NORTH VIETNAM HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1972
• Content Type: CH

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Secret
7jr
North Vietnam
Handbook
Secret
N2 69
No. 0609
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INTRODUCTION
Page
I. GEOGRAPHY
Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 1
Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. .i
Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 1
Topography . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
.
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 3
Hurnan resources . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 3
Strategic area . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 4
Growth rates and trends . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 1
Income distribution . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 1
Sectors of the economy . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 2
Transportation and telecommunications
. . . . . . . . . .
. 3
Government economic policy and financial system . . . . . .
. 6
Foreign trade . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. G
balance of payments . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 7
Foreign aid . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 7
Historical summary . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 1
Structure and functioning of the governmental system . . . .
. 2
Political dynamics . . . . . .
. 5
Security system-police. security
Defense organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Economic support and military budget . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
VIII. US INTERESTS
MAP
North Vietnam
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The Democratic F(epuL,lic of Vietnam was created in 1946 by the
leadership of the Communist Lao Dong (Workers) Party, but did not achieve
widespread diplomatic recognition until the signing of the Geneva Accords in
1954. The Comrnuriists' drive to Unite Vietnam tinder their control has
survived more than 25 years of guerrilla and conventional warfare against the
French, the South Vietnamese, and the United States, There is little evidence
that the human and the economic losses suffered by North Vietnam have
shaken the confidence of the party's leaders, who believe that unremitting
military and terrorist pressures, Lombined with political Subversion, will
eventually bring them to their goal. Even during the transitional period
following the death of Ho Chi Minh in September 1969, unity was main-
tained and the populace has been successfully kept in line with the regime's
war policies.
The stamina displayed by the North Vietnamese people is based in part
on an ancient sense of ethnic identity, which has survived the intense
dynastic quarrels that have marked the country's history. The almost con-
tinuous warfare since the end of World War I I has fostered a siege mentality,
and early domination by China and recent colonial control by France have
resulted in an atmosphere of xenophobia. Most of the 20 million inhabitants
are ethnic Vietnamese who work on collective farms, cultivating rice in the
densely populated Red River Delta and coastal areas. Only 10 to 15% of the
population are not ethnic Vietnamese. They consist almost entirely of
relatively primitive arid traditionally hostile tribes in the mountainous in.
terior areas, where they scratch a meager living from poor soil. Only about
10% of the total labor force are industrial wage earners.
The effective control system of the leadership is based on the Lao Dong
Party organization with its membership of more than one million and on a
highly centralized government structure. Internal security is maintained by
an elaborate police and security service, backed up by the military forces.
The North Vietnamese Army as a whole has proved to be the most
effective ground force indigenous to Southeast Asia, particularly for guerrilla
and small unit warfare. Its tactics have profited from the combat experience
gained in its nine-year war against the French, as well as from the current
conflict in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In 1970, increased military
mobilization and the addition of Cambodia to the army's area of combat
operations was accompanied by a drive to improve regional and militia
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troop`;, the forces that serve as it holm0 guard. 1 he country still semis capable
of fulfilling its c:fornestic labor requirements, although at some cost to the
civilian economy, of maintaining a credible combat presence in South
Vietrwrn, and of C,01-ltinuing combat activity in Cambodia and Laos.
North Vietnarrl's unique place within th, Communist world derives
partly from its military ability to continue the war in South Vietnam despite
the heavy US commitment and partly from its leaders' skill in exploiting the
competition between Moscow and Peking to obtain si able military and
econorllic assistance from both. The country has some economic resources of
its own, such as valuable deposits of coal, iron and other minerals, hydro-
electric power, and some of the trained manpower required to support a
limited degree of indclstrlalvation.
A period of intense planning for economic and industrial development
under the First Five Year Plan (1961-65) was brought to an end by the first
US bombing campaign from 1965 to 1968. The continuing disruptions of
the war allowed only a slow rate of reconstruction after the bombing halt,
but by 1970 the ,conorny had recovered to about 95% of the prebombing
level. That growth has been set back by the severe floods of 1971 and the
resumption of US bombing in early 1972. Import requirements for food as
well as for industrial goods are high. The population is held to an austere
level of living as top priority is given to the war in the South.
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Although the government continues to pay lip service to the longer
term, standard socialist goals of developing heavy industry, further collec-
tivizing agriculture, and generally building a more orthodox Marxist state, it
appears that real pursuit of these objectives will continue to be put off
because they are so costly and because they could prove a distraction to the
population and weaken the regime's ability to press the war in the South.
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1. GEOGRAPHY
North Vietnam is in the northeastern part of the Indochina Peninsula,
bordering the Gulf of Tonkin. Contiguous to China on the north and Laos
on the west, at approximately 17 degrees N. it is separated from South
Vietnam by a Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone. Hanoi, the capital,
is within about 600 nautical miles of Saigon, Bangkok, Rangoon, and Hong
Kong, and 1,000 nautical miles of Shanghai, Taipei, Manila and Calcutta.
Area
North Vietnam narrows from a maximum width of about 375 miles
through the Red River Delta area in the north to about 30 miles down
through the coastal panhandle in the South, and has a maximum north-south
extent of abou : 150 miles. The total area is approximately 61,300 square
miles, or about thu size of the state of Washington.
Distinct wet and dry periods are the major features of North Vietnam's
monsoon climate. There are two monsoonal periods, which differ mainly by
the direction of the wind; the northeast rnDnsoon lasts from mid-October to
mid-March and the southwest monsoon from mid-May to mid-September.
Annual rainfall varies from as little as 25 inches in the mountains to as much
as 125 inches in the low coastal areas, with the great9st amounts falli?,a
during the southwest monsoon. From late December through April the
coastal lowlands and adjacent mountain slopes are affected by a low cloud
cover accompanied by fog and drizzle. Daily temperatures in the lowland
areas vary between minimums in the mid-60s (F) and maximums in the high
80s. In the highlands temperatures are 10 to 20 degrees cooler. Relative
humidity is high throughout the year over most of the country. An average
of three tropical cyclones, one of which may reach typhoon intensity, affect
the country during the period from June through October and may cause
widespread destruction, particularly in the coastal lowlands where flooding
may be ex tensive.
Topography
Most of North Vietnam is mountainous or hilly. The mountains are
highest and most rugged in the north and northwest, where the highest point
North Vietnam
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in North Vietnam, 10,312 feet, is located. Uplands are more broken and
hilly in the northeastern and western areas adjacent to the plains, Roads are
few and settlements are small and far apart. In the northeast there are large
karst areas with irregular basins, pinnacles, and steep-sided hills. The plains
area consists of the delta of the Red River, covering slightly less than 6,000
square miles and generally below 45 feet elevation, and the coastal plains,
which extend northeast and south from the delta, generally less than 30 feet
elevation with scattered sand dunes and isolated hillocks about 350 feet
high.
