ISRAEL: PROBLEMS BEHIND THE BATTLE LINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130058-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: May 10, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Israel: Problems Behind the Battle Lines
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
Vril~
DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
10 May 1972
No. 0864/72
88
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
IC, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
OROUP I
UIICLUOCO FROM AUTOMATIC
00 N'NOIIAUINO AND
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 May 1972
Israel: Problems Behind the Battle Lines
The world's view of Israel has been focused on
the military and diplomatic conflict with the Arabs:
the latest border clash; an Arab fedayeen bomb at-
tack; a hijacking; a dramatic Israeli military ex-
ploit; or a new diplomatic maneuver. This is hardly
surprising. Israel began fighting with its neighbors
even before its birth on 14 May 1948 and has been in
a state of armed confrontation in the near quarter
century since then. The dust of continuous conflict
has diverted attention--both Israeli and foreign--
from some of the cracks and crevices in Israeli
society and has shrouded significant social changes
behind the cease-fire lines. Some of Israel's
domestic problems, such as the rift between the
Ashkenazi and the Oriental Jews and the declining
immigration rate, may prove critical; others, such
as the Sabra - Old Zionist generation gap and the
religious-secular disagreement--, ire more irritat-
ing than profound. In any case, the problems that
have begun to surfa,:e during the recent period of
relative calm indicate some of the domestic diffi-
culties that Israel's leaders will face should
peace ever settle over the Middle East.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current InteZZigence and coordinated within CIA.
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Background
1. Articulate Israelis tend to disagree on
many issues of politics, economics, and religion,
but they are generally agreed on one thing: that
their revived Jewish state must survive and that
this takes precedence over all other questions,
both domestic and foreign. The origins of the
survival syndrome are found in the long, often
hard, years of Jewish history--the dispersion of
Jews from the Holy Land, the ghettos and the
pogroms of Eastern Europe, and, above all, the
trauma of the Nazi holocaust. While domestic
squabbles and differences are thus suppressed in
times of threat and stress, they break out when
the external pressure is reduced and the shooting
is minimal.
2. Despite the fits and starts of fedayeen
action along the Israeli-Lebanese border and an
occasional warlike statement out of Cairo on the
liberation of Sinai, the pressure on Israel since
the standstill and cease-fire along the Suez Canal
in August 1970 has been very much reduced. The
toll of Israeli casualties on all the cease-fire
lines since August 1970 has not reached the monthly
casualties of mid-1969 on the Suez Canal alone.
The year 1970 was, in fact, a kind of milestone
for Israel in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Two
events occurred, in September of that year that
heartily pleased Tel Aviv: King Husayn crippled
the Arab fedayeen movement in Jordan, and I,,irael's
long-time nemesis, Egyptian President Abdul Gamal
Nasir, died. Although the Arabs still refuse to
make peace on Tel Aviv's terms, the Israelis are
sitting squarely on the vastly expanded territory
with no prospect that they will be pushed off.
The occupied Arab territories total about 26 , 500
square miles; before 1967, Israel proper reached
a little over 8,000 square miles. The current
cease-fire lines are, however, shorter than the 1949
armistice lines. The Arabs in the occupied ter-
ritories, although clearly unhappy with their
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situation, seem to be moving toward a pragmatic
accommodation with the Israeli authorities, and
Israel is rapidly consolidating its hold on the
conquered lands. In this situation, domestic
problems in Israel have begun to surface.
The Changing State
3. Israel today iv. not the utopian rural
agricultural state originally envisioned by the
Zionist pioneers who sought rebirth of body and
mind through hard manual labor and close associa-
tion with the soil. On the contrary, because of
continuing Arab hostility and because of a pre-
dominantly Western cultural orientation, Israel
has become a modern, industrialized state with a
standard of living far in excess of its neighbors
and approaching that of Western Europe. Despite
meager natural resources, Israel has, largely by
virtue of the technical skills, tenacity, and
determination of its people, become a state that
produces all but a few of its most sophisticated
weapons. Indeed, it is beginning to produce some
of those. Agriculture is still important; it sup-
plies about three quarters of the food consumed in
Israel (by value), and exports of foods exceed im-
ports. But in 1969, the agricultural sector ac-
counted for only seven or eight percent of goods
and services produced and for only ten percent of
employment. The industrial sector, on the other
hand, accounted for 25 percent of the domestic
product and employed 26 percent of the work force
in 1969.
