THE FRENCH LABOR SCENE--NEW CLIMATE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100132-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 132
• Publication Date: November 17, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The French Labor Scene-New Climate in Social Relations
Confidential
.87
17 November 1971
No. 2096/71
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WARNING
This document contniy,s,'.iformation affecting the national
defense of the United nn..;es, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 79,, of the US Code, as am::nded.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP
LXCLUD[n raoMI AOTO14ATIC
D Nn11ADIND AND
Dr-' 1188I rICAT1'JN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 November 1971
The French Labor Scene-New
Climate in Social Relations
Summary
Three years ago a widespread student-worker
strike almost developed into full revolution. Now
the Pompidou regime, with Prime Minister Jacques
Chaban-Delmas as grand architect, has largely re-
established labor peace. Through a "new society"
program the prime minister has initiated a range
of innovative labor reforms that have raised the
standard of living and have been generally accepted
by the major French labor unions. The government's
program has played a considerable part in dispell-
ing the revolutionary spirit of 1968, in discourag-
ing major strike activity, and in improving the re-
lationships between government and labor unions.
Since 1968 most of the labor confederations have
been willing to work within the economic and social
framework in a responsible manner. Although the
labor confederations have at times been able to
achieve unity of action, the intense competition
between them for members and their ideological dif-
ferences have limited the extent of common action.
Occasional strikes and demonstrations, especially
for salary increases and a lowering of the retire-
ment age, will no doubt occur over the coming months,
but there are no major disturbances on the horizon.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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Labor and the 1968 Crisis
1. Massive an,.Aregime strikes and demortstra-
tions began on 10 May 1968 when workers joined the
spiraling student rebellion touched off by small
demonstrations and riots at the suburban Nanterre
campus of the University of Paris. They were pro-
testing an inadequate educational system, rising
prices, widespread unemployment, and the general
unresponsiveness of the regime to the demands of
a broad sector of society. The intent of militant
student and labor leaders was to overthrow the
government of President de Gaulle. The protest
movement culminated on 25 May in the closure of
many French schools and universities and .r._ a ten-
million-man walkout that virtually paralyzed the
nation.
2. At the outset, several of the major French
labor organizations, particularly the Communist-
dominated General Labor Confederation (CGT) and the
leftist French Confederation of Democratic Workers
(CFD5.), had agitated for strike activity. None of
the unions expected demonstrations on the large
scale thL.t~ developed. Militant CFDT leaders ;"on-
tinued to foment unrest throughout the crisis and
remained closely aligned with the rebellious stu-
dents. The CGT--France's largest union--and sev-
eral other unions, however, eventually abandoned
support for the spontaneous strikes.. Still strikes,
and demonstrations spread. The inability of the
labor leaders to control the situation can be
partly ascribed to the fact that only abou_ one
third of the workers who walked off their jobs
were union members. Of much greater significance
was the failure of the leadership to assess cor-
rectly the mood of the rank and file. Spurred on
by the militant students and by hopes of finally
redressing some of their own grievances, they took
positions much more extreme than those espoused at
the top. Union leaders, particularly the Commu-
nists, were in effect outflankec? on the left by
the students and by their own followers. They re-
gained control of their followers only with great
difficulty.
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Students and workers riot during May 1968 crisis.
3. The student-worker coalition during the
crisis was somewhat paradoxical because French
workers have never regarded university students as
allies. Workers traditionally have viewed the stu-
dents as representatives of a bourgeois class with
vested interests in the governmental and social
establishment against which French labor strongly
rebelled. In 1968, however, militant student
leaders were fighting for objectives that appealed
to younger, leftist labor elements. The students
wanted not only a reform of educational institu-
tions--which among other things would have offered
greater opportunities to the children of workers--
but also, and more importantly, the students sought
a general reform of French society.
4. The workers rejected the government's
Grenelle Accords of 27 May, despite the urging of
their leaders, though the substance of these ac-
cords did eventually serve as the basis for the
settlement of the strikes in late June. In addi-
tion to wage increases ranging from 10 to 21 percent,
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the accords committed the government to introduce
legislation guaranteeing trade union rights and
increases in social security benefits.
Aftermath
5. The French economy started down the road
to recovery in the first months after the strikes.
The government helped to clear the atmosphere by
acting quickly to carry out its legislative promises.
