GIEREK'S POLAND: A MANDATE FOR CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 78
• Publication Date: May 17, 1972
• Content Type: IM

A 1 ' 7 M 1
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
i IS
25X1
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Gierek's Poland: A Mandate for Change
CIA
DVMNT SERVICES BRANCH
HLE COPY
03 NOT DESTROY
Secret
19
17 May 1972
No. 2033/72
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of :[nLelligence
17 May 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Gierek's Poland: A Mandate for Change
Summary
Since party First Secretary Edward Gierek took
power from Wiadyslaw Gomulka on 20 December 1970,
a new style of rule has appeared in Poland. Given
the circumstances surrounding his accession to
power, Gierek has accomplished a great deal in 15
months. With more vigor than Gomulka showed, he
has firmly grasped political power, obtained the
cooperation of nearly all strata of the population,
and imbued the nation with a sense of participation
in government. He has also won increased political
and material support from the USSR and his other
Warsaw Pact allies.
Many of Gierek's initial moves at home were
dictated by expediency, and long-term solutions
have rrre yet been hammered out. To fulfill his
goals, Gierek needs the support of his friends
abroad. He is wise enough to know that he cannot
do without the political and material support of
the Soviet Union. But Gierek is much more likely
than Gomulka to look at Poland's self-interest and
seek'a more influential place for his country in
Europe. So far, Gierek has displayed both the con-
fidence and energy necessary to tackle the problems
facing the nation, and he seems to know where he
wants to go. He has forged a team of like-minded
party and government officials, and the people,
sensing a new spirit in the regime, seem willing
to help take Poland into the modern age.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current InteZZigence and coordinated within CIA.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
ZINOM
Oou
Opole,
n w n
P O L A N D
lode
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
SECRET
The Succession--Genesis and Aftermath
1. The circumstances under which Gierek be-
came first secretary differed substantially from
those that ushered in the Gomulka ara in October
1956. Gomulka had been installed. after a long
period of intense factional strife. The party had
been weakened and disorganized by de-Stalinization,
and popular disaffection with the USSR and the Pol-
ish party as its instrument had increased. The
ferment was led and articulated by liberal intel-
lectuals, even though the workers in Poznan had
held protest demonstrations in June.
2. Because of the disarray in the party that
he inherited, Gomulka wes forced to expend most of
his energies to maintain factional balances within
the hierarchy. Thus preoccupied, he neglected the
needs of the nation. Alarmed at the periodic out-
bursts of popular dissatisfaction, Gomulka incor-
porated into his regime increasing numbers of hard-
line elements to control the people. By 1067 the
miasma of political stagnation, stifling bureaucra-
tization, and corruption that resulted had both
isolated Gomulka and his old guard from the rank
and file of the party and heightened the regime's
hostility to criticism and change. Confronting the
Gomulka government were not only politically apa-
thetic but economiclly dissatisfied masses. The
leadership also faced dissatisfaction in the younger
generation of party functionaries--"apparatchiks"
and "technocrats" alike. It was these people who
proved to be the main force behind the party crisis
that nearly toppled the Gomulka regime in 1968.
3. Two party leaders seemed to be vying for
Gomulka's mantle in 1968: security chief Mieczyslaw
Moczar, head of the party's hard-line anti-Semitic
faction, and Edward Gierek, the tough-minded admin-
istrator of the key industrial province of Katowice.
Because of Gierek's proven administrative skills,
many Poles believed that he was capable of meeting
the demands of a modernizing society. Gierek was
supported not only by most of the educated techno-
crats and reformists, but also by many of the tough,
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
young, nationalist party functionaries who had pre-
viously supported Moczar.
4.. Gomulka, however, succeeded in reimposing
a semblance of stability, although most Poles
realized that he was only postponing his, exit.
By December 1970, mounting economic stagnation and
popular dissatisfaction had reached a peak, and
when Gomulka, who ha(l been preoccupied with foreign
affairs, made the mistake of raising food, fuel,
and rent prices just before Christmas it led to an
explosion. Somewhat surprisingly, it was the rela-
tively prosperous and elite skilled workers from
the Baltic coast who took the lead, thus catching
the leadership off guard and permitting Gierek's
smooth take-over.