4. The popular image of Israel as primarily
a nation of kibbutzim or other collective systems
of agriculture is now inaccurate. In December
1969 there were some 600 colle-tives of varying
degrees of communalism, with only 212,534 residents,
about 8.5 percent of the total Jewish population
(2,496,000 in December 1969). Only 3.4 percent of
the communal agriculturalists were specifically on
kibbutzim. Growth in the collectives over the past
12 years, moreover, has been slow. Between 1957
and December 1969, while Israel's Jewish population
was increasing by nearly a million, no more than 18
collectives were added, and the population in all
the collectives had increased by only some 11,000.
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5. This leveling-off points to the problem of
keeping the Israeli down on the farm and in finding
new immigrants who are willing to live communally
in the countryside. More important, however, may
be the dwindling supply of reclaimable land and the
near-exhaustion of the nation's precious water re-
sources. These factors make farm expansion costly
and difficult. The Israel of 1967 had about five
million acres; of this area, the Israelis estimate,
1.3 million are suitable for cultivation, and as of
1969-70, 1.045 million acres were already under
cultivation. Any significant agricultural expansion
would appear to lie in the desalination of large
amounts of sea water or in permanent expansion be-
yond the 1949 borders into the occupied Arab lands.
The shortage of new cultivable land and of water,
in fact, gives the Israelis an added bonus in their
control of the occupied territories. The standard
Israeli justification for the establishment of
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories (now
some three dozen) has been that they were required
for defensive reasons--the need for secure borders
against any future Arab incursions. But the eco-
nomic advantages must also be tempting to the Is-
raelis, particularly if they want to double their
population, as they say they do.
6. In any event, while the kibbutzim continue
to provide some of the old pioneer mystique and
elan and a disproportionate number of ex-kibbutzniks
still hold important positions, the economic role
and influence of the agricultural collective are
on the decline. The kibbutzim, in fact, seem to
be joining the industrial trend; at least 200 of
them have established their own industrial enter-
prises to supplement their agricultural activities.
One report set the output of kibbutz industries
last year at $240 million.
7. Instead of a peaceful agricultural rural
utopia, then, Israel has become a hard-driving,
fiercely competitive industrial society. It is
heavily urban; about 69 percent of the Jewish people
in Israel are concentrated in the narrow 60-mile-
long coastal strip between Tel Aviv and Haifa. Is-
rael is beginning to experience the usual urban
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ills--noise, overcrowding, pcilution, housing short-
ages, large slum areas, traffic jams, a small but
growing drug problem, j .tvenile delinquency, and a
rising crime ::ate.
The Sabra vs. the Old Zionists
8. Soma of the change 4n Israeli society is tie
natural result of the passage of time--the aging
of the old Zionist pioneers who control the Israeli
establishment and the growing numbers of the Israeli-
born, the Sabra (named for a desert cactus), who are
eager to take over. In. 1969 natr.ve-born Israelis
numbered some 1.1 million, between a third and a
half of the total Jewish population. The Sabras
are descendants of Ashkenazi or Western Jews, the
Oriental Jews (who came mostly from the Middle
East, North Africa, and Asia), and other Sabras.
Ashkenazi-descended Sabras tend to fare better
economically and politically than those of oriental
descent, reflecting the deep social, political and
economic cleavage between the Ashkenazi and the
Oriental groups.
9. Whether of Ashkenazi, Oriental, or Sabra
parentage, the dominant experience of the native-
born Israeli has been within Palestine/Israel.
