THE SOVIET PARTY LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130045-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: April 3, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
The Soviet Party Leadership
CIA
DOCUMENT SERViCES BRANCH
FILE COPY
DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
3 April JS . 2
No . 0848/72
88
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sFC;R r7%
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Soviet Party Leadership
St,mmary
The most significant development on the Soviet
political scene during the past year and a half has
been the emergence of General Secretary Brezhne:v in
the new role of spokesman for detente abroad and
champion of consumer interests at home. In the
process he has broadened his range of policy involve-
ment a
d b
n
ecome the most authorita-
tive figure in the Soviet leadership.
He also has taken on greater polit-
ical risks than ever before.
To some extent Brezhnev simply
has taken advantage of events Et
home and reacted to developments
elsewhere. As the prevailing view
has shifted w,.thin the Soviet lead-
ership, parti:;ularly in foreign af-
fairs, Brezhnev, ,a perennial middle-
grounder, has moved with the tide.
But Brezhnev is first and foremost
a politician, and in the past year Leonid 1. Brezhnev
he has taken the lead in assuming public responsi-
bility for controversial policies. His colleagues
probably recognize that Soviet interests abroad are
best served when there is one undisputed leader able
to speak with full authority.
Note: This memorandum wa.,, prepared by the Office of
Current InteZZigence and coordinated withi:! CIA.
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Brezhnev's increased standing as a result of
political gains at the 24th party congress has
facilitated the decision-making process and enabled
the regime to move forward in several tough foreign
policy areas. Many aspects of current Soviet policy,
such as detente with West Germany, the forthcoming
talks with President Nixon, and reaction to move-
ment in Sino-US relations, are controversial in the
USSR and call for incisive leadership.
Brezhnev's assertiveness has shaken up polit-
ical relationships in the USSR, changed the rela-
tive influence of individuals, and generated polit-
ical static every step of the way. By shifting to
a more activist stance on foreign affairs and a
more consumer-oriented position at home, Brezhnev
has effectively undercut his colleagues on what
we call the moderate end of the Kremlin political
spectrum. These moderates were put in the uncom-
fortable position of seeing policies they had long
espoused finally adopted, but with the credit for
whatever gains these may bring largely taken by
the party boss.
Brezhnev was able to neutralize or divide
those who had earlier been his main critics, but
his new course has created a possibility of a
breach between Brezhnev and some supporters from
his more orthodox days. Those within Brezhnev's
immediate political entourage presumably have more
to gain by going along with Brezhnev than in op-
posing him. But there are persuasive indications
that other conservative elements have been dragging
their fees, especially Ukrainian party boss Shelest
who emerged last year as the principal spokesman
for the foot-draggers.
Shelest and those sharing his conservative
views have not prevailed in Soviet policy delib-
erations. But, in terms of power in the Kremlin,
Brezhnev's maneuvers seem to have provoked a re-
action from those of his colleagues who are con-
cerned that further gains by Brezhnev would jeop-
ardize their own positions. At the central com-
mittee plenum held last November, there were
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signs of a movement to check the growth of Brezhnev's
personal authority. While his policies were approved,
the central committee failed to accord him the high
degree of personal. acclaim that he had been receiving
in the publJ.c media in the period before the plenum.
There were no personnel shifts, despite signs that
an effort to remove Voronov--a moderate and long-
time critic of )3,"ezhnev--from the politburo had
been in the works before the plenum.
We believe that the idea of collective leader-
ship--a basic notion since Khrushchev's removal in
1964--was reaffirmed at the November plenum. The
composition of the leadership was unchanged. There
seems to have been agreement to mute criticism of
present policies. This instinct of the collective
for survival has maintained stability in the ranks
of the politburo in the post-Khrushchev years, de-
spite policy and political differences. Brezhnev
can reduce the power of his politburo opponents,
but it is difficult for him to remove them.
Although Brezhnev was under pressure to move
against Voronov, he apparently was reluctant to
do so unless he could at the same time get rid of
Shelest, a troublemaker at the other end of the
political spectrum. The politburo is so evenly
divided between moderates and conservatives that
to remove one without the other could upset the
balance that Brezhnev has long played to his ad-
vantage. Thus, when Brezhnev found that he could
not achieve both his policy aims and personal po-
litical goals, he seems to have chosen to concen-
trate, for the time being, on his policy objec-
tives.
Brezhnev's domestic and foreign policies do
not appear to be endangered by the existing oppo-
sition. Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev has been care-
ful not co accompany his policy of detente with
relaxation of internal controls, which would in-
evitably arouse real conservative ire. In fact,
as the time for President Nixon's visit approaches,
the regime has stepped up domestic vigilance as a
reminder that datente does not extend to the ide-
ological sphere.
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There are, of course, many risks ahead for
Brezhnev, External events could give him serious
problems at home. He is in an exposed position
on the issue of detente, having assumed public
respons.bility for this policy. Ratification of
the Soviet - West German treaty is of particular
importance because his entire European policy
and a good deal of personal prestige are tied up
with that agreement. If the treaty fails,. Brezh-
nev may come under fire from members of the lead-
ership who prefer that Soviet relations with the
West remain coo].. Similarly, Brezhnev must watch
his step in negotiations with the US and in shaping
policies in response to movement in US-Chinese re-
lations. These matters involve the security of
the USSR, and a major setback could cause a shakeup
of the leadership.
Brezhnev also is under the gun because of his
domestic policies. Even the weather seems to be
conspiring against him. The unusually severe
winter has done extensive damage, and prospects
for a good agricultural year are thus dim. Brezh-
nev is closely identified with current agricultural
policies, and his critics will undoubtedly attempt
to hold him responsible if the harvest turns out to
be poor.
