POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130055-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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' '"1l
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Poland Under New Management
Secret
28 April 1972
No. 0861/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN%;Y
Directorate of Intelligence
28 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Poland Under New Management
Since Polish party first secretary Edward
Gierek took power from Wladyslaw Gomulka on 20 De-
cember 1970, a new style of rule has appeared in
Poland. Given the volatile circumstances surround-
ing his accession to power, Gierek has accomplished
a great deal in 15 months. With more vigor than
Gomulka showed, Gierek has grasped political power,
obtained the cooperation of nearly all strata of
the population, and imbued the nation with a sense
of participation in government. Despite certain
unorthodox aspects of his domestic style of rule,
he has won increased political and material support
from the USSR and his other Warsaw Pact allies.
There is no Warsaw Spring in the offing, but Gierek
seems to know where he warts to go. He has forged
a team of like-minded party and government officials.
The people, sensing for the first time a new energy
in their regime, seem willing to help take Poland
into the modern age.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence with a contribution from
the Office of Economic Research, and was coordinated
within CIA.
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The Succession
1. With the country on the brink of open re-
volt in December 1970, Gierek faced several tasks.
First, he had to calm the workers. Second, he had
to show that he was prepared to respond quickly to
the most acute needs of the people. Thiru, he had
to gain control over the party and the government
bureaucracies. Finally, he had to ensure that the
Soviet Union and his other allies would support his
policies and not renege on their initial endorsement
of his regime.
2. Gierek had a few factors going for him.
The workers' disturbances had no anti-Soviet
coloration. Neither the party nor the socialist
system was the main target of attack. The agita-
tion was limited to the skilled workers, who felt
they had most to lose from Gomulka's price increases
and changes in work rules. The peasantry, unaf-
fected by Gomulka's proposed measures, was quiet.
Intellectuals and the youth also were inactive.
Finally, the powerful Roman Catholic Church kept
its peace; it merely counseled non-violence.
3. Gierek assumed power with Soviet endorse-
ment, and this helped him to gain substantial eco-
nomic assistance from his bloc allies and to turn
his attention to urgent domestic tasks. By the
spring of 1971, Gierek cautiously began to imple-
ment his program of domestic renewal, with an em-
phasis on material well-being and social reform.
By mid-year he had consolidated his already strong
hold on the leadership through , carefully phased
series of personnel changes. These included the
removal from influence of Moczar, the former secu-
rity chief, who was his only potential rival.
4. Gierek had an impressive reputation as an
efficient, veteran administrator and tough party
leader in Katowice long before he became a national
leader. A former miner, Gierek was long active in
the Communist movement in Western Europe, where he
spent the war years before returning to Poland.
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His manner is straightforward and sincere, neither
c:,~ude nor polished. Although he is far from a po-
litical liberal, he believes in listening to advice
from below as well as in issuing orders. Gierek's
genuine approachability, pragmatism, and dedication
to just reward for good work are the same qualities
that earned him the respect of "his" workers during
his 13-year tenure in Katowice.
5. As a skilled manager and technocrat, Gierek
is likely to be more willing than Gomulka to delegate
responsibility to those who deserve it. Over the
long run he will probably be more inclined to expand
relations with those abroad who sympathize with
Poland's economic needs. It is also probable that
he will move cautiously and unobtrusively; he will
tend to operate like Hungary's Kadar, not like
Romania's Ceausescu. Because of his long residence
in France and Belgium Gierek undoubtedly is more
capable than the parochial Gomulka of understandi:ig
the non-Communist world. (He speaks French fluently.)