Unlike his parents, the Sabra has no personal know-
ledge of anti-Semitism, the ghettos of Europe or
the Middle East, the pogroms of Eastern Europe, or
the Nazi holocaust. His life has consisted wholly
of the military battle with the Arabs and the
struggle to fashion a viable Israeli state. He is
said to be more concerned with the here and now;
he is less interested in the Jewish past than in
the job of consolidating the Israeli state. He is
also said to be less moved by ideology than his
parents, and less Zionist in the classic sense.
He feels little strong connection to the Jews who
voluntarily remain outside Israel. In fact, he
is said to feel disdain for those who, while do-
nating money to Israel, choose the more comfortable
life abroad.
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10. As the old Zionists die, the Sabra element
of Israeli society will begin to move toward power.
They believe that while their elders should be re-
vered for their role in settling and establishing
the state, they have had their day. Israeli sta-
tistics indicate that, as of 1969, the Sabras al-
ready had an edge over the foreign-born Ashkenazi
and Oriental Jews in professional, scientific, and
technical jobs as well as in administrative, ex-
ecutive, and managerial posts. They have been less
successful in pushing the establishment out of the
top political jobs.
11. The old Zionist pioneers born in Eastern
Europe--typified by 74-year-old Prime Minister Golda
Meir, 63-year-old Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, and
61-year-old Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili--
are still very much in political control. Mrs. Meir
has indicated she plans to step down following the
1973 elections, but Sapir is expected to replace
her. The political system is such that those who
control the Israeli Labor Party control the coun-
try's political institutions--and the old Zionist
establishment controls the party. For example,
although Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, a Sabra, is
immensely popular, he has only limited influence
within the ruling party. However impatient they
may be to assume political control, Dayan, Deputy
Prime Minister Allon, and other prominent Sabras
have chosen to bide their time rather than chal-
lenge the political system that allows the old
Zionists to rule. And well they might; the estab-
lishment is aging and shortly will be forced to
pass the torch to the Sabras. When this happens,
the Sabras probably will make no basic changes in
Israeli policy, but the manner in which policy is
conducted will doubtless change. The Sabra will
act even more independently than his predecessors,
because he is less concerned over Israel's image
abroad and less susceptible to foreign influences.
The Oriental-Ashkenazi Split
12. By far the most important domestic social
problem--one with a potential for political insta-
bility--is the deep cultural, economic, and political
differences between the Ashkenazi and the Oriental
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Jews. The only bond between the Ashkenazi and
Oriental seems to be their mutual adherence to
Judaism and allegiance to Israel. Great differ-
ences exist in cultural background, education,
social values, and even in physical characteris-
tics. The Orientals, who often have darker skins,
are sometimes referred to as "black Jews;" they
maintain many of the characteristi.rs and habits
of their original non-Western environment. The
Oriental Jew is most often poor, ill-educated,
aid has few skills; he generally has a larger
family than does an Ashkenazi. Most Oriental
Jews are latecomers to Israel (in the 1950s) and
are on the bottom of the socio-economic ladder;
they are not well fitted to compete in an indus-
trial and basically Western society.
13. Status and power in Israel lie with the
Ashkenazi Jews and their Sabra descendants. Pio-
neers from Russia and Poland were the principal
Zionist activists, the early settlers, and the
leaders of the labor and kibbutz movement. They
were, in short, the dominant figures in the forma-
tion of Israel. The Ashkenazim are usually highly
literate, European in culture and technological
skills, and imbued with the Western work ethic.
14. The overwhelming majority of oriental
Jews are drawers of water and hewers of wood. In
1969 only about seven percent had made it up to
professional, scientific, and technical jobs, and
only about ten percent were administrators, mana-
gers, executives, or clericals. In 1969 the annual
income of the Oriental family, while increasing,
was still well below that of both the Ashkenazim
and the Sabras. As a result, the Oriental is not
a large consumer, cannot afford adequate housing
and most often lives in the big-city slums., He
finds that higher education is almost entirely
reserved for his European or Sabra neighbors.