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Soviet Leadership
Members - General Secretary
BREZHNEV- BREZHNEV
,PODGORNY -
KOSYGIN -
SUSLOV-
SUSLOV (ideology, non-ruling CPs)
KIRILENKO-
Deputy Chairmen
KIRILENKO (Brezhnev's unofficial deputy,
Party Control
plus heavy industry)
(The Chairmr_a of :he Supreme Soviet
Committee Chairman
Presidiums +f the 15 Republics)
PELSHE PELSHE
MAZUROV -
Secretary
POLYANS
MAZUROV (industry)
Members
KY
SHELEST (party boss in Ukraine)
POLYANSKY (agriculture)
BREZHNEV
VORONOV
HZLEST
All-Union
Central Council
Members (85 including
of Trade Unions
the 15 Republic Premiers)
SHELEPIN
Chairman
55 .IELEPIN
GRISHIN (party bass of Moscow) -
KUNA
(
GRISHIN
YEV
party boss of Kazakhstan)
SHCHZRBITSKY
KUNAYE:'
KULAKOV
Candidates
SOLOMEKrSEV (Premier of RSFSR)
ANDROPa V
ANDROPOV (KGB-securit
6 intelli
enc
)
USTINOV
- USTINOV (defense industry S spate)
y
g
e
VORONOV (Chairman
Peo
les
DEMICHEV
DEMICHEV (culture, intellige.-.t-sia)
,
p
Control Committee)
KATUSHEV (ruling C?a)
PRESIDIUM OF
SUPREME SOVIET
KAPITONOV (party personnel actor)
RASHIDOV (party boss of Uzbekistan)
MZMVANAOZE (party boss of Georgia)
MASHEROV
RASHIDOV
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Brez'rhnev's Response to Challengf:
1. In the early days of the collective
ership, the principal challenge to
Brezhnev came from the ambitious
Shelepin who spoke for neo-Stalin-
ism and rode the wave of reaction
against Khrushchev. Brezhnev, in
classic political style, moved
with the flow of conservatism to
limit the ground available to
Shelepin, at the same time under-
mining Shelepin's political base.
By late 1967, Brezhnev had control
over the conservative wing of the
party, and Shelepin had been reduced
to the politically powerless post of
trade unions chief.
Aleksandr N. Shelepin
2. Shelepin evidently was forced to look else-
where for new constituents, new issues, and a new im-
age. Because of expediency, or a change of heart,
he gravitated toward what we call the "moderates"--
Kosygin, Mazurov and Voronov. Although there are
many differences among these men and they never act
as a faction or bloc, they apparently do hold cer-
tain views in common--in particular, an interest in
modern methods of management and in economic effi-
ciency. They also share a deep hostility toward the
agricultural lobby represented by Polyansky. Kosygin
and Shelepin have both been identified with consumer
needs. Possibly most important, these men are "out-
siders"; they do not belong to the Ukrainian coterie
clustered around Brezhnev. Suslov, another "out-
sider," has on occasion jo,;.ned with them on certain
issues.
3. On foreign policy questions, Kosygin has
long been associated with a policy of reducing in-
ternational tensions. Suslov had provided a theo-
retical rationale or positive response to a Brandt
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move toward the East a full six months before Brandt
himself came to power. There were
hints of similar receptivity to
overtures from the West in some of
Shelepin's trade union activities.
4. In late
1969
there were
reliable reports
that
Brezhnev was
under fire from Suslov, Shelepin,
and Mazurov for lack of dynamism
and a tendency to tread water on
policy questions. His efforts to
increase the cohesion of the Com-
munist world were frustrated, and
The "Brezhnev doctrine" was useful to justify, after
the fact, ;.he invasion of Czechoslovakia, but was
hardly the basis for a Brezhnev foreign policy.
Brezhnev needed an opening for fresh initiatives,
and Brandt's election as West German chancellor pro-
vided an opening in the foreign policy field. Seizing
on it, Brezhnev used the tactic that had served him
in the past--adopting the platform of his critics
while undercutting their political posit ?ons. In
the following months, a new, activist Brezhn,:?v began
to emerge.
the stalemate with China persisted. Mikhail A. Suslov
5. Brezhnev first seemed to move to secure the
support of his conservative colleagues on the polit-
buro, most notably Polyansky and Shelest, by support-
ing a costly agricultural investment program which
they favored. Such a program was embedded in the
1971-75 economic plan in July 1970, long before work
on other sections of the plan were completed. Having
secured his right flank, Erezhnev started to change
course by espousing a policy of detente and by prom-
ises that consumer interests would be given more
attention. The twin programs of peace abroad and
butter at home were not in keeping with Brezhnev's
earlier cautious style of leadership and generally
orthodox outlook. And they exposed him to greater
political risks than before.
sr;UxE1,
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6. Immediately after the Soviet - West German
treaty was signed in the summer of 1970, Brezhnev
spoke out in favor of normalizing relations with
West Germany. At the party congress the following
spring, he put considerable stress on the theme
of European detente and peace in general, and in
a speech in Tbilisi in late May 1971 he enlarged
on -these themes.
7. But until tl..~ visit of West German Chan-
cellor Brandt to the Crimea in mid-September 1971,
Brezhnev clearly was operating as spokesman for
the collective leadership; the troika of Brezhnev,
Kosygin, and Podgorny was sharing responsibility
for the conduct of foreign policy. Brezhnev's
solo two-day meeting with Brandt marked a signif-
icant departure from this pattern. Brezhnev used
the visit to establish himself publicly as the
chief spokesman for detente policy, the one person
in the leadership responsible for its conduct. He
thus put himself in a position to reap the benefits
should it succeed.
8. As a measure of how far Brezhnev had come,
it is worth i:ecalling that at the signing of the
Soviet - West German treaty in 1970 he had insisted
on calling all of his colleagues back from vacation
to stand at his side. A year later he went it
alone. He was at great pains to stress to Brandt
that he was speaking not just as the party chief
but as the leading Soviet statesman. His perform-
ance at the meeting conveyed the message that he,
rather than Premier Kosygin or President Podgorny,
was the man in the Kremlin for President Nixon to
talk to. The Nixon visit to Moscow was announced
the following month.
9. On the domestic front, Brezhnev has for
some time championed various measures to raise
living standards, but his efforts to satisfy all
important interest groups, particularly the mil-
itary-defense complex, blurred his image. He had
made clear his commitment to greater agricultural
investment in July 1970. In February 1971, the
draft five-year plan for 1971-75 was published
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over his signature, rather than under the auspices
of the central committee, as had been customary
since Stalin's death. His identification with con-
sumer interests was underscored in the draft, which
highlights the task of raising living standards.
