INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130127-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 127
• Publication Date: December 4, 1972
• Content Type: IM

 C 1 A 1 n / .?.. 1 , " - "1 L./ L/ ._
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Indo-Soviet Relations
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVCES BAId
RLE COPY
DU NOT DESTROY Secret
86
4 December 1972
No. 2440/i2
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T.tda Sa u~ej r
Retaeeaoea
Irritants have developed
in the Indo-Sovict rele..tionship
during 1972. The USSR's
popularity in India seems to
h
ave peaked in the second half
of 1971 with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation and the full display cf Soviet support for India's efforts to free
Bangladesh.
IRS nce then, India's recurrent nightmare of big power interferen,?e, fixed
on t Si
New Delhi's fears, never far from the surface, that arrangements detrimental
to Indian interests were being negotiated.
Nevertheless, the leaders in New Delhi believe that Indian and Soviet
views on South Awl.,., , ---
with them as Ion g n -q t hey ?-?????~ry a'u~ uitv . ayNai cituy Willing to pt!t lip
ca--t+-
S
i
t intere ss ..
e
ov
e
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 December 1972
Historical Development
An undercurrent of suspicion has starred Indo-Russian relations since
the days of the British Raj when London's proconsuls played the Great
Game to thwart Czarist ambitions on the subcontinent. After British troops
departed in 1947, the threat posed by a hostile Pakistan was India's first
concern abroad. Next in line stood the Soviet Union. With India protected
from China by the Himalayas, the USSR was seen as the only other country
that might present a real challenge to Indian interests.
Strains between Indian and Soviet leaders had deve;oped as early as the
late 1930s and early 1940s. While Nehru and other Congress Party figures
were in British jails for their part in the independence movement, the
Moscow-supported Communists, after Hitler's attack on Russia, were back-
ing the British war effort and in the process gaining strength at the expense
of the imprisoned Congress leaders. After independence, the Communists
were in active and often violent opposition to the new government. Al-
though the Communists have since adopted milder tactics, Indian leaders
remained chary, finding it difficult to forget Moscow's support of Corn-
munist efforts to incite vio'ent revolution in the immediate post-inde-
pendence period.
Up to the mid-1950s relations between India. and the USSR were
generally correct-limited to trade, cultural, and unexceptional diplomatic
exchanges. Then, after the death of Stalin, the Soviets fastened on India as a
major target in a new foreign policy aimed at limiting Western influence in
the underdeveloped world. Prime Minister Nehru was invited to Moscow in
June 1955, and Moscow won a return trip for Bulganin and Khrushchev the
following November and December. During this visit Khrushchev first de-
clared his country's support for India's stand on Kashmir. The Soviet move
came when New Delhi was particularly receptive to approaches from new
NOTE: This ineniorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated within CIA,
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friends with fresh support. Pakistan had just Joined SEATO and was about to
join the Baghdad Pact-later to become CENTO. As Pakistan was moving
toward the US, difficulties were beginning to cloud New Dclhi's rolations
with the Chinese Communists.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, while India's relations with China
were going from bad to worse and the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute was
intensifying, Indo-.Soviet relations were growing more cordial. Nehru's of-
ficial position did not chaner,. He maintained that India's security was best
protected by its role as a buffer between superpowers, and he opposed
formal aagnments or military pacts. Nevertheless, the Indians leaned more
heavily on the Soviet Union as their border problems with the Chinese
increased. Many Indians managed to convince themselves that, in the event
of real trouble with the Chinese, the Soviet Union would offer active
support.
When the Sino-Indian border war erupted in 1962, Indian expectations
were not fully realized. Although the Soviets continued to supply military
and economic aid and let it be known that they would build a MIG aircraft
factory in India, they did not give the kind of dramatic support New Delhi
h,-,d hoped for. The Soviets avoided taking sides as long as possible (they
were coping with the Cuban missile crisis at the time); then they issued a
pro forma statement in favor of China. This statement, coupled with the
rapid and humiliating defeat suffered by Indian forces, continuing Chinese
hostility, and Pakistani-US friendship, led Nehru to declare that India must
"have adequate armed strength." Not wishing to be only a pawn in big
power politics, Nehru's government began to revamp national priorities so as
to achieve effective military :!,d economic power as soon as possible -the
ideal of self-reliance which his daughter Indira Gandhi would proclaim as
Indian policy nine years later.
