LATIN AMERICAN OCEAN NATIONALISM: THE 200-MILE CLAIM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100075-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: August 16, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Latin American Ocean Nationalism: The 200-Mile Claim
Secret
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 ar.;d 794, of the US Coae, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
ERCLUDCD YROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNUNADINO AND
DM:I.A8Y1-ICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 August 1971
Latin American Ocean Nationalism: The 200-Mile Claim
Summary
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Since 1947, Latin American
territorial-sea claims have been
at variance with widely accepted
international norms and increasingly
a subject of dispute with the US.
In the last decade the claims, which
reflect in large part the growth of
nationalism in the hemisphere, have
made considerable headway and have
been pressed more forcefully. Fishing
disputes and seizures of US vessels
by several countries have become a
major source of friction in US -
Latin American relations, and the
controversy has had repercussions
for other hemispheric issues as
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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well. Brazil, which takes the strongest position of
all the 200-mile claimants, is attempting to forge a
coordinated Latin American approach to the problem
as part of its concerted foreign policy effort to
expand its leadership and influence in the hemisphere.
Preparations now under way for the UN-sponsored
Law of the Sea Conference in 1973 have brought into
clear focus the implications for the US that are in-
herent in a 200-mile claim. At the same time, they
have provided the Latin t.mericans with an international
stage on which to maneuver and a potentially receptive
Third World audience on the need for underdeveloped
nations to protect their resources by making a 200-mile
claim.
Commitment to the 200-mile stand varies and,
statements for public consumption notwithstanding,
Brazil's tough position is likely to be offset by
more flexible positions in other Latin American
countries. If isolated, Brazil may find that its
long-term plans for leadership in the hemisphere
dictate compromise in its position, rather than the
obstinacy that sometimes has characterized its at-
titude. For a variety of external and internal
reasons, however, the Latin American nations today
are more acutely sensitive than ever to real or
imagined threats to their sovereignty. Incidents
with US fishing vessels and the consequent use, or
alleged use, of US sanctions and pressures have
hardened Latin American positions. Similar diffi-
culties in the future would make Brazil's prose-
lyting task easier, because even the moderates have
demonstrated that they see little alternative to
unified action in the face of anticipated pressures
from the US.
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Historical Background
1. Traditionally, major powers have favored a
maximum freedom of the seas policy and, consequently,
narrowly defined coastal state jurisdictions. This
position was an outgrowth of their interests in
shipping and trade and their heavy reliance on un-
restricted sea power. Smaller states had neither the
motivation :ior the means to dispute the arbitrarily
established three-mile territorial seas limit. The
three-mile delineation seems to have no well-documented
origin, although it is commonly accepted that it arose
because it was the approximate measure of the distance
of a cannon shot from shore. A less imaginative ex-
planation claims that it came about because three
nautical miles also equals one league, which formerly
,was a common unit of measure in marine terminology.
2. The Latin American break with precedent,
beginning in the late 1940s, has been the most extreme
and widely publicized of the departures from the three--
mile limit. The Latin Americans, however, attempt to
justify their claims by pointing to the earlier Truman
proclamations. In a 1945 declaration on the Continental
Shelf, the US laid claim to the natural resources of the
seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf off its
coast. A second Truman proclamation provided for the
establishment of fishing conservation zones extending
an unspecified distance out to sea. The US did not by
these actions attempt to establish full sovereignty
over the shelf, nor did it claim sovereignty over the
sea above the continental slope. In addition, no fishing
conservation zones as provided for in the second procla-
mation have been established. The Latin American states
argue, however,, that the principle is the same: The
unilateral declarations by the United States reflected
its particular interests, just as the Latin Americans'
territorial sea claims reflect their national needs.
3. The Truman declarations thus inadvertently pro-
voked Latin American claims that, at this point, chal-
lenge the concept of freedom of the high seas. in 1947,
both Peru and Chile announced unilateral extensions of
their seaward territorial limits without regard for the
extent of their continental shelf. In June of that year
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Chile, citing prior action by the US, became the
first to proclaim a 200-mile boundary. The Chilean
declaration established a zone of protection and
control to 200 miles, which served as a model and
precedent for other nations. In August, Peru
followed suit with a similarly worded claim. Ec-
uador joined the group in 1952 with fishing and
continental shelf c;iaiois to 200 miles. Its narrower
claim of 12 miles o+ !:vereign territorial sea has
since been expanded to encompass the entire zone.
