PAPADOPOULOS-A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130101-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 101
• Publication Date: September 25, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
.t:.4PADOPOULO5-..4 Question of'Survivai
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCh
fits COPY
DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
No. 2071172
25 September 1972
73
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SEC'.RET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 September 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PA''-DOPOULOS-A Question of Survival
In the past four months, dissatisfaction with Prime Minister George
Papadopoulos' rule has increased significantly. While there has always been
an element of disaffection with Papadopoulos, mainly from younger officers
who feel they have. not risen fast enough, this time the discontent seems
much more widespread and basic. Officers are complaining more frequentl
;ihriit Panarlnnnulos' failure to carry out the goals of the revolution
military to stay in office, an if the discontent continues to spread, it could
ultimately lead to his ouster. So far, however, Papadopoulos' opponents do
not seem to have settled on a successor or overcome their disiaste for pitting
military units against each other.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordi-
nated within CIA.
The prime minister needs the suppor o ie
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Chronological Background
On 21 April 1967, George Papadopoulos, then a colonel in the army,
spearheaded a successful military coup. Along with a score of other middle-
ranking officers, he outlined a plan to revamp the Greek Government,
remove the political elements in Greek society that had contributed to the
anarchy of the preceding four years, and finally bring the country to true
democratic rule. On 13 December 1967, the clumsy, abortiv;%. countercoup
attempt by King Constantine only strengthened the colonels' resolve. The
King fled to Rome, anti-regime organizations that were formed abroad
quickly splintered, and the Greek public lapsed into an apathetic acceptance
of their new rulers. All this gave the colonels the opportunity to proceed
with their high-sounding but vaguely defined programs for ridding the
government of favoritism, restructuring the education system, rooting out
inefficiency in the ministries, and purging the military of disloyal members.
Inveighing against the ills of Greek society, Papadopoulos has continually
urged the Greek public to seek "moral rearmament and adherence to Greek
traditions and Christian teachings."
Papadopoulos, as the leader of the Revolutionary Council that pulled
off the coup and as the most intelligent and politically minded of that group,
gradually gained control of the post-coup government. He carefully maneu-
vered his colleagues into positions of lesser power and influence. In 1968,
the Greek public overwhelmingly endorsed a new constitution, and
Papadopoulos gained the personal power to implement it piecemeal at
whatever pace circumstances seemed to warrant. Gradually, as he got more
deeply involved in essentially civilian matters, Papadopoulos increasingly
used civilians and the normal chain of military command, while consulting
less and less with the Revolutionary Council. This did not sit well with
elements in the military, particularly those who felt they had played signifi-
cant roles in the revolution. In late 1970, a major confrontation developed
between the prime minister and some of his colleagues in the Revolutionary
Council, who demanded that Papadopoulos either accede to the collective
will of the Revolutionary Council or step down. The commanders of key
military combat units around Athens, however, lined up behind Papadopou-
los, and the disgruntled members of the Revolutionary Council-unable to
agree on a successor-were forced to back down. It was a clear victory for
Papadopoulos, but it left an undercurrent of discontent that has persisted in
some quarters within the military.
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Papadopoulos' recent performance has not been impressive. His failure
to carry out much-needed reforms within the bureaucracy and especially in
economic and social affairs, his contact with former politicians, and his
tolerance of opposition in the pr,;ss have cooled the military's admiration for
him. The prime minister's loss of prestige began to show in 1971 when his
merger of the economic ministries failed to improve their efficiency. The
snail-like pace of the regime's programs has appeared very unrevolutionary,
and military and civilian officials alike talk at length about a need to
reinvigorate the government. Papadopoulos' latest effort to get things
moving came on 31 July in the form of yet another cabinet reshuffle. He
brought more military men into the. cabinet in an obvious attempt to
appease them, but so far the effects have been minimal.
The Military-Friends and Foes
Papadopoulos' future depends upon his standing with the military. The
armed forces are his major source of support and at the same time the
principal threat to his staying in office. But the military itself is divided on a
number of important issues. Younger officers, for example, continue to press
for more power. They tend to be anti-monarchist and are reluctant to go
along with the implementation of the constitution, which they fear will
erode their power and prestige. Older officers do not oppose the monarchy
per se, :.lthough they oppose Constantine's return. They do favor imple-
nv.mting the constitution, albeit in a gradualist, conservative fashion that
would not endanger their positions and that would prevent the army from
being blamed for the day-to-day failures of goveroment programs.
Tactically, these differences work to Papadopoulos' advantage because
they prevent coordinated moves against him. In the long run, however, they
are a net disadvantage. Papadopoulos appears to be finding it increasingly
difficult to move the revolution along without incurring stronger opposition
from one faction or another. Since he cannot satisfy everyone, he is having
to settle for compromises that completely satisfy no one. Even this is
proving so difficult that many problems are not addressed at all.
