INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: March 28, 1972
• Content Type: IM

 A o f 1 I .f Nn _ ^ 0 L 1 1, 111
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Mernorandum
Insurgency in Thailand
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COPY
DO NAT DESTROY
Secret 7 3
28 March 1972
No. 0846/72
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 March 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Insurgency in Thailand
A General Overview
It is almost 20 years since the Thai Communist
Party, over the objections of some of its leaders,
chose a policy of revolutionary warfare as a means
of gaining power in Thailand. Over seven years have
passed since motley bands of ins'?rgents in the north-
east fired the first shots of what some called the
struggle for the next domino in Southeast ?,sia. The
Thai insurgency is no longer in its infancy; it has
grown, it has a measure of momentum, and, more im-
portant, it now ha; a history from which a few ten-
tative observations and judgments can be drawn.
The growth of the insurgency over the past few
years indicates that it is no longer credible to
dismiss out of hand the possibility that over time
it could threaten the viability of the Thai Govern-
ment. Thailand's nationalism, its Buddhism, its
fundamental economic well-being, and the relative
homogeneity of its people, are strong and may be
ultimately the decisive factors in the struggle
against the Communists. But these traits will not
immunize the Thais from the dislocations and diffi-
culties of coping with a rural revolutionary move-
ment. On the other hand, a hard-headed look at the
insurgency indicates that the almost magical powers
that are sometimes attributed to "wars of national
liberation" have been greatly exaggerated in this
case. The Communists are making gains, but they
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the
Office of National Estimates.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
Khon
Kann
THAILAND
I
Nakhon
Ratehaafma
1. r.
1J 1 / '
Communist, insurgehtr
against Malaysia
NORTH
"VIETNAM
hon?
Mm
Ubon
Ratehath
Phnom Penh.:.(
s%r4Area of inaurgrnt activity;
_ loo
Mllf. a' .
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
SECRET
suffer from serious weaknesses. It is still far
from certain, for example, that the insurgency can
reverse the trend of the past few years toward
greater reliance on tribal people in remote areas
of the north. Until the Communists make more sig-
nificant inroads among the ethnic Thai--who are
the great majority of Thailand's people--it is
still possible that the insurgency will evolve
into something approximating the situation in
Burma, where the government has struggled inde-
cisively for twenty-five years against border dis-
sidents and insurgents.
But the insurgents do have important assets
in the contest. For one thing, there has been no
sign of any fundamental reduction in China's sup-
port for the Thai Communist movement. There is
also no evidence that North Vietnamese or Pathet
Lao assistance to Thai Communist units in Laos
has been affected by Hanoi's political problem
with Peking. The Chinese have turned aside con-
ciliatory overtures from the government in Bangkok
and have given no sigr that they intend to curtail
support for the Thai insurgency in order to pave
the way for a political accommodation with Thai-
land. They are proceeding apace with a road-
building effort in Laos. One purpose of this
effort is clearly to give them the option of in-
creasing their capability to support a Thai in-
surgency (or at least to convince Bangkok that
that is their intention) and thus make Bangkok
more amenable.
At this juncture the capabilities of the
government and of the insurgents are growing,
but the latter still appear to be making the
relative gains. As imprecise and as unsophis-
ticated as they are, all the statistical indi-
cators in Thailand point to higher levels of
Communist-initiated attacks, ambushes, assassina-
tions, and propaganda meetings than two years
ago. There are now estimated to be between
4,400 and 5,050 full-time armed Thai Communists
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
SECRET
throughout the country, about 1,500 more than in
1969. In addition, the insurgents' military capa-
bilities have grown as a consequence of better
training, more experience, and, most important,
the acquisition of ')otter weapons.
Most of the insurgerts' comparative gains
have come in north Thailand, the most sorely beset
of the three rec?ions in which the Communists are
active. Of the 1,500 guerrillas who have been
added to the total in the past two years, 1,000
are in the north. In addition, almost all of the
insurgents' new weaponry has gone to their forces
in the north. The 2,300-2,700 armed insurgents
operating there have almost completed a switch-
over to Communist-manufactured small arms, mostly
AK 47s and SKS submachine guns. The insurgents
in the north have also, for the first time in tI?,^
insurgency, used mortars and grenade launchers.
They have received large numbers of non-metallic
anti-personnel mines. The mines, which are of
Soviet design, have been particularly effective
in helping defend the insurgent bases against gov-
ernment operations.
Recent Growth in Thai Armed Insurgent Strength
North
1,300-1,600 1,900
2,300-2,680
Northeast
1,200.1,500 1,400-1,600
1,525-1,776
West Central
Mid-South
75 125
300-400 300-400
125
460-470
Totals
2,875-3,575 3,725-4,025
4,410-5,050
Far South (Communist
1,200-1,400 1,400-1,600
1,800-1,900
Terrorist Organization,
targeted against Malaysia)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
SECRET
The north, for a number of reasons, will. prob-
ably continue to be the most difficult area for the
government. First, the rugged mountainous terrain
is ideal for guerrilla warfare and not at all suited
to a Thai Army that has been trained to conduct con-
ventional warfare in open country. Second, the Com-
munist bases there are contiguous to a porous and
insecure Laotian border, reached by lines of com-
munication from China and North Vietnam. Third,
the Communists have managed to co-opt belligerent
tribal people (many of whom are distantly related
to the Meo fighting for Vang Pao in Laos) who know
the terrain and harbor long-standing grudges against
the Thai Government.
