SHELEST REVISITED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130090-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: July 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Shelest Revisited
CIA
DOCLIMEFIT KMVICES BRANCH
FILE DOPY
03 RIOT DESTROY If
Secret
8 v
1 July 1972
No. 2049/72
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CENTRAL INTELT.IGENCE AGENCY
Directorate o:? Intelligence
1 July 1972
Shelest Revisited
The substitution of Shcherbitsky for Shelest
as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party
and the downgrading of the latter to one of nine
USSR deputy premiers was the most important politi-
cal change in the Soviet. Union in at least f.i.ve years
and provided a dramatic display of Brezhnev's power
on the eve of the Summit. Even more than the removal
of Voronov as chairman of the Russian Republic last
July, the demotion of Shelest represents a victory
for Brezhnev personally and a blow to his opponents,
though not a fatal one. Shelest remains on the
politburo at least for thz time being.
Shelest had, long been engaged in a struggle
with Brezhnev and his Ukrainian proteges for control
of the important Ukrainian party organization. In
recent years this political rivalry was increasingly
marked by policy disputes and, with the eclipse of
Brezhiiev's other powerful rivals such as Shelepin,
Shelest emerged as the chief spokesman for critics
of the General Secretary. Using the public platform
afforded him as a regional party boss, Shelest re-
peatedly registered views seemingly at variance with
those espoused by Brezhnev and the majority of his
polithu o colleagues on an array of issues: cul-
tural policy, the nationality issue, economic pri-
orities, but most important, foreign policy. Shelest
has had a reputation as the leading hard-line con-
servative in the politburo since the Czechoslovak
Rote: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current TnteZZigence and coordinated with the Office
of Economic Research and the Office of National Es-
timates.
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crisis in 1968, when by all accounts he was the most
vociferous advocate within the politburo of a mili-
tary solution. In more recent years as Brezhnev be-
came increasingly committed to a policy of rapproche-
ment with.West Germany, to working out a SALT agree-
ment, and to a general detente policy with the West,
the breach between them widened noticeably.
While it had been clear at least since the 24th
Party Congress in the spring of 1971 that Brezhnev
was maneuvering to oust Shelest from his power base
in the Ukraine and that some kind of showdown could
not be avoided indefinitely, the denouement, when it
came, was unexpected and surprisingly swift. There
is still no solid evidence as to what finally brought
matters to a head, but there were rumors in Moscow
that following President Nixon's speech on 8 May an-
nouncing US plans to step up military pressure on
Hanoi, Shelest was one of those who argued against
going ahead with the Summit meeting. The timing of
the announcement of Shelest's demotion on 21 May,
just one day before President Nixon's arrival,
strongly suggests that this was indeed the case.
Regardless of the weight that other issues, particu-
larly domestic ones, undoubtedly played in the de-
cision, Shelest's demotion is certainly being read
by the party rank and file as signaling a victory
for Brezhnev and the forces favoring detente. As
for Shelest, in his new position he will now be
seen a great deal in public in Moscow, but not
heard.
sECxET
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Soviet Leadership
CENTRAL- COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
. General Secretary
BREZHNEV-
-1REZHNEV
PODGORNY
KOSYGIN -
SUSLOV-
KIRILENKO
-SUSLOV (ideology, non-ruling CPs)
-
PELSHE`
.MAZUROV
Party Control
Committee Chairman
PELSHE
KIRILENKO (Brezhnev's unoilicial deputy,
.plus heavy industry)
POLYANSKY
SHELEST
VORONOV-
SHELEPIN
GRISHIN (party boss of Moscow)
KUNAYEV (party boss of Kazakhstan) --
- SHCHERBITSKY(party boss in Ukraine)
.KULAKOV
Candidates
ANDROPOV
USTINOV-
DEMtCI IEV -
PONOMAREV
SOLOMENTSEV
MASHEROV (patty boss ofBeforussia)
RASHIDOV (party boss of Uzbekistan)
USTINOV (defense industry & space)
DEMICHEV (culture, intelligentsia)
KATUSHEV (ruling CPs)
KAPITONOV (party personnel director)
-_PONOMAREV (non-ruling CPs)
SOLOMENTSEV (Premier of RSFSR)
ANDROPOV (KGB-security & intelligence)
VORONOV (Chairman, Peoples
Control Committee)
MASHEROV
OAQtfMv
Changes as of May 1972
Central Council
Of Traae Unions
Chairman
SHELEPIN
MAZUROV (industry)
I
I Deputy Chairmen (a),, 5
All-Union `SHELEST
Members (85 indudino
the 15 Republic Premiers)
PRESIDIUM OF
SUPREME SOVIET
Deputy Chairmen
(The Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet
Presidiums of the 15 Republics)
Secretary
Members
BREZHNEV
GRISHIN
KUNAYEV
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History of the Conflict
1. The conflict between Shelest and Brezhnev
is rooted in Ukrainian politics, where traditional
factionalism has been exacerbated by the presence
in Moscow of many former Ukrainian officials who
continue to meddle in Ukrainian affairs. Brezhnev,
though not of Ukrainian parents, was born and made
his career in the industrial area of Dnepropetrovsk
in the Southern Ukraine. He heeded the party organi-
zation in Dnepropetrovsk for years and, since attain-
ing high position in Moscow, has been a patron for
officials from that area. He has been particularly
warm in his support of the new Ukrainian party boss,
Shcherbitsky, a fellow party official from Dneprope-
trovsk.