In Search of Popular Support
6. Gierek's major difficulty in harnessing
support from the workers is that he had little more
to offer them in material terms than did his prede-
cessor. Initially, he had to tackle their immediate
grievances and also to assure the workers that he
would take no arbitrary measure affecting their
welfare in the future. He began by raising the
income of four million of the lowest paid workers
and pensioners, the worst off among the 33 million
Poles. But these were not the skilled workers who
sparked the revolt and who were skeptical and dis-
satisfied with what they had receivea. Most of
all, these skilled workers resented the statement
that the December price increases would remain in
effect. A second wave of strikes forced Gierek in
March 1971 to rescind these price rises and to
promise that prices would remain stable for at
least two years. These measures reassured the
workers and housewives about the food supply and,
together with Gierek's strong personal appeal,
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generated a positive response by the workers.
Thus he won time to fulfill his promises.
7. Gierek also realized that he needed the
cooperation of the peasants to grow the food he
was promising his people. Peasants have been
offered higher prices for farm products and other
help to raise production. This year, Gierek ful-
filled his earlier promise by replacing compulsory
deliveries with a contract system that gives the
peasants considerable leeway in production. He
has eased the peasants' anxieties about future
farm policy by guaranteeing that the predominantly
private ownership of land would continue. New
legislation has given many peasants clear title to
land that had been state property (although they
had been tilling it.)
8. Gierek has also struck an acceptable rela-
tionship with the intellectuals, students, and
middle class. Initially, this relationship was
ambiguous. These interest groups had fewer eco-'
nomic grievances than the workers, but Gierek must
have understood from the beginning that he would
need them to mobilize the population at large and
to balance the dominant influence of the workers
on his regime. Gierek's new spokesmen on cultural
policy have emphasized that fundamental party con-
trol over culture must remain intact and that there
will be artistic freedom for all those who do not
produce works "hostile to socialism or challenge
our fraternal alliances." Most Polish intellec-
tuals, particularly of the older generation, seem
.inclined to accept the terms of this softer cul-
tural policy. It has permitted many previously
banned authors to reappear in print. It also has
allowed more foreign travel for intellectuals.
9. Gierek's big policy departure--designed
to gain support from the majority of the people,
95 percent of whom are Roman Catholic--has been
his willingness to reach an accommodation with the
Church. Three days after taking office, the new
government offered to "normalize" church-state
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relations, which for decades have alternated be-
tween truces and crises. A meeting in early March
1971 between P(;land's Primate, Stefar; :ardinal
Wyszyn.ski, and Premier Jaroszewicz began a dialog?ae
that has since been extended to :iegotiati,)ns between
the government and the Vatican. Tn June 1971 legis-
lation was passed granting the Polish church legal
title to former German church property in he terri-
tories gained by Poland a.'_'-ter World War II. Church-
state friction persists, especially on the parish
level, but the tangible measures taken by the re-
gime have, created a new climate that has been wel-
comed by the people as well as by the episcopate.
The Gierek Style
10. Gierek's success in obtaining popular
support and generating hope for a better future
stems less from specific policy shifts than from
the style of his rule, which is designed to con-
vince the people that he is genuinely dedicated to
bridging the gap between the rulers and the ruled.
Since coming to power, Gierek's moves have been
consistent: he has avoided repression, but has
indicated that discipline is a key element in his
policy. He has condemned the past, but has stressed
that the party and its genuine accomplishments re-
main unassailable even though leaders come and go.
He has made concessions, but has warned of the
dangers inherent in excessive pressure from below.
He has stressed the need for increased efficiency
in government and its responsiveness to the people,
but has emphasized that this responsibility runs
both ways.
11. Another major feature of his scheme for
improving the political climate is his acceptance
of the concept, effectively employed by Kadar in
Hungary, that "all who are not against us are with
us." Thus he has not only appointed workers and
respected non-party professionals to numerous posi-
tions on all levels of government, but has also ex-
pressed his determination to eliminate discrimina-
tion based on class background or religious beliefs.
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This conecpt appears designed to buttress his
policy of improving church-state relations and
also to heal wounds in the body politic that had
been rubbed raw during G(-)mulka's last years in
power.
12. These changes have been accompanied by a
public relation::. r7ampaign designed to project a new
image of the party and the government and to engage
Polish patriotism in support of Gierek's policies.