5. Gierek had neither schemed to precipitate
the crisis nor welcomed the danger that it posed
for Communist rule in Poland. He may have forseen
the possibility of Goraulka's downfall, however, and
seemed to be ready to meet the challenge. With the
country on the brink of open revolt, Gierek faced
several tasks. First, he had to calm the militant
workers, especially since their initially spon-
taneous uprising was showing signs of a country-
wide movement. Second, he had to demonstrate that
he was prepared to respond quickly to the most
acute needs of the people. Third, he had to gain
control over the party and the government bureauc-
racies, which, because of their aloofness from the
people, were among the primary targets of the dis-
gruntled working class. Finally, he had to ensure
that the Soviet Union and his other allies would
support his policies and not renege on their ini-
tial endorsement of his regime.
6. In seeking to achieve these goals, Gierek
had several factors going for him. The workers''
disturbances did not take on an anti-Soviet color-
ation. Equally important, although the workers
laid their grievances at the feet of the party
leadership, neither the party as a whole nor the
socialist system was the main target of attack.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
Moreover, most of the agitation had been by the
skilled workers, who felt they had most to lose
from Gomulka's ill-considered price i.ncreases and
changes in work rules. The peasantry, unaffc.cted
by Gomulka's proposed measures, was quiet. Intel-
lect',Aal.s and youth were also inactive. Finally,
the powerful Roman Catholic Church kept its peace;
it merely counseled non-violence.
7. The fact that Gierek, unlike Gomulka, as-
sumed power with Soviet endorsement and with no
trong domestic opposition enabled him to gain
substantial economic assistance from his allies.
Thus, he was able to turn his attention to urgent
tasks at home. By the spring of 1971, having
blamed the past on the outgoing leadership, he
weathered a second wave of strikes by militant
workers and cautiously was implementing his pro-
gram of domestic renewal with its emphasis on ma-
terial well-being and social reform. Although
his initial measures treated the symptoms rather
than the causes of Poland's economic and politi-
cal ills, they gained him the labor peace that he
needed. By mid-year Gierek had consolidated his
strong hold on the leadership through a carefully
phased series of personnel changes. These included
the removal from influence of Moczar.
8. Gierek's reputation as an efficient ad-
ministrator and tough party leader was imp::essive
long before he became a national leader. A former
miner, he was long active in the Communist move-
ment in Western Europe, where he spent the war
years before returning to Poland. His manner is
straightforward and sincere, neither crude nor
polished. Although far from a political liberal,
he believes in listening to advice from below as
well as issuing orders. Gierek's approachability,
pragmatism, and commitment to rewarding good work
are the same qualities that earned him the respect,
if not the unqualified admiration, of the workers
during his 13-year tenure in Katowice.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
SECRET
9. Gierek is likely to be more willing than
Gomulka to delegate responsibility. Over the long
run he will also probably be more inclined to ex-
pand relations with those abroad who are sympathetic
with Poland's economic needs. It is likely that
he will move cautiously and unobtrusively; he will
tend to operate like Hungary's Kadar, not like
Romania's Ceausescu. Because of his long residence
in France and Belgium, Gierek undoubtedly is more
capable than the parochial Gomulka of understanding
the non-Communist world.
In Search of Popular Support
10. Gierek's major problem in winning over
the militant workers was that he had little more
to offer them in material terms than did his prede-
cessor. Initially, he tackled their immediate
grievances and assured them that he would take rio
arbitrary measure affecting their future welfare.
He raised the income of four million of the lowest
paid workers and pensioners, the worst off among
the 33 million Poles. But it had been the skilled
workers who had sparked the revolt, and they were
far from pleased with what they received: a short-
term guarantee that their standard of living would
not worsen and that the authorities would rework
the economic plan to better their lives. Most of
all, the skilled workers resented the statement
that the price increases made in December 1970
would remain in effect.
11. The inadequacy of fihese measures was
quickly revealed by a second wave of strikes.
Gierek was forced to make frequent personal ap-
pearances before the workers urging tr:at greater
local efforts be made to improve working conditions.