Most of the mountains and hills are covered by dense forests, but
cultivated clearings and large patches of grassland break the continuity. Most
of the streams and rivers flow swiftly through deeply cut V-shaped valleys in
relatively straight courses. Small streams may dry up during the dry season
and larger streams are reduced to trickles. A few roads, railroads and trails
extend through the main valleys and connect major villages and towns, while
travel elsewhere is confined to footpaths and trails.
The lowlands area is densely populated :,nd almost entirely covered by
rice fields. There are many large perennial streams that interconnect with a
vast network of irrigation canals and drainage ditches running through miry
fields. Nearly all of the numerous but poor roads are confined to embank-
ments built up from 3 to 15 feet above the surrounding land and are
interrupted by many ferry crossings, and low-capacity bridges and fords,
which may be made unusable during the high-water season. Off-road trans-
port is further hindered by the flooding of rice fields much of the year.
Conventional military operations would be very difficult in almost all
areas of the country. In the highlands, off-road dispersal and cross-country
vehicular movement would be greatly restricted or precluded by steep slopes
and dense forests. On the pla.ns and other lowland areas, dispersal and
vehicular movement would be feasible only during the dry season when rice
fields are not flooded. During the wet season all movement in the lowlands
would be confined to the main roads, some of which are impassable in places
after heavy ra;^s. Some coastal areas are suited for amphibious operations,
but exit from the beaches is dependent on difficult movement over dunes
and through rice paddies. During the Indochina War (1946-54) there was
more success with small-unit operations than with large-scale operations.
Small groups can maneuver across country slowly but without major dif-
ficulty, and supplies could be air-dropped at suitable selected sites.
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Natural resources
North Vietnam has large reserves of coal, more than 95% of which is
anthracite, and a substantial but undeveloped poential for hydroelectric
power. There are no known resources of crude oil or natural gas, although
exploration with Soviet and Romanian assistance has been under way for
several years. In addition to coal, North Vietnam has a great variety of
mineral resources including substantial deposits of iron ore, phosphate rock,
clay, and limestone. There are also smaller deposits of chromite, tin, zinc,
and tungsten. Reserves of manganese, bauxite, graphite, antimony, mercury,
gold, silver, talc, mica, and asbestos have been reported, but few of these
resources have been exploited. The only minerm!s mined in appreciable
quantities are iron ore, apatite and phosphorite for fertilizer production, and
limestone and clay for cement production.
Forests cover about one half the total land area, but pocr forestry
practices have badly depleted natural forest resources, especially the valuable
hardwoods logged for timber.
Human resources
The estimated population of North Vietnam as of July 1971 was 20.5
million persons. This estimate is based on a projected annual rate of increase
of about 2% applied to the 15.9 million persons registered in a national
census in 1960, although actual rates of growth since 1965 have been
affected by high death rates because of the war.
Over-all population density is abcut 335 persons per square mile, the
highest in Southeast Asia except for Singapore. The heaviest concentration
of population is in the Red River Delta, one of the most densely populated
regions of the world with an estimated average population density of some
1,500 persons per square mile. The narrow coastal strip extending from this
area south to the border of South Vietnam is also densely settled, while the
remainder of the country is sparsely populated. Hanoi and Haiphong are the
only traditional urban centers of any consequence and no more than a dozen
other cities have significant me[ropolitan populations. Most North Viet-
namese are farmers living in small village enclaves. The Communist govern-
ment began in 1954 to institute economic development policies designed to
increase the urban population and industrial work force, but since the
inauguration in 1965 of the US program of bombing significant North
Vietnamese military targets, the regime has implemented programs to dis-
perse the population into rural areas as a civil defense measure, leaving only
essential combat and production personnel in the cities.
North Vietnam
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The population of North Vietnam is about 85 to 90% ethnic Viet-
namese. The other 10 to 15% comprises ethnic minorities who traditionally
live apart from their Vietnamese neighbors in the seclusion of less populated
northwestern areas of the country, maintaining a tribal isolation that pre-
serves their cultural homogeneity.
A large proportion of the population (41% in 1960) is under 15 years
of age. The proportion of women in the adult population was estimated at
59% in 1970; a result of manpower losses during the guerrilla war against the
French (1946-54), the predominance of men among the refugees who moved
south in 1954, and the loss of over 600,000 men in the war with South
Vietnam.
Strat':gic area
The Hanoi-Haiphong strategic area, situated in the delta of the Red
River, is one of the most densely populated areas of Southeast Asia and the
heartland of North Vietnam's government, commerce, industry, and trans-
portation. Much of the population evacuated from the urban areas during
1965-68 has not returned to the cities since the bombing halt in 1968, and
many former urban dwellers still remain in the rural areas adjacent to the
major cities. The strategic area is heavily fortified and contains primary air
defense commands, as well as five airfields, two of which are jet fighter
bases.
Hanoi, the capital and largest city in the country, has an estimated
population of about 500,000. It is also the hub of the transportation and
telecommunications networks and an important commercial center. Most
nationally significant military installations are located in or around the city,
including the headquarters for the armed forces. The largest concentration of
industries in North Vietnam is in Hanoi and its immediate environs; however,
a number of light industries were moved to rural areas during 1965-68 and
have not been reactivated. Haiphong, the second largest city, has an esti-
mated population of about 200,000. It is the main port of the country and
its primary logistics center. The port, which handles about 80% of the
nation's foreign trade a; ~d tl- a bulk of military and petroleum imports, is
being expanded. Industrially, the city ranks second to Hanoi, but it is the
site of a significant cement plant, which is a key industry for the rehabilita-
tion of urban installations and the reconstruction of the transportation
network. The Hanoi-Haiphong strategic area is served by rail, road, and
inland waterways and forms the hub for the country's transportation system.
North Vietnam I - 4 Aug 72
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Together, the cities provide a concentration of commercial and storage
facilities for receipt and transshipment of goods and supplies throughout
North Vietnam, The strategic area contains a combined storage capacity of
about 360,000 barrels of refined petroleum products that are stored in three
bulk storage facilities and in many smaller facilities that are dispersed
ti irough ou t the area.