For example, Gierek's decision to rebuild the an-
cient royal castle in Warsaw--destroyed during
World War II--has a strong nationalistic appeal to
Poles everywhere. The project, however, forces
patriotism into the constructive and relatively
harmless channel of :.estoring a national symbol
and commends the Gierek regime even to non-Communist
exiles. Moreover, a special national fund created
to finance the project is helping to bring in hard
currency from Poles abroad. Another example was
the replacement, earl- in Gierek's tenure, of the
portraits of party and government leaders in offi-
cial buildings by the centuries-old state seal,
the Polish eagle.
13. To be convincing, these innovations in
style had to be accompanied by a basic decision to
avoid force and arbitrary intimidation. As a re-
sult, the police and the security apparatus have
kept a low profile. The brutal measures against
the workers' demonstrations in December 1970 have
been roundly condemned, and the deputy defense min-
ister in charge of the militarized security units
was unceremoniously ousted and "exiled" as ambassador
to Algeria. Gierek made clear, however, that he
did not intend these moves to be misread as blaming
the security apparatus for all the excesses of the
previous regime, nor did he mean for them to cripple
police effectiveness. A thorough review of security
practices and personnel undertaken last year served
a dual purpose: to weed out those with lingering
loyalties to former security chief Moczar, and to
enlist public cooperation against both subversive
elements and simple troublemakers who might commit
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criminal acts as a result of the more open atmos-
phere in the country. A major aid in this effort
has been a balanced approach to what might be
called police-community relations.
A New Team for a New Deal
14. To consolidate his grasp on the levers of
power, Gierek has had to rid the party and govern-
ment machinery of excess baggage accumulated during
the Gomulka era and to replace it with persons of
his own choosing. He also seeks to change the
nature of the party and the government so that the
new relationship between the regime and people will
appear credible. His decision to convoke a party
congress in December 1971--a year ahead of schedule--
showed that he was confident he could achieve his
goals and attain an uncontested mandate at the
congress.
i5. Neither at the party congress nor else-
where has Gierek revealed what changes he intends
to make in the fundamental role of the party. In-
deed, he probably intends no dramatic institutional
changes. There can be little doubt that Gierek is
no less determined than Gomulka to preserve the
"?eading role" of the party, because his position
at home and his acceptability to Moscow depend on
his doing so. He has already announced that one
of the major goals of a planned new constitution
for the country is to anchor party primacy in con-
stitutional law.
16. Nevertheless, Gierek's ideas on how the
party should function within this framework differ
front those of his predecessor. He has already
lowered the party's profile, not only vis-a-vis
the people, but also in relation to the government.
He believes that in formulating policy the party
should draw heavily on non-party expertise, monitor
and mobilize public opinion, and put pressure on the
bureaucracy. Without prejudicing the party's ulti-
mate power to intervene, the practical implementation
of policy should be left as much as possible to the
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appropriate branches of the government and to the
mass organizations. Streamlining the apparatus
and increasing its efficiency appear to be major
considerations, but by divorcing the party from
the most visible aspects of the day-to-day manage-
ment of affairs, Gierek hopes to cushion the lead-
ership against a future crisis of confidence such
as that of December 1970.
17. To supplement the new party team, Gierek
has moved to forge a new team in government. The
parliamentary elections in March of this year--like
the party congress held a year ahead of schedule,-
were a necessary prelude to the final phase of
Gierek's reconstruction of the governmental appa-
ratus. The results represented a broad endorsement
of the regime, an outcome that Gierek sought and
expected. The fact that two thirds of the newly
elected members of parliament are newcomers indi-
cates the success of his effc,rt to put his own
stamp on the legislature. The personnel shifts
effected at the first session of the new parliament
focused on cabinet posts in areas of high priority
for the Gierek regime--the economic and social
portfolios-,-and were in line with his earlier ap-
pointments of competent professionals. Gierek's
immediate legislative goals include drafting a new
constitution to come into effect in 1973, amending
many as yet unspecified "obsolete laws," reforming
local government and passing a new labor code.
