PRESIDENT THIEU BUILDS A NEW PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130036-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: February 22, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
lresident 7hieu Builds a New Party
Secret
87
22 February 1972
Nc. 0837/72
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S , ,RE T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
President Thieu Builds.a New Party
Introduction
Although the Communists have been unable to
defeat South Vietnam militarily, some observers
believe that the Saigon government would come off
second best in a political confrontation with the
Communists. President Thieu, aware that political
weakness could be his Achilles' heel, is making a
major effort to build a strong national party to
support the government--and himself. On several
occasions in the past Thieu has sought to mobilize
greater political support, but he seldom followed
through. Since his re-election last fall, Thieu
probably thinks he is in a position to move more
effectively. In that election the President suc-
cessfully faced down all non-Communist opposition
and clearly demonstrated, if not an impressive popu-
lar mandate, at least a significant capacity to out-
maneuver his challengers.
The peace offers by President Nixon and Presi-
dent Thieu last month have reinforced speculation
in Saigon that Thieu's new party is designed to meet
political competition from the Communists after the
war. A strong government party would be a key ele-
ment in such a situation, and Thieu undcubtedly took
the possibility of a peace settlement into account
when deciding to set up his party. Thus far there
has been little sense of urgency in efforts to or-
ganize the party, and it is doubtful that the party
would be much real help in meeting a political.chal-
lenge from the Communists in the near future.
Note: This memorandum was prepafd by the Office of
Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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Thieu had the party in mind well before the
peace initiative, however, and his main concern
appears to be his own long-range future. During his
early years in office, Thieu's main sources of sup-
port were the South Vietnamese Army and the US.
The US troop withdrawal and the continuing Commu-
nist threat may have forced Thieu to see the need
for broader political support. There are some in-
dications that the President may already be think-
ing of a bid for a third term in 1975 and that the
new party is intended to serve this ambition. Al-
though Thieu has publicly denied any third-term am-
bitions, in private he has admitted that he plans
to remain a political force as head of the party
even after he leaves office. His aides are already
preparing to run candidates of the new party in the
next national elections--the Senate contests slated
for mid-1973.
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1. As Thieu proceeds with his latest party-
building effort, he doubtless will try to avoid
mistakes made during earlier efforts to broaden his
political base. Throughout 1968 and 1969 Thieu at-
tempted to work with the leaders of conservative
parties which usually supported the government,
trying to institutionalize his ties with them and
bring them more firmly into the government camp.
As a military man, however, the President had lit-
tle experience and less appetite for dealing with
politicians. He realized that most of the coun-
try's political parties were omall urban-based fac-
tions with little mass support, and he left the im-
pression that he was seeking their backing' mainly
at the urging of the US. Moreover, Thieu avoided
a full commitment to these efforts and refused to
give the politicians an important voice in his gov-
ernment, preferring to rely on bureaucrats and old
military colleagues.
2. The most ambitious effort to ally the pol-
iticians with the government, the National Social
Democratic Front, was formed in the spring of 1969.
It developed into a loose coalition of six small
political parities but showed signs of real life
only on the infrequent occasions when Thieu took
a direct interest. Within a few months, Thieu tired
of the constant bickering among the politicians ana
their bids for greater power and influence in the
government. For their part, the politicians were
reluctant to give up any of their independence and
merge into a single party, particularly when Thieu
refused to give them any cabinet positions. The
front was allowed to die quietly sometime in 1970,
although it was never formally dissolved.
3. Thieu had alternative plans for strength-
ening his political position, and he successfully
developed and effectively used these in his recent-
re-election campaign. The President concentrated
on broadening his support in the countryside through
closer ties with the bureaucracy, local elected of-
ficials, and the army. He encouraged the develop-
ment of elected councils at village, hamlet, and
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provincial levels . He worked har.l to ensure the
loyalty of appointed officials and army officers.
4. Thieu also has benefited from improved
economic conditions and better security in rural
areas, particularly in the southern part of the
country where the, governr,:ent's land reform program
has given many peasants a greater stake in the
system. During his re-election campaign last
year,Thieu made frequent trips to the provinces
to build i;p his image in the rural areas. He re-
lied heavily on local officials and used his in-
fluence with members of the provincial councils to
prevent Vice President Ky from gaining the necessary
support to qualify as a presidential candidate. As
a result, Thieu has become the best-known South Viet-
namese leader sinc?~ the late President Diem, and,
although not highly popular, he seems to be well
regarded among rural residents in many areas.