North Vietnam
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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Growth rates and trends
North Vietnam is predominantly an agricultufi'aI country with the
nucleus of a rnoderr% industrial sector and a sllbStantlal smT all-SCale industrial
base The small size and underdeveloped nature of the economy are indi-
cate( by the gross national product (GNP), which in 1970 was about the
equivalent of US$1.4 billion, or less than US$100 per capita,
As a result of US bombing, industrial growth began to slow down in
1965, to decline somewhat in 1966, and then to drop sharply in 1961 when
air strikes were heaviest against the modern industrial sector. The value of
industrial output in 1967 is estimated to have dropped to two thirds of the
1965 level. Damage to agriculture, commerce, and light industries was
minimal because of the simplicity and geographical dispersion of these
activities. Nevertheless, the war contributed to a decline in agricultural
output, mainly from the military manpower drain. Economic recovery after
the bombing halt in 1968 was slow because of the priority allocation of
resources to the war effort and a shortage of manpower. By 1970 the
economy had recovered to about 95% of the 1965 level, and the government
began a new program designed to rehabilitate the economy and promote
agricultural production. Floods in the late summer of 1971 dealt a serious
setback to the economy, especially in agriculture, v;'ilere production fell to
about 20% below the 1970 level. The reconstruction program was impressive
as most of the bomb-damaged industry was restored, boosting production
nearly up to the pre-bombing level.
Prior to the resumption of large-scale bombing of North Vietnam in
early 1972, increased industrial production and growing export volumes
pointed toward over-all industrial development, while agriculture continued
to suffer from lingering effects of the floods. Information on the effects of
the bombing on North Vietnam's economy will probably not be available for
some time.
Income distribution
1
The standard of living in North Vietnam is probably among the lowest
in Asia. For several years the regime has given first priority to the demands
of the war in South Vietnam and second priority to economic development,
with improved living standards for the populace running a poor third. The
North Vietnam
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great hulk of the population, working of socialized agricultural production
coopurative.;, receives a subsistence level income in kind-food produced by
the family, homemade clothing, and housing constructed by the families
from locally available materials. Sparse data on monetary income Indicate
that urban workers receive various state allowances to supplement their IOW
wages. r he rationing system, initiated in 19511, has continued to iillocate
grain and root crop;; to adults on the basis of the strenuousness of labor and
to children according to age. Imports had enabled North Vietnam to Main-
tain the grain ration at the same level since 1965, but in 1971 the ration for
state employees was reduced by about 7%. Because of the war's continuing
demands, rationing is also in effect on many consumer goods, including
clothing, textiles, and tobacco.
Sectors of the economy
Agriculture accounts for about one half of national income among the
material production sectors, employs about 70% of the non-military labor
force of 9.9 million people, and uses about 14% of the total land area. A
program of gradual agricultural socialization was begun in 1954, and by
1970 about 95% of the peasant population had been formed into 22,300
agricultural production cooperatives that farmed 75% of the cultivated land.
In spite of the commitment to socialized agriculture, the regime permits
about 5% of the cooperative land to be used as private plots on which the
peasants grow food crops and raise livestock to supplement income earned
on the cooperative. The plots provide about 40% of the peasants' income
and supply about 90% of the country's hogs and most of the leafy vege-
tables. Farming is Ial-?cr Intensive on a small cultivated area, with little
machinery, chemical fertilizers or insecticides.
The production of food for domestic consumption dominates North
Vietnamese agriculture. Rice, the staple in the diet, is planted on about 70%
of the total harvested area, and 40% of the rice land yields two crops per
year. Subsidiary food crops, including corn, potatoes, and manioc, are grown
primarily during the dry season in areas where a single rice crop is harvested,
arid also in the highlands near the Red River and along the coast. Other
foods such as taro, beans, peanuts, soybeans, and vegetables are also grown.
North Vietnam produces a large variety of industrial crops including sugar
cane, oilseeds, cotton, jute, tobacco, tea, and coffee. While some industrial
crops are produced in sufficient quantities to be exported, food production
has not been enough to meet domestic consumption needs and large grain
imports have been required. The disastrous floods of 1971 destroyed an
estimated 35 to 45% of the autumn rice crop, and total food crop produc-
tion fell tc a record low of about three million metric tons, or about 20%
below the 1970 level.
North Vietnam 11-2 Aug 72
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Industry cornprises about lb ) of the national income fr'inl the I~ruduc-
li(ln sectors. Of the total prodnict from industry, the modern ector contrib.
utes ahout two fifths, the industrial sector is divided into two rnajclr
groupings: "central industry," which roughly coincic'us with the large,
rnudl;rn bronchus of Industry that are managed by the state, and "local
industry," which generally includes small factories and the handicraft enter-
prises that function under decentralized local nlanagenu!nt but with assist-
mice allcl direction from state planners. I'll(! activities of local industry slay
at times ellconlpass production operations normally found in the central
Sector such as Will nlllllluj, textile manufactures, electric power plants, or
boat building, the final categorization resting mainly on the scale of opera-
tions. Handicraft workshops form an important part of local industry,
typically producing textile products, metal products, or light consumer
goods. The state owns essentially all rnarlufacturiny plants. A majority of
handicraft workshops are formed into state-owned cooperatives.
The labor fora, in industry numherou nearly one million people in
1970, the majority of which were employed in local industry and handi-
crafts. Shortage of skilled labor, always a problem, has been accentuated in
recent years because of the manpower demands of the war. The major
industries include food processing and textiles, including leather arid clothing
manufacturing. Production of machinery, transportation equipment, arid
military hardware is small relative to North Vietnam's requirements, with the
bulk of these products being imp9rted from other Communist countries. The
chemical industry, fuel exploitation and processing and electrical power
industry, built and developed with foreign assistance, also produce small
amounts that are augmented by imports.
Since 1960 the value of industrial production has fluctuated because of
North Vietnam's involvement in the war. According to official data, the
gross value of industrial production increased about 70% from 1 ')GO to 1964.
In 1965 the estimated increase was i or 2%, and by 1;;d7 output is estimated
to have fallen to 65% of the 1965 level, reflecting the impact of bombing on
the centrally controlled sectors of industry. Extensive reconstruction of the
economy following the 1968 bombing halt allowed the total industrial
output in 1970 to reach 85 to 90?, of the 1965 level. In 1971, industrial
growth was claimed to oe 14%, rep(esenting fulfillment of the 1971 portion
of the current three-year state plan. Rencwed bombing in 1072 has already
had a major effect on industrial production.
Transportation and telecommunications
The transportation facilities of North Vietnam have been integrated
into a multimode transportation system incorporating both land and water
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cunununication. Land and water transport porforinance are about evenly
divided. All facilities are government-owned and are operated by the various
departments of the Ministry of Con1r11UniCatiO11_ and Transportation. Thu
systems extend front Hanoi to all major' populatic.lrl and economic areas,
The railroads are the primary long-distanc land carrier of passengers
and freight, both domestically and in ternatio,lally, Thos system, totaling
about 602 usable route miles, consists of about 25 miles of standard-gauge,
438 miles of Meter gauge, and 139 miles of dual standard and meter gauge
lines. All are single track and none is electrified. Principal commodities
normally moved include military sopplies, construction materials coal,
agricultural products, and lumber. In 1966 the railroads carried about 3.6
million short tons of freight, about 16% of the total freight moved.
