EL SALVADOR SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 25, 1972
• Content Type: IM

 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130008-4
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SECRET
No. 0777/72
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 March 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
1. A revolt against the Sanchez government, in
progress since 0200 this morning, is being led by Colo-
nel Benjamin Mejia and apparently includes many younger
army officers. The national guard and the air force
so far remain loyal to the government, but have been
given an ultimatum to surrender.
studied in the Canal Zone and in the US and has been
described as friendly toward the US.
3. Mejia claims to be in control and to have
taken President Sanchez prisoner. Sporadic fighting
continues in the capital, and air force planes loyal
to Sanchez have bombed army installations in the city.
Other members of the Sanchez government have taken
refuge in the air force headquarters. A spokesman
for Mejia announced on the radio that the new junta.
will dismiss the legislature and supreme court and "`
that the new government will respect its international
commitments and "maintain good relations with El Sal-
vador's traditional friends."
4. The revolt is an outgrowth of the unrest
and discontent that followed the elections cn 20 Feb-
ruary (presidential) and 12 March (legislative')'.
Some military officers were unhappy with the choice
of Colonel Molina as the presidential candidate for
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Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130008-4
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SECRET
the governing' party and disappointed that the party,
which has had military backing, was so poorly pre-
pared for elections that it had to resort to consid-
erable ballot juggling to defeat the leftist coali-
tion. If the coup is successful, the junta may
schedule new elections to recover public confidence
and salvage the country's reputation for electoral
honesty.
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130008-4