The New "Democracy Party"
5. Thieu is now in the process of institution-
alizing the assets that served him so well in the
election. At least as early as last spring Thieua
and his aides were formulating plans for a govern-
ment party as a major project for the President's
second term. Originally, Thieu returned to the
notion of bringing existing parties and politicians
together, apparently hoping to base his new organi-
zation on a merger of the two most effective and
best organized parties. Once again, however, move-
ment in this direction was hampered by mutual mis-
trust bet.aen Thieu and the politicians; each waited
for the other to make the first move. The President
soon abandoned the idea to concentrate instead on de-
veloping his support in rural areas through local of-
ficials and the army. Under the new plan, he and his
aides began to envision the Thieu party as a kind of
khaki-cadre organization.
6. Recruiting efforts for the party--tenta-
tively called the Democracy Party--began in earnest
right after Thieu's re-election last October. Al-
though the President appears fully committed to the
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project, he has left organizational activities to
his aides. This spadework is still in its early
stages and is proceeding slowly. The party prob-
ably will not be launched in public for many months,
perhaps just in time to begin preparations for the
Senate election campaign next year.
7. Organizers of the Democracy Party have
concentrated largely on Saigon and on the northern.
provinces thus far. In the capital some staunchly
pro-government legislators and other prominent po-
litical figures have been recruited. At the same
time, Thien has begun to make a series of changes
among his province chiefs, reportedly in part to
put able men of unquestioned loyalty in charge of
the provincial party-building efforts. In the
north, bureaucrats from the provincial level down
to the village have been signed up. Many army of-
ficers stationed in the area also have been approached.
8. It is not entirely clear why Thieu's aides
have concentrated on the northern provinces. They
may be using the area as a testing ground before
setting up the party on a nationwide basis. Since
it is the main center of strength for the opposition
An Quang Buddhists and a weak area for tle govern-
rent, it is here that 1-he party presumably can do
Thieu's cause the most good. It is here that the
party will ineet its sternest test. 11.e north also
is the area of greatest political activity outside
of Saigon, and the existing parties generally are
better organized and more numerous than elsewhere.
Many local officials, who are being sought for the
President's party, are members of these parties.
9. Some aspects -if the Democracy Party are
reminiscent of the Can Lao Party under Diem. The
controversial Can Lao consisted of a nationwide net-
work of cadre, most of whom were officials iii key
positions. It conducted its business in secret.
Its chief job was to provide the Diem regime with
information on opponents. The Can Lao was neld to-
gether by fear and greed rather than common ideology,
and many members gained substantial economic benefits
from their positions.
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10. Like the Can Lao, all of the Democracy
Party's activities thus far have been behind the
scenes. Some new members have been sworn in with
secret ceremonies complete with oaths of loyalty to
Thieu. The President's aides have admitted that
setting up a secret apparatus throughout the country
to exercise tight control over the new organization
will take priority over forming overt party machin-
ery. On occasion, Thieu has privately expressed
admiration for former Can Lao leaders and their
methods. Some of these leaders are still active
in politics today, but there is no indication that
they will play an important role in the Democracy
Party. Thieu and his aides have indicated that
unlike the Can Lao, they plan eventually to create
a broad-based mass party. In addition to the secret
apparatus there are to be overt sections represent-
ing youth, peasants, and labor, as well as a legis-
lative section? There is also to be a separate
element for the army.
Mixed Reaction
11. Recruiters for the Dcmocrar:y :['arty have met
with a varied reception in the northern provinces.
Many local officials and army officers have joined,
because they believe that party membership might
advance their careers. Others have shown a reluc-
tance-to cut their ties with.their parties to join
one that still is an unknown quantity. Despite Thieu's
show of strength at the polls last year, some poten-
tial members are uncertain about his tenure in office
and fear that if he should be replaced reprisals
could follow against members of a party closely
identified with him. These fears probably were re-
inforced by Thieu's offer to resign as part of a.
peace settlenenc with the Communists.
12. Most established political parties probably
will act cautiously, waiting to get a better idea of
what shape the Democracy Party will take before de-
termining their responses. Leaders of some parties
which have cooperated with the government in the past
are apprehensive about the future of their own groups.
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Thieu's aides, in their recruiting, are insisting
that new members renounce all other party affilia-
tions. A few prospective recruits have complained
bitterly in private that the President's lieutenants
are using extreme pressure--a practice that could
lead to more hostile reactions in the future.