Labor leaders, to protect their gains, pressed for
immediate implementation. But the regime was nervous
about several factors that still threatened the eco-
nomy. It was particularly concerned over labor's
intentions in the light of its new militancy and
over the stability of the franc in the face of the
new wage settlements. During the last two months
of 1968, the monetary crisis impelled the government
to launch an austerity program in preference to de-
valuing the franc. Currency controls were introduced,
credit and budget policies were tightened, a tax
policy to improve balance of payments was adopted,
and a new series of price controls imposed.
6. The workers feared the program would wipe
out their gains and place a disproportionate burden
on them, and the labor unions promoted some protests
against the program. No significant strikes re-
sulted, however, and labor demonstrations were mini-
mal. Most workers probably reasoned that prices
had not risen enough to justify serious protests.
Moreover, they were reassured by the government's
prompt moves to fulfill its promises on trade union
rights legislation, :labor's most significant achieve-
ment in 1968. Nonetheless, as the year ended, most
of the basic problems that set off the May crisis re-
mained, despite the considerable effort to solve them.
Labor Reforms
7. No significant progress in labor-management
relations was made until President Georges Pompidou
came to power on 20 June 1969. In an effort to get
the unhealthy French economy moving, the Pompidou
government devalued the franc on 8 August 1969, at
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the expense of irritating labor, and instituted
an economic stabilization plan. These moves greatly
facilitated France's economic recovery and laid
the groundwork for reforms that served to ameliorate
labor-management relations.
8. In September 1969 Prime Minister Jacques
Chabcii-Delmas announced his "new society" program,
describing it as the first step toward improving
the social climate. With the aid of two special
assistants, Jacques Delors and Simon Nora, he in-
itiated a pattern of government consultations with
the unions in a search for programs and policies
that benefit both. Although the consultation pro-
cedure varies with circumstances, the government
representative, Delors, bypasses the central labo-:
organization and talks directly with the local
leaders who are more aware of worker complaints.
Simultaneously, the other government representative
Nora, contacts management, stressing the importance
of resolving management differences with labor.
The system has worked well thus far, even in cases
involving civil servants and nationalized industries
where the government was one of the disputing parties.
The new technique contrasts with that of the De
Gaulle era. Then the government often intervened
directly in disputes and imposed solutions rather
than limiting its role to that of arbiter between
...abor and r,~~nagement.
1
"Today governing a great state has become infinitely
comnler it requires the cooperation of all living
forces of the country. Becoming informed and ,,in-
forming, listening and explaining have become im-
perious necessities. My government will therefore
heed the wishes expressed in the country, taking care
to act upon these wishes or to explain why it cannot
immediately satisfy them. The necessity of teamwork
therefore imposes itself- teamwork in which each
gives his ideas, his opinions, and in which the decision
is made by the man who holds this responsibility
after joint reflection.... "
National Assembly Address, 26 3nne 1969
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9. The Pompidou regime promptly enacted a
range of useful labor legislation that has brought
the country two years of general labor peace. The
first reforms were theupward revision of the legal
minimum wage with annual adjustments, and the es-
tablishment, in October 1969, of a shorter work
week (40 hours) without pay reductions. French
workers had been legally entitled to a 40-hour week
since the Matignon Agreements of 19 36 , but they
have rarely insisted upon implementation. The gov-
ernment has usually permitted management to extend
the work week to 43 or 45 hours, requiring only that
overtime rates be paid for the added hours. Because
many workers needed the overtime pay, they had for
many years few objections to the extra work hours.
10. Labor began to press for enforcement of
the 40-hour week, and this has resulted in signifi-
cant adjustments of work schedules since 1970. Many
industries in the public and private sector still
fall short of meeting official requirements. In
state-controlled enterprises, such as electricity
and gas, the work week was reduced by two hours to
42 hours; in the railroads by two and a half hours
to 42 hours; and in the Paris transportation system
by 50 minutes to 41 1/2 hours. In private industry
and commerce, the average work week dropped less
than half an hour to 44 1/2 hours.