In that same year the trio signed the Declaration
of Santiago, which recognized and unified their re-
spective claims and established a formal consultative
group called the South Pacific Commission. Other
Latin American nations, although they did not imme-
diately join in the move for wider seas, expressed
solidarity with the Santiago group, known as the
CEP countries.
5. Internationally, the difficulties stemming
from sometimes imprecise and contradictory claims
were creating a problem of major concern. In rec-
ognition of this, international conferences on the
Law of the Sea were held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960
under UN auspices. Agreement on outstanding issues
was not reached, although at the conference in 1960
a proposal for six miles of territorial sea and an
additional six-mile fishing zone was defeated by
only one vote. The question of the breadth of the
territorial seas was the major stumbling block. In
addition, the conference did not arrive at a precise
definition of the limits of the continental shelf.
Conference terminology delineated the shelf as "ex-
tending to a depth of 200 meters or...to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of exploration
of natural resources." Advancing technology, facil-
itating exploration at greater depth, has made even
this imprecise definition inadequate and outdated.
In addition, widening claims have made the "six plus
six" formula proposed in 1960 a relic.
6. Although the Latin Americans are the most
visible and vocal of the claimants for expanded ter-
ritorial sea rights and certainly at the fore of the
movement for expanded coastal state ocean rights,
they also reflect a gradually shifting sentiment
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that has had an impact beyond Latin American shores.
In 1930, the majority of states accepted the tra-
ditional three-mile limit for a territorial sea and
only the USSR claimed a 12-mile limit. By 1971,
about 51 countries, or nearly half of the world's
coastal states, claimed a 12-mile territorial sea,
and some 14 others claimed various distances between
12 and 200 miles. In 1958, the year of the first
Geneva conference, territorial sea claims encom-
passe,a 1,397,986 square nautical miles; by 1971
claims were made to 4,463,592 square nautical miles.
More than 70 percent of this latter total was ac-
counted for by six Latin Amer can states and by
Guinea; Indonesia, and the Philippines.
A Proliferation of Claims in Latin America
7 The ranks of the original three-member, 200-
.mile club have been swollen by the addition of Argen-
tina, Brazil, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay. A
n
?.
less swccr+.a
which decreed a 200-mile fishing zone. Other nations
own o e consi-
k
n
are
. -.---- Costa Rican legislators on several oc-
its
li
m
sent
.casions have introduced bills allotting an undefined
"special competence" over a 200-mile zone to the
12-mile limit-was--also introduced, although a poten-
tial seaward boundary d.ispL :.e with Venezuela appears,
along with other factors, to have put an effective
brake on the territorial rea ambitions in the con-
gress.
8. Even the smaller countries see little reason
antiquated limit. In the Caribbean, Jamaica recently
miles with so little forethought that, after passing
the legislation, it came to light that the Jamaicans
of
e
~
were uncertain as to whether_their.claim waswon
to be independent within a few years, is considering
the
an
assed by its more than 200 :islands. During the
com
p
eral weeks Trinidad has been trying to con-
t
sev
pas
voke a meeting of all. Caribbean countries to cons ic9er
a common seas policy.
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9. As the numerous post-1952 claims make evi-
dent, a majority of the Latin American states now
are dissatisfied with the three miles recognized
by the United States. Most of'the more extensive
Latin American claims have been lodged relatively
recently, suggesting that in the absenca of an in-
ternational accord on the issue, sentiment for wider
boundaries is still gathering momentum. In addition,
there have been further efforts to institutionalize
Latin American claims. The CEP countries have used
meetings of the Latin American Parliament, repre-
senting the several nations' congresses, to push
through resolutions recommending that other coastal
states proclaim expd)ded jurisdictions. Aside from
the incipient Caribbean move to form a consultative
group, Uruguay announced in June that it was under-
taking an initiative to create a common organization
for the South Atlantic 200-milers--Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay. The Montevideo group apparently would
parallel the South Pacific Commission set up in 1952
by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
?10. Brazil is the most recent 200-mile claimant
and, by virtue of its size and importance in Latin
America and the fact that a large foreign fleet fishes
off its shores, is also the most significant. Its
decree of March 1970 was implemented in June of this
year and is the most restrictive to date. In addition
to claiming complete sovereignty over the continental
shelf, subsea resources, the sea, and the airspace
above, Brazil later issued detailed decrees regulating
fishing in its claimed waters. In the first 100-mile
zone, fishing is reserved exclusively for Brazilian
vessels or boats under charter to Brazilian firms.
