INDIRA GANDHI POWER STRATEGY PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130089-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: June 29, 1972
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5 J
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 June 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Indira Gandhi's role in India's foreign and domestic politics today rivals
that of her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, in his heyday. in recent years, power
has been gradually centralized around her in New Delhi. Her opponents have
been vanquished, and regional leaders within her party have lost power in
their individual fiefdoms. Mrs. Gandhi's confidence is growing daily, and her
decisive role in shaping present policies and future developments is seldom
challenged. Still, her appetite for more power is apparently unappeased.
Mrs. Gandhi has not undertaken to rebuild the Indian power structure
singlehandedly. In the beginning she had to be prodded, and she has since
sought assistance from an assortment of political, technical, and bureaucratic
advisers. Her style is not direct, and she often has appeared, especially to
foreign observers, to be vascillating between ill-defined alternatives. She is,
however, capable of decisive action, a characteristic which foes and allies
alike were slow to appreciate, but for which they now have a healthy
respect. On the whole, Mrs. Gandhi has managed to project herself as a
rallying point for a vast number of disparate followers, and, what is signif-
icant for the future development of the Indian nation, her considerable
talent for leadership is growing.
NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated within CIA.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Strategy and Tactics
Since her rise to the prime ministership in January 1966, the most
easily identified of I> diia Gandhi's goals has been the acquisition of power.
She was chosen prime minister by the Congress Party's "syndicate"-political
barons with strong regional bases and so jealous of each other that they were
only too happy to let the presumably malleable Mrs. Gandhi have the job.
Consequently, Mrs. Gandhi's writ extended only so far as the consensus of
these combative leaders allowed. Until the Congress Party split in 1969, she
often appeared indecisive, but occasionally inanag(;d to maneuver herself
into positions where she could assert herself and bring her ideas to bear on
party and government policies.
After the split, which she in large part precipitated, Mrs. Gandhi found
herself at the head of a minority government. Sixty-two Congress members
of parliament joined the newly created Organization Congress Party, cutting
Mrs. Gandhi's support from a pre-split majority of 288 to a post-split
minority of 226 in the 523-member lower house. For survival, her govern-
ment had to depend on the good will of a variety of groups, such as
Socialists, Communists, and a strong, autonomy-minded south Indian re-
gional party. Although more fully in control of what was left after the split,
her position as head of government was not unlike her earlier position
vis-a-vis the Congress Party. In her favor was the fact that, like the barons in
the old Congress Party, her parliamentary opponents felt unsure of their
strength against each other as well as against her. None was anxious to bring
her down and risk a fresh election?
Mrs. Gandhi sought to consolidate her domination over what remained
of the Congress Party organization. Her first targets were Congress Party
regional leaders with enough political weight to threaten her grasp on power.
She mounted a steady campaign against them and by 1971 was in a position
to revamp the party in several states. Long-time leaders of the organization
were eased out in favor of "progressives" picked by the party machine in
New Delhi and indebted to Mrs. Gandhi for their positions. 'Today Congress
Party politics still revolve around her efforts to replace local leaders who
have independent bases of power.
Mrs. Gandhi has varied her tactics in this campaign, but in general she
has attempted to single out key individuals, divide them from their fellows,
and-when the stage was set-move swiftly to topple them from power. She
has avoided open confrontation until the final stages and has seemin',ly
accepted any setbacks with good grace, all the while continuing her low key,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
but relentless attack. In order to strengthen her hand in party maneuvers,
Mrs. Gandhi has courted the Indian masses and has used her position as
prime minister to call elections timed to capitalize on the upswings in her
popular support.
In all of this, she has tried to depict herself as one fighting an uphill
battle against entrenched privilege-which, according to Mrs. Gandhi, is
found within the government, the economic "establishment," and even the
Congress Party. She has appealed to the Indian people to support her in the
implementation of broad "progressive" policies to establish an egalitarian
society and to satisfy the demands of the young and the disadvantaged for
admission to the Indian establishment. The people respond and, underdogs
themselves, identify with her in her "unequal" struggle-Indira and everyman
against the political and economic elite.
Mrs. Gandhi built her strength during 1969 and 1970, moving slowly
and floating trial balloons, such as suggestions for land and property reform.