At the 24th party congress in March and April 1971,
Brezhnev reiterated these positions. The image has
been created even though, in real terms, the at-
tention to consumer goods appears to be in large
measure propaganda froth that will have little im-
mediate impact on the country's economy. In a
political sense Brezhnev's move is both real and
controversial. It marks a departure from the long
sacrosanct tenet of the primacy of heavy industry
over light industry and, over the long run, it could
have important economic results.
Political Impact in the Kremlin
10. Brezhnev's departures in foreign and
domestic policy once again cut ground from under
his critics and rivals. Shelep-In again found
Brezhnev crowding his political platform. Al-
though Shelepin managed to hold his position on
the politburo at the 24th party congress, he
dropped in ranking from sixth to last place.
His speeches since the congress suggest that he
sees no alternative for the moment but to go along
with Brezhnev.
11. Premier Kosygin suffered a
of status at the congress. He
dropped from second to third place,
behind President Podgorny. One of
the principal spokesmen for clos,:r
Soviet relations with the West,
Kosygin has steadily been pushed
aside as Brezhnev assurtted leader-
ship in this field. It was Kosygin,
who visited France in 1966 and
England in 1967, and who met with
President Johnson at Glassboro
later that year. But in 1971 it
was Brezhnev who traveled to France
and met with Brandt. While Kosygin
welcomed Brezhnev's support for
slight loss
,MOM
Aleksey N. Kosygin
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policies that he had long espoused, he can hardly
appreciate the accompanying loss in his own pres-
tige.
12. Not only has Brezhnev
encroached on Kosygin, but Brezh-
nev also has helped his political
ally, President Podgorny, to do
likewise. The last-minute in-
clusion of Brezhnev and Podgorny
in what were originally scheduled
as private talks between Kosygin
and Mrs. Gandhi had every appear-
ance of a deliberate elbowing in
on Kosygin. The premier has had
a special interest in relations
with India, at least since the
Tashkent Conference in 19 66 . Nikotay V. Podgorny
Brezhnev went out of his way to demonstrate his sup-
port for Podgorny by making an unusual trip to the
airport to see him off for Hanoi.
13. Kosygin's statu'; on the domestic front
also diminished. The ecc...tomi.c reform program he
sponsored in 1965 has not lived up to the high ex-
pectations with which it was launched. It was
pretty well buried at the 24th party congress.
Moderate elements who had supported the reform may
have been mollified to some extent by the increased
emphasis on consumer goods. They may doubt that
the attempt to provide these goods by the tradi-
tional system of tight centralized controls will
work, but they seem to be willing to give Brezhnev
a chance.
14. Of the politburo members who hold gener-
ally moderate views, Voronov suffered the most
grievous set-back, both at the congress and later.
Voronov has long been at odds with two of Brezhnev's
political allies, Kirilenko and Polyansky. In the
past he competed with Kirilenko for political con-
trol of party affairs in the Russian republic, more
recently, with Polyansky over agricultural policies.
Voronov has advocated administrative reform as an
alternative, or at least a corollary, to huge
SJ UKJ 1'
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capital investments in the agricultural sector.
He vigorously campaigned for the
adoption of the controversial
"link" system of organizing farm
labor, a system that, to the ideo-
logically orthodox, smacks of pri-
vate farming.
15. Officials in Polyansky's
agricultural bureaucracy clearly
opposed this system, and their hos-
Gennady I. Voronov
to use the issue politically to embarrass the agri-
cultural lobby and its spokesman, Polyansky. The
two engaged in a bitter public exchange in the
spring of 1970, and the matter was resolved in
Polyansky's favor only when Brezhnev gave his full
backing.
tility was shared by officials in
the Ukraine. Over and above his
commitment to the link system as
one answer to the ills of Soviet
agriculture, Voronov clearly tried
16. Following this defeat, Voronov's polit-
ical fortunes began to plummet. Several of his
proteges were demoted, and on his 60th birthday
he was pointedly snubbed in an official party
greeting, receiving less than the full honors due
a politburo member. Voronov went on criticizing
aspects of the agricultural support program and un-
doubtedly won Brezhnev's enmity. Although Voronov
retained his seat on the politburo at the 24th
party congress, he dropped in ranking from fifth--
the position he had held '.n 1966--to next to the
last.
Potential Conservative Backlash
17. Brezhnev was thus able to counter the
more moderate wing of the politburo, but the quick-
ening pace of detente evidently began to alarm con-
servative elements in the country. As Brezhnev
was clearly identified as the architect of this
policy, it has made him a prime potential target
for the conservatives' ire.
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18. The depth and strength of conservative
feeling in the .~'oviet Union is difficult to meas-
ure, but a series of public lectures in Leningrad
last fall provided a sample of public--and pre-
sumably party--opinion in one locale outside the
capital. The lectures u.icovered a fairly rich
vein of conservatism on foreign policy. During
the question periods, the audiences voiced con-
siderable suspicion about a wide range of current
Soviet foreign policy--from China, through Germany
to the visit of President Nixon. "It is strange
that Nixon can find a common language with China
while we cannot. Have we forgotten our Leninist
precepts?" "What compromises did we have to make
to obtain a Berlin agreement?" "Whatever happened
to the West German revanchists we used to read
about?" "Aren't we helping Nixon to get re-elected?"
Other questions showed marked hostility to Brezhnev.
There were, for example, repeated queries about why
his trip to France received more publicity than
Kosygin's or Podgorny's travels.
19. Leningrad, it should be noted, cannot be
considered typical. Brezhnev is considered to be
Ukrainian because of his long career there, and
the Ukrainian and Leningrad party organizations
have long been rivals for political influence in
Moscow. Even so, there is little question but
that the foreign policy attitudes of the Lenin-
graders are reflected at higher levels of the
party and government. Many rank-and-file party
workers see the world in simplistic black-and-
white doctrinal terms. The leadership may make
some accommodation with "class enemies" in West
Germany and the US, but this is bound to arouse
visceral uneasiness among certain party workers
at all levels. Conflicting views are inevitable,
and they invariably are a factor in Kremlin pol-
itics as leaders a:e tempted to exploit them to
furthe!: their own ambitions.