The achievement of self-sufficiency is a long process, and even as Nehru
worked toward that goal, the nation was drawn into closer involvement with
the Soviet Union. In February 1962, the Soviets shipped India four of an
initial order of 12 MIG-21 fighters, and work began or. a complex of MIG
assembly plants in India. In September 1964, the Soviets confirmed their
readiness to assist in the con; traction of the huge Bckaro steel plant and to
boost further their stock with the Indian Government they continued to
admonish the Indian Communist Party to follow a peaceful, parliamentary
path. Meanwhile, tension persisted along the Sino-Indian border, and hidia
engaged Pakistan in a brief and inconclusive border fracas over a dispute in
the Rann of Kutch-a remote area near the southern termnus of the Indo -
West Pakistani border.
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By mid-1965, the Soviet Union was India's major source of diplomatic
and military support. When it full-scale Indo-Pakistani wrir broke out in
September 1965 the "special relationship" looked good to New Delhi.
Unlike the US and Great Britain, the Soviet Union continued to give military
aid and other support. Total support, however, did not last long.
Moscow, in the person of Premier Kosygin, was soon calling for an
immediate cease-fire. Once the war was brought to an end, Moscow moved
further away from New Delhi in an obvious effort to improve its credentials
as a mediator at the Tashkent conference. Moscow's motives in doing this
were a mixture-a desire to be seen as a peace-maker, a recognition that
India's continuing ties with the US and UK had not been appreciably
loosened. and a wish to improve its standing in " ukistan and weaken that
country's growing dependence on China.
The new Soviet strategy, seen in New Delhi ,..s an attempt by the
Soviets to develop Pakistani at the expense of Indian power, led to a Soviet
decision in July 1968 to supply military aid to Pakistan. The reaction in New
Delhi was predictably negative, but stopped short of open denunciation.
Although the Indians kept up a steady stream of protests, they could not
ignore their need for Moscow's unqualified support in the UN for their
clu..ns in Kashmir. New Delhi continued to side with Moscow on issues vital
to Soviet interests. Thus, New Delhi refused to condemn the Soviets for the
invasion of Czechoslovakia and in April 1969 came out in support of the
Soviets in their border dispute with the Chinese.
Still, New Delhi did not actively support Party Chief Brezhnev's sug-
gestion for a system of collective security in Asia, and in mid-1970 the
Indians suspended discussions on a possible Soviet-Indian friendship treaty.
During 1970, Indian concern over the Soviet role on the subcontinent
grew. The fundamental difference was over Soviet arms to Pakistan, but
friction appeared in several relatively minor areas. Problems cropped up, for
example, over the administration of economic and military aid, over the
continued publication of official Soviet maps that showed disputed areas on
the Sino-Indian border as belonging to the Chinese, over the Soviet Union's
construction of a cultural center in the south Indian city of Trivandrum
without informing Indian officialdom, and over India's hesitation in taking a
stronger pubic position in favor of Soviet positions on Vietnam and the
Middle East.
At the same time, the Soviets were complaining of the Indians' inability
or unwillingness fully to utilize Soviet aid. As a result of poor management,
strikes, and lagging production of domestic components, some Soviet-aided
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plants were not being completed on schedule and others were being inef-
ficiently operated. The recession in 1966 had led conservative Indian fiscal
administrators to hold down government investment. Lagging investment
sharply curtailed the use of Soviet economic aid earmarked for the construc-
tion of heavy industrial plants. Moreover, reduced government demand for
investment goods among other things caused many completed plants to
operate below capacity, further reducing the need for the type of aid the
USSR was furnishing. Moscow's refusal to allow New Delhi to reallocate
project aid to import industrial raw materials meant that more than $200
million of Soviet credits were not allocated. The Indians must have com-
pared Moscow's stipulations unfavorably with Western economic assistance
where non-project aid made up about 85 percent of the total.
