THE MOUNTAIN AND THE PLAIN: THE REBELLION IN OMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130079-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: May 19, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Mountain and the Plain: The Rebellion in Oman
CIA
-*qft oo P, ,A Secret
DOCUMENT SEA RVInc
,
r T' 19 May 1972
Fl'aNo. 2034/72
83
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DO NOT DESTRnY
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 May 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Mountain and the Plain; The Rebellion in Oman
The Sultanate of Oman, at the southeastern end of the Arabian Penin-
sula, has been experiencing rebellion since 1963. The rebellion, which
threatens to cut off Oman's western province of Dhofar, had its seeds in
years of discontent over poor social and economic conditions and the
authoritarian rule of the Omani sultans, This discontent has been exploited
by leftist elements, assisted by the radical regime in neighboring Yem,m
(Aden). The leftists have organized a political front with n guerrilla army
that has fought for the last several years for control of Dhofar. Government
forces have begun to strike back, and, since late last year, they have
recovered some areas of the province from rebel control. They are now
engaged in an offensive that the government believes will turn the tide in its
favor; the monsoon may bring the offensive to a halt before this happens.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated within CIA.
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Al Auraymi
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
SAUDI ARABIA-.'.--.--.
Fuhud
I
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Thamarit, Kuria Muria Islands
Mirbat
5alalahTageh
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Rikhyut Most+ active area of
Unsurfaced road
Track or 'rail
0 Sa 100
,l
((Al `Masirah
EDVPT \ SAUDI
ARABIA
SUDAN (r Y
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The Setting
1. Dhofar, which covers an area of approximately 30,000 square miles,
has a population of about 35,000. It has few towns-the provincial capital of
Salalah, Taqah, and Mirbat being the most important-and a handful of
villages. Most of the other locations appearing on maps are water holes or
vaguely defined areas associated with the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes
which inhabit the mountains. The nareow 250-mile coastal plain benefits
from the southwest monsoon from late May through September. As a result,
the coastal plain and the seaward slopes of the 3,000 to 4,000 foot moun-
tains are green and fertile. From the crest of the mountains, numerous wads
run northward through a barren and and landscape toward the sands of the
Rub al Khali-the Empty Quarter. The Dhofar rebels have capitalized on
both weather and terrain in their guerrilla war against the British-led forces
of the Sultan,
The Beginning
2. The roots of the insurgency lie in long-standing demands by Dhc,:ari
traditionalists to be separated from Oman. For centuries, the sultans of
Oman have claimed authority in Dhofar, but the province has been troubled
by almost constant dissidence and unrest as Dhofaris persistently resisted
this outside rule. Separated from the more populous part of Oman by
hundreds of miles of desert, Dhofat has been and is more closely linked
religiously, tribally, economically, and linguistically to the Hadhramaut area
of Yemen (Aden) than to the rest of Oman.
3. Dhofaris, as well as other Omanis, became increasingly restive in the
early I 960s as a result of the social and political restrictions imposed upon
them by the reactionary and authoritarian Sultan Said ibn Taymur Al Bu
Said. The capricious Sultan ruled the country from 1932 until 1970, when
he was deposed by his son, Sultan Qabus. The discovery of oil in the
sultanate in 1963 made small difference to the Dhofaris; most of what little
economic and social development was started by the government was under-
taken in Oman itself. A growing number of Sultan Said's Dhofari subjects
came to resent his neglect, maladministration, and heavy-handed eccentrici-
ties.
4. The current rebellion is usually traced to an uprising in 1963 staged
by members of the Bait Kathir tribe who had joined the Dhofar Benevolent
Society, a religious and social welfare organization. This group was com-
posed mostly of Dhofari nationalists favoring secession; they were soon
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Joined by members of the local branch of the leftist Arab Nationalist
Movement and some Dhofaris returning from service in the British-sponsored
Trucial Oman Scouts (now the defense force of the United Arab Emirates).
The merger resulted in the creation of the Dhofar Liberation Front, which
pledged to detach Dhofar from Oman by armed force. By 1964, Iraq may
have been providing military training for a few rebels; by mid-1965 the front
was receiving limited financial and military aid from Egypt and Iraq. Its first
anti-regime military action took place in June 1965.