Foreign craft may purchase licenses for fishing priv-
ileges only in the 100-to 200-mile zone, and, even
here, only Brazilian boats are permitted to fish for
crustaceans. Brazil thus reserves for itself the
shrimp and lobster harvests, which are the most prof-
itable and account for the bulk of the catch in the
area.
Rationale of the Latin American Claim
11. As prev.ously noted, the Latin Americans
contend that the Truman declarations furnished both
legal and moral precedents. Even today, the 200-
milers are quick to seize on any indication that
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wider territorial boundaries are being favored in
the US. Statements from US congressmen advocating
a US 200-mile decree, or actions-by coastal state
legislators aimed at expanding state boundaries to
protect fishing resources, are exploited and cir-
culated.
12. The Latin Americans now justify their
claim, to a large extent, on economic gr-linds.
The Humboldt Current flows off the west coast of
South America, and most of the commercially prof-
itable schools of fish follow the current--some
30 to 200 miles offshore. At present, the bulk of
the fishing catch taken off the shores of South
America, aside from Peru's anchovy haul, is netted
by foreign fleets--largely US, Japanese, and Rus-
sian. The South American states are not in direct
competition with these boats; their own fishing
fleets are relatively small and generally confine
their activities to sea lanes close to shore. The
South American states argue, however, that narrow
boundaries deprive them of their control over the
foreign fleets and of their right to protect a
potentially valuable national economic resource.
A 200-mile boundary is justified as an ecological
buffer as well. Recent oil spills, for example,
reinforce the argument that a wide sovereign zone
is necessary, if only to protect shorelines. The
Latin Americans also contend that their expanded
claims to the sea are justified because the bio-
logical riches of the ocean contiguous to their
shores stem in part from the land. The Peruvians
point to ocean-bound rivers rich with nutrients
and to the highly fertile guano droppings that
add to the enrichment of the waters. An additional
economic impetus for these developing states is the
generally unvoiced but widely held belief that coastal
seas will yield as yet undiscovered natural riches.
13. Using the presence of fish as an argument
enables the 200-milers to turn aside the blandish-
ments of the advocates for a claim based on the con-
tinental shelf. They contend that the use of a geo-
logical concept such Ps the shelf as a base for
claims favors the US, which has a wide shelf and an
extensive foreign fleet with which to fish other
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shores. The biological zone, which takes fish and
other living resources into account, is more suited
to their needs. As a final counter to the continen-
tal shelf proponents, the Latin'states point to the
west coast of South America in rebuttal. Here, espe-
cially along the Ecuadorean coast, the shelf is narrow
and drops off precipitously, naturally limiting a
claim based on the underw~:ter slope.
14,, Relatively little effort is made to justify
the 200-mile claim in terms of national defense. In
the case of Argentina, and perhaps Uruguay and Brazil,
the presence of Soviet boats fishing in coastal waters
has sometimes aroused concern, and the use of expanded
claims as a means of future control may have been a
minor consideration for the extension of sea jurisdic-
tion. With respect to contemporary needs and capabili-
ties, however, the national defense argument is implic-
itly recognized as untenable. Even in Brazil, the most
powerful of the Latin American states, the influential
newspaper 0 Estado de Sao Paulo cautioned after the
extension of Brazilian c a:ms that the country was in
no position to control ant monitor movement in its ar-
flung territorial waters, given the size of its sea and
air patrol forces. Naval spokesmen are now attempting
to use this argument to justify inci,eased expenditures
for new equipment with which to fulfill their expanded
responsibilities.
