CROATIAN EMIGRE ACTIVITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130099-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 99
• Publication Date: September 15, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence .Memorandum
C)r ztian Emigre Activity
CIA
U:.
Secret
15CS`ep:ember 1972
No. 2069/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 September 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Croatian Emigre Autivity
With power groups jockeying for position inside
Yugoslavia as that nation looks ahead to the not too
distant succession period, radical anti-Communist
emigres have stepped up their campaign for an inde-
pendent Croatia. Throughout post-war history, Tito-
ist Yugoslavia has been subjected--mainly by the
heirs of Ante Pavelic's fascist Croatian Ustashi--
to emigre propaganda and sporadic terrorism in the
form of bombings and more recently assassinations.
These emigres have taken new heart from the -upsurge
in Croatian nationalism in 1971, from the knowledge
that the time left for Tito--who was 80 on 25 May--
to act as a stabilizing influence, is at best lim-
ited, and from the successes scored by other terror-
ists. The outrage perpetrated by fedayeen at the
Munich Olympics may have sparked the hijacking on
15 September of a Swedish airliner by Croat sepa-
ratists. It is part of a pattern of increasingly
frequent ustashi, the Croatian word for "terrorist,"
attacks over the last 18 months.
Background
Aided and abetted by Mussolini, the Croatian
Ustashi was founded in the late 1920s under the
leadership of the exile Ante Pavelic. Its history
between World War I and World War II featured sabo-
tage and murder, highlighted by the assassination
of Yugoslav King Alexander in 1934. When Hitler
occupied Yugoslavia, Pavelic became head of a pup-
pet Croatian state, ushering in one of the bloodi-
est chapters of World War II. Thousands of non-
Croats were put to death in a wanton slaughter.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current InteZZigenie.
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Following the war Pavelic and his followers
went underground. Today, ustashi no longer refers
to a specific body or organization, but is a generic
term applied to the plethora of emigre groups
pledged to separate Croatia from the Yugoslav feder-
ation by any means necessary. Membership in these
groups is generally small and fluctuating. Their
financial backing comes mainly from the established
Croation emigre communities in Western Europe and
the US. Their political philosophies range from
fascism to quasi-socialism, but they are united in
nationalism and opposition to Tito.
The word ustashi, terrorist, accurately de-
scribes the modus operandi of these numerous Croa-
tian emigre groups. Although the Croatian Libera-
tion Movement is supposedly the heir to Pavelic's
organization, other former ustashi operatives have
infiltrated other Croatian emigre organizations,
prodding the more radical elements to terrorism.
Wittingly or not, many if the Croatian emigre or-
ganizations (estimated at 17) in the US, Western
Europe and Australia have ustashi connections or
are subject to the machinations of former ustashi.
Until the late 1960s ustashi activity centered
on bombing Yugoslav installations. In 1968, how-
ever, a shift in tactics occurred and Yugoslav of-
ficials became the targets. In June of that year,
the chief of the Yugoslav Military Mission in West
Berlin was severely wounded by gunfire. Since then
emigre terrorism has become more violent. On 10
February 1971, the Yugoslav Consulate General in
Goteborg, Sweden,was occupied by terrorists who
attempted, without success, to hold its occupants
for $100,000 ransom and to obtain the release of
a fellow terrorist then on trial in Yugoslavia.
The Goteborg incident v:a:, followed by the assassin-
ation of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir
Rolovic, in April 1971. The hijacking of the Swed-
ish airliner is an attempt to exchange the plane,
its crew and 86 passengers for the assassins of
Ambassador Rolovic.
These terrorists mean business. In late Janu-
ary they blew up a Stockholm-to-Belgrade airliner,
killing 27 of its 28 passengers. They may have been
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aiming to blow iip the Yugoslav Premier, who flew
this route the following day. In early July a
group of 19 ustashi guerrillas infiltrated into
western Bosnia-Hercegovina in a none-too-successfu],
effort to incite armed rebellion.
The group most likely responsible for today's
hijacking is the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood
(Hrvatsko Revoijucionarno Bratstvo--HRB) that was
founded in 1961 in Australia. It has tried to in-
filtrate terrorist groups into Yugoslavia and to
carry out attacks on Yugoslav installations abroad.
Its existence did not become known until 1968.r
Since then it has gone further underground
and h a shifted its operations to Scandinavia. It
is this organization which is most likely behind a
recent spate of bombings in Sweden and in Yugoslavia.
Other Ustashi Groups
The most notorious of Croatian emigre organiza-
tions, the Croatian National Committee (Hrvatski
Narodni Odbor--HNO), is headquartered in West Berlin;
it was led by the late Branko Jelic, a former lieu-
tenant in Pavelic's Ustashi organization. Jelic
founded the HNO in 1951 following a falling out with
Pavelic. Frustrated by the marked improvement in
Yugoslav ties with the West in recent years, Jelic
claimed that he sought Soviet support for a free and
independent Croatia. Although Jelic said he had
visited Moscow, there is no proof he got anything
more than a low-level verbal endorsement from the
Soviets. Nevertheless, Jelic's flirtation with the
Kremlin carried with it the implication of Soviet
meddling in Yugoslav affairs
The Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) was
formed by Pavelic in 1957 after several years of
squabbling between ustashi factions. It is head-
quartered in Spain. Following Pavelic's death in
1959, HOP came under the leadership of Or.. Stjephan
Hefer, an official of
the Croatian Home Guard (Hrvatski Domobrani). Under
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Hefer, HOP degenerated into mere feuding. As a re-
sult it maintained a low profile throughout the
1960s, relying on like-minded colleagues to be the
Croatian standard bearers.
The Croatian National Resistance (Hrvatski
Narodni Otpor) was founded by a former ustashi gen-
eral, Maks Lubric. This is a quasi-military organi-
zation with branches in Spain, West Germany, France,
Sweden, the US, Canada, and Australia. Lubric was
murdered in 1968 in an emigre feud; since then, the
Australian branch has emerged as the dominant wing
of this organization; this win is led b, Srecko
Rover.
Largely because o its
activity in Australia, the Resistance is undoubtedly
high on the Yugoslav list.
The Union of Croatian Communists Abroad (UCCA)
is a relative newcomer on the emigre scene. The
league appears to be some sore of ustashi smoke
screen designed to discredit the legal Croatian
Communist party back home through a var4.ety of
means. It claims to have ties to some of the Cro-
atian leaders and condemns others. Founded by
Velimir Tomulic, the current chairman of the UCCA
is Tomo Sedlo. The UCCA has close contacts with
Jelic's HNO. It has prompted a disproportionately
high response from Yugoslav officials because of
the ties to Jelic and its implied claim to be the
true Communist leadership for Croatia.
Belgrade has sought to cooperate with Western
governments in curbing emigre terrorism, but these
efforts have not prevented a new upsurge of attacks
in 1971 and 1972.
feelings, from Tito down to the manAinltherstreet,
were already running high in Yugoslavia following
the guerrilla attack last July and the Munich atro-
cities.
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The hijacking in Sweden will add fuel to the
flames, and, if Belgrade is not satisfied with the
outcome, it is likely to take matters into its own
hands. This could include instructions to the Yugo-
slav Intelligence Services to remove emigre leaders
and emigre groups from this kind of action. The
Yugoslav Intelligence Services and the ustashi
emigres have already engaged in a gangland-style
fight in Munich and in Spain over an eight-month
period in late 1968 and early 1969. Six livas
were lost then; a similar gang war may thus lie
ahead.
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