In March 1971 not only did he rescind the price
rises of the previous December but he promised
that prices would remain stable for at least two
years. With the help of a $100-million loan from
the USSR, he managed substantially to increase the
supply of meat available to consumers--the first
such rise in five years. All these measures, to-
gether with Gierek's strong personal appea?. were
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
favorably received by the workers and gave him
time to fulfill his promises.
12. Gierek realized that he also needed the
cooperation of the peasants to grow the food he was
promising his people. Peasants were offered higher
prices for farm products. This year, Gierek ful-
filled his promise to replace compulsory deliveries
with a contract system that gives the peasants con-
siderable leeway in their operations. He has eased
the peasants' anxieties about future farm policy by
guaranteeing that private ownership of most land
would continue. New legislation has given many
peasants clear title to land that had been state
property (although they had been tilling it).
13. Gierek has also struck an acceptable re-
lationsiip with the intellectuals, students, and
middle class. Initially, this relationship was am-
biguous. These interest groups had fewer economic
grievances than the workers, but Gierek must have
known from the beginning that he would need their
support to mobilize the population at large and
balance the workers' strong influence on his regime.
Gierek's new spokesmen on cultural policy have em-
phasized that although fundamental party control
over culture must remain intact, there will be
artistic freedom for all who do not produce works
"hostile to socialism or challenge our fraternal
alliances." Most Polish intellectuals, particu-
larly those of the older generation, seem inclined
to accept the terms of this softer cultural policy.
It has permitted many previously banned authors to
reappear in print. It has also allowed more foreign
travel for intellectuals.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
The Gierek Style
15. Gierek's success in obtaining popular
support and generating hope for a better future
stems less from specific policy shifts than from
the style of his rule, which is designed to con-
vince the people that he is genuinely dedicated to
bridging the gap between the rulers and the ruled.
Since coming to power, Gierek's moves have been
consistent: he has avoided repression, but has
indicated that discipline is a key element in his
policy. He has condemned the past, but has stressed
that the party and its genuine accomplishments re-
main unassailable, though leaders come and go. He
has made concessions, but has warned of the dangers
inherent in excessive pressure from below. He has
stressed the need for increased efficiency in gov-
ernment and its responsiveness to the people, but
has emphasized that this responsibility runs both
ways.
16. In innumerable face-to-face meetings with
the people, Gierek has sought to demonstrate that
there is now open and direct dialogue between the
highest echelons of the party and government and
the people. That this principle was initially
forced upon Gierek by the workers' militancy de-
tracts neither from its novelty in Poland nor from
his guarantee that it will remain a permanent fea-
ture of his regime. Meetings of the policy-making
Q1?C D Urr
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
party politburo were rarely held and never publi-
cized when Gomulka was in charge. Under Gierek,
meetings are frequent and are often expanded to
include non-party specialists. The results are
regularly published in abbreviated form. Unlike
the cabalistic practices of Gomulka's top leader-
ship, members of Giorek''s politburo, secretariat,
and central committee departments--as well as gov-
ernment ministers and their deputies--are in direct
contact with workers and special interest organiza-
tions throughout the country. Moreover, their
appearances have been marked by genuine dialogues.
Finally, cabinet ministers, party leaders, and
leaders of mass organizations have submitted to
critical interviews on radio and television. Re-
cently these programs have bean expanded to include
questions submitted by the listening audience while
the program is on the air.
17. Gierek clearly intends to retain firm
control of the media, but he feels that more open
discussion of domestic problems will serve as a
safety valve for popular dissatisfaction, a means
to overcame public apathy, and a catalyst for con-
structive change. Soon after he took over Gierek
established a permanent cabinet-level post of under-
secretary of state for information who now regularly
reports to the press on the proceedings of the gov-
ernment, and submits to questions--often pointed--
by journalists. Gierek has also tolerated, and in
some cases encouraged, publication of mildly provoc-
ative articles in the press. Although the media
do not question the role of the party or the permanence
of the socialist system in Poland. they have offered
opportunities for discussing long-range social and
economic options facing the country. In this way
Gierek has brought public discussion to bear on the
same tasks that are being thrashed out in permanent
and ad hoc commissions within the regime.