In these circumstances, .t is not surprising
that the northern insurgents have been able to
establish control over the series of mountain
ridges along the Lao-Thai border. Over the pail
year or so, the northern insurgents have been at-
tempting to politicize and organize the tribal
villages in the mountains, while attempting to
initiate contacts among the ethnic Thai villagers
who live in the nearby valleys. The limited in-
roads they have made among the Thai villages ap-
pear thus far to be based more on the natural
accommodation villagers make to a military force
than on any real conversion. T though the in-
surgents have been more actively
engaged against gov~~rnment secu- Countrywide
Insurgency Incidents
1965
45
1966
585
1967
921
1968
1,034
1969
1,981
1x70
2,556
,1
19'
3,500 (est.)
appear to have had only modest success. It seems
likely that more significant expr nsion efforts will.
be made in the coming months.
SECRET
rity forces, some of this activ-
has been essentially defen-
ity
sive in nature. For example, in
some areas of Nan Province, at-
tacks have been aimed against
government efforts to build roads
into insurgent-controlled areas.
The insurgents have also at-
tempted to expand westward out of
the border area, but so far they
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
SECRET
While thAi Communists were making military gains
in the north, they continued to emphasize political
action in the northeast, the main area of the in-
surgency until 1967. At that time the attempt of
the northeast insurgents at mass expansion collapsed
in the face of the government's counter-action.
Thereafter they began slowly and painstakingly to
build a village-based organization that could, in
classical fashion, support a jungle guerrilla force.
By all accounts, the insurgents have had consider-
able success spreading their influence and estab-
lishing a political organization in the villages
in and near the Phu Phan hills. At the same time
they have thwarted the half-hearted government
effort to establish a village defense system in
the threatened areas. The Communists appear to be
doing a much better lob than the did in the period
before 1967. their jungle
troops--whose numbere are still not much greater
than they were in 1967--are receiving replacements
for their locally acquired weapons. But it seems
unlikely that the Communists have yet developed a
secure supply corridor that would permit them to
rely entirely on outside supplies.
Although the Communists have turned in an im-
pressive performance pulling themselves together in
the northeast since 1967 and have made significant
new inroads, the government has not yet renewed its
counterinsurgency effort there. There may be par-
allels between the present situation in the north-
east and the 1964-66 period, when the absence of
government military operations permitted Communist
rains that proved to be ephemeral once the govern-
ment reacted. For example, last September, the
government sent a small reconnaissance patrol into
one of the Communists' areas of influence; after
two insurgents ourrenderei to the patrol, almost
600 "vi.llage supporters" left the area and rallied
to the government. The incident may be only an
isolated case, but it does raise questions about
the Communists' new and revived village apparatus
in the northeast. It may be more impressive on
paper than in reality.
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
SECRET
If it is true that the Communists continue to
gain strength in Thailand, then it must follow that
the government has not met the ultimate test of con-
taining, if not eradicating, the insurgency. It is
clear that despite the lip-service paid to the canons
of counterinsurgency, the endless bureaucratic re-
organizations, and the modest but loudly trumpteci
increases in security expenditures, the Thai Gov-
ernment's security effort is failing. Still, for
all of their deficiencies, the Thai are better or-
ganized and prepared both materially and psychologi-
cally to fight an insurgency than they were ten or
even five years ago.
It is, however, sowetimes difficult to determine
exactly how Bangkok's increased capability has been
translated into more effective action in the field.
The performance of the Thai Army in the tri-border
area of Phitsanulok, Phetchabun, and Loei provinces
this year and in Operation Phalad in Chiang Rai last
year, was a far from impressive example of how a
large, conventional force fixes and inflicts injury
on small guerrilla bands, even when the insurgents
chose, as they did in the tri-province area, to
stand their ground and fight. The Thai Army is not
getting as much out of big-unit "sweeps" against
guerrillas in mountainous terra.i:n as it might. The
army's planning is still poor, tactical intelligence
is either inadequate or badly used, tactics are
frequently deficient and, most important of all,
leadership is neither aggressive nor imaginative.
And yet, when these operations are compared with
those undertaken by the army and police in the
1967-1970 period in the north, a discernible pat-
tern of improvement emerges. The Thai Army is
slowly coming to the realization that the tribal
guerrillas cannot be scared off with air strikes
and noisy artillery barrages and that troops from
the Thai plains are at a distinct disadvantage
operating in the m:,untains. Three years ago, the
insurgents turned back a government effort to re-
establish its presence in the Hin Long Kla area.
But in the past two weeks, the army has retaken Hin
Long Kla and forced the insurgents to abandon at
least temporarily the base for sanctuary in Laos
or farther north along the border.
-6-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130043-5
 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130043-5
SECRET
It is highly unlikely that this operation will
result in a decisive improvement of the security
situation in the tri-province area. For one thing,
it remains to be seen whether the army will attempt
to keep a residual force in the area after the pres-
ent operation terminates. But it is a mistake to
evaluate Thai operations solely on the basis of
their decisiveness or even whether they accomplish
as much .-s they might. It is important to recognize
that for all of their defi