2. Shelest, on the other hand, got his start
in the Kharkov party organization, lcng a rival of
the Dnepropetrovsk faction. President Podgorny was
once a patron of the Kharkov group, which was badly
hurt in the campaign against Podgorny after Khru-.
shchev's ouster and no longer had much political
clout. As a result, Shelest had to look elsewhere
in the republic for political support. He fixed on
the Donetsk party organization. The Donetsk is an
important coal mining area, and its party organiza-
tion has emerged as a new force in Ukrainian politics.
Shelest successfully sidetiackedLyashko, the leader
of the Donetsk faction, two years ago and then went
to work to ingratiate himself with local party func-
tionaries there. In a fitting turn of events,
Lyashko has now returned-to a powerful position in
the Ukraine, succeeding Shcherbitsky in the post of
premier.
3. In the rest of the republic, Shelest sought
to buttress his position by a subtle appeal to Ukrai-
nian nationalist sentiment, in contrast to the more
Moscow-oriented policies of the Dnepropetrovsk
group. He was tolerant of Ukrainian nationalist
writers and promoted a policy of gradual, limited,
and controlled Ukrainization of the cultural and
economic life of the republic. He seems to have
tried to use the support that this brought him from
lower party and government officials, particularly
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.in the nationality-conscious western areas, to gain
for himself a measure of independence from Moscow.
It was at best a risky game.
4. Shelest, also consistently showed an inter-
est in any administrative reforms that would bring
about some devolution of authority from Moscov; to
the republic level and thus increase his own power.
On other subjects, Shelest was a thorough conserva-
tive. His long association in the past with the.
defense industries made him a spokesman for this
special interest group and a champion of defense
spending in general. He usually took a hard line
on foreign-policy questions, and was particularly
concerned about the cohesion, of the East European
bloc.
5. Rivalry between Shelest, on the one hand,
and Brezhnev and his protege, Shcherbitsky, on the
other, was more or less submerged during the years
that Brezhnev was struggling against Shelepin,
Brezhnev may have seen a need for Shelest's support
(or neutralism) in those years, and the Ukrainian
party boss' orthodox views were generally in vogue
in Brezhnev's circle then.
Brezhnev's Response to Challenge
6. In the early days of this collective lead-
ership, the principal challenge to Brezhnev came
from the ambitious Shelepin, who spoke for neo-
Stalinism and rode the wave of reaction against
Khrushchev. Brezhnev, in classic political style,
moved with the flow of conservatism, to limit the
ground available to Shelepin, while at the same
time-undermining Shelepin's political base. By
late 1967, Brezhnev had control over the conserva-
tive wing of the party and Shelepin, though still
a member of the politburo, had been relieved of
his other party posts and hack been reduced to the
politically powerless post of trade unions' chief.
7. Shelepin evidently was forced to look
elsewhere for new constituents, new issues, and
a new image. Because of expediency, or a change
of heart, he gravitated toward what we call the
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"moc;erates"--Kosygin, Mazurov and Voronov. While
there are many differences among them and they
clearly never acted as a faction or bloc, they ap-
pear to hold certain views in common--in particular,
an interest in modern methods of management and in
economic efficiencj. They also share a deep hostil-
ity toward the agricultural lobby represented,by
Polyansky. Kosygin and Shelepin are both known to
be advocates of consumer needs. Possibly most im-
portant, these men are "outsiders"; they do not be-
long to the Ukrainian coterie around Brezhnev. Sus-
lov, another "outsider," has on occasion joined them
on certain issues,
9. On foreign policy questions, Kosygin has
long been identified with a desire for a slackening
of international tensions. Suslov had provided the
theoretical rationale for a positive response to
Brandt's Ostpolitik a full six months before Brandt
himself came to power, and there were hints of a
similar receptivity to Ostpolitik in some of.
Shelepin's trade union activities.
9. In late 1969 there were reliable reports
that Brezhnev was under fire from Suslov, Shelepin,
and Mazurov for his lack of dynamism and a tendency
to tread water on policy issues. His efforts to in-
crease the cohesion of the Communist world were
frustrated, and the stalemate in relations with Com-
munist China persisted. Brezhnev needed an opening
for fresh initiatives, and Brandt's election as West
German Chancellor provided new opportunities in the
foreign policy field. Criticized for a lack of
dynamism, Brezhnev resorted to the tactic that had
served him in the past--adopting the platform of his
critics, while undercutting their political positions.
In the following mon;:hs signs of a new activist
Brezhnev began to appear.
10. Brezhnev first seemed to move to secure the
support of his conservative colleagues on the polit-
buro, most notably Polyansky and Shelest, by support-
ing a costly agricultural investment program which
they favored. in July 1970 he nailed down agricul-
ture's share of investments in the 1971-75 economic
plan, long before work on other sections of the plan
was completed. Having secured his right flank,
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Brezhnev started to change course by espousing a
policy of detente and by promising new attention
to consumer interests. Brezhnev was, of course,
to some extent responding to particular"long-term
needs and interests of the USSR in the domestic
field and in its relations with the outside world;
particularly Europe, the US, and Communist China.
Brezhnev's espousal of peace abroad and butter at
home, however, stood in contrast to his previous
caution and orthodoxy, and reflected a willingness
on his part to incur greater political. risks than
before.
11. Immediately after the Soviet - West German
treaty was signed in the summer of 1970, Brezhnev
took the lead in speaking out in favor of normalizing
relations with West Germany. At the party congress
in the spring of 1971 he put considerable stress on
the theme of European detente and peace in general,
and followed this up with more specific proposals
in a speech in Tbilisi in late May.
12. But until the visit of West German Chan-
cellor Brandt to the Crimea in mid-September 1971,
1rezhnev was operating