18. Another major feature of Gierek's design
for improving the domestic political climate is
hhis Kadar-like acceptance of the concept that "all
who are not against us are with us." He has not
only appointed workers and respected non-party pro-
fessionals to numerous positions at all levels of
;F.C.R F:T
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
S . RF,,,r
government but has also expressed his determination
to eliminate discrimination based! on class back-
ground or religious beliefs. These innovations are
probably designed to buttress his policy of improv-
ing church-state relations and also to heal wounds
in the body politic that had been rubbed raw during
Gomulka's last years in power. The politically
motivated, anti-Semitic purges that characterized
the intra-party struggle in 1968 and the exodus of
Poland's leading Jews that followed have removed
the issues of anti-Semitism in the Gierek regime.
It may be noted, however, that Gierek either did
not take part in, or soon dissociated himself from,
the anti-Semitic excesses of 1968.
19. These tangible changes in the style of
leadership have been accompanied by a public relations
campaign to project a new image of the party and the
government, and to mobilize Polish patriotism in
support of Gierek'a policies. For example, Gierek's
decision to rebuild the ancient royal castle in
Warsaw--destroyed during World War II--has a strong
nationalistic appeal to Poles everywhere. The pro-
ject, however, forces patriotism into the construc-
tive and relatively harmless channel of restoring a
national symbol and commends the Gierek regime even
to non-Communist exiles. Moreover, a special na-
tional fund created to finance the project is
bringing in some hard currency from ethnic Poles
abroad. Another example was the replacement, early
in Gierek's tenure, of the portraits of party and
government leaders in official buildings by the
centuries-old state seal, the Polish eagle. Though
no lv.ss omnipresent in the lives of the people, the
regime's power is thus represented- by a symbol that
generates pride rather than resentment.
20. To be convincing, these innovations in
style had to be accompanied by a. basic decision to
avoid the arbitrary use of force and intimidation.
Not only have the police and the security apparatus
kept a low profile, but the brutal measures against
the workers' demonstrations in December 1970 have
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
been roundly condemned, and the deputy defense min-
ister in charge of the militarized security units
unceremoniously "exiled" as ambassador to Algeria.
Gierek made clear, however, that he did not intend
these moves to be misread as blaming the security
apparatus for all the excesses oii the previous re-
gime, nor did he intend them to cripple police ef-
fectiveness. A thorough review of security practices
and personnel undertaken last year served a dual
purpose: to weed out those with lingering loyalties
to former security chief Moczar, and to enlist
public cooperation in apprehending subversive ele-
ments and troublemakers who commit criminal acts as
a result of the more open atmosphere in the country.
A New Team for a New Deal
21. To consolidate his grasp on the levers of
power, Gierek has had to rid all levels of the party
and government machinery of excess baggage accumulated
during the Gomulka era and has had to install his own
people. He also is trying to change the nature of
the party and the government so that the new rela-
tionship between the regime and people will appear
credible. His decision to convoke a party congress
in December 1971--a year ahead of schedule showed
that he was confident he could achieve his goals and
attain an uncontested mandate at the congress.
22. Immediately after taking office, Gierek
came under strong pressure from all sides--the peo-
ple, the party, and possibly even Moscow--to explain
the causes of the December 1970 crisis. At a key
plenum of the central committee in February 1971,
he divorced his regime from its predecessor. He
accused the former leaders of labeling the riots
a counter-revolution when, in fact, they were an
expression of legitimate grievances. He also
blamed the clique surrounding Gomulka and his
ousted politburo colleagues for having lost touch
with the people and for mismanaging the social
and economic system.
shuHh'J."
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
The Party
23. The situation within the party when Gierek
took over bore some resemblance to but was also quite
different from that confronting Gomulka in 1956.
Gomulka had had to enlist the support of powerful
leaders already on the scene who were mutually an-
tagonistic. Gierek, on the other hand, faced no
such built-in rivals, except Moczar. Gierek did,
however, keep several holdovers from the Gomulka
regime in order to have a team broadly represent-
ative of a cross-section of "party opinion."