Much of the rail network is in the coastal plains and the Red River
Delta, linking the major industrial, mining, and agricultural areas with Hanoi
and the port of Haiphong. Two international connections are made with the
railroads of China, one of these via the northeast line through Lao Cai. The
line south from Hanoi to Vinh is the restored part of the former connection
with South Vietnam and has been of great importance in the support of
military operations in the South.
Highways, although a very 'Inlportant means of transportation, serve
mainly as short-haul feeders to the railroads and are used in conjunction with
rail and water transport in support of the North Vietnamese war effort. They
also provide access to agricultural and industrial areas and serve remote
regions that lack other means of transportation. The highway network
consists of about 8,400 miles of motorable roads, plus about 2,100 miles of
seasonally motorable roads. About 800 to 900 miles of roads have
bituminous-treated surfaces and the remaining motorable roads have
crushed-stone, gravel, or earth surfaces. The basic pattern of the highway
system centers on the major cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, from which
routes extend radially to the hinterland. There are also highway connections
with China and Laos, and an unused link with South Vietnam.
Inland waterways and coastal shipping account for about half of the
country's total transport capability, and inland waterways carry more cargo
than any other mode. The waterway network, totaling 4,200 miles, is heavily
trafficked by barges, junks, and sampans; craft with drafts to six feet can
navigate perennially about 1,800 miles of the inland routes. Most waterways
are concentrated in the lowlands area and include the Red River and Song
Thai Binh networks and the interconnecting Song Luoc and Song Duong
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nets, During the high water season, craft drawing seven feet can travel more
than 300 miles up the Red River from the sea. Craft operating on inland
routes are estimated to total about 33,000 units, 80% of which are primitive
junk and sampan varieties. The coastal fleet has been augmented arid
modernized, and the estimated total of 105 craft i,; capable of carrying
18,625 tons. Periodic dredging is necessary to maintain adequate waterway
depths in the heavily silted lowland deltas.
The ports of Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai are the only ports
having alongside accommodations for ocean-going ships. Haiphong handles
over 95% of all maritime imports and most of the export,, for coal. The
importance of Haiphong to the economy arid the military effort is evident in
the fact that the port receives about 90% of the country's total imports,
which in 1970 amounted to over 2,232,000 metric tons. Cam Pha and Hon
Gai, the other major ports, funcCon primarily for the export of coal from
nearby mines. The North Vietnamese merchant marine consists of six dry
cargo ships and five tankers totaling 16,523 gross register tons. Augmenting
the merchant fleet are more than 200 river and coastal cargo ships arid
tankers. Foreign flag ships carry virtually all of North Vietnam's sea-borne
foreign trade.
All of North Vietnam's scheduled air transport services have been
suspended, and all transport aircraft are believed to be in use for military
purposes. The only regularly scheduled international commercial services are
semi-weekly flights by the Civil Aviation Administration of Ching, operating
between Hanoi and Nan-ning, and weekly flights by Aeroflot linking Mo.,cow
and Hanoi, via Tashkent, Karachi, Calcutta, and Vientiane.
The telecommunications system has been repaired and expanded since
the bombing halt in 1968, but it is still not capable of meeting current
requirements. This system operates chiefly for defense and civil administra-
tive needs and is composed basically of a carrier-equipped open wire net-
work, supplemented by high frequency radiocommunication facilities and a
few newly installed radio relay links. Domestic radiobroadcast and wire
broadcast facilities have been expanded to cover most areas. The interna-
tional broadcast service has growr. to be a major propaganda medium.
Special purpose communication systems are also operated by railroad,
aeronautical, maritime, and meteorological agencies and, most importantly,
by the Lao Dong Party. The military also operates a comprehensive wire and
radio communication network. A telephone and telegraph landline network
radiates from Hanoi to all provincial capitals and other major towns. The
total number of telephones is estimated at 15,000 or more, virtually all of
which are designated for official use.
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Government economic policy and financial system
All economic policies in North Vietnam are formulated by the leader-
ship of the Lao Dong Party and are translated into specific programs of
action through the national economic plan. The Council of Ministers is
responsible for formulating national economic policy. The State Planning
Cornrnission, under the Council of Ministers, draws up the plans. Targets for
all sectors of the economy, such as the evels of production for major
commodities, the amount and types of capital investment, and the allocation
of labor and materials, are sent to individual operating units through the
economic ministries of the central government and provincial and district
governments.
In the 1950s and mid-1960s the regime set forth three-year and five-
year state plans based primarily on th^ need for reconstruction after long
years of war and for the general rehabilitation of agriculture and industry, In
1965, the first Five Year Plan had not been fulfilled and US bombing forced
a new look at economic policies. A proposed second Five Year Plan was
replaced by a two-year emergency plan (1966-67) designed to disperse
industry as a defense against air attacks and to emphasize regional self-
sufficiency. Few dita have been published by the regime, but there is little
doubt that production in 1967 fell to the lowest level of the war, mainly as a
result of bomb damage to heavy industrial facilities.
North Vietnam has not legally defined its currency in terms of gold or
foreign currencies and no official exchange rates are announced. Tne
standard unit of currency is the dong, which the State Bank of Vietnam
converts at the rate of 3.7 to the US dollar for Western travelers. This rate
probably does not reflect the real value of the dong. Imports from and
exports to non-Communist countries are valued either in the currencies of
the trading partnuo )r in pounds sterling, and trade with Communist coun-
tries is expressed in clearing-account rubles.
Foreign trade
The Communist countries are North Vietnam's major trading partners,
accounting for more than 95% of the value :)f North Vietnam's total trade in
1970, compared to roughly 85% during 1961-64. Of the 1970 total, the
USSR accounted for 54%, the Eastern European Communist countries 31%,
and China 13%. Japan was the largest non-Communist trading partner from
1966 to 1970, accounting for roughly one half of the trade.
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More than one half of North Vietnam's total exports by value are
agricultural products, handicrafts, and light manufactures (clothing ar")
footwear). The remainder is made up principally of metals, minerals, and
building materials. Pig iron exports, formerly an important hard currency
earner, have not resumed since 1967 when the country's only significant iron
smelter was bombed. Exports of apatite and cement were resumed in 1969
for the first time in more than two years, but increasing domestic needs in
1971 probably prevented a signilicant expansion of cement exports and also
may have accounted for the sharp decline in apatite exports. Although coal
exports were never halted, the effects of the bombing reduced coal exports
in 1970 to less than one third the 1965 level. In 1971, coal exports increased
by 30% over 1970 levels, with Japan taking over from China as the leading
customer.
