CASTROISM CLARIFIED IN CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100142-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: December 27, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Castroism Clarified it" Chile
Secret
73
27 December 1971
No. 2i U8/71
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 December 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Castroism Clarified in Chile
Summary
Fidel Castro's long stay in Chile has con-
vinced him that the Cuban--i.e., his--revolutionary
process is the only true way. Although he may be-
lieve that there is more than one way to begin a
revolution, he makes it clear that violence must be
used at one time or another in varying degrees of
intensity to defend it. His visit has signaled an
end to Cuba's isolation in the hemisphere, afforded
him an opportunity to propagandize the success of
the Cuban experience, and reaffirmed his position
as a revolutionary leader. Castro was able to meet
with other Latin American leaders and. Communist
Party officials on their home ground and to get
their views on the state of the "revolutionary proc-
ess in their countries." His official statements
and private conversations reflected a scarcely con-
cealed hatred of the US and his desire to destroy
the influence of the US and other "imperialist"
powers. One possible result of his trip will be
the intensification of his efforts to socialize
Cube completely and create a "socialist man" whose
outlook cannot be reversed.
Note: This memorandum was produced by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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General
1. Now that Fidel Castro has returned to his
island bastion from his odyssey in Chile and its
brief postscripts in Peru and Ecuador, it may be
useful to review the record of what he said and
did there. Many of Fidel's statements in Chile were
made under unfavorable circumstances for him. Some
of his more acerbic remarks, in fact, were aimed at
antagonistic questioners. It is possible that these
remarks were closer to his real feelings than the
well-thought-out answers to friendly interviewers.
2. What has the trip accomplished? Most im-
portant, it may have signaled the effective end of
Cuba's isolation from the rest of the hemisphere.
The economic and political sanctions imposed by the
OAS may well continue to crumble. Peru, Ecuador,
and possibly several other countries will probably
establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, regardless
of the outcome of maneuverings in the OAS.
3. Secondly, the relative success of the trip
and his personal reception have given him some re-
assurance of his popularity with the "masses." Al-
though he would probably be the first to admit that
he didn't win any new followers, he did satisfy him-
self that he stood well with those people he ex-
pected to support him.
4. Castro had a lot going for him in this re-
spect. His large physical appearance and his breezy
informality contribute much to his charisma. To
Chileans accustomed to the rather dour Allende, Fidel
was quite a shock, pleasant to some, scandalous to
others. Where the throngs could make a direct com-
parison of Castro and Allende, Castro's proclivity
to play basketball, kiss babies, don miners' helmets,
etc., captivated many. Moreover, his nonstop trav-
eling and speaking must have left most Chileans gasp-
ing at the man's stamina. His conduct in this re-
gard, if it did nothing else, scotched for the time
being rumors of failing health.
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5. Finally, the trip allowed the would-be leader
of contemporary Latin American revolutionaries to ex-
amine first hand the current revolutionary process
in Chile. Castro took great pains to point out the
differences in the "revolutionary" trends of Cuba
and Chile and paid homage to the Chilean process of
via pacifica. He expressed chagrin at Allende's
failure to counter reactionary violence with "rev-
olutionary" force, and probably believes that unless
Allende takes off the gloves the coalition's days are
numbered. He was an unhappy militant when he left Chile.
"Revolutionary" Process and Dissent
6. Castro's thinking on the "revolutionary"
process has gone through transition. His speeches
and private conversations suggest that he has en-
dorsed the idea that each nation can follow its own
distinct revolutionary path. This obviously in-
cludes--among other possibilities--the Chilean via
pacifica and the Peruvian military populism. Ac-
cording to Castro, the basic criteria fo_ revolu-
tion are the direct "participation" of the masses
in the social, economic, and political life of the
nation, and an anti-imperialist (anti-US) view of
the rest of the world. Castro says, ""Revolutions
are not invented by men. Revolutions arise from
real objective factors that produce awareness at a
given moment.... Everything must be linked to the
masses."
7. Thus, he appears to have abandoned his rigid
adherence to the "rural concept; i.e., that revolutions
must start in remote sections with peasant support. More-
ovar, he now sees the development of larger foci
of students and workers in the cities as a vanguard
of the defense of the "revolutionary" process af-
ter it has been initiated. For example, Allende
may have risen to power in Chile through democratic
means and the via Pacifica, but this does not mean
that undemocraEirc and violent means will not be
needed to protect and advance the revolution.
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with antagonistic students--especially from the
Christian Democratic youth--caused Fidel to lose his
co+.,1. on occasion. These face-to-face conflicts with
detractors and the failure to attract a large turn-
cut at his last rally had an effect on him by the
end of his visit. His promise to stay out of Chilean
politics was cast aside during his farewell speech,
and all of his scarcely concealed anti-US feelings
rushed to the surface.
11. Castro's main point on dissent is that it
cannot be tolerated by a socialist government. Com-
munications and propaganda outlets must be taken over
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by "revolutionaries." Newsmen must lend a "revolu-
tionary" interpretation to what they report. The
people must be made aware of "truth and reality."
Obviously, if they are unable to attain this level
of "awareness," they have to be educated, and if
that fails, they must be forced. In Castro's ideal-
ized concept of socialism, dissent simply does not
occur.