Nationalism as a Factor
15. The 'JO-mile issue is firmly rooted in the
nationalism that has gained an increasingly firm hold
on Latin American policies in the last decade. It has
become a major irritant in US bilateral relations with
several countries and already has demonstrated its po-
tential for sparking diplomatic confrontations. In-
variably, related problems with the US, such as those
involving fishing disputes, have united both the rulers
and the opposition in condemnation of US "affronts" to
national sovereignty. Mass media across the political
spectrum applaud the unified stand against the US "co-
lossus." Tile reaction has been uniform, varying only
in the degree of its virulence, throughout Latin America
whether the regime has been of the left or right, mili-
tary or civilian.
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16. With the waning of the optimism surrounding
the years of the All. arice `or Progress, the Latin
Americans have gradually lost confidence in bilateral
US aid as a panacea for their problems. With US at-
tentions and priorities focused elsewhere, the Latin
Americans have come to believe in a self-help nation-
alism, with greater interest in multilateral approaches
to difficulties. This view of foreign events, in con-
junction with increasing domestic pressu:-es for rapid
solutions to economic and political problems, has made
US interests more vulnerable than at any time in the
past. The rash of nationali?ation legislation, from
the graduated approach taken by Venezuela to the sweep-
ing approach taken by Chile, is the most obvious mani-
festation of the new order. Other illustrations abound,
such as Panama's unyielding approach to canal negotia-
tions with the US and the current effort by several
states to expand trade and contacts with the Communist
world.
17. The territorial seas controversy has been
carried along in this rush to nationalism. In taking
over U5 companies, the Latin Americans accuse the US
of economic rape of the land. Few voices would be
raised in opposition to the contention that 200-mile
legislation forestalls similar rapacious intent via
the sea.
The Fishing Rights Controversy
18. The most dramatic effect of the 200-mile
claim has been to embroil the US and several of the
Latin American countries in disputes over fishing
rights. Although boats from several nations have
occasionally been rounded up--Soviet craft have been
fined for several years, Argentina fined a Greek
trawler several months ago, and the Central Ameri-
cans have fired on one another's boats--the principal
target of the 200-mile decrees has been the US. Un-
til this year, the controversy principally concerned
the CEP countries, and of the three, Ecuador has been
the primary disputant. Chile, whose cold waters are
less attractive to the deep-water fleets, has seized
only one US boat wince promulgating its claim. Peru
and Ecuador have been seizing and fining US boats
since 1958. Enforcement of the claims, however, has
been uneven and generally has depended on the internal
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political situation and the current state of bilateral
relations with the US. The government in Peru, for
example, currently moderating its policies following
a hectic rush to a revolutionary pose after taking
power in 1968, apparently has seen fit to ignore boats
in its waters this year.
19. The dispute moved to the negotiating table
in 1969 when the CEP countries agreed to join the US
in four-power talks. US bilateral. relations with
Peru were strained at the time by the Peruvian ex-
propriation of the International Petroleum Company
and by the US suspension of military sales to Peru
imposed as a consequence of earlier boat seizures.
The agreement to proceed with the talks was reached
after the US had lifted the military sales suspension.
20. The talks have dragged on for more than two
years, with no appreciable progress toward a solution.
A basic tenet of the CEP coalition at the outset was
that the 200-mile claim itself was not negotiable.
It was this stance that had led the three countries
to refuse an earlier US proposal for talks that would
have included Japan and Canada, as the Latin Ameri-
cans feared their agreement to participate in more
wide-ranging talks would implicitly compromise the
validity of their claim. At present, the talks are
again stalemated by the refusal of the CEP countries
to attend scheduled sessions. They contend that US
pressures, e.g., the present US suspension of mili-
tary sales to Ecuador as a consequence of the spate
of Ecuadorean seizures of US boats earlier this year,
make it impossible to negotiate.
21. Ecuador's sudden and active enforcement of
its 200-mile law began in January of this year: over
a period of two and a
half months the Velasco
Ibarra government cap-
tured 26 US ships (in-
cluding two seizures of
the world's largest
tuna fishing vessel,
the Apollo) and col-
lected $1 million in
fines. President Vel-
asco may have ordered
the initial seizures;
The Tuna Ship Apollo, the largest in the world,
seized by Ecuador on 17 January.