Enrollment in high schools and universities in
Israel is based on performance in competitive na-
tional examinations, which put Oriental students
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at a disadvantage. Moreover, higher education is
expensive. Both high schools and universities have
tuition fees. Many of the Oriental students who do
enter high school drop out before graduation.
15. Although the Ashkenazim are in the driver's
seat now, the Orientals have outnumbered them since
the early 1960s and are growing more rapidly than
the other two groups. An estimate made by the US
Embassy in 1965 indicated that by 1980 the balance
between Ashkenazi and Oriental Jews might be on
the order of 35-65 percent. This has raised concern
among the Ashkenazim that in time their influence
will be diluted and that Western-oriented Israel
might ultimately become another Levantine state.
16. Though a community of over one million
people, the Orientals do not yet appear to be or-
ganized politically. They are spread through sev-
eral politica'. parties from left to right. In the
October 196D parliamentary elections, the Young
Israel Party, which perennially runs on the specific
platform of increased influence for the Orientals,
won a miniscule 2,000 votes out of 1.36 million
votes cast--not enough for one seat. Of the 120
members elected in 1969 for the current Knesset,
only 13 are Orientals; there is only one Oriental
in the 18-man cabinet (the Minister of Police).
The Orientals are heavily represented in the police
force, but at best have only token representation
in the rest of the civil service. There are two
Chief Rabbis, one Ashkenazi and one Oriental. Mrs.
Meir's Labor Party in June 1971 named a Yemeni Jew,
Yisrael Yeshayahu, as secretary general of the
party, apparently to underscore its awareness of
the problem. Yeshayahu has since been Speaker of
the Knesset.
17. The apparent widespread apath,, of the
Orientals and their inability or unwillingness to
act as a unified political force have stemmed in
part from their basic conservatism, but they may
be becoming more aware of their political potential
and majority position. In the spring of 1971, a
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small group of Oriental youths, call:,,ng themselves
"Black Panthers," staged a series of public demon-
strations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. With an assist
from some splinter Communist groups, they protested
discrimination against Orientals in housing and jobs
and brought the plight of the Oriental Jews to public
attention. They were particularly disturbed that
the new immigrants from the. Soviet Union (most of
them Ashkenazim) and other Western immigrants were
being given priority in jobs and new housing. Re-
cently an Oriental leader was quoted as saying, "If
we ever get peace in the Middle East, we will have
civil war at home." Another likened the situation
to that of Ulster, comparing the Catholics in North-
ern Ireland to the Oriental Jews in Israel as the
large-family, low-paid class of society, and the
Protestants to the Ashkenazi Jews, "who have the
power and large incomes."
18. These statements may be overblown, but
the discontent. is real, and the problem probably
cannot be indefinitely set aside. The government
is trying to bridge the gap between the Orientals
and the Ashkenazim. The major effort is directed
at recasting the Oriental in a Western mold--mostly
through Hebrev,r language training, special educational
benefits, agricultural and other vocational training,
and army service. But progress is slow, both because
of the nature of the problem and because of limited
finances. T~.e government will have to run hard just
to keep ahead of the Orientals' rising expect:ations.
The eventual assumption of power by the Sabras could
bring an evolutionary solution--there seems to be
less awareness of "differentness" among younger Is-
raelis.
The Immigration Problem
19. The Israelis are faced with high Arab
birthrates both inside and outside Israel. The
Jewish birthrate in Israel in 1969 was 23.4 live
births per 1,000 population. The US birthrate
for 1970 was 18.2 live births per 1,000 population.