Despite all these difficulties, the Indians remained dependent on the
Soviets for advanced weapons. Since Soviet military aid to India was first
initiated in November 1960, Moscow has delivered more than $1.1 billion
worth of equipment. These deliveries, which averaged over $180 million
annually after 1965, include MIG-21 jet fighters, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles,
MI-8 helicopters, OSA-class guided missile patrol boats and tanks.
A Wartime High Point
In 1969 the Soviets concluded that their attempt to curry favor with
Pakistan was losing them more good will in New Delhi than they were
gaining in Islamabad. Military aid deliveries to Pakistan were accordingly
suspended, and by 1971 the Soviets were restricting them,~..lves in Pakistan
to economic development projects. As a result, the leaders in New Delhi
again convinced themselves that Moscow would support them in a serious
confrontation with Pakistan. While their experience indicated that Moscow
would prefer a quick and peaceful means to defuse the explosive Indo-Pak-
istani situation, Mrs. Gandhi seemed confident that she would ire able to
obtain Soviet support once the Kremlin leaders understood there was no
alternative to war. She wis right. In the event, the Soviets decided not to risk
their "special relationship" in a futile effort to prevent war.
As events on the subcontinent moved inexorably toward full-scale
hostilities, New Delhi took steps to coordinate its diplomatic and defense
strategies with Moscow. la addition to ensuring a continuing flow of military
supplies, Indian strategists were anxious that all precautions be taken to
guard against Chinese intervention. The Soviets were in a position to offer
assurances in regard to both.
Throughout the summer of 197 1, Soviet arms shipments continued to
arrive it India. The significance of this aid could not have been lost on
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Peking. Indian strategists had already calculated that winter weather in the
Himalayas would make it difficult for China to engage in diversionary action
along the border, and Peking's less than vigorous public support for Islam-
abad increased Mrs. Gandhi's confidence. Nevertheless, the Indian prime
minister was anxious to obtain a commitment from the Soviets that would
leave the Chinese no room for doubt that Moscow would protect its client.
To this end, she suggested in the summer that the friendship treaty first
proposed by the Soviets in 1969 be (lusted off for early signature. Moscow,
only too anxious to accommodate Mrs. Gandhi on an arrangement that
provided long-term gains for the Soviets, quickly agreed. The Indo-Soviet
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed in August. It called
for immediate consultations in case either India or the Soviet Union were
attacked or threatened, and for both sides to refrain from giving assistance to
any third power engaged in an armed conflict with the other. Thus, India
secured Moscow's written promise that in the event of Indo-Pakistani hostili-
ties, Soviet assistance to Pakistan would stop. New Delhi also had the
commitment it needed to counteract the Chinese. Although billed to c'n-
tinue for at least 20 years, the treaty preserves a certain flexibility for New
Delhi by providing for mutual consultations in the event of differences over
interpretation.
In the months that followed its signing, abundant evidence of increased
cooperation appeared, including an exchange of visits by Indian and Soviet
government leaders undertaking full consultation prior to the outbreak of
hostilities. This show of amity was capped by a conspicuous military airlift
in November.
When war finally erupted in December, Soviet support for India was all
that the leaders in New Delhi could have desired. The Soviets had already
stocked the Indian arsenals and most likely promised to replace materiel lust
in the war. In addition, Moscow promised to veto any draft submitted to the
UN Security Council that called either for troop withdrawal before the
Indians had accomplished their objective or for a political settlement that
was not acceptable to the Bengalis. Finally, the Kremlin's propaganda
machine was turned up full blast on behalf of New Delhi, and warnings to
"outside powers" to stay out of the conflict were beamed directly at Peking.
For their part, the Soviets asked two things-that the Indian armed forces
accomplish their goals quicl.ly and that they confine their objective to the
liberation of East Pakistan, i.e., that they forego the destruction of West
Pakistan.
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But Problems in Peacetime
The "special relationship" may have hit its peak during the war. Almost
as soon as the fighting stopped, old suspicions and differently perceived
national interests re-emerged. Soviet offers to act as a go-between were
interpreted in New Delhi as a sign that Moscow was eager to revert to the
role of mediator by loosening its ties with India and weaning Pakistan away
from China and the US. The Indians made it clear that peace negotiations
would be carried out by the principals alone and that third-party inter-
ference-Soviet, UN, or other-would not be welcome. They were quick to
take offense at any Soviet action that couiu be interpreted as pressure on
them to settle affairs with Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi's frequent and derogatory
remarks about the sinister machinations of "big powers," although aimed
primarily at the US, appeared to be warnings to the Soviet leaders as well.