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in any event, he quickly gave his consent to continued
naval operations. He hoped that the US-Ecuadorean
conflict would generate some popular enthusiasm for
his troubled'administration that was, at best, regarded
with indifference by the population. The Ecuadorean
campaign went to new extremes--a US naval cargo vessel
was fired upon when it passed close to Ecuador's Gala-
pagos Islands, almost 600 miles from shore. In re-
sponse to the US suspension of arms sales, the Velasco
government charged the US with "economic aggression"
and used an OAS meeting in Washington in January as a
forum to plead its case. In response to an Ecuadorean
request for a special meeting of foreign ministers to
consider its charges, the OAS voted 19-0 (with the US
abstaining) to convoke the session. The net result of
the meeting was an evenhanded resolution calling on
both parties not to aggravate the situation, but the
controversy created considerable political embarrass-
ment for the US and a short-term propaganda coup for
the Ecuadorean Government.
22. President Velasco's victory, if it was one,
was both pyrrhic and short-lived. Most Ecuadoreans
automatically supported the government's stand, but
the dispute did little to stir popular support for
the Velasco regime. Pressing his anti-US stanve fur-
ther, Velasco decided to expel the US military group
from Ecuador in March. The decision, taken without
consultation, was regretted generally in the govern-
ment and certainly by a majority in the relatively
moderate military. At present, opinion in the armed
forces would clearly seem to favor some modification
of the anti-US stance into which Velasco has maneu-
vered himself in attempting to court popular support.
23. The glare of publicity surrounding fishing
disputes has shifted since early this year to South
America's east coast, with the emergence of Brazil
as a late-blooming but vociferous proponent of the'
200-mile thesis. With the gradual expansion of the
200-mile club to include most coastal state countries,
it was not surprising that Brazil was drawn into the
group, and it began enforcing its legislation on 1
June 1971. Brazil's entry into the debate at this
time also reflects the government's confidence in
its domestic economic achievements and its desire to
expand its foreign role. Since promulgation of the
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legislation, Brazilian policy has been one of relative
restraint on the seas combined with an active and con-
certed foreign-policy effort to force the US into
making concessions.
24. Thus far, no US ship has been seized by
Brazil; Brazilian boats have simply warned US vessels
to depart their claimed waters. Although Brazilian
harassing tactics and the truculence of some US ship
captains have combined to create the potential for
several serious incidents, none has yet occurred.
Several Brazilian officials have commented that they
would prefer to apply the new law for the first time
to a ship within the more widely recognized zone of
12 miles. There is little reason to doubt the Bra-
zilians' oft-repeated statements that their policy is
designed to minimize the possibility of an ocean in-
cident that would jeopardize historically close re-
lations with the US, which they value highly. If at
some time in the future the Brazilians were to be-
lieve, however, that a selective seizure was needed
to strengthen their case or to serve their tactical
aim of creating a united front in Latin P'rerica on
the 200-mile issue, they would probably proceed.
25. Brazil's moderate ocean tactics have been
backed by an energetic diplomatic campaign. Since
June, Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa has met with
several other Latin American foreign ministers in
Brazil and is himself engaged in an extensive tour
of other Latin American capitals. At each stop, the
Brazilians coaxed a communique from their hosts that
directly or indirectly supported the Brazilian ter-
ritorial waters stand. In addition, Brazil has begun
fisheries negotiations with several foreign govern-
ments whose boats fish its shores. Tiny Surinam and
Trinidad-Tobago, out of whose ports many of the major
fishing companies have operated, can ill afford a
further pinch from the loss of fishing rights. These
countries are presently engaged in fisheries negotia.?-
tions with Brazil, and France has entered similar
discussions and seems willing to negotiate some sort
of settlement. The Brazilians, hard bargainers from
all accounts, will be attempting to use any agreements
that are reached to suggest that their claims have
recognized legal validity.
26. Brazil's sea claims involve several con-
siderations that are not applicable to other Latin
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American nations. Brazil aspires to leadership in
Latin America, and its aggressive foreign policy is
designed to establish such a role for itself not
only in the hemisphere but also in the Third World
generally. It has recently been'the most outspoken
advocate in international meetings of the need for
greater attention to the interests of the less de-
veloped countries and the most aggressive complainant
that major powers, principally the US, doninate inter-
national organizations and control them for their own
purposes. Seeing the Law of the Seas issue as a
Great Powers vs. the Third World contest, Brazil is
determined to play a leading role. Further, within
Latin America the nationalistic territorial seas
issue also presents rightist Brazil with an oppor-
tunity to occupy political center stage in the hemi-
sphere. Previously, such leftist regimes as those of
Peru and Chile, which have defied the US on bilateral
issues, have held the spotlight. To add further .:im-
petus, the Brazilians have long been convinced that
their country is destined for eventual great-power
status. With this future in mind, they seek to pre-
serve for their own exploitation as much of the ter-
ritorial sea, and its presumed riches, as possible.