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Mc'nwhiic, Papadopoulos has been personally assuming a growing
number of functions. He now holds five portfolios, including the Regency,
and his responsibilities have isolated him more and more from working
relationships with his revolutionary colleagues. As he has concentrated more
power in his own hands and relied more on members of his family and close
personal friends, he has forfeited the advice of seasoned experts and has
become vulnerable to criticism for administrative lapses.
In spite of his shortcomings, Papadopoulos is generally considered head
and shoulders above any potential rival. There is no evidence, moreover, that
he has lost the support of most key leaders. His principal advisers include the
chief of the armed forces, General Odysseus Angelis, and the newly ap-
pointed head of the intelligence organization, Mihail Roufougalis. Angelis is
the only leading figure in the council hierarchy who did not participate in
the coup, but his able leadership of the military and his lack of personal
political ambition have made hinm one of Papadopoulos' most trusted
advisers.
Stylianos Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos once shared equal power
with Papadopoulos in the triumvirate that ran the government following the
coup. They have since been downgraded to subordinate roles-deputy prime
ministers. Occasional rumors that Makarezos is less than loyal to Papa-
dopoulos have surfaced in recent months, but Pattakos still appears to be in
Papadopoulos' camp. In any event, unless the situation in Athens deterio-
rates rapidly, Papadopoulos can probably count on the backing of these two
men.
One principal unknown quantity within the leadership is Dimitrious
loannides, the incorruptible commander of the military police. loannides
resents the fact that his constant warnings to Papadopoulos to put an end to
corruption in the government have gone unheeded. The military police play
an important role in maintaining security in Athens, and Ioannides' loyalty
to Papadopoulos is vital. Rumors that Papadopoulos bought off some jun-
ior-level Revolutionary Council members with appointments to the minis-
tries to dull their reformist zeal could only have had a negative effect on
loannides. At this stage, loannides seems to be maintaining an ambivalent
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attitude toward Papadopoulos. If he decided to go against the prime minis-
ter, the threat of a successful military coup would balloon rapidly.
A Shaky Future
On the surface Papadopoulos remains confident, but the military op-
position clearly worries him. Earlier he may have taken some comfort in the
fact that military unrest emanated only from the younger officers, but now
he cannot be so sure.
At this point, in all
probability, he is cautiously assessing hi'. military support before deciding
what, if any, further action is neeJed. Meanwhile, the o osition ma not
find it easy to agree on a successor to Papadopoulo
Even less apparent is just how much of a deterioration in the situation
would be enough to force Papadopoulos out. A major scnnnni ~nvnIu;n
g
up terrorism or Isor erl-rh-
y stu ents or t ~e a test opposition could hurt
Papadopoulos badly, particularly if he gave an impression of indecision in
coping with it. With the opening of the fall sessions at the universities, a
recurrence of last May's student demonstrations for educational reform
cannot be ruled out, and leftists will probably try again to turn student
unrest into opposition to the government.
The perennial Cyprus problem, which has toppled several governments
in the past, bears watching in the context of Papadopoulos' tenure. The
intercommunal talks under way in Cyprus and relations with Turkey are
emotional issues in Greece. Papadopoulos is seeking better re;ations with one
of Greece's traditional archenemies, Turkey, in the hopes that this wil!
provide a better atmosphere for tl a solution of the Cyprus problem. Not
much progress has been made, however, toward resolving basic questions:
Can the Greek and Turkish Cypriots live together peacefully in an independ-
ent state, should the island be attached to Greece, or should it be divided
between Turkey and Greece? In the interests of expediency, the various
parties have-with varying degrees of reluctance-shelved these fundamental
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considerations and are trying to work out a scheme that will ensure harmony
between the two Cypriot communities. To this end discussions are under
way on Cyprus between the two communities' negotiators, with participants
from Greece, Turkey, and the UN. This approach has not met with universal
approval in Greece. ;i it does not work-or if Papadopoulos seems to be too
accommodating to the Turks-it might give his opponents another excuse to
move against him.
Longevity has never been a hallmark of Greek regimes. Papadopoulos
has already held power for five years in a country that since 1821 has seen
seven coup attempts-five of them succes1ul-one royal assassination, three
repudiations of the monarchy, and three military dictatorships. In the words
of one Greek politician, "Leaders are not recognized in Greece by what they
achieve, but by how many enemies they acquire. To prove you are a great
man in this country you must be vilified-every day if possible!" No Greek
government has lasted longer than the seven-year rule of former premier
Constantine Karamanlis. Military governments in Greece have been par-
ticularly susceptible to early demises because of traditional factionalism
within the armed forces. The next few months should shed a clearer light on
the fate of this government, but the warning signs are here.
If Papadopoulos becomes a victim of a coup, it will be essentially
because of a failure on his part to maintain a close relationship with those
military officers who see themselves as the guardians of revolutionary virtue
and Greek national pride. Any immediate replacement government is likely
to be at least as anti-Communist and as highly nationalistic and sensitive to
outside interference as its predecessor.
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