PROSPECTS FOR THE 26TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 111
• Publication Date: September 16, 1971
• Content Type: IM

 ~L( d
Approved r Rele s005/08/ ~C - DP85T00875R00110aI~~rr~~pppp~ ~~yyCG~CR,,2
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Prospects for the 26th UN General Assembly
25X1
Secret
16 September 1971
No. 2069/71
Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2 88
 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100111-2
WARNING
This document contain, information affeew. r the national
defense of the United States, within the ):,eaning of Title
18, see' :ons 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amanded.
Its trau ,mission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
ZXCLUD):D MOM AUTOMATIC
DOWNll11AUINO AND
DIX:I.ANYIYIrATION
Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100111-2
 Approved For Release
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 September 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Prospects for the 26th UN General Assembly
Introduction
The Assembly opening on 21 September may mark
a turning point for the UN, given Peking's reason-
ably good prospects for admission and the present
likelihood that a new secretary general will be
selected before the meeting ends.* Moreover, the
international community appears ready for extended,
acrimonious debate on various facets of the Middle
Past problem, the Korean question, several African
issues, budgetary problems and, possibly, certain
arms control subjects. This memorandum examines
these and other matters of particular interest to
the US.
Note: 7PT'is memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current InteZZigenee and coordinated within CIA.
Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : - DP85T00875R001100100111-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2
F SCRET
Background
1. The tame Assembly meeting last fall was
not altogether favorable to our interests. The
Albanian Resolution to seat Peking and expel Tai-
pei received a majority--51-49--for the first
time and was defeated only because th US again
secured a majority ruling--66-52--that any change
in Chinese representation is an Important Question
requiring a two-thirds vote. On Middle East issues,
the Arabs--frustrated in their attempts to obtain
redress in the Security Council--turned to the As-
sembly and won adoption of a contentious resolution.
The voting tended to isolate the US on the Israeli
side. On the other hand, the US was able to win
Assembly endorsement of the seabeds demilitariza-
tion treaty and of the proposal for a Law of the
Sea conference in 1973.
Chinese Representatior,
2. The international status of Peking has im-
proved since the 1970 voting; about as many UN mem-
bers new recognize mainland China as recognize Tai-
wan. In response to the changed situation, the US
last month opted for a dual representation approach
to the China issue. This was tied to a modified
Important Question resolution that would meike only
the expulsion of Taipei subject to a two-thirds
vote. The draft dual representation resolution
has recently been amended to concede the China
seat in the Security Council to Peking, but it
does not deal with the conflicting claims of Pe-
king and Taipei to represent all of China.
3. Rounding up co-sponsors for the new strategy
has proved difficult, in part because a number of
governments are still not convinced that the US it-
self plans an all-out fight to preserve Taipei's
status. Under the assumption that the Communists
would not enter the UN while Taipei retained mem-
bership, the Nationalists had reluctantly accepted
dual representation as a tactic when the resolution
did not initially give the Security Council seat to
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/0 P85T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 75 R001100100111-2
Peking. Now that it has been amended to concede the
seat, Taipei will probably not only denounce the pro-
posal when it is made publi-c, but will be unwilling
to instruct its representatives to continue privately
seeking its allies' votes for dual representation.
4. The Alba ian Resolution was amended this
year to specify that the Communists get the Coun-
cil seat. The pro-Peking camp placed it on the
Assembly's tentative agenda well before the US sub-
mitted its item for inscription last month. Peking
has officially denounced the US initiative, main-
taining firmly that its acceptance would result in
the mainland's continued exclusion. The Soviets
have made some low-key remarks in support of the
Albanian Resolution and against dual rep esentaticn,
but they are believed to be apprehensive over what
China's presence at the UN means for them.
5. The Chinese representation issue this year
is certain to provoke an unprecedented amount of
parliamentary maneuvering of great complexity. The
US hopes to secure priority consideration for its
Important Question resolution and to have it adopted
by the requisite simple majority. Should that tac-
tic be approved, the Albanian Resolution would need
to garner two-thirds support. The pro-Peking camp
is, of course, seeking priority consideration for
the Albanian Resolution without the Important Ques-
tion hurdle, and should it succeed in its endeavor,
adoption of the Albanian Resolution would be certain.