The Arab birthrate-in several nearby Arab states
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and in Israel approaches 50 live births per 1,000
population. A recent study within Israel of the
"Gross Reproduction Rate," based on the average num-
ber of daughters a female has, listed the Israeli
Muslim female the highest with a reproduction rate
of 4.39; the Oriental Jewish female followed with
2.05; the Sabra female, 1.38; and the Ashkenazi fle-
male, 1.28. Thus, the Israelis have always regarded
a steady stream of Jewish immigrants from the
Diaspora as crucial to the long-term survival of
Israel as a Jewish state. After defense, immigra-
tion has the top national priority. Last year, for
example, Finance Minister Sapir called for the
doubling of the Jewish population in Israel in the
next decade by natural increase and by the addition
of one and a half million immigrants. Since this
would require 150,000 immig.:ants per year, Sapir's
was probably an unrealizable hope. in the past 18
years since the great waves of immigration after
World War II and in the very early 1950s, the num-
ber of immigrants has averaged 40,000 per year. The
emigration of Soviet Jews currently permitted by
Moscow is encouraging, but there is always the fear
the Russians may not allow this to continue very long.
20. In 1970 there were an estimated 13.9 mil-
lion Jews in the world, including the 2.5 million in
Israel. The two largest blocs outside Israel are
the approximately 5.8 million Jews in the US and the
2.6 million in the USSR; sizable groups are also in
Europe and Latin America. The problem is that rela-
tively few Jews in the West want to settle in Israel,
and Moscow until recently would not let Soviet Jews
emigrate. Not many American Jews have Emigrated to
Israel--or stayed when they did. Befcre 1967, immi-
grants from the US numbered only some 600-1,200 annu-
ally, and approximately half of these did not stay.
Since the 1967 war, with the heightened emotions it
evoked, Jewish immigration from the US to Israel
rose from about 2,100 in 1967 to about 7,800 in
1970, but this rate now seems to be leveling off.
about 8,500 Jews
21. When Moscow broke relations with Tel Aviv
over the 1967 war, it also shut off the pre-war
trickle of emigrants. In mid-1968 Moscow, for rea-
sons not fully clear, began again to permit a few
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Soviet Jews to leave the USSR. According to Is-
raeli figures, some 3,000 Soviet Jews emigrated to
Israel in 1969, only about 1,000 in 1970. In the
spring of 1971, however, the rate suddenly jumped
to 1,000 per month and hit a rate of 100 per day
(3,000 a month) in December. The total permitted
out of the USSR in 1971 is estimated at 14,000, the
largest yearly total ever. The high rate of Decem-
ber has dropped in the spring of 1972 to about 74
a day. This is still a substantial number, however,
and, if maintained, would bring a record 27,000 Rus-
sian Jews to Israel in 1972.
22. Israel has a whole array of institutions
and organizations actively trying to attract the
immigrant and to ease his integration into Israeli
society. Besides basic arrangements for temporary
housing, employment, and language training, there
are many inducements for the new immigrant, includ-
ing customs exemptions, easy mortgages, tax conces-
sions, free or subsidized housing, and business
loans. The privileges given to the immigrant have
been a source of irritation to many Israelis, par-
ticularly the Orientals. While there may be some
reduction of special concessions as a result of this
domestic discontent, the need for immigrants is so
overriding that a large cutback is not likely.
23. Residence in Israel for many Jews is a
considerable cultural shock. Some of the immigrants
are totally ignorant of the different living condi-
tions in Israel, and the contrast to their idealized
"land of milk and honey" produces severe disillusion-
ment. The general anxieties and uncertainties of
immigration are complicated by a new and strange
land and language. Most Western immigrants resist
pressure to get them into the less settled rural
areas; they want to settle in the more heavily pop-
ulated coastal urban area or in Jerusalem. The less
affluent Oriental Jew is often the one who ends up
in the country or the newer development towns. Im-
migrants frequently want to live in a certain town
with their own countrymen or with relatives and are
frustrated when they cannot. For some,'-the standard
of living in Israel is lower than what they were
used to. Unfamiliar Israeli professional and edu-
cational standards are an obstacle to employment o~:
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schooling. in fact, considerable numbers of new
immigrants reconsider and try to emigrate elsewhere.
