ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130028-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 7, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Elections in El Salvador
Secret
77
7 February 1972
No. 0829/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 February 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Elections in El Salvador
Introduction
While instability and political violence still
plague many of the larger, more developed republics
of Latin America, El Salvador is taking healthy
strides toward democratization of its political insti-
tutions and more equal distribution of its meager
wealth. Extremes of riches for a few and poverty
for the majority still exist, but the smallest,
most densely populated nation on the hemisphere's
mainland has achieved a considerable degree of
economic and social development under a decade of
relatively progressive military rule. As in much
of Latin America, political democracy exists at the
sufferance of the military. Nevertheless, the two
administrations since the 1961 coup not only have
energetically pursued a program of reform, but also
have gained a degree of cooperation from the oli-
garchy, whose political power the military pre-
empted.
Salvadorans will decide on 20 February who
will be their president for the next five years, and
on 12 March they will elect a new congress and new
municipal councils for two-year terms. The elec-
tions are expected to follow the pattern of relative
order and honesty that has been established in the
past ten years. The strongest presidential contender
is Colonel Arturo Armando Molina, who like his pred-
ecessor, is a moderate reformist. His party, the
Note. This memorandum was produced by the Office
of Current Intelligence, and was coordinated within
CIA .
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governing National Conciliation Party (PCN), is expected
to retain i-L!, majority in the National Assembly.
The second strongest group is the National Opposi-
tion Union (UNO), a leftist coalition of Christian
Demo crtits and two mini-parties, one of which is
Conununi`t-infiltrated. Of particular concern to
the government is the rightist opposition, which, al-
though small, could siphon off some of the govern-
inent's past conservative support.
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Importance of the 1972 Elections
1. The past decade has seen a gradual strength-
ening of tht~ country's commitment to political, de-
mccracy plus considerable social and economic prog-
ress. The ideal of responsible elected government,
however, is still so young that significant disorders
or repression during the coming campaign could nullify
these accomplishments. Furthermore, the commitment
to popularly elected government has not yet been
tested by an opposition victory, and it is unlikely
that the military--the country's most powerful
political force--is ready to accept such a turn of
events.
2. A trend toward social and political reform
under the auspices of the military began in 1948
when a group of progressive young officers ousted
the reigning military dictator. One of these officers,
Major Oscar Osorio, was elected president in 1950.
He accomplished few of his reform objectives, how-
ever, because of opposition from the wealthy class
which had governed--directly or through the military--
during most of the country's history. Osorio's
successor, a weak and vacillating man was overthrown
in October 1960. The junta that followed was soon
influenced by Communist elements and was overthrown
by another group of young officers three months later.
This group was led by Col. Julio Rivera, who was
elected President in 1962 using the newly created
PCN, the present governing party, as his electoral
vehicle.
3. The two PCN administrations--Rivera. (1962-67)
and Gen. Fidel Sanchez (1967-72)--have instituted
the political reforms that gave opposition parties a
chance to participate in government, thus increasing
their confidence in the electoral process and en-
couraging political stability. The most important
development is the fairness with which elections
have been conducted. Despite occasional charges of
coercion, some of them undoubtedly true, most ob-
servers--"in cl uding OAS teams and many opposition
politicians--agree that El Salvador has taken a giant
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step toward modernizing its political process. In
preparation for the approaching election, voters
have been re-registered, using a computer to cross-
check for potential multiple voters--a prevalent type
of fraud in Latin America. Another important in-
novation was the introduction before the 1964 elec-
tion of proportional representation for legislative
deputies. As a result, since then opposition parties
have held a substantial minority in congress, and
Former 1'resident
Julio Adelberto Rivera
participation in the legislative process has given
mostpartie G a constructive attitude toward the gov-
ernment.
4. Presidential elections are held every five
years. If no candidate receives a majority of the
popular vote, congress chooses between the two front
runners. Legislative deputies (elected by proportional
representation) and municipal officials (elected
by a plurality) are chosen every two years. This
year all offices are to be filled.
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The Government's Campaign
5. Mclina, the presidential candidate of the
governing party, was private secretary to President
Sanchez and therefore intimately involved with the
policies of the outgoing administration. Molina hit
the campaign trail. well before his three opponents.
He and his running mate, Col. Enrique Mayorga Rivas,
had visited more than two thirds of the 261 munic-
ipalities by helicopter before the end of December.
During these visits he talked extensively with local
leaders and spoke at many well-attended public ral-
lies. Molina pledged to continue programs already
under way, with special attention to public health,
housing, and agricultural
problems. Housing needs
are particularly great,
and agriculture--the main-
stay of the economy--is a,
concern because El Salva--
dor's coffee production
exceeds its export quota.
Molina has promised to
help coffee growers with
their problems but recom-
mends increased production
of crops other than coffee.
He has also come out in
favor of redistribution
of underused land (but
within the legal framework
of respect for private prop-
erty) and has suggested that
some agricultural cooperatives Colonel Arturo Armando Molisna
might be established. He
has stressed administrative reform, ai.location of
public funds to encourage labor-intensive industries,
and restrictions on the political role of the uni-
versity. His party hds accused its rightist opponents
of stubbornly resisting change of any kind and has
criticized the left for associating wi`h Communists
and attempting to discredit the military.
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 LEGISLATIVE & MUNICIPAL
1964
Votes % Legis.