24. Moczar's role as a potential rival to Gierek
was grossly overestimated, both by supporters and de-
tractors. Gierek and Moczar had differed in the past,
but they had also on occasion cooperated. After De-
cember 1970, more from necessity than inclination,
they again did so. There is strong evidence that
he had been divested of his responsibilities on the
party secretariat for internal security long before
he suffered a heart seizure in April 1971, and cer-
tainly before he was ousted from the secretariat in
June. Moczar's ouster from the politburo at the
party congress was thus anti-climactic. In any event,
the attention focused on the Gierek-Moczar "rivalry"
within the leadership masked a relatively smooth
process, with Gierek progressively whittling away
politically embarrassing holdovers of the previous
regime.
25. Gierek's major problem in consolidating
his hold on the party in advance of the congress,
like that which faced Gomulka in 1956, was the re-
organization of the middle and lower echelons of the
apparatus. Gierek's extensive shifts in cadre fo-
cused on the provincial'party organizations; by mid-
year he had replaced half of the 19 provincial party
leaders who were on the scene in December 1970: the
rest were gone by the eve of the party congress.
Most of the new regional party chiefs were younger
and better educated than their predecessors. More-
over, unlike Gomulka's appointees, most of them had
gained their experience through work in the provinces
they headed rather than in the central apparatus.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
26. A spin-off of the reconstruction of the
party at the regional level was the infusion of
workers and peasants into the regional and local
central committees. This not only fit Gierek's doc-
trine of more party contact with the masses, but in
many cases had the added value of incorporating vocal
working-class leaders into the establishment. Al-
though these personnel changes did not fully over-
come the passive resistance in local organizations,
they did result in a local apparatus sufficiently
pliable to give Gierek the delegates and endorsement
he needed at the party congress. These organiza-
tional measures were accompanied by a relatively
quiet purge of the 2.3 million rank-and-file member-
ship--100,000 are estimated to have been dropped
from the rolls or expelled.
27. With the stage thus set, the party congress
was a broad-brush affair that formalized what in ef-
fect had already been accomplished. It endorsed the
outline of Gierek's reform program and sele-ted for
the party's high command more adherents to his style
of rule. Almost 60 percent of the new central com-
mittee were freshmen, many of them workers. Gierek
thus had both a new leadership team and a central
party apparatus on which he could rely to support his
programs.
28. Neither at the congress nor elsewhere has
Gierek revealed what changes he intends to make in
the fundamental role of the party. Indeed, there is
good reason to believe that he intends to make no
dramatic institutional changes, but instead to con-
cenLrate on pragmatic and gradual reforms. There can
be little doubt that Gierek is no less d':termined
than Gomulka to preserve the "leading role" of the
party--both his position at home and his acceptability
to Moscow depend on his doing so. He has already
announced that one of the major goals of a planned
new constitution for the country is to anchor party
primacy in constitutional law.
29. Nevertheless, Gierek, unlike Gomulka, has
already lowered the party's profile, not only vis-
a-vis the people, but also in relation to the gov-
ernment. He believes that in formulating policy
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
the party should draw heavily on non-party expertise
monitor and mobilize public opinion, and put pressure
on the bureaucracy? Without prejudicing the party's
ult{.mate puwer to intervene, he feels the practical
implementation of policy should be left as much as
possible tc, the appropriate branches of the govern-
ment and to the mass organizations. Streamlining
the apparatus and increasing its efficiency appear
to be major considerations, but by divorcing the
party from the most visible aspects of the day-to-
day.management of affairs, Gierek hopes to cushion
the leadership against a future crisis of confidence
such as that of December 1970.
The Govjrnment
30. To supplement the new party team, Gierek
forged a new team in government. The parliamentary
elections in March of this year, which--like the
party congress--were held a year ahead of schedule
were a necessary prelude to the final phase of Gierek's
reconstruction of the governmental apparatus. The
results were a broad endorsement of the regime, an
outcome that Gierek had expected. The fact that two
thirds of the newly elected parliament are newcomers
indicates the success of his effort to put his wn
stamp on the legislature. The personnel shifts ef-
fected at the first session of the new parliament
focused on cabinet posts in areas of high priority
for the Gierek regime--the economic and social port.-
folios--and were in line with his earlier appoint-
ments of competent professionals.
31. Gierek has already outlined some of the
specific tasks that will face his new government and
the legislature. He appears intent on giving his
program a new institutional and legal basis. He is
proposing a new constitution to come into effect
sometime in 1973, the amendment of many as yet un-
specified "obsolete laws," the reform of local gov-
ernment, and passage of a new labor code to put his
relationship with the workers on a solid legal basis.
