PAKISTAN: INTERNAL CONTROVERSY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130050-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: April 13, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Confidentia
Intelligence Memorandum
Pakistan: Internal Controversy
CIA
6~~~MfN1 SEP VICES BRANCH
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IJJ NOT DESTROY
Confidential
13 April 1972
No. 0854/72
74
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WIN VIDEN'h AL,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
13 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PAKISTAN: INTERNAL CONTROVERSY
Introduction
Pakistan emerged from the disastrous war of last
December with Bhutto appearing to be firmly in com-
mand. In the months that have passed since then, the
new President has engaged in frenetic activities de-
signed to improve Pakistan's international position--
particularly vis-a-vis India--and to maintain his par
amount position domestically. Recently, one of his
major problems at home has been the growing friction
between him and the leader of the principal opposi-
tion coalition in the yet-to-be convened National As-
sembly--Khan Abdul Wali Khan of the National Awami
Party. The outcome of the dispute between the two
men will largely determine the course of domestic
pCiitics in the important days immediately ahead and
possibly whether Pakistan remains united or fragments
over the longer period of time.
Note: This memorandum was produced by the Office of
Current Intelligence. It was coordinated within CIA.
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National Assembly
Northwest
Punlnb Sind Baluchistan Frontier
PPP end allies 99
NAP and allies 26
olhals 19
PPP Pakistan People's Party
NAP National Awami Party
NOTE: "Azad Kashmir State,"
Is not considered a province.
AZAD
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unnnI-1 2 I Jammu
WEST/, r~ ands
+ _ FRONTI R ~'a~ Keshmlr"
? . n 2
Islamaba
N ~a
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1. The basic issue in the dispute between
President Bhutto and Wali Khan,leader of the National
Awami Party, is over which man will control Pakistan's
two least populous provinces--the Northwest Frontier
and Baluchistan. Wali opposes the President's plans
to continue martial law, because Bhutto uses martial.
law provisions to exert control over the two prov-
inces. In demanding provincial governments, Wali,
in effect, means to establish governments headed by
the National Awami Party's control in Baluchistan and
the Northwest Frontier Province.
2. In the elections of December 1970, Bhutto's
Pakistan People's Party swept the Sind and the Pun-
jab, the two most populous provinces of what was
then West Pakistan. It won about two thirds of the
seats from the West wing in the National Assembly
and control over the two provincial legislatures.
But the party did not fare well in the other two
provinces. The National Awami Party has a one-vote
majority in the Baluchistan provincial assembly, and
in the Northwest Frontier--although it holds only a
third of the seats--is the strongest single party
and controls the assembly with the help of allies.
3. The glue which holds the party together is
the demand for provincial autonomy. Wali himself
has long been identified with the separatist aspira-
tions of the Pushtu-speaking Pathans of the frontier.
His father, Khan Abdul Ghaffa.r Khan, opposed the in-
clusion of the Northwest Frontier Province in Paki-
stan in 1947 and since then has been the leader of
a movement to establish an independent Pushtunistan.
The National Awami Party, however, does not follow
Ghaffar Khan. In the Northwest Frontier Province
it is made up of a coalition of tribal leaders,
provincial autonomy advocates, Pushtun nationalists,
and pro-Soviet leftists. In Baluchistan--although
some party leaders lean fairly far to the left--the
party draws its strength from semi-feudal tribal
leaders whose main political objective is to run
their tribes without outside interference. The
party in the Sind and the Punjab is weak and ideo-
logically far to the left of the party in the fron-
tier provinces.
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4. With Bhutto's accession to power last Decem-
ber, the National Awami Party stepped up its agita-
tion for an end to martial law and for the establish-
ment of elected governments. In the frontier prov-
inces, the party tacitly threatened Bhutto with
tribal rebellion and civil disorders. In the Sind
and the Punjab, it threatened to exploit labor and
student agitation and to win over the left wing of
Bhutto's own party.
5. More in response to the tacit threats than
to any overt action by the National Awami Party,
Bhutto on 6 March agreed to a compromise political
settlement. Under the agreement, Bhutto would con-
vene the National Assembly on 14 April, replace his
personally appointed and none-too-competent governors
in the two frontier provinces with men acceptable to
the National Awami Party and its allies, and set the
definite date of 14 August for martial law to end.
The provincial assemblies would convene on 21 April.
In return, the National Awami Party, according to
Bhutto, agreed to vote with the Pakistan People's
Party in the National Assembly to extend martial lave
and to give Bhutto's government a vote of confidence.