24. If the Israeli attitude on immigration is
larded with more hope than fact, information on emi-
gration from Israel is even more cloudy. Emigration
from Israel is a real problem, and Tel Aviv is sensi-
tive about it. In some years, Israel has had a mi-
nus net immigration because of departures of erst-
while Israeli settlers. In the 20-year period,
1948-1968, about 220,000 persons are believed to
have left. The average number of departees prob-
ably remains about 9,000-10,000 annually. Most im-
portant, those who leave tend to be Western, young,
and professional--the very type of people Israel
needs to keep.
25. In sum, barring a world crisis or events
abroad that threaten t.ie Jews, immigration is likely
to remain constant or even to decrease, which augurs
ill for the concept of Israel as a Jewish state. A
professor at Weizman Institute said in February 1971
that, because of the high birthrate of the Israeli
Arabs, the population balance will. eventually shift
to the detriment of the Jews if 60,000 Jewish immi-
grants do not come to Israel annually. Some demo-
graphic experts have predicted that the Arabs in Is-
rael will have numerical equality with the Jews by
the year 2000.
The Orthodox Versus the Secular Majority
26. Another domestic problem that has long
plagued Israel is the battle of the largely secular
majority against religious strictures demanded by
the small, but powerful, Orthodox minority. The
current political maneuvering over the coming elec-
tions of two new chief rabbis, the recent harass-
ment and violence against doctors performing autop-
sies and violators of the Sabbath, and the frequent
threat by the religious parties to bring down the
coalition government all illustrate this problem.
For most Israeli Jews, being Jewish is cultural
rather than religious, and they observe only a
minimum of the religious requirements.
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27. The Israeli Government does not endorse
the concept of a theocratic state--as sought by
some of the ultra-Orthodox--but the Orthodox rite
is nevertheless the only form of Judaism recognized
in Israel. Virtually all Israelis are considered
adherents of Orthodox Judaism, no matter how secu-
larized they may be as individuals. This monopoly
gives the Orthodox hierarchy power to rule on ques-
tions such as marriage, divorce, conversion, and
burial. There are 14 congregations of lesser Or-
thodoxy in Israel, five Conservative and nine Re-
form congregations, but these groups must call on
Orthodox rabbis to perform every personal religious
ceremony.
28. These powers stem from the fact that since
1948 religious political parties have been called
upon to fill out the coalition governments. Israel
has yet to have a single-party majority--although
the Israeli Labor Party-MAPAM Alignment. came very
close in the 1969 elections. Over the years labor
has traded off control of religious affairs in re-
turn for political support from the religious par-
ties. The National Religious Party, the largest
religious party and principal coalition partner,
won only 12 Knesset seats in 1969 (out of a total
of 120) but it controls three cabinet posts out of
18--the ministries of Religion, Social Welfare, and
Interior. The Interior Ministry does not control
the police, but is concerned with local institutions
and government services, including population reg-
istration.
29. The ultra-Orthodox political party, Agudat
Israel, is the country's second largest religious
party. It represents Israel's "true believers."
It won four seats in the Knesset, but was given no
cabinet posts. Not until 1948 did Agudat put aside
the belief that the coming of the Messiah might be
endangered if the party engaged in partisan politi-
cal activity. Agudat wants a theocratic state based
on total conformity with Orthodox religious doctrine.
It opposed Israeli statehood and now opposes a writ-
ten constitution, military service for women, secu-
lar control of the schools, and such anti-Orthodox
practices as working on the Sabbath and mixed swim-
ming. Militant and aggressive, Agudat uses violen^e
and demonstrations to make its points.
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30. Poaeli Agudat Israel, the smallest reli-
gious party, is the labor wing of Agudat and was
formed to protect Orthodoxy in the labor movement.
It has participated in the government--usually at
sub-cabinet levels, did not oppose statehood, and
has founded and supported its own rural collectives.