For the most part, Moscow has gone along w th India, but the Soviets have
found it difficult to refrain from low-keyed efforts to push India, Pakistan,
and Bane; Mesh to some sort of formalized acceptance of their new relation-
ship.
Celebrations held in India in August 1972 to commemorate the signing
last year of the Friendship Treaty were kept to a minimum. Mrs. Gandhi
paid tribute to Indo-Soviet friendship, but she described the treaty as a
"benefit to the rest of the world" and was careful to highlight the unusual
circumstances-"when our nation faced a major challenge" -surrounding its
signature.
There have bean other irritants. Although there has been a dutiful
increase in Indian appearances at Soviet-sponsored commemorative occasions
and at Communist-front meetings, New Delhi has not failed to notice, with
growing alarm, that Soviet consular officials are now more in evidence
outside the capital city and, that, building on their established base within
the leftist press, Soviet representatives are placing news stories in publi^a-
tions not previously open to their material. Two Indian wire services recently
agreed to exchange materials with TASS, and TASS news photos for the first
time are being used in other than the pro-Moscow publication, Patriot. The
Soviets inaugurated a new House of Soviet Culture in Madras in February; in
April the Trivandrum cultural center opened, although with an all-Indian
staff; and construction is continuing on a new cultural center in Calcutta.
There has been a country-wide increase in new Indo-Soviet cultural ,,ocieties
and more Soviet-sponsored cultural events.
This has, of course, led to the presence of large numbers of Soviets in
India. Indian statistics indicate that a roximatel 5 350 Soviet nationals are
now in the country.
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Old annoyances have cropped up again this year. The Soviets have not
stopped publication of official maps showing territory claimed by India as
belonging to China. Indian trade union leaders are concerned at what they
see as Soviet-inspired pressures to replace Western contacts with ties to the
Soviet Labor Federation. Top armed service personnel-the majority of
whom are western oriented-have revived their chronic complaint that the
Soviets refuse to give India the best arms; Moscow, they say, goes on
substituting quantity for quality.
Strains are continuing in the economic relationship. Despite frequent
high-level economic contacts and new intergovernmental economic agree-
ments, on a long-term basis, Moscow's capacity to absorb increasing amounts
of Indian consumer goods is questionable. Moreover, India's demand for
non-military Soviet manufactures has already stagnated due to New Delhi's
own excess industrial capacity in sectors competitive with Soviet exports.
Although the Soviets have agreed to provide limited amounts of key
items such as fertilizers, non-ferrous metals, petroleum and chemical
products, the record suggests that the Indians will continue to face hard
bargaining on these items. There is no evidence to suggest that the much-
vaunted Joint Commission or. Economic, Scientific and Technical Coopera-
tion, established in Moscow last September, will elevate economic coordina-
tion much beyond previous levels.
Meanwhile, Soviet aid deliveries are also stagnating.
Relations between the Ruling Congress Part3 and the pro-Moscow
Communist Party of India, which had been one of Mrs. Gandhi's main
sources of support, have deteriorated. The Communists have adopted a
critical attitude toward the Congress Party government. Their aim is to
appear as vigorous champions of the poor and disadvantaged with an identity
separate and distinct from the Congress Party, and while they do not seek
primarily to denegrate Mrs. Gandhi, she does not fully appreciate the
distinction and is indignant. The Communists' new position reportedly was
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approved by Moscow, probably with a view toward placating party activists,
but it has reminded Mrs. Gandhi that the Soviet Union has interests in India
that do not coincide with those of her government or her party. She is
certainly wary of Soviet contacts with Indian Communists, and her intel-
ligence service keeps a close eye on such things.
Yet the thorniest issu': in Indo-Soviet relations during 1972 was the
Kremlin's decision to welcome President Nixon to Moscow for summit talks.