North Vietnam depends on imports for all of its supplies of petroleum,
finished steel, railroad rolling stock, and vehicles; and for most of its
complex machinery, metal manufactures, spare parts, industrial chemicals,
and raw cotton. In addition, roughly one sixth of total food supplies were
imported during the period 1965-70. Seaborne imports totalled more than
2.2 million tons in 1971, with the USSR accounting for less than 60%, China
for about 30%, and the remainder from Eastern Europe and other Com-
munist countries.
Balance of payments
North Vietnam has incurred a deficit in its foreign trade every year
since 1954, that is financed essentially by aid from Communist countries.
The deterioration in the export situation brought about by damage from US
bombing, accompanied by increased reliai,ce on imports from Communist
allies, brought about a sharp increase in the deficit from an average of US$70
million during 1961-64 to a peak of about US$680 million in 1969 and $605
million in 1970. North Vietnam maintains a favorable balance of trade with
non-Communist countries, although an occasional small deficit occurs in
trade with an individual country.
Foreign aid
Economic assistance from Communist countries, which reached a peak
of US$685 million in 1969, continues to be essential for maintaining North
Vietnam's economy and for prosecuting the war in Indochina. During
1962-65, economic assistance was responsible for establishment of the coun-
try's modern industrial base, expansion of the transportation network, and
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improvement and diversification of agriculti ire. Following the advent of the
US bombing program in 1965, the character of aid changed from emphasis
on large-scale enterprises to the development of small enterprises that were
intended to bolster regional self-sufficiency. Although assistance to the
large-scale sector of industry has continued since the bombing halt in 1968,
it has been limited largely to reconstruction of bomb damage or to com-
pletion of unfinished projects. North Vietnam has also had to rely heavily on
commodity assistance to offset shortfalls in domestic output and to maintain
an adequate level of consumer welfare.
From 1955 through 1970, total economic aid from Communist coun-
tries reached about $3.4 billion. The USSR has provided about 50%, China
about 20%, and the Eastern European countries nearly 25%. Only nominal
assistance has been received from Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, and North
Korea. Assistance from non-Communist countries thus far has been confined
to small amounts of humanitarian aid such as pharmaceuticals, text '2s,
foodstuffs, and other consumer goods.
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III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical summary
Since ancient times Vietnam has been an ethnic and cultural crossroads.
Its history is partly a record of the territorial expansion of the Vietnamese at
the expense of other peoples and partly a record of its political conquest and
cultural penetration by the Chin.,se and the French. Following their con-
quest by the Han Dynasty in the second century B.C., the Vietnamese
experienced a millenium of direct Chinese rule. In the mid-10th century a
period of semi-independence as a tributary state began, --id finally from
roughly 1428 until the imposition of French rule in the mid-19th century
the Vietnamese enjoyed a greater degree of political independence.
The French initiated Vietnam's second great social revolution, intro-
ducing Western education, Christianity, industrialization, the money econ-
omy, European-type urbanization, and numerous other aspects of Western
material and intellectual culture. Vietnam became a transitional society; a
complex, unstable mixture that resulted from the merging of disparate values
and ways of life and from the varying impact of the processes of socia
change on the different elements of society. Much in the same way that the
Vietnamese had absorbed Chinese culture while constantly resisting their
political domination, anti-Frr:nch nationalism took root early and persisted
throughout the colonial period. Reflecting the Vietnamese penchant for
factionalism and internal conflict, various groups of Communist and non-
Communist nationalists competed for leadership of the struggle for inrie-
pendence. in early 1941 the Viet Minh was formed from a front movement
that united diverse nationalist elements. This -in time became dominated by
Ho Chi Minh's better organized and more highly motivated Indochina
Communist Party.
World War II and occupation by the Japanese were followed by the
seven-and-one-half year Indochina War in which the French, in their attempt
to re-establish control, were defeated by the Viet Minh. Under the terms of
the 1954 Geneva Accords ending the war, Vietnam was reconstituted as the
separate states of North Vietnam and South Vietnam, divided at about the
17th parallel on the basis of military and political factors. In North Vietnam,
the French economic and political elite was replaced by a new elite com-
posed largely of hard-core revolutionists, other more recently recruited
Communist cadres, and the leadership of the North Vietnamese Army. The
Ho Chi Minh regime continued to consolidate its power mainly through
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programs, begun as c;: iy as 1946, aimed at destroying the traditional and the
colonial social structure and reordering society along doctrinaire Communist
lines. The government conducted a determined drive to socialize the econ-
omy, collectivize agriculture, expand industry and, with aid from the Soviet
Union, China and other Communist countries, repair war damage.
While continuing domestic social reforms, Hanoi's leaders undertook a
concerted effort in the late 1950s to arm and organize the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam, with the ultimate aim of taking over the Saigon government.
The police state nature of the Communist apparatus and the continuing
privations arid hardships of the people probably resulted in a waning of
public enthusiasm and growing dissatisfaction in the later 1950s and early
1960s. Peasant restiveness was stimulated by a succession of poor harvests,
but the prevailing public attitude appeared to be one of apathy and passivity,
without significant organized opposition. Throughout this period, the regime
continued to strengthen the party apparatus, particularly at the lower and
middle levels, and improve all instruments of control-the party, the army,
and the police-in an effort to get them firmly established and responsive to
commands from above.
The US aerial bombardment from 1965 to 1968 halted Communist
efforts at major social reform and considerably disrupted North Vietnamese
civilian life, interfering with the regime's efforts to put the economy firmly
on a Communist basis. During that period, however, the leadership was
extremely effective in appealing to patriotic feelings among the population
and in recapturing some of the earlier nationalistic fervor. Severe military
setbacks suffered by Hanoi in South Vietnam since the Tet offensive of
1968, the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, and the events in Cambodia in
1970, further complicated the regime's efforts to improve the performance
of an inefficient economy and forced Hanoi's leaders to divert more of their
country's manpower, as well as more of their own energy, away from
domestic problems and back to the war. This has not meant that the North
Vietnamese are neglecting domestic problems. Hanoi is stressing c(ficiency,
improvement in managerial techniques, and even material incentives, even
though party control remains a basic feature of society.
Structure and functioning of the governmental system
The principal function of the highly centralized and authoritarian
government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is to implement the
rational policy directives of the Lao Dong Party, whose structure parallels
that of the central government. Although there are other instruments that
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the party uses to carry out its programs-the prrty apparatus itself and the
nationwide mass organizations-the governmental machinery is its principal
vehicle, The governmental system is modeled closely on that existing in
Chit a in the late 1950s, and it operates on the same principle of "democratic
centralism" as does the Lao Dong Party. Although the constitution makes a
theoretical separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions, the
legislative and executive branches in practice are combined, resulting in a
highly centralized government. The judiciary is subordinated both to the
executive elements of the government and to tric party.