It holds two Knesset seats. The Neturei Kt:;ta, the
"Guardians of the City," is another extremist Ortho-
don group. Its several hundred members live in
Jerusalem. It is not a political party; its members
absolutely refuse to recognize the existence of the
secular Jewish state and frequently engage in vio-
lence and mass protests on religious issues.
31. A total of 18 Knesset seats are held by
the religious parties, representing just short of
15 percent of the votes cast in 1969, a little over
200,000 votes. Their influence is out of propor-
tion to their vote. Successive labor governments
beginning with Ben-Gurion's have felt it necessary
to "bow to the rabbis," and the religious parties
have consistently exploited their advantage.
32. One of the ministries they hold, the Min-
istry of Religious Affairs, has the legal responsi-
bility for all religious communities in Israel--Jewish,
Muslim, and Christian. It oversees the establishment
of religious councils and courts, the appointment of
religious judges and some religious leaders, and the
registration of marriages and divorces. The supreme
religious authority in Israel is vested in a six-
member Chief Rabbinate headed by two Chief Rabbis,
one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi*.
The terms, Sephardic Jew and Oriental Jew, are not
synonymous. The Sephardim are those Jews expelled
from Spain in the 15th century and their descendants,
wherever resident. Many of the Sephardim settled in
North Africa, Italy, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, the
Balkans, and the Turkish Empire, notably at Salonika
and Constantinople. Others went to England, Germany,
France and elsewhere in Western Europe, as well as
to the West Indies and to North America. While all
Oriental Jews (those from North Africa, the Middle
East, etc.) are Sephardic, the reverse is not true;
many Sephardim--notably those who went to Europe,
England, and North America--do not regard themselves
as Oriental Jews, but as Sephardim. The Sephardic
rite and tradition are quite different from that of
the Ashkenazim, the former going back to Babylon, the
latter to Palestine.
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There is also a 12--member Supreme Rabbinical Coun-
cil, which is equally divided between Ashkenazim
and Sephardim. The Chief Rabbinate decides on ques-
tions in Jewish church law that are not within the
jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts, supervises
dietary laws and regulations, end issues marriage
permit;i. It also approves the ordination and ap-
pointment of the clergy and religious teachers.
There are teen Rabbinical Courts: the Rabbinical
High Court of Appeal and nine Regional Rabbinical
Courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction over
Jews in such matters as marriage, divorce, and
alimony, and with agreement of concerned parties,
in cases of wills and probate, custody of children,
paternity, and adoption.
33. This pervasive authority is often galling
to the non-Orthodox and secularized citizens who
form the majority of the population. Many of these
fail to understand the retention of power by theo-
cratic elements in an otherwise largely secular
state. Resentment arises over the definition of
"Who is a Jew?", over marriage, and divorce laws,
over the unacceptability of non-Orthodox conver-
sions. Another frustration is the Toraic prohibi-
tion of work on the Hebrew Sabbath, between sundown
Friday and sundown Saturday. Full observance of
Orthodox tradition would mean that all work, pro-
duction, transport, and services would stop except
when necessary to save life. Such a standstill has
been unworkable and unacceptable, and compromises
have evolved. Urban bus lines stop, but intercity
services and taxis keep working. Israeli airlines
do not fly, but foreign airlines maintain schedules.
There are no movies, but there are radio broadcasts.
The introduction of a new taxicab service in Tel
Aviv in 1968 provoked demonstrations by religious
groups who claimed the "status quo" agreement pre-
vented them from running on the Sabbath. When tele-
vision was introduced in late 1969, the religious
parties forced Mrs. Meir to seek a court injunc-
tion against Sabbath programming. Another irritant
is the requirement that most hotels and restaurants,
government cafeterias, and armed forces kitchens
observe the dietary laws.