The Nixon visit, on the heels of new US moves in Vietnam, was particularly
galling to New Delhi because it was interpreted as another example of the
willingness of the big powers to reach accommodations at India's expense.
More to the point, New Delhi had come out strongly against US bombing
and mining north of the 17th parallel, doubtless believing that Moscow was
preparing to react sharply and scuttle the summit. The Indians found
themselves way out on a limb, and they resented Moscow's failure to keep
them informed. Soviet leaders met with their Indian counterparts in a
hurried attempt to soothe the Indians, but it is doubtful that New Delhi was
satisfied.
The Indians remain suspicious of Soviet attempts to expand their
presence in Asia and despite considerable pressure from Moscow, New Delhi
remains as aloof as possible from the Soviet proposal to establish a Soviet-
sponsored Asian collective security system. When Indians do speak of the
collective security concept they emphasize its economic as opposed to its
military aspects, a ploy calculated to do the least possible damage to their
prospects for an improved relationship with Peking.
What Now? The View From Moscow
These difficulties notwithstanding, Moscow is not likely to abandon its
nearly 20-year courtship of New Delhi. Already the dominant force on the
subcontinent and a potential great power, India is important to Moscow as a
counterweight to China. Good Soviet-Indian relations make a big contribu-
tion to Moscow's ambition of denying South Asia to Chinese and US
influence. Another, but lesser, factor is the influence India still has among
the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia and other nations in the
Afro-Asian, underdeveloped, and nonaligned worlds. Moscow can therefore
hope that New Delhi will ease the way for an expansion of Soviet influence
in the countries where Indian views count.
Moscow also has some practical economic rearo:is for keeping its ties
with India in good order. The Soviets have, for several years, been willing to
allow New Delhi to run a deficit in its current account to service outstanding
debt obligations. They have accepted manufactured products from India as
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repayment for Soviet economic and military aid, and have agreed to slight
increases in the quantities of raw materials they will supply India. The
Soviets will send more steel shapes, non-ferrous metals, and newsprint, but
they still refuse to provide non-project aid under credits. More important,
they have been willing to provide considerable amounts of modern military
hardware to the Indians; the Soviets have been the largest supplier of such
items for some years-thus far in 1972 India has concluded som,. $300
million worth of arms contracts with the USSR-and this element of Indian
dependence is not likely to change in the near future given India's appetite
for new weapons.
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There are, of course, definite limits to 'pow far the Soviets will let their
identification with India carry them. They ,ve found that their role in India
places significant limits on their freedom of maneuver in the rest of Asia.
They must also be alive to the risks involved. The lessons of Indonesia and
Egypt are there. Moscow's experience this summer with Cairo can only be a
painful reminder that there are always dangers in dealing with such touchy
foreigners.
For their part, Indian policy makers worry about what they see as a
growing detente not only between the Soviets and the US but between the
Chinese and the US. With relations between New Delhi and Washington at a
low point and in the absence of indications that Peking is ready to respond
favorably to New Delhi's proffers of friendship, the Indian leadership must
rely on the Soviet Union for support.
It is not a comfortable position, since, as the Indians see it, their
country gets low priority in Moscow's scheme of things. The Indians think
that Moscow wants most of all to avoid a situation that might bring it into
conflict with the US and China. Mrs. Gandhi believes that this overriding
interest could lead the Soviets, for example, to join with the US and China in
seeking to bolster Pakistan against India. Thus, she is no longer really sure of
the Soviet response should the Indians call for military aid when war
threatens.
The fact that India's defense plans aim at a rapid improvement in
weapons technology heightens Indian dependence on foreign suppliers, par-
ticularly the USSR. This dependence leaves New Delhi even more anxious
and vulnerable; it also makes it more difficult for India fully to capitalize on
its relations with Moscow and easier for the Soviet Union to claim special
privileges in India.
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Mrs. Gandhi may be under pressure to grunt special privileges to the
Soviet Union in return for Soviet support in recent years, but so fur she has
shied away from any sort of blanket concessions. She has not and probably
will not give Moscow permanent naval facilities on Indian territory, though
she may well award the Soviets special favors on a case-by-case basis
including allowing Soviet ships to b,; serviced at some Indian ports. Iicr
government's discouragement of visits by US ships in recent months may
have been partly designed to forestall an increase in Soviet port calls. Ad hoc
permission for specific Soviet flights over India en route to Hanoi or in
support of Soviet space efforts has been granted, but a general clearance is
likely to be refused.