20. In the present case, we think Brezh-
nev can feel reasonably confident that his flank
is guarded against attacks from conservatives.
His record of orthodoxy and his close ties with
important elements in heavy industry and the mil-
itary reduce his vulnerability to criticism from
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the conservative wing. Furthermore, unlike Khru-
shchev, he has been careful not to combine a pol-
icy of detente with relaxation of internal con-
trols. On the contrary, the authorities have in-
tensified their pursuit of dissident elements.
21. Brezhnev can take comfort in the fact
that most of the important spokesmen for conserv-
ative causes had either been removed from office
before the detente policy got under way or were
sufficiently beholden to him politically to en-
sure their compliance. One influential foreign-
policy conservative, Leningrad party boss Tolstikov,
was maneuvered out of the country as ambassador to
Peking before the 24th party congress. His suc-
cessor appears to be somewhat more open to Brezh-
nev's blandishments, and as a "new boy" carries
considerably less weight than had Tolstikov.
Dmitri S. Polyansky Kirill T. Mazurov
22. Critics could arise from within Brezh-
nev's own political circle. Polyansky, for ex-
ample, reportedly sought in the pre-congress pe-
riod to appeal to hardliners by supporting their
pcsitions on a variety of cultural matters. He
is said to have even flirted from time to time
with the ultra-conservative neo-Stalinists. But
Polyansky is indebted to Brezhnev for support on
agricultural policy. Moreover, Polyansky's most
visible rival to succeed Kosygin when the premier
steps down is Mazurov, whose ties are with Brezh-
nev's critics. If Polyansky is ambitious, as is
likely, his ambition would seem to be best served
by loyalty to Brezhnev. The same holds true for
Kirilenko, who displayed a marked conservative
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cast during the access of orthodoxy following the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. As Brezhnev's right-
hand man, and presumably with hopes of becoming
his successor, loyalty again would seem advisable.
So, even if these "Moscow Ukrainians" are a bit
uneasy about a future of detente and butter, their
interests lie with Brezhnev and the political slip-
page of their mutual rivals.
When Ukrainians Fall Out
23. With these former spokesmen for the con-
servative cause biding their time, at least in
to promote Shelest's rivals in the Ukraine and has
tried to keep him continually off balance.
24. The breach between Brezhnev and Shelest is
rooted in Ukrainian politics, where factionalism has
been exacerbated by the presence in Moscow of many
former Ukrainian officials who continue to meddle in
Ukrainian affairs. Brezhnev, though not of Ukrainian
parents, was born and made his career in the indus-
trial area of Dnepropetrovsk in the southern Ukraine.
He headed the party organization in Dnepropetrovsk
for several years and, since attaining high posi-
tion in Moscow, has been a patron for officials
from that area. He has been particularly warm in
his support of Shcherbitsky, who was also a party
official in Dnepropetrovsk.
public, the field has been left to
Ukrainian party boss Shelest, who
has emerged as the principal cham-
pion for conservative interests and
the noisiest critic of Brezhnev's
policies, domestic and foreign.
Brezhnev, possibly because he has
in Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitsky
a protege and an attractive alter-
native to Shelest in the Ukraine,
has made little effort to accom-
modate the Ukrainian party boss.
On the contrary, Brezhnev evi-
dently sought a political break
with Shelest at the 24th congress.
Brezhnev successfully maneuvered
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25. Shelest, on the other hand, got his
start in the Kharkov party organization, long a
rival of the Dneprcpetrovsk faction. Podgorny
was once a patron of the Kharkov group which was
badly hurt in the campaign against Podgorny after
Khrushchev's ouster. It no longer has much polit-
ical clout. As a result, Shelest has had to look
elsewhere for political support. He has fixed on
the Donetsk party organization. The Donetsk is an
important coal mining area, and its party organi-
zat4.on has emerged as a new force in Ukrainian
politics. Shelest has been busily ingratiating
himself with its rank and file.
26. Shelest has sought to buttress his posi-
tion by appealing to Ukrainian nationalism, which
he contrasts with the Moscow-oriented policies of
the Dnepropetrovsk group. He has be.';n :tolerant
of Ukrainian nationalist writers and has promoted
a policy of gradual, limited, and controlled
Ukrainization of the cultural and economic life
of the republic. He evidently has tried to use
the support that this has brought him. from lower
party and government officials, particularly in
the nationality-conscious western areas, to win
a measure of independence from Moscow.
27. In keeping with this emphasis on local
interests, Shelest has consistently shown an in-
terest in administrative reforms that would bring
some devolution of authority from Moscow to the
republic level. On other subjects, Shelest is
a thorough conservative. His long association
with the defense industry has made him a spokes-
man for this special interest group and a cham-
pion of defense spending in general. He has gen-
erally taken a hard line on foreign-policy ques-
tions and is particularly insistent on maintain-
ing cohesion in Eastern Europe.
28. Rivalry between Shelest, on the one
hand, and Brezhnev and his protege, Shcherbitsky,
on the other, was more or less dormant during the
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years when Brezhnev was struggling against Shelepin.
Brezhnev may have seen a need for Shelest's support
(or neutralism) in those years, and the Ukrainian
party boss' orthodox views were generally in vogue
in Brezhnev's circle thin. The first breach be-
tween the two men came in late 1369 at a collec-
tive farmers' congress when Brezhnev reneged on
a promise to support one of Shelest's decentrali-
zation schemes. Relations were strained by the
signing of the Soviet - West German treaty in 1970
and by disagreements over the allocation of re-
sources in the new five-year plan. The drafting
of the plan was clearly not easy. It was not dis-
cussed at a party plenum before the party congress
last spring, as was customary, and it was issued
over Brezhnev's personal signature, suggesting that
controversies may have necessitated unconventional
measures to get the document out for the congress.
29. At the congress, it was almost a public
row. Shelest complained openly that funds ear-
marked in the draft plan for the Donetsk coal en-
terprises were insufficient. In part, this com-
plaint was a gesture to curry favor with the
Donetsk leadership.