The agreement also provided that the assembly ses-
sion would last only three days and that the agenda
of discussions would be very limited. The assembly
was to re-convene as both a constituent and legisla-
tive assembly on 14 August.
6. Neither Wali nor Bhutto lived up to the
agreement. By late March, Wali was again criticiz-
ing Bhutto, demanding that the assembly convene im-
mediately to discuss foreign affairs and announcing
that, in accordance with his interpretation of the
agreement, the National Awami Party would vote
against extending martial law. For his part, Bhutto
with Wali's approval, selected prominent members of
the National Awami Party to serve as provincial
governors in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan,
but never formally installed them. Although the
two leaders met on 8 April to try to revive the
agreement, the attempt was a failure.
7. A continuation of he dispute between
Bhutto and Wali risks a showdown that neither man
wants and that both appear to be trying to avoid.
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Wali, for example, shortly after his conference with
Bhutto on 8 April, announced that the coalition led
by his party was the de jure government of the North-
west Frontier Province. The establishment of a rival
provincial government there would almost certainly
force the President's hand, but so far Wali has done
nothing to implement his announcement
Wali later indicated he planned no action unti a er
the national assembly session.
8. Bhutto, instead of using the power of the
government to face Wali directly, is trying to under-
cut him. Bhutto has published their correspondence,
which he feels will place the blame for the dispute
squarely on Wali. He may even be considering ending
martial law, thereby depriving Wali of one of his
main issues. Bhutto also attempted to prevent Wali
from forming a coalition provincial government in
the Northwest Frontier Province by forming an alli-
ance with a faction of the moderate Muslim League,
the second strongest party in the province. Even
after the alliance was formed, neither group had a
majority in the provincial assembly, and Bhutto
hoped to win independents to his side. Wali, however,
subsequently gained the support of enough assembly-
men--inn'luding two from the Pakistan People's Party--
to give his coalition a one-vote majority.
9. Neither man wishes to push matters too far,
because--unlike East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman
and former President Yahya--neithei? feels sure of
his own strength. Yahya apparently believed that in
the face of military action, Bengali resistance would
collapse. Bhutto has no illusions that the Pathans
and Baluchis--renowned fighters--can be cowed easily.
Wali's popular support in the two frontier provinces,
however, is far weaker than was Mujib's in East Paki-
stan.
10. Neither man wants to split Pakistan. Both
believe that a further breakup would be an invitation
for foreign interference--by the Iranians in Balu-
chistan, the Afghans in the Northwest Frontier, the
Indians in the other two provinces, and the Soviets
and Chinese everywhere. Neither man wants civil dis-
order, which both are well aware can easily get out
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of hand with unpredictable consequences. A military
takeover which would end the power of both men would
be almost certain. Neither, however, has much room
for maneuver in hi.., search for a compromise. W&li,
who has ambitions of becoming a national figure, is
under pressure from his more radical followers, prob-
ably the main reason why the agreement of 6 March
broke down. Bhutto faces a number of limitations on
his ability to deal with Wali. He thinks a strong
negative vote on martial law in the National Assembly
would be seen in New Delhi as an indication of weak-
ness and would infringe on his ability to deal with
Mrs. Gandhi. He could please the Afghans by granting
maximum provincial autonomy to the Northwest Frontier
Province, but the Shah of Iran is already worried
about the effect that autonomy for Baluchistan would
have on the half million Baluchis in Iran.
11. Bhutto could please not only Wali but many
other Pakistanis by ending martial law immediately.
Bhutto, however, believes that he must have martial
law in order to push through his reforms. If he has
to rely on the assembly, he risks deepening the rifts
between the right and left wings of his party.
Bhutto must also remember that if he stumbles badly
on any issue, the army may once again consider taking
control of the country.
12. In the next few weeks, a miscalculation by
either side could lead to a confrontation. Bhutto
still appears intent on convening the national and
provincial assemblies on schedule.
13. On 11 April, Bhutto distributed a draft in-
terim constitution to leaders of all parties. Sev-
eral reacted very critically to the constitution's
provisions for provincial government because they re-
portedly would place local administration in the
hands of presidentially appointed governors instead
of chief ministers elected by the provincial assembly.
Such a provision would deny poav?r to Wali Khan.
14. The draft may, however, be merely Bhutto's
initial negotiating position in the assembly. The
following day he told reporters that in a democracy
power should lie with the chief ministers and that he
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would not tamper with provincial majorities. Never-
theless, even if Bhutto were willing to compromise
and even if the interim constitution were designed
to last only until martial law is scheduled to end
in August, the problem of relations between the pro-
vincial and central governments could become most
difficult and divisive, bringing on the confrontation
neither man wants.
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