13. Most politically aware Vietnamese acknowl-
edge the need for greater unity among non-Communist
groups and admit that the government is the only
organization capable of forging such cooperation.
Even many politicians whose parties are endangered
by the Democracy Party probably would be receptive
to an. overture to join, particularly if the new
party appeared to be doing well, Many of these
polit'.cians have little in common with anti-govern-
ment :?,rces, and they might feel they had nowhere
else to go. Most of all, they are aware, of the
financial rewards reaped by members of the Can Lao,
and many would want to get in on the spoils if the
new party seemed to offer similar benefits.
14. The opposition has shown little concern
over the new party as yet. If it does develop along
lines similar to the Can Lao, however, anti-govern-
ment elements probably will become alarned. Reli-
gious. feeling ran high under the Diem regime and
the largely Catholic Can Lao was anathema to the
Buddhists. If the Democracy Party shows signs of
reviving Can Lao methods, the Buddhists might aban-
don their current moderate opposition policy in
favor of greater militancy. On the other hand,
the development of the Democracy Party could have
a beneficial effect on the opposition. The govern-
ment ostensibly has been promoting greater politi-
cal unity among the country's many diverse factions
for some tix , and ideally the new party could in-
duce diverse opposition groups to unite, hopefully
creating a sort of loyal opposition.
An Uncertain Future
15. The structure and working methods of opera-
tion of the Democracy Party are still being worked
out. The performance of the Thieu government in the
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months to come probably will have the greatest bear-
ing on the party's prospects. As long as the Presi-
dent appears to be firmly in control, his party is
likely to prosper. On the other hand, any substan-
tial military setbacks or serious economic or politi-
cal problems could endanger the party. Similarly,
any movement toward an early peace settlement prob-
ably would increase uncertainty about the govern-
ment's tenure and would hamper party recruiting ef-
forts.
16. The party's prospects will also be affect,.~d
by the way Thieu proceeds.' If the party comes across
as an elitist authoritarian organization designed to
solidify his personal control., Thieu could provoke
a strong reaction. Although the President privately
has indicated his intention to open up the party to
mass support in the future, his past performance
casts doubt on how far he will go in this direction.
On several occasions Thieu has talked of broadening
his government, bringing in new support, and conciliat-
ing the opposition. In practice, he has consistently
moved to improve the efficiency of his administra-
tion and ensure loyalty among his ministers and
advisers. The President has so far been able to
justify this on. the grounds that tight discipline
is necessary to the war effort, Thieu's controver-
sial election strategy last year demonstrated more
than ever his overriding concern for assuring his
own power position even at the risk of disregarding
the trappings of democracy.
17. Despite Thieu's apparent. preference for
a, strong, tightly controlled party, he must be aware
of the pitfalls encountered by the Can Lao, The
divisiveness it created was one of the factors that
contributed to the downfall of the Diem regime. In
moving to strengthen his position in the past, Thieu
has demonstrated a knack for knowing how far he
could go. He has become a more effective politician
in his four years in office, His programs for the
rural areas and frequent visits to the countryside
have gained him considerable credit and respect.
These assets should stand him in good stead by help-
ing crea'-e the type of climate he needs to develop
his party.
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18. Although some supporters of the government
may hope that the Democracy Party can eventually be-
come as well disciplined as the Communist Party,
there are not likely to be many similarities between
the two. The new party's members will have opposi-
tion to the communists in common, but Thieu's party
will lack the strong ideological base of the Commu-
nists. Instead it will be largely his personal
creation, and it probably would not long survive if
he were to leave the political scene.
19. Given enough time and a continuation of
the political stability that has prevailed since the
presidential election, the party appears to stand a
good chance of becoming an effective political force
in its own right, in part by cutting into established
alliances. The most recent election campaign showed
Thieu's potential for lining up support among lo-
cal officials nationwide. If Thieu can institution-
alize and make more effective this support, which
basically is already loyal to him, he will have
created the first strictly non-Communist political
organization since the Can Lao to have real strength
throughout the country. Moreover, if this effort
goes well in the rural areas, fence-sitters includ-
ing some of the urban-based political factions might
get on the bandwagon. Thr.s Thieu's position would
be strengthened appreciably cvcr the long run, both
in terms of future elections under the present con-
stitutional system or in the event of political
competition with the Communists.
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