30. Brezhnev seems to have taken up the na-
tionality issue to beat Shelest with. The Brezh-
nev report to the congress contained an uncharac-
teristic paean to the Great Russians, which was
picked up by some, but by no means all, subsequent
speakers. The regional party leaders who praised
the Great Russians also had publicly expressed
their support for Brezhnev, suggesting an orches-
trated drive against Shelest and other, nationalist
or independent local leaders. Brezhnev's praise
of the Great Russians also seemed designed to help
him shed his own Ukrainian image.
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31. The split between Shelest and Shcherbitsky,
the latter a proxy for lrezhnev, was much in evi-
dence at the congress. Scherbit-
sky stressed that the labor of
all the Soviet people formed the
basis of Ukrainian success, and
added that "great credit" was due
to those in Moscow who were un-
flagging in their concern for all
the republics. Shelest's speech,
in contrast, contained no word
this stance by the same republic Vladimir V.Shcherl,itsky
party bosses who before the congress had shown the
greatest reluctance to praise Brezhnev personally.
of thanks to the Great Russians.
Instead, he insisted that the
shoe was on the other foot--that
the Ukraine was responsible for
a great part of the nation's pro-
duction. Shelest was j--ined in
32. The result was one-sided. Brezhnev
emerged from the congress much strengthened; two
reliable proteges, Kunayev in Kazakhstan and
Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine, were promoted from
candidate to full membership on the politburo.
Shelest retained his ranking on the politburo, but
his position in the Ukraine was considerably weak-
ened. Officials connected with Dnepropetrovsk
were favored over Shelest associates in the elec-
tions to the new party central committee. But
the most serious blow was the elevation of Shcher-
bitsky. It is most unusual for both top posts in
a republic to be represented on the politburo,
and the promotion of Brezhnev's personal protege
removed any pretense of neutrality on his part.
Indeed, it seemed to eliminate whatever chance
there might have been of patching up his differ-
ences with Shelest. The breach, if not final, was
fully visible.
Thunder on the Right
33. Shelest did not lie low after the con-
gress. Far from it. Throughout the summer and
fall his speeches were punctuated with thinly
disguised expressions of disagreement with Brezh-
nev on an array of subjects. On economic issues,
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Shelest consistently and deliberately ignored or
distorted the 24th party congress formulations
on the tasks of the new five-year plan. As for-
mulated in the congress material and stressed by
Brezhnev, the "main task of the plan is to ensure
a considerable upsurge in the material and cul-
tural well-being of the people, on the basis of
a high rate of development of socialist produc-
tion and improvement of its effici.ancy." Shelest,
referring vaguely to a decision "to strengthen
further the economic and defense might of the
country," put consumer welfare last on his list
of priorities, or turned the congress formulation
on its head so that increased efficiency and tech-
nical innovation became the main task. In sharp
contrast to Shelest's studied downgrading of con-
sumer interests, Shcherbitsky warmly endorsed the
congress decision and in the main report at ar,
Ukrainian central committee plenum discussed
measures to increase production of consumer goods.
34. In a speech to the Ukrainian writers
union in May, Shelest continued his low-keyed
appeal to Ukrainian nationalist pride by deploring
the practice of "littering" the Ukrainian lan-
guage--an obvious reference to borrowing Russian
words. He told writers that the consolidation
of the socialist community was the most important
theme of the 24th party congress. He made no men-
tion of Brezhnev's peace program. He warned against
underestimating "ideological diversions of the
class enemies" and asked for greater political vigi-
lance and the cultivation of a "hatred for our foes."
So much for the spirit of detente.
35. The danger of ideological subversion from
the West has been a continuing theme in Shelest's
speeches. His tactics were plain. He would parry
attempts by his critics to pin on him the label,
Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist, with hints of ide-
ological laxness and political blindness in Moscow.
He has studiously refused to suggest that there
might be any problem with nationalist sentiment
in the Ukraine itself.
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36. In June Shelest again stressed the im-
portance of unity in the socialist camp and re-
ferred approvingly to the blow dealt "rightist"
elements in Czechoslovakia in 1968. He had some
jarring remarks on defense too. He dusted off
an argument of Soviet doves--that a nuclear war
would mean the destruction of civilization--but
turned it around to use it as an argument for a
still stronger defense establishment to deter
would-be aggressors. This speech came only a
few weeks after he US and the Soviets had an-
nounced plans, to negotiate a limited SALT agree-
ment. Brezhnev's later lengthy defense of the
wisdom of negotiation with the US seemed in part
intended as a riposte to Shelest and others of
his presuasion.
37. At the end of June, after Brezhnev's
statement in East Berlin that Moscow was ready
to see the Berlin negotiations succeed, Shelest
again sounded a sour note designed to revive
old fears of the Germans. In a speech at a So-
viet-Bulgarian friendship meeting, he remarked
that, although 30 years had passed, "We have no
right to forget, we must not forget the high
price paid for our victory. Twenty million lives
were sacrificed." The next day, he again warned
of the danger presented by the spread of hostile
ideology and of bourgeois views and morals.
A Busy Summer
38. Following the announcement on 15 July
that the President was going to visit Peking, the
conservatives seemed to grow stronger. On 24
July Voronov, who had tangled with Kirilenko and
Polyansky, was removed from his post as premier
of the Russian Republic and demoted to an insig-
nificant post. The shift removed any rationale
for keeping him on the politburo, and it seemed
it would be only a matter of time before he was
removed. Brezhnev interrupted his vacation in the
Crimea to attend the installation the following
week of Voronov's successor, party secretary
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Solomentsev. In his remarks at the ceremony, Brezh-
nev snubbed the outgoing Voronov and went on to
praise Solomentsev.