Largely symbolic gestures, such as divesting the maharajas of their privy
purses and nationalizing the banks, were well received. Then, catching the
opposition off guard, she called a snag.- general election for March 1971, a
year before the parliament's Five-year term was up. She won a watershed
victory-350 of the 518 contested seats. Thereafter, Congress politicians saw
the advantage of climbing aboard the Gandhi bandwagon. The 1971 election
made clear that Mrs. Gandhi had captured the popular imagination and that
the masses were beginning to look to New Delhi, rather than to their local
leaders, to satisfy their demands for a better life.
Mrs. Gandhi's long quest for power has prompted many to charge that
she seeks to establish an authoritarian government. She may indeed chafe
under the need of dealing with politicians opposed to her programs, but she
has so far shown that she is willing to work within the system; in fact, she
has proved remarkedly adept at using the democratic process to achieve her
ends.
She appears to view politics as an evolutionary, not a revolutionary,
process. The most dramatic of her initiatives-bank nationalization, abolition
of princely privileges and purses, land reform, and India's intervention in the
struggle for Bangladesh-did not spring unheralded upon the Indian people.
All had been the subject of lengthy public debate; the timing, not the acts
themselves, carried an element of surprise. Mrs. Gandhi shows the direction
of her thinking; she listens to those opposed and those in favor, seeking to
develop a consensus in support of her project and to avoid unnecessary
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL,
opposition; she tries to marshal the power necessary to get her way and, if
opposition is unavoidable, makes no move until the odds are in her favor.
Her Circle of Advisers
Although Mrs. Gandhi is confident of her ability to govern India, she
relies upon a number of advisers. But none of them is privy to all her
thoughts on all matters. Mrs. Gandhi tends to keep her advisers tied to
relatively narrow specialities such as inter-
national relations, domestic politics, and
economics. They are, of course, important
to her, but she is wholly dependent on no
single individual. For example, D. P. Dhar,
whose star has been rising, is head of the
Foreign Policy Planning Commission and
is consulted freque,itly on Indo-Pakistani
and Bangladesh matters. As much as any-
one, he shares Mrs. Gandhi's ideas on for-
eign policy, but he appears to have little
to do with shapin4; her thinking on eco-
nomic planning and domestic political
matters. She uses her advisers, and when
they can no longer serve her or when
better qualified people are available, she
does not hesitate to replace them, as
happened to her long-term confidant and
former foreign minister, Dinesh Singh.
Mrs. Gandhi keeps in touch with govern-
mental operations through the Prime Minis-
ter's Secretariat, an organization she inherited
from her father but has tailored to meet her
own needs. The secretariat, about 130 strong
in Nehru's day, now numbers about 200. It is
headed by P. N. Haksar, a senior foreign serv-
ice officer, who like Mrs. Gandhi and many of
those closest to her, is a Kashmiri Brahmin.
Because the bulk of papers requesting action
are funneled to Mrs. Gandhi through I-Iaksar,
he is a key individual in her administration
and a trusted member of her entourage. A
kind of super staff man, he was once thought
to be pro-West. He now, like his boss, leans
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
toward leftist solutions for domestic and foreign problems and is favorably
disposed toward the Soviet Union.
The man most responsible for the prime minister's successful domestic
political program is another member of the "Brahmin Mafia," a shrewd,
71-v'ar-old former Nehru associate named D. P. Mishra. An ex-chief minister
froi m the state of Madhya Pradesh, he is no longer politically active on his
own behalf. He owes Mrs. Gandhi a debt because she once intervened with
her father to restore the outspoken Mishra to favor after he had been forced
by Nehru to spend several years in political exile. Because of his years and
Mrs. Gandhi's trust in him, Mishra can offer criticism when other advisers are
hesitant. He figured prominently in getting the old Congress Party barons to
compromise on Indira as prime minister in 1966, and later, when she was
unsure of her timing, advised her when to push the fight against them.
Mrs. Gandhi uses Mishra and a fellow spetuagenarian, Health and Family
Planning Minister U. S. Dikshit, to develop political strategy for reshaping
the Congress Party and the government. It
is Mishra who seems most likely to have
counseled her to drop independent-
minded senior cabinet and government of-
ficials in favor of loyal individuals more
closely associated with youth, minorities,
and depressed groups. Prior to the March
1972 provincial elections, when Mrs.
Gandhi was preoccupied with Indo-Pak-
istani problems, they both played major
roles in superimposing Gandhi people on
existing state party structures. Rumors of
further sweeping changes have unsettled
Congress politicians who, unsure of how they will fare, have tended to look
to Mrs. Gandhi for support rather than to unite against her. The net result
has been an increase in Mrs. Gandhi's stature and a reduction in restraints on
her exercise of power.