11. The Gaullist profit-sharing program of
1967 was strongly endorsed by the Pompidou adminis-
tration as an essential aspect of the "new society"
program, and legislation was introduced in December
1969 to facilitate its implementation. This measure
allows wage and salary earners to benefit from the
productivity gains of their company. When the profit-
sharing legislation was enacted, about 9,500 enter-
prises employing four million persons were expected
to negotiate with their employees on the adoption of
profit-sharing plans. According to the French Min-
istry of Labor, however, only 5,778 agreements bad
been signed by the end of 1970. The agreements,
covering 6,515 enterprises employing three million
workers, resulted in an average bonus of $64 per
worker in 1970, representing 2.7 percent of the
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MAJOR STEPS TAKEN TO IMPROVE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
April Extension of annual paid vacation to four weeks for all workers
who have completed one full year of work for the same em-
ployer (retroactive to May 1968)
August Devaluation of the franc to revive the flagging economy created
by the 1968 May crisis
September Creation of government's "New society" program to facilitate
new labor legislation
September Initiation of government's policy of consultation with the trade
unions
October Establishment of a shorter work week (40-hours) without reduc-
tion in pay
October Revision of the legal hourly mir:lmum wage in industry and
agriculture with annual adjustmer
December Approval of compulsory legislation for implementation of
worker participation in profit shareholding programs (decree of
August 1967)
December Establishment of a social contract ("contrat de progres") as the
union's nuarantee of wage adjustments linked to movements in
the GNt, worker productivity, and the general performance of
the employing company in return for a 90-day pledge from the
unions not to strike
March Enactment of Mensualisation agreement which transfers blue-
collar workers from hourly to monthly pay status and grants
them fringe benefits formerly enjoyed only by white-collar
workers
July Provision of vocational training with partial pay compensation
for young workers under 18 years of age and a one-year maxi-
mum training leave with ful! pay compensation for adult work-
ers with two years seniority.
June App, oval of legal hourly minimum wage increase
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total wage bill and .1.4 percent of the declared
profits of these enterprises. The profit-sharing
program is mandatory in enterprises having more
than 100 employee:,;. only about 10 percent of the
signatory enterprises have smaller work forces.
Most of the agreements are concentrated in the con-
struction and public works industries. Despite
the failure of companies employing one million
workers to meet their obligation to sign profit-
sharing agreements and despite the low level of
workers' shares (the French Government initially
estimated that profit-sharing could raise the in-
come of the participating workers by an average of
10 percent), the government feels that implementa-
tion of the legislation during the first year is
satisfactory. The government is determined to
push the program to maximum participation and has
called upon enterprises that have not signed to
negotiate profit-sharing plans without delay.
12. The most important innovative measure
introduced by the government in 1969 was the social
contract. The first contract was signed in the
public sector by the French Electricity and Gas
Company. Characterized by Prime Minister Chaban-
Delmas and others as "revolutionary," it guarantees
wage adjustments linked to movements in the Gross
National Product, worker productivity, and the gen-
eral performance of the employing company. In return
the workers pledge not to strike for 90 days after
the outbreak of a dispute. The social contract has
had a measurable degree of success despite the re-
fusal of the General Confederation of Labor--
France's largest and best organized labor union-.:,to
sign the agreement.
13. In 1970 the government agreed to provide
the same arrangements for blue-collar workers as al-
ready enjoyed by white-collar workers. The agree-
ment, endorsed 'by .1&bor-.and".management, transferred
blue-collar workers from hourly to monthly pay status
and granted them fringe benefits, including wage pay-
ments during absence for sick, maternity and military
leave, paid holidays, and seniority, retirement and
separation premiums.
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Group
General Labor
Confederation (CGT)
Worker's Force (FO)
National Educational
Federation (FEN)
French Confederation Jean Bornard
of Christian Workers
(CFTC)
French Confederation
of Democratic
Workers (CFDT)
Estimated
Leader Origins Membership Characteristics
1,000,000 Communist-dominated; majority
membership blue-collar workers
Andre Bergeron Broke with CGT 400,000 Socialist-oriented; majority member.
James Marenge 3roke with CGT 300,000 Socialist-oriented; represents the inter-
n 1947 est of mostly primary, secondary and
vocational school teachers
Founded in 1919 80,000 Religious orientation, but independ.
ent of the church, government, and
political parties; non-believers, agnos-
tics and atheists also included in
working class membership
Edmond Maire 'volved from "de- 5U0,000 Leftist-oriented; appeals to the
confessionalization" youngnr,'liberal slementsof thework-
of Catholic-led CFTC ing class
in 1964
General Confederation Corentin Calvez Founded in 1944 100,000 Represents the interest of industrial
of Supervisor
Em-
y
ployees (CGC)
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14. The vocational training agreement, reached
by labor and management in July 1970, was seen by
the imaginative Jacques Delors as a matter of high-
est national priority. This agreement, negotiated
over a 14-month period, for the first time provides
that adult workers who have two years seniority
and are at least five years from retirement age can
receive up to a year of training with full pay. It
also provides partial pay for workers under 18 years
of age who wish to upgrade their skills or ].,earn a
new job. This innovative measure places France ahead
of most industralized countries in new techniques to
satisfy the personnel needs of modern industry.