39. With Brezhnev at the ceremony were the
"Moscow Ukrai,lians," Podgorny, Kirilenko and
Polyansky--the last two being
prime beneficiaries of Voronov's
removal. Those leaders who would
seem to have had the most to lose
from Voronov's political demise
and who probably opposed his
ouster--Kosygin, Suslov, and
Shelepin--were absent, perhaps as
a deliberate gesture to dissociate
however, seem to be, of an incapacitating nature thus
far. Rumors of his retirement because of poor health,
which recur sporadically have not coincided with any
of the identifiable periods where the Prer,ier was ill
and seem to be less a reflection of any F,w:h intention
on Kosygin's part than a symptom of temporary politi-
cal weakness. They may have been started by others
in the leadership eager to see him go.
40. The specter of a US-Chinese rapprochement
arose at a time when the Kremlin was annoyed by
China's flirtation with Romania and Yugoslavia, and
it spurred Soviet moves to warn Eastern Europe against
using contacts with China as a pressure tactic against
the USSR. Preparations were noisily made in late
July for Warsaw Pat troop maneuvers in the Balkans.
Pressure was applied against Romania to participate,
raising memories of similar pressures against Czech-
oslovakia in 1968. In this tense atmosphere, the
party chiefs of all the East European members of
the Warsaw Pact except Romania--pointedly excluded--
were called to the Crimea for consultation with
Brezhnev and Podgorny on 2 August. The added pres-
ence of Shelest, who had played a prominent part in
the Czechoslovak crisis, lent a further ominous note
to the occasion.
themselves. Moreover, rumors be-
gan once again to circulate about
Kosygin's impending retirement,
due to "ill health." It is true
that Kosygin has health problems
of long standing. They do not,
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41. We do not know what happened, except that
a new and more hopeful mood seemed to ensue. Within
a few weeks the Soviet leadership was engaged in a
burst of diplomatic activity. There must have been
a decision not to be stampeded by the President's
visit to Peking and to attempt to stay out in front
of the Chinese. We also speculate that negotiations
between the US and the USSR for President Nixon's
visit to Moscow prompted at least some of the
change. In any event, by the end of August the
militant spirit of the Crimea meeting had all but
evaporated. The Warsaw Pact maneuvers failed to
materialize, and Brezhnev's peace offensive gained
new momentum. On 18 August the four-power draft
agreement on Berlin was signed, clearing away many
long-standing obstacles in the path of rapprochement
with West Germany. During the last two weeks in
August, the Soviet leaders arranged trips that would
soon take the three top leaders to Yugoslavia, France,
Hanoi, Canada, and Scandinavia. The groundwork was
also laid for irandt's visit to the Soviet Union
in mid-September.
Renaissance: of the Moderates
42. As movement toward detente gained momen-
tum, the influence of those who had long favored
such a policy, particularly Kosygin and Suslov, be-
gan to rise again. Although critical of Brezhnev
in the past, neither Kosygin nor Suslov is a po-
litical rival in the same sense as Shelepin or even
Shelest. Neither Kosygin nor Suslov has designs
on the top party post, and thus do not feel com-
pelled to offer alternative policies to those set
forth by the party boss. Furthermore, as Brezhnev
became identified as the spokesman for detente,
particularly after his solo meeting with Brandt
in September, he needed the support of moderates
to counter the mounting attacks of the conserva-
tives.
43. Far from making plans to retire, Kosygin
seemed to regain some of his former vigor. In ad-
dition to a long interest in the policy that was
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being pushed, he'may have had other considerations
in mind. The alacrity with which he accepted in-
vitations to visit Canada and Scandinavia, and
his preformance on these trips, suggested that he
and others'interested in preserving collective rule
were anxious to bolster his position in the lead-
ership. His initiatives in behalf of increased
US-USSR trade, particularly his role in the visit
of Secretary Stans, may have served the same pur-
pose. Indeed, Kosygin seems to have responded to
Brezhnev's encroachment on his position as Soviet
spokesman for relations with the West by himself
striking out in;:o new territory. In pursuing op-
portunities in US-Soviet trade, he is in an area
where his expertise and experience are great as-
sets.
44. Party secretary Suslov, o'tt of the public
eye in July and early August, subsequently became
considerably more active in public than has been
customary lately. In an unusual gesture of good
will toward the US, he met with Senator Scott on
20 August and was cordial and forthcoming. During
the fall, he addressed a number of ideological
conferences providing carefully reasoned theoret-
ical arguments in support of the current Soviet
line. Moreover, on at least one occasion, he
attacked "dogmatism," a familiar target before
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but rare in recent
years. This, coupled with a cautious plea for
greater creativity in theoretical work, suggests
that he may be attempting to nudge the leadership
further away from the rigid orthodoxy of the past
few years.
Run up to A Plenum
45. In mid-October, the politburo announced
approval of the draft five-year plan. The move,
which is without recent precedent, undercut the
public role of the central committee in consider-
ing and approving such plans. In the official
report on the plan, stress on raising living
standards as the main task came through with par-
ticular force.
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46. Brezhnev'o journey to France in late
October was the high point of his drive to become
the Soviet spokesman for detente. Shortly after
his return, a joint decision of the politburo,
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR
Council of Ministers was announced. It approved
his activities in France and dubbed the visit an
"act of great international importance." The
statement enhanced Brezhnev's image and, like the
politburo approval of the economic plan, narrowed
the range of permissible public dissent for crit-
ics, like Shelest, by tying them to an officially
approved line.
47. At the end of October, it was announced
that the Supreme Soviet would convene on 27 Novem-
ber to give final approval to the five-year plan.
The central committee routinely meets before ses-
sions of the Supreme Soviet, and rumors began to
circulate that there would be significant person-
nel changes marking new political gains for Brezh-
nev. The conspicuous absence of Voronov from the
6-7 November anniversary celebrations reinforced
the impression that his days on the politburo were
numbered and that his removal might open the way
for other adjustments in the leadership.
".S. Rumors also began to spread that the cen-
tral committee would approve the establishment of a
super-body that would provide biezhnev a state posi-
tion befitting his new role. The rumors could have
been floated by Brezhnev to test t.ie water, or by
his opponents in an effort to head off what they
feared was a likely development. Whatever their
source, the rumors added to the sense of expectation
concerning the central committee plenum.
49. Brezhnev's pre-plenum maneuvers seem to
have provoked a reaction from some of his colleagues.