Beyond these key figures, the members of Mrs. Gandhi's circle fall into
two general categories. One is comnosed of men like Defense Minister
Jagjivan Ram, who commands the support of the Hindu untouchables, and
Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan, the political boss of the important western
state of Maharashtra. They have independent political strength of their own.
The other, including Army Chief of Staff Mankeshaw, Planning Minister C.
Subramaniam, Haksar, and D. P. Dhar, has technical know-how.
-4-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
The technical group appears to be in the ascendancy just now. Mrs.
Gandhi distrusts people with independent political bases, and this means her
political alliances with Chavan, Ram and other politician
temporary.
She likes to use bureaucrats with
technical know-how in specific fields (Foreign Secretary T. N. Kau], for
example). Nevertheless, the politic -,ns are useful, if only to keep her in
touch with political currents and to protect her from becoming a captive of
the technical people.
Slightly removed from the center, but still part of her circle, are the
idea people she likes to keep near her to provide stimulation and to serve as a
sounding board for new policy plans. She uses some of them as trouble
shooters to sort out problems at the lower levels of the Congress Party. She
maintains direct contact with the Communist Party and gets additional
insights into its workings through leftists and former Communists on her
staff. Finally, she pays close attention to the "young Turks" within the
Congress Party-all on the far left of the political spectrum. These mavericks,
not very influential on their own, are critics of her enemies-and sometimes
of the prime minister herself when she seems to be moving too slowly. But
they often plead for causes she wants served.
By and large, Mrs. Gandhi's advisers serve her well. Rivalries are evident
within her inner circle, and there is some stress between the Brahmins, for
whom she has a definite predilection, and the non-Brahmins. Their differ-
ences do not inhibit the efficient functioning of the team. Mrs. Gandhi may
even encourage minor divisions, aware that they can, when necessary, be
nourished to prevent combinations forming to challenge her leadership.
On The Economic Front
Mrs. Gandhi's image as a reformist has remained intact despite the
remarkably little significant or effective reform l gislation enacted since she
took office six years ago. There is, in fact, a noticeable degree of confusion
over Mrs. Gandhi's devotion to "progressive" causes; no one, probably not
even Mrs. Gandhi, is precisely sure what she means by the term.
It can be deduced from her generally leftist orientation and from the
tone, if not the clarity, of her public remarks, that she is trying to develop
-5-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5 ~.r;
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
the Indian economy along socialist lines without the use of force. She
admires the accomplishments of the Soviets, but does not wish to emulate
their harsh methods. She is a pragmatic leader and envisions a gradual
evolution of economic programs and policies. She would like to gain the
cooperation of special interest groups, many of which perceive a direct
threat to their wealth and mode of living in her economic reforms. Mrs.
Gandhi realizes that the businessmen and the wealthier farmers might well be
able to sabotage the most carefully constructed. reform program, so she tries
to avoid the kinds of precipitate and all-encompassing actions that could jolt
these powerful and suspicious forces into a direct fight. Another factor
dictating caution is that she must be careful nc,t to alienate the traditional
financial backers of the Congress Party-the well-f o-do farmers.
Accordingly, along with her promises of inform, which have won her
the support of the young and the poor, she attempts to reassure the business
community that she is no doctrinaire socialist and that private industry can
prosper in a socialist India, provided that industry concentrates its invest-
ment in enterprises that will help the economy grow. Mrs. Gandhi insists that
increasing government controls in the economy are intended only to ensure
that private industry's growth and profits are accompanied by "social jus-
tice." For their part, business leaders, uch as spokesmen for the Federation
of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have publicly acknowledged
that their responsibilities extend beyond shareholders to consumers, to
workers and to the nation in general. Although businessmen remain suspi-
cious of her long-range goals, they have expressed a willingness to meet Mrs.
Gandhi halfway. In return, she ha,, promised to simplify and rationalize
procedures to remove difficulties and obstacles in the way of legitimate
business expansion. On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi basically distrusts
private enterprise, ciid it is most unlikely that a real liberalization is immi-
nent. In fact, Mrs. Gandhi is completing the necessary formalities to give
parliament the power to amend any part of the constitution-such as
individual property rights-to supplement her appeals for business "coopera-
tion."
One of Mrs. Gandhi's priority goals is to raise employment levels, but as
yet no comprehensive program of massive public works projects to provide
extra jobs has been implemented. To obtain the necessary funds, Mrs.
Gandhi is proposing increasing taxes on rural landholders and urban property
owners, but even with her near-total domination of he government she is
reluctant to artagonize these powerful economic interests and is treading
carefully. Here, as elsewhere, she has so far pursued a step-by-step approach.