5. The revolt was initially small and limited for the most part to
sporadic attacks on traffic along the mountain road linking Salalah and
'riiamarit. The Sultan of Oman took a complacent view of the rebellion,
considering it little more than another expression of the tribal and religious
enmity that had frequently plagued his regime. He preferred tc keep his
small British-led army near Muscat and ordered local security forces to deal
with the rebels.
6. It was not long before the Dhofar Liberation Front began to move to
the left. A left-wing faction-largely from the Qara tribe-Stalked about Arab
unity, socialism, anti-colonialism, and pan - Persian Gulf revolution, but the
right-wing Bait Kathir tribal faction in the front remained primarily con-
cerned with Dhofari separatism. The eventual triumph of the leftist element
was ensured by events in neighboring Yemen (Aden), where the radical
National Front came to power in late 1967 after the British had withdrawn.
The new regime in Aden became an active patron of the Dhofarr Liberation
Front, providing arms, money, an outlet for rebel publicity and propaganda,
and a safe haven for the guerrillas. The Yemen (Aden) port of Hawf and the
interior town of Habarut became important supply depots for materiel being
passed to the insurgents. By mid-1968, the rebels were able to make daylight
raids on Salalah and Mirbat, and by the end of the year the rebels were fairly
well-e,,uipped and organized, and more aggressive.
The Popular Front
7. The growing strength of tl,e radical wing was reflected at a 20-day
meeting, since described as a turning point in the rebellion, which was held
in September 1968 at Hamrin. The Dhofar Liberation Front was renamed
the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, a 40-mem-
ber General Command was elected to replace the old leaders, and a new
statement of goals was promulgated. The new name signified the organiza-
tion was no longer concentrating on Dhofari separatism, but was committed
to a people's war throughout the Persian Gulf, which was described as "a
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Muhammad Ahmad Sala] al-Ghassani
Popular Front Leader
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single historical, geographical, and ethnic
entity," The 1-lamrin r),,;legates adopted
Marxism-Leninism as their ideology.
8. The, popular front is run by a
Central Committee, with sub-units respon-
sible for Dhofar, political Affairs, trai"Ing,
finance, and supply. Its headquarters are
in Aden; other offices are located in
Cairo, Kuwait, Baghdad, and Bahrain. The
front has denounced the "cult of leader-
ship," and for this reason, as well as for
security, leaders are rarely mentioned. But
it is believed that Muhammad Ahmad
Salal al-Ghassani, a Chinese-trained
Dhofari of the Qara tribe, is the front's
chief.
9. The size of the frn;it's People's
Liberation Army is a well-shrouded secret;
estimates have been as high as several thousand. Nearly all the guerrillas in
Dhofar are believed to be indigenous to that area; in fact, it is estimated that
only about 10 percent of the People's Liberation Army is composed of
non-Dhofaris, mostly gulf Arabs and Adenis. The front also supports a
People's Militia, made up of less committed armed supporters in sympathetic
villages; these number about 2,000. The front has no permanent military
bases in Dhofar, and rebel camps are moved every two weeks or so, in part
because food and water are scarce in the mountains. The guerrillas operate in
groups of 20 to 40 men. These groups have names such as the Ho Chi Minh
unit and the Che Guevara unit. They avoid pitched battles with the Sultan's
armed forces, and as a result, losses have been low on both sides. The rebels
favor tactics such as the mining of roads, the ambushing of patrols, and the
use of mortars to shell targets.
10. Basic military training and political education are conducted at
Hawf and at Jadhib in Yemen (Aden). Recruits are reportedly given heavy
doses of lectures on class struggle and wars of national liberation, with
frequent references to Marx, Lenin, and Mao; the goal is to prepare both
"fighters and politicians."
11. Following the Hamrin conference, the front undertook new mili-
tary initiatives in Dhofar, and the number of rebel attacks increased
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markedly. By mid-1970 the rebels controlled the coastline from the Aden
border to within a few miles of Salalah and held many coastal village's-such
as Mirbat and Sadh-east of Salalah. They moved at will through the
mountains and along nunv roes overland routes. The environs of Salalah
were sporadically attacked.