During the period before the plenum Kosygin and Sus-
lov, the two most influential "independents" on the
politburo, were increasingly prominent. Most remark-
able, however, was the assertiveness of Shelest.
Shelest's activities suggest that he may have sensed
that he would be next on the list after Voronov.
After all, the seating of the two leading Ukrainian
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officials on the 15-man politburo was the most glar-
ing anomaly of all the personnel actions taken at
the party congress. Shelest appears to have decided
to fight for his position.
50. Shelest traveled to East Germany in early
October. Rather curiously, he went under the aus-
pices of the Supreme Soviet, rather than in his
party role, and spent considerable time with retired
party boss Walter Ulbricht. Given Shelest's fre-
quently expressed suspicions of the policy repre-
sented by the Brezhnev-Brandt meeting, the visit
was bound to raise eyebrows. Whatever may have been
said in private, Shelest's public remarks were above
reproach.
51. Back in the USSR, in two speeches immedi-
ately before the plenum, Shelest seemed to go all
out to exploit vulnerabilities in Brezhnev's posi-
tion and to make common cause with other conserva-
tives, particularly Belorussian party boss Masherov.
Shelest continued to divert attention from his own
nationalist stand in the Ukraine by hammering at
the dangers of ideological laxness---by implication,
in Moscow. And for the first time he broadened his
attack on Brezhnev. He directly attacked the atten-
tion given to consumer welfare, echoing the warning
voiced earlier by Masherov against "vulgar" attitudes
of "consumerism." The entire leadership had assumed
responsibility for the plan, but it was Brezhnev
alone who had publicly played ul) the consumer aspect
and, astonishingly for an experienced Soviet politi-
cian, failed to cover himself with a nod to the dan-
gers of "consumer attitudes." Adding insult to in-
jury, Shelest implied that Brezhnev had promised
more than he could deliver in the consumer goods pro-
gram. Masherov followed up with a second moralistic
attack on "consumer attitudes," specifically taking
issue with Brezhnev's reference to the need to
"saturate" the market with consumer goods.
52. In the past, the Ukrainian and Belorussian
party organizations were rivals, and their party
chiefs were more often than not on opposite sides of
poli^y disputes. The synchronized attacks on Brezh-
nev's consumer-goods policies on the eve of the
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plenum suggested a community of interest, at least
on some issues. Something of this sort may also
have been in Shelest's mind when he uncharacteris-
tically referred to the similarities between the
Great Russians and Ukrainians. in part, this refer-
ence may have been an attempt, like Brezhnev before
him, to shed some of his provincial image and broaden
his appeal to conservatives elsewhere, particularly
among the Great Russians. His attack on Zionism--
by no means his .1trst--would also sit well with
ultra-conservative elements among the Creat Russians.
53. At his most contentious, Shelest stated
that the draft of the five-year plan had only been
reviewed by the politburo and would be submitted for
review by the next plenum of the central. committee.
Tz- This formulation ignored the publicly announced po-
litburo approval of the plan and left the implica-
tion that was still room for revisions by the
central committee. Once again, he misrepresented
the "main task" of the plan. He seemed, in fact,
perilously close to appealing to the central commit-
tee over the heads of his politburo colleagues for
a change in economic priorities. If he actually be-
lieved there was any chance at this late date of
forcing some adjustments in the plan, he was to be
disappointed, but his trouble-making did create a
diversion.
Collective Reins
54. The general secretary dominated the pro-
ceedings of the two-day plenum at the end of Novem-
ber, as he had at previous plenums. Brezhnev gave
a major--as yet unpublished--report on foreign pol-
icy. He summed up the debate on the report, as well
as the debate on the plan and budget report, the only
other main item on the agenda. Nevertheless, there
seemed to be a sort of a stop-Brezhnev movement.
Although his policies were endorsed, the central com-
mittee failed to accord Brezhnev the high degree of
personal acclaim that he had been receiving from the
media in connection with his excursions in foreign
policy. Furthermore, Kosygin held the spotlight at
the Supreme Soviet session that followed, presenting
the main report on the five-year plan and the 1971
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plan and budget. Brezhnev, contrary to his usual
practice, did not attend the Supreme Soviet session
after opening day.
55. The party plenum failed to remove Voronov
from the politburo, despite all the signs and rumors.
Only minimal changes were made--the removal of
Solomentsev from the party secretariat and his elec-
tion as a candidate member of the politburo. No one
was named to fill Solomentsev's post on the secre-
tariat. The plenum, like the 1971 party congress,
left an impression of loose ends.
56. Voronov probably owed his reprieve ir. part
to the reluctance of 'jome of his colleagues, despite
policy and political differences, to vote against
him. Some of them probably reasoned that his ouster
would make it that much easier for one of them to
be removed later. The instinct for survival has ap-
parently been responsible for the stability in the
ranks of the politburo over the years. It has been
easier for Brezhnev to reduce the power of his polit-
buro opponents than to remove them.
57. Brezhnev, although under pressure from
Polyansky and Kirilenko to move against Voronov, may
have been reluctant to do so unless he could at the
same time get rid of Shelest, the main trouble-maker
at the other end of the political spectrum. The
politburo seems to be so evenly divided between what
we label as moderates and conservatives that to re-
move one without the other might tend to upset the
balance that Brezhnev has long played to his advan-
tage. The noisy performance of Shelest during the
period before the plenum suggests that he may have
been aware of this linkage.
58. But there were other reasons why Brezhnev
may have found it no longer politically expedient
to move against Voronov. Brezhnev badly needed the
support of the moderates as his detente policy moved
into the uncertain triangular relations among Commu-
nist China, the US, and the Soviet Union. Suslov, on
whom Brezhnev relies heavily, had acted as a protec-
tor of Voronov in the past. Thus, for a variety of
reasons, Brezhnev was apparently not able to achieve
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both his policy and his political goals. For the
time being he has apparently decided to concentrate
on his policy objectives.
Winter in the Country
59. In mid-December, following the central
committee plenum, membe.:s of the leadership fanned
out across the countryside to address regional party
meetings on the decisions of the plenum. Although
party leaders touched upon a range of subjects in
their talks, including economic questions and spe-
cific local problems, the main purpose of the meet-
ings apparently was tc explain the current line on
foreign policy as outlined in Brezhnev's report.