The constitution, adopted in 1960, is modeled extensively on the 1954
Chinese constitution and serves both as a body of law for the government
and as a propaganda document for the Lao Dong Party. It gives special
prominence to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of economic and social
conditions, and it contains a long list of civil liberties that are guaranteed so
long as they do not conflict with the interests of the state. Like all
Communist constitutions, it does not reveal the totality of party control and
ascribes to the governmental organization considerably more responsibility
and authority than it has in practice.
The most important centers of power within the government are the
executive agencies-the President of the Republic, the Premier, the Council
of Ministers, and at the local level the administrative committees that
represent the principal governmental authority within their areas.
According to the constitution, the president is appointed by the Na-
tional Assembly, and he in turn, with the approval of the National Assembly,
appoints the premier and the Council of Ministers. All terms are for four
years and run concurrently with that of the National Assembly. In addition,
the constitution grants the president the power to promulgate laws and
regulations. He is commander of the armed forces and presiding officer of
the National Defense Council, and he may attend and preside at meetings of
the Council of Ministers. He can convene special political conferences to
examine major policy problems.
Of all the government organization, the Council of Mir,;.;ters, an execu-
tive and administrative organ of the National Assembly, is closest to the
policy-making process. In mid-1971 it consisted of the premier, seven vice
premiers (five of whom also headed ministries or state commissions), 31
additional ministers and heads of state commissions, and the director of the
State Bank. At that time, most of its 40 members were serving on the party
Central Committee, and several occupied positions on the Politburo, the
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party's senior policy-making body, thereby assuring that government deci-
sions were in fact party decisions.
Non-Communists participated extensively in the council during the
early days of the regime, but this participation decreased significantly as the
number of competent party administrators grew. By early 1971, few non-
party members sat on the council. Their responsibilities are confined to the
cultural field or to a few of the economic portfolios that require some
technical competence,
The Office of Premier is the executive organ of the Council of Ministers
and as such is responsible for executing all decrees and plans of the Council
of Ministers, as well as those of the Standing Committee of the National
Assembly, It is composed of the prr'mier, three ministers, a secretariat, and
several branch secretariats that coordinate and supervise the activities of
their respective ministerial subordinates. The Ministry of National Defense
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by men who are also vice
premiers, are not under the supervision of branch secretariats.
Legislative authority, according to the constitution, resides in each of
the elements of a pyramid of elective represent-tive assemblies existing at
four descending levels of government. These assemblies are the National
Assembly and the Peoples' Councils at three successively lower levels: 1)
autonomous regions, provinces, and special cities; 2) rural districts, major
towns, and provincial capitals; and 3) small towns, villages, and urban wards.
The 420 members of the unicameral National Assembly are elected by
direct vote to four-year terms. The latest elections were held in April 1971.
In the previous three legislatures there were 91 deputies from South Vietnam
who were elected in 1946 but had their terms extended because of "tem-
porary territorial partition." This practice, however, was ended with the
newly cted legislature. The National Assembly is in fact under firm party
control (its chairman and vice chairman are Politburo members) and does
little more than approve and publicize the proposals and actions of the
executive agencies. In April 1965, because of the war situation, the National
Assembly authorized a suspension of the constitutional provision that as-
sembly sessions be held semiannually, and delegated some of its power to its
permanent Standing Committee, which consisted in early 1971 of 22 mem-
bers. Like the assembly itself, the Standing Committee does little more than
ratify decisions made either in the Council of Ministers or in the party's
policy-making organizations. Since 1965 the National Assembly has held
only six sessions, of which two were held in 1971.
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Representatives to the local people's councils are elected for two and
three-year periods at different levels, and all elections are under the close
supervision and direction of the Lao Dong Party. Local elections, which
unlike the National Assembly elections were riot suspended during the years
of the US bombing, were also held in April 1971.
The judicial establishment consists of the regular court system and the
People's Organs of Control, both of which are nominally responsible to the
National Assembly or to its Standing Committee. The courts are declared to
be independent cnd subject only to the law in the administration of justice,
but all are controlled by the party.
At the apex of the court hierarchy is the People's Supreme Court,
established along with the People's Organs of Control to handle judicial
matters after the abolition of the Ministry of Justice in 1960. The People's
Supreme Court has two types of jurisdiction: as a court of the first instance,
it deals with cases involving high treason and other serious criminal and civil
cases that "it may wish to try"; and as the highest court of appeals, it
reviews cases originating in the lower courts. In addition, it supervises the
judicial system, including the organization of the courts, the training of legal
staffs, and the establishment of court procedures. Subordinate tribunals
include local people's courts, military courts, and special courts authorized
by the National Assemoly to handle extraordinary cases.
The People's Organs of Control serve as watchdogs of the state and
function independently of all government agencies except (nominally) the
National Assembly or its Standing Committee. The People's Supreme Organ
of Control and its subordinate bodies exercise extraordinary powers of
surveillance over both the public and private domain. They check on the
performance of government enforcement agencies. Officials of the People's
Organs of Control represent the state before the people's courts in judicial
proceedings. Like the people's courts, subordinate organs of control are
established at all levels of territorial administration, with each reporting to
the next higher level of authority. Unlike the local people's courts, however,
they are riot responsible to the people's council at the corresponding levels.
The code of justice, adopted in 1950, is an adaptation of the French Ci"il
Code.
Political dynamics
The Lao Dong Party, an orthodox Communist party formed in 1951,
exercises all political power in North Vietnam, and has occasionally used its
control over the military and the police to suppress any overt opposition. It
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claims a membership of over one million, about b%, of the Population, and it
is estimated that 97% of all army officers are party members.
The highest powers of the party, including determination of policy and
direction of all activities, are vested in a National Congress and a Central
Committee elected by the Congress. The party constitution calls for the
Congress to meet once every four years, but the last meeting was in 1960.
Because of its infrequent meetings and its size (about 600 delegates), the
Congress is not suited to perform its statutory functions. Its powers are in
practice exercised by the Politburo and various Central Committee depart-
ments. The Congress rarely does more than ratify past or proposed actions of
the party leadership.
The Lao Dong Party Central Committee by mid-1971 had a member-
ship of 41 regular members and 28 alternates. Central Committee plenums,
scheduled to be held about twice a year but often delayed or held in secret,
discuss major policy developments. Rather than formulate policy, the role
assigned to it by the party constitution, it serves largely as a forum for the
dissemination of information concerning policy and its implementation.
Many major policy directives are issued as Central Committee resolutions,
but they were formulated by the all-powerful Politburo, which releases many
others. The last Central Committee plenum was held in early 1972, but was
not announced by Hanoi until April.
The Secretariat of the Central Committee serves as the central coordi-
nating body for all party activities and as the party's primary agency for
impiementing policy. I t directs the specialized departments of foreign affairs,
propaganda, organization, inspection (or control), military affairs, reunifi-
cation, industrN;, and agriculture. The Secretariat probably also makes the
decisions on most routine middle and upper echelon party assignments and
promotions.