The groundwork for a more direct, systematic course could be laid in the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79)-the first Mrs. Gandhi has been able to
oversee personally from the start-which is nearing the final stages of
preparation. One of her closest economic and political advisers has been put
in charge of the planning process. It seems likely that the Fifth Plan will
outline new tax policies and point out new economic directions.
Foreign Affairs
Buoyed by her bravura performance in the political arena, and by the
success of her foreign policy vis-a-vis Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi has been speak-
ing with more assurance on foreign aid. Her theme is national "self-reliance,"
a theme that was prominent in her rhetoric immediately before, during, and
after the Indo-Pakistan war. By self-reliance, she means not only political
independence but, ultimately, independence from all foreign assistance.
Foreign aid which does not compromise h:r version of independence will be
accepted, but that aid which does will be declined. Although she admits that
economic assistance is helpful and desirable, Mrs. Gandhi maintains that
India no longer needs aid for national survival and progress. Her emphasis
upon Indian independence fits well with the country's enhanced military
prestige and strikes a responsive chord in a more nationalistic India, newly
self-confident and assertive. But part of the emphasis is defensive in that
foreign aid is decreasing and Indo-US relations are at low ebb. US economic
assistance, halted during the Indo-Pakistani war last December, has not been
resumed. India might accept new US aid, but Mrs. Gandhi is not likely to ask
for it. While she has asked some Indian exporters to look for imports from
countries other than the US, so far she has taken no dramatic steps, such as
halting individual Western aid projects, to implement the new "policy."
The Congress Party in March 1971 was given an electoral mandate to
"end poverty," but the Bangladesh crisis, which saw some ten million
refugees flood into India and culminated in a 14-day war with Pakistan,
demanded top priority; the economic reform program was sidetracked.
Although she still talked about ending poverty Mrs. Gandhi's overwhelming
victory in the state elections last March was based more on the people's
approval of India's war on Pakistan than of its war on poverty.
Mrs. Gandhi is under few illusions that the Indian people are satisfied
with her efforts in the economic sphere. More ar.u more she is under the gust
to deliver on her promises. But these are difficult, almost intractable prob-
lems, so in pr?ctical terms she must find a means of diverting attention from
the hard facts of economic life. There is a temptation for her to turn to
foreign affair, now that India has become recognized as the dominant power
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
on the subcontinent and a growing one in Asia. Here there are more
immediate prospects for success. .
Speaking in Calcutta on 2 March Mrs. Gandhi pledged to work to make
India strong enough to influence world events and stressed the need for
"evolving new policy for a new India." She is not, however, merely playing
to her countrymen's newly discovered and invigorating sense of nationalism.
She seems to have concluded that India in its foreign relations has remained
dormant long enough. She apparently reads the recent victory over Pakistan
as a sign that the time has arrived to reassert national interests and to make a
fresh bid for leadership in the region and in the developing countries.
New Delhi appears confident that India's dominance of South Asia will
lead to a correspondingly larger Indian role in Asia as a whole. The Soviets
see the Indians as a counterweight to China and Japan. They have therefore
not actively discouraged India from seeking a more influential role. The
Soviets probably have a somewhat more realistic appreciation of India's
limited ability to realize its objectives. Following the Chinese invitation to
President Nixon last year, the Soviets re-activated party leader Brezlinev's
three-year-old proposal for an Asian collective security system. The coinci-
dence of the Soviet security demarches with the signing of the Soviet-Indian
Friendship Treaty prompted speculation that the Soviets planned to use
India as their stalking horse in Asia. The Indians, however, were not enthusi-
astic. They chose to conclude their own bilateral or multilateral treaties with
other-Asian countries to prove that they continued to adhere to the princi-
ples of non-alignment. They wished to show that there were no controlling
strings running from Moscow to New Delhi.