15. Last June legislation was passed to increase
the legal hourly minimum wage from 3.68 francs ($.67)
to 3.85 francs ($0.70) effective in July. Most French
workers receive an hourly wage that is close to one
dollar. but about 750,000 laborers are still paid only
the minimum rate. Because the earnings of these
laborers are supplemented by a number of social se-
curity benefits, many are able to subsist reasonably
well. French wives are encouraged to stay home and
raise families rather than pursue careers. They re-
ceive generous allowances for children, as well as
rent subsidies and health benefits.
Att'i'tude's' of the Labor Confederations
16. The government's "new society" program has
gained considerable popular support, and has Con-
tributed substantially to the decline of militancy
in the ranks of labor and the virtual disappearance
from labor's ranks of the revolutionary spirit of
1968. With only one exception, the labor confedera-
tions have now accepted the social, political, and
economic system in France and have pursued labor's
interests in a generally reasonable and responsible
manner.
17. Prior to 1968 the General Confederation of
Labor was fairly militant, calling frequent strikes
for political rather than economic reasons. Since
1968, however, when it failed to support the revolu-
tionary student movement, the CGT.has attempted to 'project
the image of a powerful and responsible labor organ-
ization. The most significant motive for this shift
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in tactics is a desire to gain political respect-
ability. The CGT is also interested in broadening
its representation among white-collar workers. As
the CGT acquires prestige and popular support, the
political power of the French Communist Party and
its chances of competing effectively with the Gaul-
lists in the 1973 legislative elections are enhanced.
l3. In 1964 the French Confederation of
Christian Workers turned leftward, denounced its
religious orientation, dropped "Christian" from
its title, and became the French Confederation of
Democratic Workers (CFDT). It is France's second
largest labor organization and an increasingly
militant force that tries to steal the spotlight from
its principal rival, the CGT, whenever possible.
This is partly the result of the accession to power
in the union of younger, liberal--and in some cases
extreme leftist--elements. When other unions de-
clined to work with the students during the May
crisis in 1968, the CFDT cultivated a relationship
with the radical student leaders as a tactical move
to challenge the more cautious CGT. As a result,
the CFDT has attracted more young people than any
of the other French unions. Although the union
supported Chaban-Delmas' social contract, its leaders
continue enthusiastically to take the initiative in
encouraging strikes, staging demonstrations, and call-
ing for work stoppages in various industries. The
most recent strike was at Renault last April. The
CFDT's current philosophy is that militancy and in-
transigence promote class consci,7*-isness and a readi-
ness to fight for the broader goal of changing the
French political and economic system, What the CFDT
has to offer as an alternative has not been fully
spelled out, but its utopia would have "democratic"
planning of national objectives, social ownership
of the means of production, and workers' management
of the economy.
19. The Workers' Force is an anti-Communist
labor organization that splintered from the CGT in
1947. It follows a moderate but activist course
in seeking labor reforms for its members, the ma-
jority of whom are white-collar workers. Firmly
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committed to the contractual approach to labor-manage-
ment relations, the union, originally socialist-
oriented, has become apolitical. By tradition and
ideological outlook, it is wedded to the concept of
majority rule. The Workers' Force offers little
challenge to the two large confederations that domi-
nate the labor scene, but it is respected as an organ-
ization that gives priority to seeking reforms within
the present economic system.
20. A small group of dissidents continue to
operate under the old title, the French Confederation
of Christian Workers. In 1970 this faction was given
official recognition as an organization entitled to
consult with the government and other labor confedera-
tions. According to its secretary general, Jean
Bornard, the union is not res+-ricted to ;hristian
workers. Its members and officials have various re-
ligious affiliations, or none at all. Bornard has
stated, however, that the union's philosophy is based
on the Christian concept of the human being, which
implies a balance of rights and duties. He has also
asserted that the union is independent of the govern-
ment-and political parties.
21. Other unions of significance are the Gen-
eral Confederation of Supervisory Employees, composed
of .technicians.and supervisory personnel in industry,
and the National Education Federation, representing
teachers and other civil servants at all levels of
the school system. These unions, along with the Con-
federation of Christian Workers, support strikes and
protest demonstrations when the need arises, but
neither is strongly leftist.