27. The ill feeling created by several of these
h?.lateral disputes has spilled over onto multilateral
hemispheric issues as well. US legislators have pro-
posed mandatory sanctions against those countries that
seize US vessels in waters the US regards as high seas.
The Vessel Loan Act requires the President to cancel
such a loan if the participating country captures a US
vessel in international waters. The President is also
empowered, at his discretion, to withhold foreign aid
in the case of seizures. Neither of those provisions
has been applied, but each elicited protests from
Latin America when enacted. Recently, the US Congress
blocked, at least temporarily, continued US participa-
tion in the International Coffee Agreement, of which
Brazil is a principal beneficiary, and legislators'
public statements linked the action to Brazil's 200-
mile decree. in response, the foreign minister of
Colombia, which claims only a 12-mile sea, warned
that such action. on the part of the US could only
provoke a hardened and unified stand on territorial
waters from the rest of Latin America.
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International Impact
28. The Latin Americans have attempted, by
several means, to promote acceptance and support
for the 200-mile policy elsewhere in the world.
Invitations were extended to African and Asian
countries to attend both the 1970 and 1971 Law of
the Sea conferences held in Latin America, and
several delegates from Latin American countries
took advantage of reciprocal invitations to at-
tend the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee
Meeting in Ceylon this year. In addition to
such multilateral action, both the Peruvian and
Brazilian governments reportedly have pressed
bilateral campaigns in the nonaligned world through
the diplomatic representatives and UN delegations.
One aspect of the situation that promotes inflexi-
bility in the Latin Americans' position is their
belief that support for a 200-mile limit or some-
thing similar is growing and that the US, Russia,
and other developed countries preferring a narrow
limit will eventually find themselves an isolated
minority. To emphasize this view, the Latin Ameri-
cans can point to the sentiment for expanded claims
discernible in such diverse areas of the world as
Canada, Sierra Leone, and Iceland. The Latin
Americans have also found a more than willing prop-
aganda ally in mainland China. China, although
not claiming a 200-mile limit for itself, has
strongly endorsed the efforts of others in the
Third World to stand firm against what it sees as
US and Russian pressure.
29. Preparations for the 1973 Law of the
Sea Conference under UN sponsorship have brought
some of the questions involved in the territorial-
seas dispute into clear focus. Shipping and trade
would be restricted by world-wide acceptance of a
200-mile limit. Enforcement would close virtually
all of the important straits and seas of the world.
In addition, one of the chief spokesmen for the
Latin Americans on territorial sea matters, UN
Chilean representative Zegers, has been quick to
perceive the security interests behind US proposals
on Law of the Sea questions. In several instances,
he warned that if some compromise between the US
and Latin America on territorial limits could not
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be reached, then as a tactical move the Latin American
delegations might try to have the matter of peaceful
uses of the sea addressed in greater detail. This
issue, which would raise a host of problems for US
security-related operations, would not only stir
greater opposition to US proposals among nonaligned
nations, but also might make it more difficult for
the US and USSR to reach agreement on the maritime
subjects.
30. In addition to that tactical gambit, the
Latin Americans can also hope to use the conference
to promote Third World sentiment for a substantial
reordering of international law as it pertains to the
sea. One of the attractions of the 200-mile figure
for former colonial possessions is that it represents
an almost complete reworking of the international
norms set up when they were colonies and excluded
from the process. The Law of the Sea problem thus
presents an opportunity for the less developed coun-
tries to force new departures in the field of inter-
national law and to tie the specific matters at hand
to the general aspirations of those countries vis-a-vis
the super powers.
31. Although there is a host of complicated
questions involved in the prospective 1973 conference,
the territorial-limits controversy is'the focus of
Latin American efforts. The Latin Americans in
general, for example, pay heed to the concept of an
international regime for the control of the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction with benefits from ex-
ploitation to be distributed to all countries, whether
or not they possess a coastline. This notion, however,
takes a back seat to the basic question of coastal-
state sovereignty. Latin American countries are pri-
marily interested in retaining as many economic ad-
vantages for the coastal states as possible. Only
two states in Latin America, Bolivia and Paraguay,
are landlocked.