12. No matter how impatient Fidel is with dis-
sent, he has devised, in addition to short-term vio-
lence, long-range plans to eliminate it. This aims
at the complete socialist education of the masses.
Time after time during his talks in Chile with stu-
dents, he hammered on the theme that everyone in a
socialist state should be so educated. Education
and indoctrination in a socialist society will re-
sult in the elimination of capitalistic sentiment
and anti-government factions, he explained.
Castro on the US
13. In Chile Castro blew hot and cold on rela-
tions with the United States. He appeared to make an
effort at first to avoid criticism, but by the end of
his visit, his true thoughts about the US had become
apparent. He accused the US of seeing itself as "the
policeman of the world." He dwelt at some length on
the US military base at Guantanamo as an affront to
Cuba's dignity--but said that he would not be so fool-
ish as to try to take it by force. "One single mis-
sile could destroy the base, but unfortunately we do
not have them," he said, adding, "If we had them we
would not launch them... (except) under special con-
ditions in which we had no other choice but to defend
ourselves."
14. Castro cited the Vietnam war and the revela-
tions in the "Pentagon Papers" as proof of America's
economic, social, and political "deterioration." He
promised that relations will not be re-established be-
tween the two nations until a "realistic government"
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comes to power in Washington. The Nixon administra-
tion is not, in his judgment, this kind of government.
Questioned on the planned visits of President Nixon
to Moscow and Peking, Castro said, "The only thing
we can say is that Nixon will. not visit Havana."
15. Air line hijacking is a gritty point in
current Cuba-US problems, and Castro was emphatic
in reaffirming Cuba's past position on the issue.
He said he could do little about the problem because
the hijackers are, for the most part, minority ele-
ments or "political prisoners" escaping from a "re-
pressive" US. He added that all hijacked planes are
returned to the US, whereas Washington condones es-
cape from Cuba and illegally seizes and retains the
boats Cubans use to escape.
16. In discussing the possibility of establish-
ing relations with other countries, Castro asserted
that he is "not desperate to normalize relations with
other Latin. American countries." The basic criterion
for such relations would be adoption by the others
of a foreign policy independent of US influence. In
Castro's view, as long as "they obey orders from the
United States" there is no sense in recognition.
Castro on the USSR
17. The Cuban leader went out of his way to un-
derline Cuba's current good relations with the Soviet
Union. His support for the via pacifica and his meet-
ings in Chile with such orthodox pro-Moscow Communist
stalwarts as Ecuador's Pedro Saad are good indications
of his bond to the USSR. During his press confer-
ence in Santiago, he praised the Soviets for their
aid when his country was alone in the early 60s. "I
don't care if reactionary birds have written that Cuba
is a Soviet colony, the?t we are economically dependent,
and more of those mythi. I believe that all revolu-
tionaries in Latin America should be glad of this
(aid to Cuba from the USSR), to know that under dif-
ficult circumstai.ces a country like Cuba could re-
ceive the solidarity and support of the Soviet Union."
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Conclusions
18. Castro obviously made the trip to Chile be-
cause the Allende government provides him with Cuba's
first ally in Latin America. In addition, the wel-
come afforded him an opportunity to bolster his claim
to being Latin America's foremost "revolutionary"--a
position that in recent years has been called into
qv.estion to one degree or another by others--Che
Guevara, Carlos Marighella of Brazil, and of course
by Castro's host, Salvador Allende.
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20. There are no clear answers why Castro in-
dulged in all the fulsome talk about the Soviet Union
and met with pro-Soviet Communist Party leaders. Cas-
tro may have managed finally to convince himself of
the correctness of Soviet policies; he may have ac-
tually modified his view of the revolutionary process;
he may have come under considerable pressure to en-
dorse orthodox Communism in the hemisphere.
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21. As for Cuban relations with other Latin
American nations, it seems clear that the Castro
trip was another step toward the eventual lifting
of OAS sanctions against Cuba. Other Latin nations
will probably follow Peru and Ecuador in re-estab-
lishing diplomatic relations. All this activity will
help undermine US political influence in the hemis-
phere and reinforce the trend on the part of Latin
politicians to use nationalism--especially anti-
Americanism--as a political weapon. Many of them
will be encouraged to adopt continued adamant stands
on specifically Latin issues, such as the 200-mile
territorial waters problem and the foreign exploita-
tion of raw materials. In the latter case, there
may be more of a tendency to use nationalization of
foreign industry as a political weapon against the
US and as a propaganda device to demonstrate an in-
dependent foreign policy. These trends had already
set in, but the Castro visits may have lent impetus
to them.
22. What about the future of Cuba? Castro
appears to have gone home more convinced than ever
of the correctness of his "revolution." He went so
far as to say that after seeing the confrontation in
Chile between the revolution and "fascism," he was
"more extremist than ever," This may cause him to
accelerate his "revolution" into a new phase in which
the complete socialization of Cuba and the creation
of the "socialist man" will be attempted.
23. In sum, Castro has returned home intent
in his support for revolution and on undermining
the capitalist system. He remains adamantly opposed
to the US, and early rapprochement seems most un-
likely. His position is secure in Cuba, and his
economic ties to the Soviets assure that their as-
sistance will continue indefinitely.
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