Seats
National Conciliation Party (PCN)
172.058
Christian Democratic Party WIC)
75.585
Renovating Action Party (PAR)
44.202
Salvadoran Popular Party (PPSt
Republican Party of National
Evolution (PREN)
National Rcvolutionarv Move-
ment (MNR)
Nariuo tl Democratic Union
Party (PUDN)
REGISTERED VOTERS
PARTICIPATING
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1 1966
Municipal Votes 7r Legis. Municipal
Councils I Seats Councils
205.267
120.719
'6.i28
9,182
PRESIDENTIAL
1967
Votes %
267,447
106358
70,978
47,111
LEGISLATIVE & MUNICIPAL
1968 1970
Votes % Legis. Municipal) Votes % L,egis. Municipal
Seats Councils
2212.661 47.0 27 169 315560 (.0_0
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6. Since its formation, the governing party
has polled a clear majority of votes in every
election except 1968 (see tabulation). Its sup-
port has come mainly from the farms and the mili-
tary, with some votes from the urban middle class
and the oligarchy. It has an effective party struc-
ture throughout the country, and its extensive
publicity campaign indicates no lack of funds.
The Threat from the Right
7. The newest party in the political equation
is the Independent United Democratic Front, which
was created by the ultra-conservative Salaverria
family of Ahuachapan, El Salvador's westernmost
department. The party has a weak organizational
base and almost no support outside its home depart-
ment. Its presidentia) candidate, General Jose
Alberto Medrano, may nevertheless have some personal
following among the military, especially the National
Guard--of which he is a former director--and in
rural areas. His rural sup-
port comes from both land-
owners and campesinos, the
latter through association
with an anti-Communist group
he founded. Medrano is also
trading on his reputation as
a hero of the conflict with
Honduras in 1969.
8. In his campaign
debut on television in De-
cember, Medrano was impres-
sive and assured. He calmly
outlined a conservative plat-
form of maximum personal lib-
erty and economic growth through
private enterprise. Although
he is a rabid anti-Communist,,
his remarks on this topic were
restrained.
General Jose Alberto Medrano
FUDI Candidate
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9. Few people are neutral to Medrano; he
is either idolized or deeply feared. Among
his enemies are many who remember the erratic
behavior
which caused President Sanchez to dismiss
him as head of the National Guard, of a national
campesino organization and of the country's na-
tional intelligence agency, posts which he held
simultaneously. Already signs of friction have
appeared in his relations with his running-mate,
party president Raul Salaverria. Party prop-
aganda has been scarce since the pre-Christmas
kick-off, probably indicating that efforts and
campaign funds are being saved for the final
weeks before the election.
10. The other conservative party, the Salva-
doran Popular Party, draws most of its support from
well-to-do i ric?ustrialists, businessmen, and land-
owners. Since it was formed in 1966, it has been
the spokesman for conservative interests; few will
be deceived by its new slogan, "the party of the
working man." It appears to have substantial fi-
nancial backing and has been flooding the media,
particularly radio, with
fairly sophisticated prop-
aganda. Its presidential
candidate is a well-known
attorney, Antonio Rodriguez
Porth; in the second spot
is Ernesto Guillermo Palomo,
a psychiatrist. Both men
are effective speakers.
11. The party has no
illusions about its chances
in the presidential race.
Several businessmen in its
camp say they will support
Molina for the presidency,
but will vote for the Pop-
ular Party in the legislative
election, where its main
efforts are being directed.
Antonio Rodriguez Porth
PPS Candidate
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Unity (?) on the Left:
12. For the first time in at least a decade,
the parties on the left have managed to put together
an electoral coalition. The alliance, called the
National Opposition Union, is dominated by the
Christian Democrats. Internal friction was evident
from the beginning. By including the Communist-
infiltrated National Democratic Union Party, the
union has probably lost as many votes from mod-
erates as it has gained from leftists. The mi-
nuscule National Revolutionary Movement adds little
to the coalition's strength.
13. Heading up the coalition's list is the
former three-term mayor of San Salvador, Jose
Napoleon Duarte, by far the best television speaker
among the presidential candidates. His vice-presi-
dential partner is Guillermo Manuel Ungo of the
National Revolutionary Move-
ment. In some of his polit-
ical appearances, Duarte has
fiercely attacked the govern-
ment for imposing an official
candidate, for repression,
and for "pie-in-the-sky"
solutions to the country's
problems. In his TV speeches,
however, he has presented a
well-reasoned critique of
government programs, often
using official reports as
sources.
14. Although the Chris-
tian Democratic Party is the
country's second largest,
having consistently polled be-
tween 21 percent and 43 per-
cent of the votes since 1964,
Duarte's chances of winning
the presidency are slim. The
more immediate and realistic
Jose Napoleon Duarte
Candidate of the UNO
Leftist Coalition
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goal of the coalition is to increase left-of-
center strength in the legislature, thus gaining
more bargaining power in the next administration.
Conclusion:
15. The most likely outcome is a Molina
victory, whether by majority vote or in a con-
gressional runoff. Molina's election would mean
little change in the policies of the past two
governments. Some feel that he might be more
progressive and reformist than his predecessors,
but that major innovations would run into re-
sistance from the military and the rich.
16. The line-up in congress, a relatively
strong and vocal institution by Central American
standards, could affect Molina's progress in
reforms. His party is not likely to elect the
two-thirds majority necessary to give its leg-'
islative program clear sailing. In fact, President
Sanchez estimates it may lose four or five of its
present 34 seats in the 52-seat legislature.
17. As important as the results is the manner
in which the campaign and elections are conducted.
Some of the opposition attacks on the government--
including allegations that it accepted US support
for its campaign--have triggered sharp reactions,
and the campaign could become more bitter in the
remaining weeks. There is no indication, however,
that President Sanchez will resort to coercion and
electoral fraud, although he recognizes that vic-
tory will not come as easily as in past elections.
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