60. The leadership has resorted to this sort
of whistle-stop tour on a number of occasions in
the past in an effort to ensure that sensitive and
complex policy issues were understood and to sound
out grass-roots sentiment. Given the controversial
nature of the detente policy, the Moscow leaders
may have felt particularly obligated to carry the
word to the local level.
61. All members of the politburo and secretar-
iat participated in the ca.ipaign, with one notable
exception, Ukrainian party boss Shelest. Ordinarily
he would have been expected to report to Ukrainian
party workers on the plenum decisions. But in an
unprecedented move, President Podgorny was sent from
Moscow to do the honors in the Ukraine. His col-
leagues in Moscow may have assured that Podgorny,
because of his Ukrainian heritage and his past as-
sociation with Shelest, would be the most acceptable
emissary, but reports in the Ukrainian newspaper
suggest that he met with a distinctly cool reception.
62. Since then, Shelest's published speeches
have stayed away from foreign policy questions and
other controversial issues. He appears to have been
muzzled, at least in public and for the time being.
Curiously enough, Belorussian party boss Masherov
has continued his attacks on Brezhnev's policies in
language stronger than before. In a speech at an
ideological conference in Minsk in early February,
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Masherov combined his earlier complaint against
"consumerism" with a harsh attack on the West and
the ideological threat--just as Shelest had in No-
vember.
63. Masherov differed with Shelest on one im-
portant issue, the nationality question. This sets
limits on their cooperation. Consistent with his
ideologically militant set of mind, Masherov sharply
attacked the "poison weed" of nationalism and urged
that greater strides be made toward the goal of
drawing all the peoples of the Soviet Union together.
In this he appeared to be responding to the note
sounded by party theoretician Suslov, who stressed
the same points in a report in December. Suslov's
treatment of the nationality question and dogmatism
had apparently been aimed at Shelest and his allies.
64. There is other evidence to suggest that
Brezhnev and his supporters are trying to silence
Shelest, or at least to turn his harpings against
him. First, the central press in early December
charged that Lvov officials were lax in their reac-
tion to nationalist manifestations in their baili-
wick. These accusations were followed by the sud-
den arrest of more than 20 Ukrainian intellectuals
on charges of nationalist activities. The arrests
were part of a nation-wide roundup of dissidents
that appears to have been carried out on the orders
of the KGB in Moscow.
65. Shelest has consistently sought to play
down the problem of nationalist sentiment in the
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could been embarrassing to Shelest. He
had just presented the Order of Lenin to Lvov, ac-
companying it with words of unstinting praise for
all aspects of work in the city.
66. During the winter there was evidence that
Brezhnev was also trying to counter Shelest's appeal
to other conservatives. In the briefing campaign
after the November plenum, Brezhnev spoke not only
The Charges against the Lvov officials
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in Moscow but in Leningrad. During his four-day
visit to Leningrad, Brezhnev was intent on overcom-
ing the ingrained hostility of local officials to
him personally and on gaining their support for his
policies. Brezhnev praised the Leningraders' ini-
tiative in setting up production associations and
in drawing up a comprehensive economic and social
plan for the city. He apparently promised to sup-
port the extension of this concept of integrated
planning to other cities. His remarks reportedly
were appreciated by the local officials, and his
standing in the city may have risen.
67. Brezhnev is not prepared to compromise
policies of detente or his commitment to consumer
interest at home, but his actions in Leningrad pro-
vide an example of the kind of concessions he can
make and is apparently willing to make to conserva-
tive elements in order to win them over. His ges-
tures to the Leningraders should hold some appeal
for the Belorussians. Like the Leninqraders, the
Belorussians combine an interest in progressive
innovations such as complex planning with an ultra-
conservative stand on foreign policy questions and
ideological matters.
The Road Ahead
68. There are, of course, many pitfalls ahead
for Brezhnev. In the first place, he seems to be
presiding over a divided politburo. He has not
altered its composition enough to ameliorate this
problem, and he may find it increasingly difficult
to keep its factions at least partially content.
Suslov and some other moderates appear to be pushing
for further adjustments in party dogr.ta to meet new
requirements in a changing world, bt.t this pressure
only increases the alarm of conservatives.
69. Furthermore, Brezhnev's failure to move
against Voronov in November may have disappointed
Kirilenko and Polyansky, in particular, and points
up the limits to Brezhnev's ability to come up with
political concessions for his allies in return for
their support of his policies. Although Polyansky
still seems to be beholden to Brezhnev and there is
no evidence that he has bolted the party boss, on
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one occasion he apparently went out of his way to
associate himself with Shelest. Polyansky was the
only politburo member on hand to see the Ukrainian
party boss off to East Berlin in early October and
greet him on his return, a reminder that the two
have political ties and that Polyansky's support for
Brezhnev is not unconditional.
70. The weather appears to be against Brezhnev.
The extent of the damage done to crops by the unusu-
ally severe winter is still being assessed, but it
may be extensive and will require much resowing at
great cost and effort. The prospects for a good
harvest are thus dim. Brezhnev's critics will un-
doubtedly attempt to hold him responsible if there
is a major setback. Brezhnev's close identification
with agricultural policy and his insistence on tak-
ing the credit when things were going well make him
especially vulnerable. Certainly the fortunes of
the principal critic of his agruculture policies,
Voronov, should brighten if the year brings a disap-
pointing harvest. In fact, a sudden renewal of at-
tention in the press to his pet "link" scheme last
month suggests that he may already be benefiting.
71. External events could compound Brezhnev's
problems at home. He is in an exposed position on
the issue of detente, and he will need tangible suc-
cesses. The ratification of the West German - USSR
pact by the Bundestag is of particular importance
because Brezhne.r's European policy and a good deal
of personal prestige are linked to that treaty.
Moreover, Shelest's ability to hold out against
Brezhnev suggests that other important members of
the leadership are skeptical of Moscow's present
course and, perhaps, are standing by if it should
fail.
SECRET
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