-rhe Lao Dong Party follows the familiar Communist organizational
principi' of democratic centralism, whereby each administrative unit is
subordinate to the one immediately above it in the organizational chain. In
thecry, all positions in the party are filled by elections. According to party
statutes, the membership at the provincial and at the district or city level
elect congresses, which then elect executive committees. In practice, how-
ever, each list of candidates is carefully selected in advance by the party
leadership. The local executive committees select "standing committees" and
"secretaries," which serve as the executive authority for the area, working
closely with the specialized departments of the Central Committee and
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under the direction of the, National Secretarial. At the base of the party
administrative structure is the cell (chi bo), established in all geographical,
economic, social, and Cultural groups Where at least three party members are
located-villages, government offices, factories, farms, retail stores, schools,
trade unions, and women's groups.
The Fatherland Front, which was orgarlited in 1955, placed udder
party control the various non-Communist elemon S of society that Hanoi
gathered into mass orgnizations (women's, youth, peasant and labor groups).
The front was designed to mobilize popular support for the regime's domes-
tic programs, to preserve the facade of a multiparty system, and to orient all
front activities toward the national goal of unification. The Fatherland Front
is an important way of influencing a large majority of the population. It has
been headed since its creation by Ton Duc Tharg, a full member of the Lao
Dong Party Central Committee. Organized like the Lao Dong Party, the
front has a Central Committee and a ruling presidium. Prominent party
members dominate the controlling positions in the organization. In 1971 the
front still included the Socialist and Democratic parties, catering to intel-
lectual and bourgeois elements, respectively. Since 1960, when the DRV
began to increase its military pressure on South Vietnam, the Fatherland
Front has become more active in promoting the goal of reunifying Vietnam.
I t has served as the propaganda counterpart in North Vietnam to the
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, which was set up in the
South by the Lao Dong Party in December 1960.
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The North Vietnamese security and intelligence apparatus, organized
under several government branches, is the organ of Lao Dong Party control
over the populace in North Vietnam and in Communist-held territory in
South Vietnam. A sizable amount of manpower is er.gaged in police, se-
curity, and intelligence functions, and there is also a vast network of
informers outside the formal apparatus. There are the usual Communist
population controls: identification cards, licenses, travel permits, and census
data.
St.:urity system-police, security
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VI. ARMED FORCES
Defense organization
The armed forces of North Vietnam consist primarily of ground forces.
Air and naval forces are small and are oriented toward a ground support or a
defensive role. Equipped vith modern conventional weapons of primarily
Soviet and Chinese origin and having a combined strength of about 530,000
personnel (as of late 1971), these forces constitute the most experienced and
effective military power native to Southeast Asia. Large numbers of North
Vietnamese troops are in combat in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
The army has the capability to launch assaults of multi-divisional strength,
but is at its best in guerrilla or small-unit warfare.
President Ton Duc Thang is the nominal Supreme Commander of the
armed forces. Broad military policy is determined by the National Defense
Council, which transmits its decisions through the Ministry of National
Defense to the High Command. Most of the members of the National
Defense Council are members or alternate members of the politburo. The
High Command consists of the commander in chief, General Giap, and the
heads of the three General Directorates: Political, Staff, and Rear Services.
Under the commander in chief, operational control over the armed forces is
exercised by the general directorates. Superimposed on the military com-
mand channels is the Lao Dong Party contro! structure. Party policy is
disseminated from the Central Committee's Military Committee (headed by
General Giap) to the General Political Directorate, then passed through
political bureaus, committees and delegates at every unit command level.
Territorially, North Vietnam is organized into five military regions and
a capital area headquarters. Commanders of the military regions control
provincial militia and certain regular army units in their regions. Most regular
units are normally under the direct control of the High Command but may
be placed under regional control for particular missions.
The armed forces have a combination of military, political, and eco-
nomic functions. Militarily, their mission includes the maintenance of inter-
nal security, suppression of sabotage and subversive activities, support of the
national objective of reunification of North and South Vietnam, and further-
ance of Hanoi's objectives in Laos and Cambodia. Politically, they are used
to indoctrinate the civilian population in governmental policies and goals.
Economically, they grow their own food and are also called upon to help
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farmers during the planting and harvesting seasons and to assist in the
development of agricultural cooperatives.
The ground forces are the dominant service element, consisting in April
1972 of about 540,000 men under arms, including about 90,000 in Laos,
35,000 in Cambodia and over 200,000 in South Vietnam. Ground combat
forces are organized into eight infantry divisions, three training divisions, one
infantry training group, seven independent regiments and the Armor Com-
mand with two regiments. Other units are organized under the Engineer,
Artillery, Transportation, and Sapper commands subordinate to the High
Command. Weaponry includes Chinese-made assault rifles, Soviet and
Chinese artillery including the 130-mm. field gun, and Soviet tanks.
Limited support for the ground forces is provided by the 3,000-man
Navy Command, which is subordinate to the General Staff Directorate. The
navy is a small coastal defense force Vwith an inventory of 44 to 47 patrol
boats and 50 service craft, engaged mainly in patrolling national waters and
assisting in air defense. Offensive ' apability is probably limited to surprise
torpedo boat attacks. Combatant ships include motor torpedo boats, motor
gunboats, and submarine chasor; used for patrol purposes, organized into
squadrons, divisions or flotillas by type or function. Fleet headquarters is at
Haiphong. Junks may be used to supplement logistic operations by the
service fleet.
The Air Force-Air Defense Command, equipped with surface-to-air
missiles, radar-controlled anti-aircraft artillery, modern Soviet fighter air?
craft, and an efficient early warning system, is currently formed L w a
sophisticated defense force, but it has a very limited offensive capability.
The air force has an estimated personnel strength of 10,000, including about
300 jet pilots. There are approximately 350 aircraft, which operate from
eight major airfields. Air defense forces are organized into 45 anti-aircraft
artillery regiments and about 50 missile battalions, equipped with the SA-2
missile.
Manpower
Total strength of the North Vietnamese regular armed forces is esti-
mated to be 553,000. TherE are two armed reserve elements: the Regional
Forces are a full-time, lightly armed combat force of 51,000 men organized
into 17 provincial regiments; the People's Militia-Self Defense Forces is
part My armed and functions on a part-time basis with units organized in
each district, village, and hamlet. There are about 1,549,000 militiamen.
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Other mPitary manpower resources are an estimated three million in an
unarmed reserve and 16,500 in the paramilitary Armed Public Security
Forces, a full-time armed security element subordinate to the Ministry of
Public Security.