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
;CRF r11
32. These measures are in line with Gierek's
commitment to restore the forms of "socialist de-
mocracy" and to establish a streamlined and rela-
tively independent governmental apparatus. At the
same time, plans to accord a more significant role
to parliament, local government, trade unions, and
other representative organizations lend credibility
to Gierek's pledge to give the people a wider voice.
He has already made some gestures toward Poland's
two non-Marxist political parties and toward various
other groups by soliciting advice on matters affect-
ing their members. In addition, he has reinvigorated
the leadership of the National Unity Front political
umbrella organization to make it more representative
of its membership.
Outlook
33. Gierek is taking Poland down a new road
that, because of necessity as much as his own prag-
matic inclinations, he has left largely undefined.
Nevertheless, he has gained a measure of support
from a skeptical people, whom he has promised not
only to lead but also to consult. His actions have
shown that he means what he says on the need for
dialogue between the rulers and the ruled, for en-
listing the talents of the broadest spectrum of the
population, for a freer flow of information, and for
humanizing the party's approach to internal political
and economic matters.
34. There is, of course, no Warsaw Spring in
the offing. Still less would any Poles, especially
Silesians who know how Gierek operates, compare him
to a Dubcek. As a tough and thoroughly pragmatic
politician, Gierek knows that certain essentials--
Poland's alliance with the USSR, the basic features
of the internal system, and national unity under the
party's aegis--are not to be tampered with. While
he has eschewed force, he has made it clear that he
intends to curb all forms of "anti-social" behavior.
Iis actions have already improved the political and
social climate to the extent that persuasion rather
than coercion is the rule.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
35. Moreover, Gierek seems to have pushed out
or neutralized the few potential adversaries in the
top echelon of the party, and he is intent on mold-
ing a stubborn and rigid bureaucracy in his image.
His program promises no miracles, only hard work
and dedication. These qualities, he has pledged,
will be justly rewarded. As a result, the people
appear inclined to give him the time he needs to
fulfill his promises.
36. The key to Gierek's long-term prospects is
whether he can achieve results in the economic field.
The inert bureaucracy and backwardness inherited by
Gierek have caused Poland to lag behind other East
European countries in introducing technological
change and improvements in management and planning.
G:erek has to contend with serious structural prob-
lems resulting from under-investment in food process-
ing, the construction industry, transport and com-
munication, and agriculture. The resulting limita-
tions on output make fulfillment of his hope of im-
proving the variety and quality of the food supply
and reducing the chronic shortage of housing very
difficult. These are some of the reasons for Gierek's
high-priority drive to acquire Western technology in
order to break the self-perpetuating cycle of high
capital costs, low labor productivity, and wasteful
use of materials.
37. Gierek cannot expect real improvement in
the economic situation until some time after 1975.
Meanwhile, he has promised or implied economic re-
forms in the direction of consumerism. But the
measurable institutional shifts have been negligible,
and there is no evidence that any major change toward
even a modified market economy is planned. Gierek
seems to intend to streamline the apparatus of power,
and to "energize" the workers and managers. He wants
to alter popular attitudes while leaving the system
largely intact. In the process, he hopes to maintain
the delicate balance between sometimes contradictory
objectives--for example, national "engagement" in the
process of renewal and worker discipline as against
a freer internal atmosphere; firm party authority as
against a democratized and reformed governmental
system; and greater responsibility by management as
against wc,ker participation in the decision-making
process.
SF.C:R FT
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7
SECRET
38. It is clear that even with what he has done
so far, Gierek has not eiiminatee the well-entrenched
proponents of the old ways of doing things. And he
certainly cannot ignore the wishes of his more con-
vervative allies, especially the USSR. Giver, the
circumstances of his coming to power, Gierek must
sometimes be anxious lest Soviet leaders come to see
themselves as losers no matter what happens in Poland.
If Gierek fails, Moscow may face an even more serious
crisis than in December 1970. If he succeeds in
creating a new path to socialism, many of his populist
innovations will have wide appeal elsewhere in Eastern
Europe,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130078-7