Peking's friends may also opt to raise the matter
early in the session by challenging Taipei in the
credentials committee. Peking, however, would pre-
fer to have the issue settled in the plenary.
The Middle East and Peace-keeing
6.
The resolution which the Arabs
pushed rough last year amounted to a highly
selective interpretation of the 1967 Council reso-
lution on how peace might be achieved. Hoping this
25X1
Approved For Release 2005 1 -RDP85T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08( t 9DP85T00875R001100100111-2
25X1
year to pick up US support, the Arabs may settle
for a more moderate text that would concentrate
on subjects on which the US and Israel apparently
disagree. Such a resolution could, for example,
call for a positive Israeli response to the sug-
gestions of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring for interim
steps toward a definitive settlement, and condemn
Israeli actions in Jerusalem. The Israelis in
turn surely would seek to exacerbate intra-Arab
tensions by raising the subject of the continuing
clashes between Jor&_i and the fedayeen.
7. Although peace-keeping mechanisms would be
an essential part of any Middle East accord, the
Assembly is not likely to make any substantial prog-
ress toward breaking the lengthy impasse over guide-
lines for UN peace-keeping missions. Moscow's recent
reply to the US proposals of 1970 was a rehash of the
Soviet view that any mission should be fully under
the control of the Security Council, where permanent
members may exercise a veto. The Soviets will prob-
ably adhere to this view in spite of cccasional hints
that they would like to achieve some sort of an a.
commodation before Peking assumes a seat in the ON.
8. Troubled by the continuing deadlock, -)ther
UN members, especially Canada, may seek Assembly ap-
proval of at least some interim measores on peace-
keeping. The most promising of these would set up
a roster of troops and facilities that member states
are willing to provide. Although the Soviets favor
the roster concept, they have in the past insisted
that it be part of a total package of peace-keeping
arrangements. Action on the interim steps would be
important in that it would demonstrate the strong
commitment of the members in an area envisaged by
the Charter as one of the UN's key functions.
9. The mandate o:: the UN Relief and Works
Agency, which provides assistance in the Middle
East refugee areas, expire, next June. The Assem-
bly is not likely to terminate the agency's existence,
but it may be forced to make substantial reductions
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/00Z:2-:'M- DP85T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08/2285T00875R001100100111-2
25X1
in food and educational programs in view of the
agency's perennial budgetary problems. The Jor-
danians and Lebanese claim any cuts would facili-
tate fedayeen recruitment- among refugee teeAlagers.
Egypt has already protested to Secretary General
Thant the recent destructiono 6f., housing-:and-:reset-
tlement of some refugees and agency employees in
Gaza and will no doubt raise the issue again when
the item is considered by the Assembly.
Other Security Issues
10. India and Pakistan have been leveling
charges against each other in UN forums for several
months, and Assembly delegates are likely to be
subjected to further harangues. The South Asian
crisis could become even more pressing should the
fighting heat up or should famine conditions de-
velop despite the reliaf efforts of the interna-
tional community. The Security Council has so far
not formally considered the India-Pakistan issue,
but Islamabad is talking about introducing it in
October, when it expects that Peking will be oc-
cupying the China seat.
11. The Turkish and Greek foreign ministers
are scheduled to discuss Cyprus privately on 1Oc-
tober during their visits to the Assembly. The
prospect troubles Cypriot Pzesident Makarios, who
resists any attempt to impose a settlement of in-
tercommunal differences on thy; island. To head off
this possibility, he appears to be angling for a
Secretariat, and possibly an Assembly, declaration
of support for Cyprus' sovereignty. The UN force
in Cyprus is having its usual fiscal and manpower
problems, and these are certain to receive consider-
able attention when the -enewal of its mandate comes
before the Council in December.