As of April 1972, North Vietnam had a manpower pool of an estimated
1.3 million male civilians aged 15-39 fit for military service, about one half
of whom are in the 17-25 age bracket. The armed forces can induct and train
up to 100,000 men per year without drawing down this reserve. Available
manpower is classified according to health and political reliability. During
the past several years, the high and persistent losses suffered by the North
Vietnamese Army have caused deterioration in the quality of its cadres and
troops.
Economic support and military budget
North Vietnam's underdeveloped economy cannot produce the material
.needed to support its armed forces. Aid from Communist countries supplies
a substantial portion of all military requirements, including food, petroleum,
vehicles, and weapons. Domestic production includes small quantities of
grenade launchers, small arms, land mines, grenades and mortar ammunition.
Only the output of light mortars and individual quartermaster items is
adequate for current needs. The Soviet Union has provided nearly all of the
heavy field weapons, naval vessels, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. China
has supplied large quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition, some
naval craft, and a few aircraft. Total Soviet and Chinese military assistance
from 1965 through 1970 amounted to more than US$2.1 billion.
The North Vietnamese have not announced a defense budget since
1962. At that time, actual military spending was about US$103.2 million, or
22% of total expenditures and about 7% of estimated GNP. Data for later
years are not available, although current military outlays undoubtedly ac-
count for a much greater share of total expenditures and the GNP.
!.ogistics
General policies for military procurement are established by the Min-
istry of National Defense, and the General Rear Services Directorate is
responsible for detailed planning and supervision of the procurement pro-
gram. The subordinate Munitions Procurement Directorate supervises do-
mestic production of arms and ammunition.
Aug 72
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The army has, for the most part, adopted the standardized equipment
of Communist countries, but some quantities of captured weapons of non.
Communist origin are still in use by the militia forces, The navy has no
extensive logistic network. Naval air force, air defense ordnance, and
material are obtained through the General Rear Services Directorate from
other Communist countries. The armed forces do not have enough technical
specialists for the maintenance of the advanced equipmen~ now held or to be
acquired, and they are dependent on the donor countries for training and
technical assistance.
North Vietnam
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VII., FOREIGN RELATIONS
The DRV regime has two major objectives: to unite North and South
Vietnam under Communist control and to establish a Communist society,
first in North Vietnam and then in the South. While the Lao Dong Party
leadership has alvrays attempted to remain independent in policy determina-
tion, as a result o; its war needs it must make some allowances for the
attitudes of the Soviet Union and China, on whom it is heavily dependent
fog assistance.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has been of major concern to Hanoi, and the
leadership has consistently decried this division in Communist unity. The
North Vietnamese have gained some benefit from the rift by remaining
neutral and playing off one side against the other for aid and support. For a
brief period in 1963-64 they did support the Chinese on most of the major
issues, but they returned to neutrality as soon as Premier Khrushchev was
overthrown and the new Soviet leadership promised greater interest and
support for North Vietnamese objectives. For a while, despite numerous
hinese assurances, Hanoi expressed anxiety that its interests might be
compromised in the course of developing Sino-US rapprochement. Loss of
support from either Moscow or Peking would seriously disrupt Hanoi's
ability to defend itself against air attack dnd to support the war in the South.
Almost all the progress that the Lao Dong Party made toward its domestic
and foreign policy goals was made possible by economic assistance from
both the USSR and China.
In terms of long-range policy, DRV leaders would like to see Viet-
namese hegemony extended to all the states of former French Indochina.
Until such a take-over becomes feasible, the DRV has preferred to promote
neutral governments in the three non-Communist states with a view to their
eventual replacement by Communist regimes. WWIithin these long-range goals,
first priority is given to efforts in South Vietnam. Communist activity in the
South was for some time focused primarily on political action, including
subversion, propaganda, and terrorism. Because of the marginal success of
Hanoi's political program, terrorism increased and by 1960 had reached the
level of organized guerrilla warfare. The North Vietnamese decision to use
increasing levels of military force to achieve their objectives involved they? in
a major military confrontation with the US and its allies. The North
Vietnamese probably expect Southern resistance to diminish as the US
withdraws from the war.
North Vietnam Aug 72
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SECIZF,T
The North Vietnamese interest in Laos and Cambodia is manifested in
Hanoi's overt and covert support of the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Commu-
nists. The North Vietnamese use both countries as infiltration routes and
staging areas for Communist military activity in South Vietnam, In addition,
Hanoi is conducting political warfare in an attempt to build up indigenous
Communist strength and eventually to overthrow the existing governments
in both countries.
North Vietn~,n has only limited contacts outside the Communist states.
Compared with the almost 100 countries that have recognized the Saigon
government, only 20 non-Communist countries have recognized Hanoi. Most
of these are small nations in Africa and Asia. Sweden and Denmark are the
only UVest European nations having full diplomatic relations, although Nor-
way and Switzerland in 1971 announced their intention to recognize Hanoi.
France and North Vietnam have exchanged "delegates general." Burma and
India have consuls-general in Hanoi, and Canada has limited contacts wish
DRV officials as a member of tf~e International Control Commission. Britain
maintains a consul-general in Hanoi who is accredited to the municipal
rather than the national government. Hanoi has no official representatives in
either the United Kingdom or Canada, and treats them with the same basic
antagonism that it does the US. The DRV has been especially hostile to all
countries that contribute troops or other support to South Vietnam, namely
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Thailand. Prior to the opening of
the Paris talks in 1968, Hanoi generally refused all contact with the United
States, even informal discussions over such problems as the treatment of
prisoners of war.
In many countries, DRV diplomats hold themselves in relative isolation
from the people, press, and government of the country to which they are
assigned. Of the 150 diplomatic and economic officials Hanoi sends to
non-Communist capitals, however, those in Paris, New Delhi, Stockholm,
and Cairo actively seek publicity through press conferences and interviews in
local journals, as well as frequent contact with the foreign office officials of
the host governments.
North Vietnam VII - 2 Aug 72
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The US interest in North Vietnam is a result of its heavy commitment
to South Vietnam, where US and North Vietnamese policies are in direct
conflict. North Vietnam's use of military force in an attempt to achieve its
ultimate goal of uniting Vietnam under Communist control has involved the
Hanoi regime in a major military confrontation with the United States,
which at the height of the war had some 500,000 troops in South Vietnam,
Since the withdrawal of US ground combat troops from Vietnam, the US Iias
continued direct military engagement with North Victna~n~se forces in
tactical and strategic air and naval support of the Sor;tli Vietnamese.
The only regular direct US channel of communication with North
Vietnam is through the negotiations in Paris, which began in 1968 in an
attempt to reach a settlement of the war. The talks have made little progress,
with North Vietnam often using the negotiating table as a forum for its
propananda. Substantive discussions have at times been broken off, but as of
early 1972 the ?aris talks had not been formally disbanded.
North Vietnam Aug 72
SECRET
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