22. The supervisory and education unions are
the least politically oriented of the major labor
federations. Both tend to be more concerned over
social and economic issues than over political power
or union rivalry. They have only rarely been in-
volved in unity-of-action plans, largely because
such activities have political overtones.
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The Renault Strike-a Case in Point
23. The wildcat strike this year at the state-
owned Renault car plant, which lasted from 29 April
until 24 May, was initiated in the Le Mans plant by
82 : - setaiskilled workers. Eventually it affected
some 50,000 laborers from the other six Renault plants.
The riseMiskilied workers were demanding wage increases
ar_d a complete overhaul of a classification system
that resulted in frequent job shifts and fluctuations
in pay. During the last few years, the workers have
resented the system, not only because of its effects
on their income and chances of promotion but also be-
cause it deflated their sense of dignity.
24. The CFDT local leaders were the first to
respond to the protest movement. They immediately
adopted the stri,'ce as their own and proceeded to as-
sume leadership. The CFDT national leaders, however,
were somewhat restrained in their support of the
strike, primarily because the mood of the workers was
not revolutionary.
25. The CGT adopted an even more cautious ap-
proach t-?) the situation. The union had signed a col-
lective agreement with Renault the preceding February
that had covered wage increases for 1971. Lending
wholehearted . support to the strike would have obviously
placed the CGT in the position of being irresponsible
in failing to live up to a contract. Moreover, the
CGT did not want to risk undermining the basic strategy
of the French Communist Party, which advocates gaining
power through the polls rather than revolution. Given
this situation, the CGT, to which 70 percent of the
Renault employees belonged, sought desperately to end
the strike the day after it began. Despite strong op-
position from the CFDT, the CGT arranged for the workers
to hold a secret vote on whether to continue the strike.
Fifty-five percent abstained, but. of those voting, 53
percent favored the strike. Th,a CGT was forced to go
along with the protes`:, but it was careful to dis-
courage the impression that it was fomenting unrest.
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26. The Workers' For-.e was not represented
at the Le Mans plant, and it did not become involved
in the strike until it had spread to the other Re-
nault plants. Its representatives then contributed
decisively to bringing the strike to an end by urging
the workers to be cool and wary of the promises of
the CFDT.
27. Thi.ughout the strike, the government's
"hands-off" policy forced the unions to accept man-
agement as its bargaining partner and frustrated
any attempts by labor leaders to politicize the
protery, The Director General of Renault responded
to the unexpected strike with firmness but restraint.
Using a technique French management often employs
when dealing with wildcat strikes in large establish-
ments, he laid off nonstriking employees shortly
after the,strike began on the grounds that components
necessary to operations were in short supply. Manage-
ment's bargaining position in the strike was strong
because Renault pays semiskilled- workers higher .
wages than some French industries pay to specialized
craftsmen and skilled workers. Also important was
the fact that working conditions at Renault are
among the best in the country.
28. The compromise settlement which ended the
strike fell far short of the workers' demands. Al-
though the agreement opened the door to the revi-
sion of the pay system for semiskilled workers
throughout the metal industry, this concession did
not take effect at once. Nor did the agreement
provide for an immediate wage increase. But the
workers were in no mood for a fight to the finish,
and they approved the terms of the agreement by a
4-to-1 majority on 24 May. The Renault strike
revealed many features of the current French labor
scene:
1). The propensity of the CFDT to seize every
opportunity to challenge the economic system and the
government; 2). The commitment of the French Com-
munist Party and the CGT to pursue a strategy of re-
spectability; 3). The current low level of militancy
among French workers, which suggests that the May
crisis has left little inclination to repeat the
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experience soon; 4). The government's endorsement
of the full responsibility for nationalized enter-
prises in handling labor disputes, which implies also
that the management of any such enterprise assumes
full responsibility; 5). The intense competition
at the grass-roots level between the CGT and the
CFDT, despite their national campaigns calling for
joint protest demonstrations when the government
fails to meet worker demands.
Prospects for Labor Unity
29. French trade unions have long sought unity
of action as a tool to increase labor benefits. Few
union leaders want organizational unity, with all the
labor organizations losing their separate identities
and political orientations. The CGT and the CFDT
have twice attempted to agree on a common platform
to strengthen their-leverage in bargaining with man-
agement and the government, but basic ideological
and tactical differences prevent them from cooperating
on any other than an ad hoc basis. Neither their
January 1966 agreement to collaborate at the na-'
-.tional:level on economic issues nor::.their accord of
December 1970 to work jointly for labor benefits has
had a significant effect upon the la',or sector.
