbitsky both work in Kiev, and there are
signs of rivalry between them, with Brezhnev trying
to build up the latter as a counterweight to the
former.
The Style of Soviet Policy Making
19. The high premium attached to collectivity
and the remarkable sta'.lility in Politburo membership
have had their effects on the way Soviet policy is
made. In contrast to the Khrushchev and Stalin eras,
policy changes now come slowly and incrementally.
Radical proposals are not encouraged, and abrupt
shifts can be entertained only in the face of major
crises. Their method of working helps the Soviet
leaders to avoid big errors and imparts a fair degree
of steadiness to the execution of policy. A conse-
quence of rule by committee is an occasional slowness
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of response and a flatness of style that has given
this leadership a reputation for mediocrity and lack
of imagination. The collective is not incapable,
however, of responding flexibly to opportunities,
as the USSR's exploitation of the Indo-Pakistani
war of 1971 and its aftermath shows.
20. One aspect of this method of governing may
have particular significance for the summit. The
concurrence of all, or nearly all, of the Politburo
members is sought, in every decision, and these men
also see themselves, in part, as the representatives
of various interest groups. Thus a complex set of
simultaneous decisions, some closely related and
others not, is likely to confront. them with special
difficulties. They have doubtless hammered out a
Soviet position on some of the issues likely to ap-
pear on the agenda, taking account of divergent views
in the process. On other issues, they may have
agreed to do no more than hear what the US has to
say. If, in the process of summit negotiations,
they are urged to accommodate US views on one ques-
tion in return for a US concession on another, the
merits of such a proposal may strike individuals
quite differently. It is likely, for example, that
Kosygin will set the greatest store by increased
US-Soviet trade, that Suslov will be particularly
wary about increased personal contacts, that Shelest
will be highly cautious about the terms of an arms
control agreement, and that Polyansky may attach
a high priority to agricultural imports. Thus the
current structure of the Soviet leadership, and the
modes of decision-making which it has developed,
will hamper it in any effort to make multiple ad-
justments in a speedy fashion across a range of
several issues.
The Dissident. Movement
21. What the Western observer now describes
as dissidence has its roots in Khrushchev's expo-
sure of Stalin's crimes. It took on a new, semi-
clandestine form in the mid-1960s when the present
leaders began to reverse Khrushchev's tolerant,
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albeit. zi,z-zag, policy toward criticism and protest.
The most. important. event in this reversal was the
case of the writers Daniel and Si.nyavsky in 1966.
After their trial and conviction, the dissidents,
who had up to then focused mainly on artistic and
intellectual freedom, broadened their concerns to
include a wi.de range of human and civil rights. As
a political force, however, they remain weak, con-
fined to portions of the cultural and scientific
professions and isolated almost completely from the
working class.
22. With. a few minor exceptions, the dissidents
are neither anti-Communist nor pro-American, They
are opposed only to what they regard as perversions
of the basic tenets of Leninism, begun by Stalin and
continued by his successors. Their ultimate goal is
a return to the true faith, but there is no evidence
that they propose to use violence or revolution to
achieve this end. Indeed, by Western standards So-
viet dissidents are either unable or unwilling to
organize a "mass" demonstration. Past demonstrations
have involved only a very few individuals and have
lasted from a few seconds to several minutes before
being quickly dispersed by the KGB, which seems to
know about plans for such activities well in advance.
23. Among the dissidents, the Jews are a unique
group. Wh.i.le they are interested in the general aims
of the democratic movement and are an important part
of it, the primary goal of many of them is not reform,
but emigration. They have been encouraged and em-
boldened by Israel's success in the 1967 war and are
more audacious than other groups in their protests
against regime policies. They have, for example,
staged at least one sit-in at the Central Committee
building in Moscow. In this type of action, they
rely on the publicity which their protests generate
in the West to provide a measure of protection.
24. The dissidents have never used the occasion
of an important state event to stage a demonstration.
However, given the audacity of the Soviet Jews, it
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is possible that they might try to present a petition
to the US Embassy or the President during his forth-
coming visit. The KGB would know of such plans and
could he expected to thwart them.
If some manifestation should nevertheless occur,
the Soviet leaders--proud of their control mechanisms
and highly sensitive to displays of domestic oppo-
sition--would be deeply embarrassed.
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Soviet Leadership
POLITBURO OF SECRETARIAT OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS PRESIDIUM OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SUPREME SOVIET
Members General Secretary Presidium Chairman Chairman (Titular Chief at State)
BREZHNEV-
PODGORNY
KOSYGIN -
non-rulin
CPs)
SUSLOV (ideolo
Dea_ry C^a. _
g
gy,
SUSLOV-
KIRILENKO KIRILENKO (Brezhnev's unofficial deputy.
(Tie Crri:r.
c. ---- S,=?e-e S_.
t,,s heavy industry)
Party Control
Committee Chairman
PELSHE
Pres:d:ums _.
Sece.a, y
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PELSHE
MAZUROV (industry)
f lee. -'ers
MAZUROV
POLYANSKY rag- :culture)
BREZHNEV
POLYANSKY
SHELEST
SHELEST (party boss in Ukraine)-
VORONOV
`
Members (85 nc!ud;ng
o!T ....-- Un:ons the 15 Reaubi,c Pramm,ets)
SHELEPIN
SHELEP!
t
GRISHIN
GRISHIN (party boss of Moscow) -
KUNAYEV
KUNAYEV (party boss of Kazakhstan)
SHCHERBITSKY
KULAKOV
Candidates
& me!J genre'
KGB-securit
ANDROPOV (
ANDROPOV
y
.
USTINOV-
USTINOV (defense industry & space)
VORONOV (Chairman. Pandas
entsia) Control Comr.^lt..ee)
intelli
DEMICHEV (
lt
DEMICHEV-
ure,
g
cu
KATUSHEV (ruling CPs)
KAPITONOV (party personnel director)
CP
-
li
ONOMAREV (
)
SOLOMENTSEV
non
ru
ng
s
P
MASHEROV
MASHEROV (party boss of Belorussia) -
RASHIDOV
RASHIDOV (party boss of Uzbekistan) -
MZHAVANADZE (party boss of Georgia)
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