12. In p,:essing their drive, the rebels enjoyed certain advantages: a
sanctuary across the Aden border; admirable guerrilla terrain in the mou;i-
tains and wadis; and the sympathy and cooperation of a substantial propor-
tion of Dhofaris. It is estimated that at one time about two thirds of the
population supported the rebels. The front looked to civilians to supply
informers, messengers, lookouts, and workers. Terrorist tactics have been
used against Dhofaris who fail to cooperate.
13. Both for ideological reas.>ns and in an attempt to destroy existing
patterns of leadership, the front made an effort to reorder society in the
Women Fighters of the Popular Front
so-called "liberated" areas. In particular, it undertook to eliminate the
traditional tribal and kinship system of Dhofar, which it saw as irrelevant to
the needs of the revolution. Front leaders have claimed "dazzling success" in
replacing tribal relations with "comrade relations."
14. Although the front is committed to "liberate" all of the gulf, the
organization has yet to get off the ground outside of Dhofar. Most front
organizers appear to be primarily occupied with raising funds and with
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political indoctrination, rather than with armed subversion. The Dhofaris
have little interest in fighting for anything but Dhofar. For instance, large
numbers of Dhofaris living in Abu Dhabi who had been active in the Dhofar
Liberation Front lost interest and stopped their financial contributions when
the leftists took control.
The New Popular Front
15. Last January the popular front announced that it had merged with
another left-wing organization that had been operating in northern Oman
intermittently since early 1970. The new organization took as its name "the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf." The merger
probably grew out of a conference held in June 1971 in Rakhyut. It was
decided at this meeting that a second front elsewhere in Oman was essential
if the rebellion in Dhofar was to succeed.
Foreign Assistance
16. The rebel's chief foreign backer is the radical government of Yemen
(Aden). Aden's financial support has been estimated variously at between
$150,000 and $600,000 per year. (The lesser figure is probably more nearly
correct.) The front's headquarters is in Aden, and the Adonis provide
arms-mostly of Soviet origin-logistic support, medical aid, broadcasting
facilities, and training sites for the guerrillas. Occasional tension has marked
the relationship; the Adeni Government frequently complains, with reason,
of being pestered for aid and is critical of the rebels' failure to gain victory.
The Adonis also complain that too many front members prefer living in
Aden to fighting in the mountains of Dhofar.
17. China has supplied limited quantities of arms, ammunition, and
other equipment to the rebels. Thirty front members reportedly were trained
in China in 1068, and a Chinese training and advisory mission may be based
in Hawf. The New China News Agency disseminates rebel propaganda.
18. The Soviet Union has also provided modest amounts of war mate-
riel to the rebels. Yemen (Aden) has tried to persuade Moscow, as well as
Eastern European nations, to give the Dhofar rebels more aid, but apparently
without much success. North Korea sent a small quantity of arms and
foodstuffs in 1970 and reportedly has given military training in North Korea
to 20 Dhofaris.
19. For its part, the froni has concluded that, with the exception of
Yemen (Aden), no Arab state will provide support. In fact, the front bitterly
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(left) A Membrx of the Sultan's Forces
(right) Sultan Qabus of Oman
(bottom) British Officers Serving With
the Omani Army
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attacks the other Arab states. Limited Iraqi and Syrian aid channeled
through Aden ended in 1970. The front does maintain close tics with Nayif 25X1
Hawatmah's Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a
fedaycen group not responsive to the direction of any government.
'The Sultan's Forces
20. Attacks on several northern Oman towns in June 1970, in the wake
of a deteriorating situation in Dhofar, probably triggered the
palace coup that ousted Sultan Said ibn Taimur from office and
rep aced him with Sultan Qabus ibn Said, Initially, Sultan Qabus believed
that the change in leadership and his promises of reform and development
would encourage Dhofaris and rebellious Omanis to lay down their arms.
Most rebels at first rejected the Sultan's offer of amnesty. A trickle of
defectors began, and by late 1971 the number had increased to the point
where they were being organized into small counter-insurgency units, called
firqats. These firqats know the terrain, but their enthusiasm is frequently
fleeting, and some have redefected.
21. When it became obvious that these policies were not working,
Sultan Qabu and his British military advisers resolved to enlarge the army,
acquire new weapons, and go on the offensive. Qabus increased the armed
forces from fewer than 3,000 to over 7,000 by late last year. About half of
this force are Omanis and half expatriate mercenaries, primarily Baluchis.