12. Ireland has given no indication that it
will seek Assembly action on the crisis in Uls-"--er,
but it could well raise the issue unless tensions
soon abate. The UK probably can defeat any Irish
bid by warning the members, as it did two years
ago, of the risks of UN involvement.
25X1
Approved For Release 2 I I 5R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2
SECRET
25X1
Arms Control
13. The Assembly is likely to review the US-
Soviet draft convention curbing biologi,::al weapons
that is expected to be endorsed soon at the 25-nation
Geneva disarmament conference. Nonal:;gned members
would have preferred a convention deal?ng with chem-
ical weapons as well, and they may seek a firmer
commitment from the superpowers to negotiate an
agreement in that area. Approval of the biological
weapons convention by the Assembly could be jeop-
ardized if there should be a push for language that
would challenge the US contention that the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 does not ban the use of tear gas
and herbicides in war.
14.. The question of a comprehensive ban on
nuclear testing should receive considerable atten-
tion in the Assembly, especially if. the US--despite
Tokyo's and Ottawa's objections on environmental
grounds--goes ahead with its plans for a high-yield
underground test in the Aleutians next month. Many
nonnuclear countries also believe that such a ban
would limit further improvements in strategic
weaponry of the nuclear powers, and thus enhance
the chances of success in the strategic arms limi-
tation talks. There have been inconclusive indica-
tions that Moscow may be preparing an initiative to
capitalize on this interest of the nonnuclear states
and carry a step further the "disarmament offensive"
launched by Brezhnev in March. Such a proposal
would probably call for verification of compliance
by an international "nuclear detection club" using
seismic data exchanges.
15. The Assembly's annual review of the Geneva
talks probably will conclude satisfv..ctorily since
the draft biological weapons convention meets the
Assembly's informal criteria that some progress be
recorded each year in the disarmament arena. The
recent Soviet call for consideration of a world
disarmament conference is not likely to make any
headway this fall. There has been little pressure
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/2 85T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 1t
: Lip, 5T00875RO01100100111-2
for an all-states approach from UN members in re-
cent years, but the concept in the future could
gain more backing if the Geneva conferees were to
appear incapable of achieving further substantive
agreements.
Perennial Issues
16. The Assembly may also be seized with the
South-West Africa question. The Africans have ten-
tatively scheduled a Security Council meeting on
the topic for later this month when senior repre-
sentatives should be on hand. Their purpose is to
seek support for further measures against South
Africa--perhaps even its expulsion--as a result of
the June advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice that upheld the Assembly's termination
five years ago of Pretoria's mandate over the. terri-
tory. If, as is likely, their proposals arc vetoed
by the Western powers in the Council, the Africans
will probably take the issue to the Assembly.
17. Rhodesia is another preoccupation of the
Africans, but probably they will largely confine
their efforts against Salisbury to the Council, which
must enforce the UN's sanctions program. The Por-
tuguese territories are more likely to be considered
in the Assembly. There, the West will be hard
pressed to defeat an expected African demand that
the various liberation movements be represented on
the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
18. The West had hoped to avoid debate on the
Korean question this year, but the Communists have
again put forward their proposals for the withdrawal
of foreign forces from the peninsula and the dis-
solution of the UN Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea. The Communists will
also seek an unconditional invitation for Pyongyang
t' participate in the debate, but Seoul's allies
can probably again secure adoption of a resolution
that would effectively require the North Koreans
to accept the UN's author.Yty. This outcome is less
certain than in the past, because of reverberations
from the Chinese representation issue.
Approved For Release 2005/08/2? - 8'5T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 , T00875R001100100111-2
25X1
19. The UN budget, a source of controversy
for years, will be heatedly debated again this year
as the major donor nations seek to rein in the gen-
erally accelerating costs of the organization and
the demands of the less developed nations for eco-
nomic assistance. Aggravating the budgetary problem
is the threat of the UN's staff employees to resort
to strike action next month if their demands for
a 15 percent pay boost are not met by the Assembly.