The Economy--Legacy and Prospects
18. The inert bureaucracy and national back-
wardness inherited by Gierek'has meant that Poland
is lagging even behind other East European countries
in introducing technological change and improvements
in management and planning. Gierek has to contend
with serious structural problems resulting from
underinvestment in food processing, the construction
industry, transport and communication, and agricul-
ture. The resulting limitations on output make
fulfillment of his hope of improving the variety
and quality of the food supply and reducing the
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0
chronic shortage of housing very difficult, These;
are some of the reasons for Gierek's high-priority
drive to acquire Western technology in order to
break the self-perpetuat:ineg cycle of high capital
costs, low labor productivity, and wasteful use of
materials.
19. The economy is about average for Eastern
Europe in terms of GNP per capita, ($1,350 in 1970)
and rate of growth (about five percent in GNP dur-
ing the 1960s.) Poland, however, has done better
than most East European countries in putting food
on the table, Industry grew by over eight percent
a year during 1956-70--above average among the
more advanced East European countries--but Poland
was the only one in the last half of the 1960s to
experience a declining rate of growth of productivity.
20. Gierek is not likely to depart from the
centralized system he inherited. As before, the
state dominates investment and foreign trade, hands
down output quotas, and sets the rules for dis-
tributing enterprise income. Firms can undertake
some minor investments, make up their own quarterly
plans, and exercise limited authority over employ-
ment and the product mix. As an efficient admin-
istrator, however, Gierek probably will try to make
things run more smoochly by streamlining rather than
decentralizing the system. For the time being, at
least, Gierek has scrapped Gomulka's reluctant re-
form of the wage incentives system, which would have
tied bonuses to profitability and sales, although
he has allowed experiments with this system to con-
tinue in some firms. He also has put aside the
long-standing objective of boosting food prices.
If he decides to move in either of these unpopular
directions, he probably will go slowly and undoubt-
edly will carefully explain the program to the people.
21. Some of Gierek's longer run intentions for
the economy have emerged in the revised 1971-75 plan.
He has raised Gomulka's original goals for the growth
of real wages, personal consumption, and consumer
market supplies, particularly of meat and processed
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foods. On the other hand, he has resigned himself
to a worsening of the housing shortage. According
to the plan, housing space will increase only
slightly faster than during the 1965-70 period,
and additions will not keep pace with urban popu-
lation growth.
22. The over-all plan is fairly ambitious,
projecting a more rapid rise in national income
and personal consumption than in 1966-70, and a
slower growth in investment and employment. Con-
siderable emphasis seem; to have been placed on
raising productivity, which in turn depends heavily
on achieving the planned shift toward light industry.
23. Largely to support his consumer program?
Gierek's plan calls for a faster rise in imports
than in 1966-70; Gomulka's conservative trade pol-
icies have given Gierek considerable scope for
expanding imports; Poland has one of the lowest
Western debts (relative to exports) in Eastern
Europe. Thus, in addition to plans for boosting
purchases of consumer goods, Gierek intends to
double imports of machinery and equipment from the
West to $2.5 billion over the five-year period.
West Germany probably figures as the major sup-
plier, but the Poles hope--if suitable credit can
bo arranged--to buy some $350 million worth of US
equipment, particularly for their petroleum, copper,
electronic, and light and food industries. The re-
gime would also like to promote US investment in
joint ventures in Polish mining and manufacturing.
24. Gierek;s first year and a quarter have
got the five-year plan off to a good start. Goals
for 1971 were met or exceeded throughout the economy.
Investment grew by nine percent, industrial output
by eight percent; real wages by over five percent,
and agricultural output by four percent. Livestock
production rebounded last year. Trade trends were
also favorable. In spite of large imports of meat--
made possible by a $100-million Soviet hard-currency
loan--Poland ran a $123-million surplus with the
West. The economic trend early in 1972 continued
to be favorable, except for agriculture, which is
threatened by the winter-spring drought.
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