Demands like these make India uncomfortable. Mrs. Gandhi would like
the added maneuverability a wider range of suppliers and supporters would
give. Specifically, she would like to develop better economic relations with
the US and the developed West, where there are countries better equipped io
meet Indian needs. She is accordingly exploring several avenues of escape
from India's present dependence on the Soviet Union.
For one thing, she is determined to keep her Ihies open to Western
capitals. She was, for example, quick to scotch press stories that India would
participate in CEMA, a significant move in light of CEMA's recent efforts to
cast itself as a viable partner for the lesser developed countries. The USSR
and Eastern Europe have not met, and very likely cannot meet, the gap in
India's commodities needs, notably for fertilizer, that was created when US
aid wigs halted. So she searches for improved relations with the West. Aid
cutbacirs by the US and other Western countries, however, make the present
a poor time to look for substantial help from this quarter.
Another of the alternatives Mrs. Gandhi has been exploring is an
understanding with the Chinese. In 1969, she and other government spokes-
men, including Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, publicly expressed hopes that
a way could be found for New Delhi to resolve its dispute with Peking. There
was intense interest in New Delhi in 1969 when Chairman Mao appeared to
reciprocate these sentiments by extending a cordial greeting tc, the Indian
charge at May Day celebrations in Peking. The charge' scurried hom,. for
consultations, and during the summer Indian officials noted that Peking's
treatment of their diplomats had begun to improve. To keep the ball rolling,
New Delhi up-graded its representation at Chinese functions, and amid
repeated reports of ambassadorial contacts between India and China in
foreign lands, Indian hopes for an imminent exchange of ambassadors grew.
Hopes subsided, however, when in April 1971 Peking spoke out fn.
Pakistan and against India. This action had not been unexpected, and the
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Indians tried to minimize its effect upon their long-term relations with the
Chinese. In November 1971, Mrs. Gandhi told newtlnlen that Chinese state-
ments on the Indo-I'akistani i:tuulion would not affect India's Interest in
Improving relations with Peking. When, however, Peking continued to sup-
port Pakistan, New Delhi lessened Its elTorts to improve bilateral relations.
Ambassadors have not been exchanged since the Indians will not yield to the
Chinese insistence that an Indian ambassador be posted to Peking before a
Chinese ambassador appears in New Delhi. Indian officials are reluctant to
make the first move without firm assurances that Peking will reciprocate.
At present, New Delhi is concentrating on its problems with Pakistan
and Bangladesh, and a breakthrough In Sino-Indian relations is unlikely until
the situation on the subcontinent stabilizes. Once that is accomplished, New
Delhi seems likely to resume its cautious courting of Peking. In a major
parliamentary statement on 30 November, Indian Foreign Minister Swaran
Singh pointed the way, stating that "it is our firm belief that India and China
can and must norm nlize their relations" and that "India is willing to consider
an exchange of ambassadors" with China.
At the same parliamentary meeting Singh asserted that his country was
ready to normalize its relations with the US. New Delhi, he said, "would do
everything in its power" to bring about a rapprochement with Washington. A
senior Foreign Ministry official later stated that Washington would be
expected to treat India as the dominant power in South Asia and abandon
the former US policy of looking upon Pakistan as a counter-balance to India.
This, of course, is similar to the line New Delhi has been pushing on the
Soviet Union.
Over the long run, it appears that New Delhi would like to forge a new
set of power relationships n southern Asia. The first step-the emergence of
India as the dominant power on the subcontinent-has already been accom-
plished. The next steps toward these goals will be more difficult. As she
moves along the road, Mrs. Gandhi hopes to find sources of Western
economic and military assistance and to reach a detente with China that will
lessen her need for Soviet protection and thus increase her nation's inde-
pendence. Until she succeeds in these endeavors, she will have to nurse along
India's relationship with the Soviet Union and trust that Moscow will be
responsive.
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