30. Re.ations between the two unions, always
tenuous, deteriorated sharply during the May crisis.
The independent, militant stance of the CFDT and its
close alliance with the revolutionary student move-
ment precluded any chance of serious collaboration
with the CGT. The latter, like the government, was
committed to ending the wave of spontaneous strikes,
and, unlike the CFDT, was careful not to advocate
the overthrow of the Gaullist regime.
31. The two unions differ not only on tactics
but also on goals. The CGT seeks higher wages for
every stratum of French labor, while the CFDT places
all its emphasis on war" hikes and benefits for the
lowest-paid workers. i"reover, the CGT thinks of
itself as the tradition :?1 spoke:;man for French labor
and is therefore reluctant to relinquish its dominant
position by aligning with the smaller, newer and
more militant CFDT.
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32. Nevertheless, the two unions recognize that
when they have acted in concert, the result has
almost always been a gain.f'or the workers. The _:ombined
forces of the two organizations represent roughly 65
percent of France's organised labor. The CGT realizes
that it cannot neglect the young workers who are
attracted by the militant leadership of the CFDT.
Nor can the smaller union ignore the preponderant
influence of the Communist group, to which all of
the other labor organizations must turn when they
want to disrupt electrical power, stop the operation
of trains, or organize a march of several hundred
thousand workers. The two unions will therefore
continue to explore the possibilities of cooperating
at the national level, even as they intensify their
competition at. local levels.
33. The CFDT and the Workers' Force have ex-
plored the possibility of cooperative action for a
number of years. Leaders of the two organizations
met at the beginning of :1970 and agreed to cooperate
in the future when possible. But, aside from occa-
sional joint campaigns, there has been little tangible
evidence of unity since. Even though the Workers'
Force continues to view close cooperation with the
CFDT as an effective counterweight to the CGT, tradi-
tional ideological differences between the two smaller
unions persist and preve.; serious coordination. The
CFDT, for example, still feels that the Workers' Force
represents the elite element of society-government
workers rather than the working class. The Workers'
Force, which is just as anticlerical as it is anti-
Communist, has never been convinced that the CFDT
has cut its religious ties.
34. The Workers' Force resents moves of the
CFDT to unite with the CGT. Since its'break with
the CGT in 1947, the leaders of the Workers' Force
have strongly opposed cooperation with the Coimnu-
nist.s because they :fear that any joint action would
be dominated by the French Communist Party.
35. Other French labor unions have shown lit-
tle interest in unity-of-action campaigns.
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Outlook
36. The Pompidou regime has been relatively
successful in dealing with the day-to-day problems
that have developed in the labor sector over the
last two years. The rising standard of living and,
the implementation of major labor legislation have
contributed greatly to labor peace. Although in-
flation and unemployment trouble workers, the franc
is fairly strong, and measures are being taken to
stabilize the economy. The government is also
working earnestly to provide more jobs and train-
ing skills for workers. With the exception of the
26-day wildcat strike at Renault last April, the
present administration has succeeded in averting
major labor crises. In the last two years there
has been only some minor labor unrest among metro
workers, farmers, small shopkeepers, truck drivers,
miners, civil servants, airline pilots, and police-
men.
37. In the coming months, labor peace will
probably be threatened by an occasional demonstra-
tion or strike. Workers and union leaders will
step up their campaign for labor reforms by reopen-
ing old issues and searching for new ones. But as
long as labor receives significant concessions from
the government and feels its position is sympatheti-
cally reviewed, it will not join alienated French
students in protest to set off another explosion.
The most probable union goals will be salary in-
creases commensurate with rising prices and a lower-
ing of the retirement age from 65 to 60 years.
These issues are popular with many workers in both
the public and private sectors. In September the
French national police threatened to occupy the of-
fices of the prime minister and the finance minister
and to organize a march on the Elysee if their de-
mands for pay increases and better working condi-
tions were not met. But police union representa-?.--
tives have ?recently.acceded..tb:.Interior:.Minister
Marcellin's request that no action be taken until
the outcome of budget discussions now in progress
is known.
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38. The desire of most workers to push hard
for pay increases may also be t,emperod by their fears
that the domestic economy has already been seriously
affected by the international monetary uncertainty.
At any rate, Chaban-Delmas,and his assistants will
continue to give top priority to improving the social
climate through better labor-management relations.
They must exercise considerable tactical skill to
allow the pot to bubble without boiling over.
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