As far back as 1968, the Indians were floating the idea that both the US
and the USSR could act as guarantors of Asian security. They have recently
revived the proposal. Other Asian countries, however, have long been suspi-
cious of the Indians, and their wariness increased after the Indo-Pakistani
war. Ceylon fears the subversive potential of its large Indian Tamil minority,
Nepal has long chafed under high-handed Indian attempts at domination,
and Bangladesh is desirous of asserting its newly won independence. All are
Leary of the growing Indian power and are wary of being sucked into an
Indo-Soviet-Chinese struggle. Presumably New Delhi is aware of these mis-
givings and will move slowly, concentrating on less controversial programs
such as regional economic cooperation.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
(X)N11 1)IEN'FIA1.,
Despite protestations of nor-aIignfile n1, Indian policy has tihil;ed to-
ward Moscow and its allies in recent years. In respect to Victnarl the shift
Mrs. Gandhi greets General Secretary Brezhnev
has occurred because of an assessment that Hanoi will triumph in the end
and that Indian interests will be best served by moving closer to the North
Vietnamese. Similarly, Mrs. Gandhi's ca!: for an end to domination of Asians
by "rich and big nations"-an obvious reference to the 'Vest-is hased on her
suspicions that such powers do not want Asian nations to become stronger.
New Delhi does see areas where Indian and Soviet interests are in conflict.
Problems have arisen with respect both to Bangladesh and to the Indian
OCCan-which India would like to see turned into a "zone of peace." On
balance, Mrs. Gandhi appears convinced that too close a relationship with
the USSR will not ultimately work to the interest of India. Speaking at the
opening of a five-day Asian Policy Conference held for 28 Indian diplomatic
chiefs on I 1 April, she said that non-alignment, "another name for the
pursuit of our national interests in total freedom from outside interference,"
was the bedrock of all Indian foreign policy.
CONFIDENTIAL,
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Because Mrs. Gandhi assumes that the
role of the US and other Western powers will
decline in Asia and because she was piqued
with US policy during the 14-day war last
year, many of her public remarks have taken
on an anti-US tone. Still, she would like to
leave the door open for an improvement in
Indo-Americ7-1 relations. Typical of her gen-
eral approac'::., she has resisted domestic left-
wing pressure for such precipitate actions as a
break with Saigon or the raising of diplomatic
relations with the East Germans to the ambas-
sadorial level.
Ultimately, Mrs. Gandhi would like to
improve relations with the Chinese, but
Peking has shown no disposition to move in
Mrs. Gandhi Leaves Washington
this direction. So, Mrs. Gandhi is not pressing the matter. She may well
calculate that her bargaining position with the Chin' se leaders will be
strengthened if she is successful in reaching a mutually satisfactory accom-
modation with Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi has, in the meantime, shown a marked
ability to adapt herself and Indian policy to the tempo of the times. She is
tied to no fixed ideology or set of foreign policy precepts, and those she
does espouse she freely modifies to suit her purposes. Mrs. Gandhi's influ-
ence on foreign policy is pervasive, and prospects are good that Indian policy
will continue to develop along pragmatic lines.
Indira's Longevity
The state elections of March 1972 brought Congress Party governments
to power in 14 of the 16 states where elections were held. Aside from the
pro-Moscow Communist Party of India, which benefited from c!ectoral
alliances with the Congress, effective non-Congress opposition was almost
eliminated. It is likely that Mrs. Gandhi will initiate quiet campaigns to
undermine non-Congress governments in the few states where they have
managed to survive. Just this month she has managed the fall of the unsteady
Swatantra-Uktal Congress coalition in the mid-eastern state of Orissa, and
she will probably seek a similar fate for her one-time ally, the ruling Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam in the southernmost state of Tamil Nadu. A concerted
effort to undermine lingering Jana Sangh power in the union territory of
New Delp! is also probable. And the effort to destroy the radical Communist
Party of India/Marxist in violence-prone West Bengal is almost certain to
continue.
-10-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5
CON1i IDEN1,:'IAL,
In several Congress-ruled states, Mrs. Gandhi may find herself engaged
in bolstering chief ministers, chosen for their loyalty to her but with weak
political bases. The Congress organizations in many states where new pro-
Indira chief ministers have been elevated to power are beset by competing
regional, caste, and ideological factions, Until the new "Indira people"
consolidate their positions, state politics are likely to remain unsettled. Mrs.
Gandhi's power to impose order on her party and government is stronger
than ever before, but the calm that followed the Indira Wave shows signs of
giving way to another period of shoving and hauling. This will temporarily
cut down on efficiency at the state level and result in a deterioration of
center-state relations, but it is unlikely to damage Mrs. Gandhi's power
position.
The fact is that India has no other leader of stature to veplace Mrs.
Gandhi. There is no rallying point for her opponents and those currently out
of her good graces. Failure to bring an improved standard of living to large
segments of the population could eventually tarnish her image, but her
considerable talent for leadership is growing. Barring some unforeseen dis-
aster, Indian political, economic, and foreign policy appears likely for some
time to develop under her guidance and be pleasured by her standards.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130089-5