Other Subjects
20. Membership questions in addition to the
China issue include the applications of Bhutan and
Bahrain. The admission of both is certain to be
approved, raising the UN membership to 129. The
Assembly probably will also consider the candidacies
of Oman, whose application had been delayed by the
Council, and Qatar, which recently became independ-
ent. The Soviets will strongly support Pankow's
bid to gain the status in UN agencies that Bonn now
enjoys. They could threaten to boycott or downgrade
important UN events, such as the environmental con-
ference scheduled for Stockholm next year, unless
the East and West Germans are placed on an equal
footing.
21. States such as Brazil may ask the Assembly
to postpone the Law of the Sea conference beyond
1973 so that they will have more time to drum up
support for their claims to extensive territorial
waters. The US and the USSR share an interest in
narrower limits and firmer rights of passage through
international straits, and they probably have the
votes this fall to defeat any delaying move.
22. Two topics dealing with outer space are
likely tc receive some attention by the Assei:,,?)ly.
The members almost certainly will endorse and open
for signature the liability convention designed to
provide compensation for damage causca by errant
space vehicles. Mutual concessions by the East
and West early this summer broke the three-year
impasse over the terms of the convention. A draft
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/2.1"=-WOP85T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2
SECRET
treaty on the moon ballyhooed by the Soviets last
spring may be brought before the Assembly, but most
delegations appear to share the US view that it
offers virtually nothing not already contained in
the Outer Space Treaty of 1966.
23. The UN has long been. a forum for the air-
ing of concerns about human rights, and tais year
should prove no exception. The Israeli-occupied
territories, the South Asian imbroglio, and the
white redoubts of Africa will all receive attention.
There will also probably be considerable East-West
conflict over the proposal, backed by the US since
1965, that the post of UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights be established. The Soviets clearly
fear that the potentially broad powers of such an
office could be used to focus unwanted attention
on their internal affairs.
24. A thorough revamping of the cumbersome
Assembly structure was a key goal of the US and
Canadc. last fall, and a committee of 31 was estab-
lished to study the situation. The committee will
offer only a few minor proposals this year. Most
members seem still to prefer the status quo; which
gives the smaller states many opportunities to ex-
press their views and to hold chairmanships, to a
more efficient organization composed of fewer, more
specialized committees.
25. More likely to be altered in a signifi-
cant way by Assembly action is the UN's Economic
and Social Council. The Assembly probably will ap-
prove a resolution to double the size of the Council
from 27 to 54 members, although some nonaligned na-
tions, especially Yugoslavia and Brazil, consider
the increase inadequate. The US is supporting the
measure in return for the establishment of more
efficient procedues for the Council to deal with
scientific questions and UN aid programs.
26. The Soviets have again placed on the As-
sembly agenda their proposal to "strengthen inter-
national security," which was first outlined by
Foreign Minister Gromyko in a speech two years ago.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/22 5T00875R001100100111-2
 Approved For Release 2005/08q.Pff P85T00875R001100100111-2
25X1
Moscow apparently intends to use the proposal. as a
vehicle to propagandize the Brezhnev "peace offen-
sive" and to push for a conference on European se-
curity. Only 22 of the 127 UN members replied to
Secretary General Thant's request for comments on
the subject, however, indicating that most UN mem-
bers remain apathetic. The Yugoslavs, moreover,
hope to amend any such Soviet-sponsored resolution
to call for scrupulous respect for national inde-
pendence. Such a text could be construed as a
condemnation of the Brezhnev doctrine.
Conclusions
27. The UN may well be entering a new phase
of its development. Peking's entry would not nec-
essarily pose insuperable problems, and it would
clearly make the UN more representative of the
existing world situation and its changing powLr re-
lationships. New faces in the secretariat appear
likely, and the international community should
profit from that change. The Assembly session will
almost certainly arra:i.n demonstrate its utility as
a forum for the airing and, in some cases, easing
of grievances. In certain areas, such as the Middle
East and South Ania, UN discussions may exacerbate
immediate problems, but prospects are that the ses-
s:on will show once more that there are still in-
ternational concerns that the UN alone is equipped
to address.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2