The ground forces are led by 100 to 120 British officers; the air force of
some 40 to 60 pilots is entirely a British operation.
Operation Jaguar
22. When the Sultan's army launched "Operation Jaguar" in Dhofar last
October, he controlled only the Salalah plain, an area of approximately 80
square miles along the coast, and had military posts in the towns of Sadh,
Taqah, and Mirbat. The Sultan's forces had recaptured Taqah in February
1971 after it had been in rebel hands for about a year. Even these military
posts, as well as Salalah, were subject to sporadic mortar attack and hit-and-
run raids by the rebels.
23. "Operation Jaguar" was a post-monsoon offensive designed to drive
the rebels from the coastal plain and from the mountains that provide cover
and sanctuary. The Sultan's military advisers are pleased by the results of the
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offensive and recently expressed cautious optimism about their ability to
handle the military aspects of the rebellion. The coastal area between
Mughsayl and the Yemen (Aden) border is now one of the most active areas
of conflict. Perhaps the main achievement of the offensive has been to cut
two of the three important rebel supply routes originating in Yemen (Aden).
More and more tribesmen are cooperating with the government as its ability
to protect them incrcaacs. The fighting has been fierce and casualties arc up
but, for the first time since the. rebellion began, the Sul!.;n's forces occupy
outposts in the mountains. They hope to hold these positions during the
coming summer rainy season. Although security checks in Salalah and other
coastal towns remain tight, the almost nightly mortar attacks and mining of
roads have been reduced. Areas considered cleared and secure are still
occasionally penetrated by guerrillas, and fighting in the difficult mountain
terrain is expected to continue.
24. The success of "Operation Jaguar" is, in part, a result of increased
mobility and the effective use of air power. The government prepared small
airstrips near some of the mountain bases to case the problems of'supply and
to accommodate reconnaissance planes. From these airstrips and from bases
near Salalah, British-piloted Beaver spotter planes and helicopters seek out
rebel camps and supply dumps. Defectors are used to help spot guerrilla
hideouts. Air strikes are then carried out by BAC-167 Strikemaster jets. The
Skyvan transport, with its short take-off and landing capabilities, has been
used effectively by the government to ferry troops and supplies.
25. Oman's offensive led to a border clash with Yemen (Aden) in early
May. The four-day battle involved attacks by popular front insurgents as well
as Adeni militia on Omani positions near Habarut. The attack, which was
probably designed to ease pressure on other popular front units, was the first
reported clash across the ill-defined border. When Omani attempts to arrange
a cease-fire were unsuccessful, Omani fighter aircraft strafed the attackers
across the border in Aden. Yemen (Aden) seized upon the incident to
spotlight British military assistance to the Sultan.
26. When the summer monsoon piles thick rain clouds and heavy fog
and mist against the Dhofar mountains, helicopters and Skyvans will be
unable to bring supplies or evacuate wounded from the government's moun-
tain outposts, and the jets will be forced to suspend most of their air.strikes.
The government's ability to keep forces in the mountains under these
circumstances and maintain the security of overland routes will, in large
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measure, determine the future of the Dhofar rebellion. If the Sultan's forces
are compelled to retire to the Salalah plain during the monsoon, the rebels
w:11 have the opportunity to regroup and to receive new supplies. If, on the
other hand, the government can retain its hard-won mountain posts, it will
perhaps be able, during the dry season beginwing in October, to deliver
another heavy blow to the rebels in Dhofar. Nevertheless, as long as Yemen
(Aden) provides a safe haven, Dhofar is likely to be subject, at a minimum,
to cross-border attacks.
27. Should the front be able to prolong the rebellion in Dhofar, Sultan
Qabus's social and economic development program will be retarded. Failure
in Dhofar could open the gates for unrest and subversion elsewhere in Oman
and the Persian Gulf. Oman, a primitive and very poor country, is spending
between 40, and 60 percent of its annul $125-million oil income-almost its
The Sulta?g's intentions
are good, but expectations of people who have been waiting for reforms for
generations may outstrip his performance. The Sultan cannot afford to get
bogged down much longer in Dhofar.
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