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34. The death in July 1970 of Interior Min-
ister Haim Moshe Shapiro, the leader of the National
Religious 'arty, may be working to exacerbate reli-
gious contentions. Shapiro, a moderate, had worked
hard to control the party's religious extremists,
and his death has caused a power struggle within the
party. The Agudat is apparently taking advantage
of the turmoil to enhance its own position. The
ultra-Orthodox party is believed to be behind the
harassment against Israeli doctors performing autop-
sies, and it is apparently promoting its own candi-
date for Chief Rabbi.
35. The perennial religious question that pro-
vokes secular-minded Israelis and has threatened
cabinet splits is, "Who is a Jew?" The question
comes up frequently as a result of mixed marriages
between Jews and non-Jews. The problem arises of
determining the personal status and citizenship of
the non-Jewish spouses and their children in Israel.
According to Halakic (religious) law, a Jew is one
born of a Jewish mother or one who has converted"to
Judaism. Two relevant cases in 1970 threatened to
lead to full-blown cabinet crises. In one, an Is-
raeli-born Jew, married to a non-Jewish woman (both
were atheists), sought to have his children regis-
tered as of Jewish nationality, but of no religion.
In a compromise that narrowly averted a political
showdown, the children were registered on a one-time
basis, but religious law was upheld. The second
case involved an American-born Israeli woman, a con-
vert to Judaism by the Reform Movement, who sought
to register as a Jewish national. The Orthodox
religious groups, through the National Religious
Party, were able to force a re-conversion by Ortho-
dox procedures before she could be registered.
36. The so-called "mamserin" (bastards) case
is another example of the religious problem and its
injection into politics. Jewish religious law con-
siders a child born of a married woman, but fathered
by a man not her husband, to be a bastard and out-
side the religious community. In 1966 a young Is-
raeli soldier applied to the Chief Rabbinate for a
wedding license. He was denied permission on the
grounds that he was a bastard--his mother, a Polish
immigrant, had remarried in Israel without divorcing
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her Polish husband. He and his sister unsuccess-
fully contested the ruling for over five years. De-
fense Minister Dayan turned the case over for study
to the chief army chaplain, Rabbi Sh,lonio Goren. Al-
though Goren, now Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, found
flaws in the first marriage that could render the
second marriage valid, neither Dayan nor the Labor
government has been able to persuade the Chief Rab-
bis to reconsider. Frustrated, the government ap-
parently now hopes to solve the case by making Rabbi
Goren its candidate to replace 87-year-old Chief
Rabbi Unterman, a proposition vigorously opposed by
the Orthodox community.
37. Since the establishment of Israel, con-
trol of the Chief Rabbinate has been a prize sought
by the contending political parties. In March 1964,
the candidates of the National Religious Party won
both the Ashkenazi and Sephardi posts for Chief
Rabbi; Yitzak Nissim, the Sephardi Chief Rabbi,
overwhelmed his opponents, including'the Labor can-
didates, while Isser Unterman, the Ashkenazi Chief
Rabbi, barely beat the Labor candidate. For reasons
not entirely clear, there have been no elections
since that time, although the term of the rabbis is
five years. Drafting a Chief Rabbi Election Bill
has been a long,:.involved process, with both the
government and the religious parties attempting to
get the best bill for themselves. There have been
disputes over age qualifications and over whether
there should be both an Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi and
a Sephardi Chief Rabbi. In any event, the secu-
larists and religionists are girding for battle in
elections now scheduled to take place before 30
June.
38. Much of the religious pressure in Israel
seems somewhat irrational and anachronistic not
only to the outsider but also to many Israelis.
But religious influence is a fact of Israeli life,
and the religionists show little sign of weakening
in their struggle for conformity to the Orthodox.
Certainly things will change if the Labor Alignment
achieves a Knesset majority in its own right and no
longer depends upon the religious parties for polit-
ical support. Even then, however, it seems unlikely
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that the religious structure can or will be dis-
mantled easily or quickly. One way or another, the
religious influences that kept Israel a nation dur-
ing the long centuries when it could not be a state
seem likely to remain alive now that a state is in
being; they will persist in the day-to-day affairs
of a largely socialist government and a largely secu-
lar people.
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