The 200-Mile Claim: Is It Really Non-negotiable?
32. The present public position of the recent
200-mile adherents is that the claim is a non-nego-
tiable, sovereign issue. In countries where the
claim has existed for decades, such as in Chile and
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CLAIMED MARITIME LIMITS
(in miles)
County
Territorial Sea Fishing Limit Expanded Claim
Argentina
200
200
1967
Barbados
3
12
Brazil
200
200
1970
Chile
27 (50 km.)
200
1947
Colombia
12
12
1923
Costa Rica
3
12
Cuba
3
3
Dominican Republic
6
12
1967
Ecuador
200
200
1952
El Salvador
200
200
1950
Guatemala
12
12
1958
Guyana
3
12
Haiti
6
6
Honduras
12
12
1965
Jamaica
12
12
1971
Mexico
12
12
1969
Nicaragua
3
200
1965
Panama
200
200
1967
Peru
200
200
1947
Trinidad-Tobago
12
12
1969
Uruguay
200
200
1969
Venezuela
12
12
1956
United States
3
12
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Peru, it has gained stature over a period of almost
25 years. In El Salvador, the 200-mile claim is en-
shrined as part of the national constitution. Several
of the Latin American governments lay claim not only
to the sea and its resources, but also to the conti-
nental shelf, the seabeds and subsea resources, and
to the airspace 200 miles out to sea.. Each government
is more than ready to engage in a bit of saber-rat-
tling for receptive domestic audiences in the event
of a real or imagined threat to its territorial sov-
ereignty. Despite the bravado, however, a majority
of the Latin Americans would now appear willing to
accept considerably less than the complete sovereignty
they currently claim.
33. At present, the Latin American position may
seem uncompromising, at least on the surface. :given
the CEP fisheries talks are stalled, with the Latin
Americans refusing to attend. There is little ttoub t,
however, that the three countries would be will.Lng to
resume talks as soon as the US lifts the suspension
of military sales to Ecuador. In public statements
making reference to the talks, representatives of
Peru and Ecuador have repeatedly singled out the sus-
pension as the primary--and probably only--roadblock
to their continued participation. Privately, the
Ecuadoreans have also signalled a more conciliatory
position on law of the sea matters.
34. It is doubtful, however, that there will be
much progress on territorial sea problems in the CEP-
US talks when they resume. Among other factors, the
participants will be engaged in formulating their
over-all strategy for the 1973 Law of the Sea Co~zfer-
ence and probably will be reluctant to enter into
agreements that might inadvertently bargain away any
tactical advantage they can save for the conference
itself. The CEP participants probably also look to
the talks not so much as a means of resolving the
multifaceted problems surrounding the fisheries dis-
pute, but rather as a face-saving mechanism allowing
tensions to abate, even if there is no real change
in the practical situation.
35. The Chileans, for a variety of reasons,
have played a relatively moderate role in regard to
the fishing dispute, as was illustrated by their
generally constructive actions during the OAS meeting
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in Washington earlier this year that considered Ec-
uador's charges of aggression against the US. Chile,
despite its position as historic groundbreaker on the
200-mile question, seems reluctant to press the fight,
for several reasons. Its claim calls for complete
territorial sovereignty only to 27 miles (50 kilometers),
with the 200-mile boundary termed a "zone of protection."
At the 1960 Geneva Conference, the CEP countries proposed
only that states with "exceptional" circumstances be
granted special jurisdictions. Also some of the ancho-
veta schools, which Chile fishes, have at times moved
north into Peruvian waters and so placed the Chilean
fishing industry at a disadvantage. In addition, Chile
already has considerable problems with US interests and
may not be particularly eager to lock horns on this issue.
It also has less at stake than several other countries.
36. The Ecuadoreans, Peruvians, and Chileans seem
to be lobbying among the other Latin American states
for a united position behind a substantially modified
proposal. The plan envisages laying claim only to a 12-
mile territorial sea in the classic sense, but. at the
same time decreeing a 200-mile economic zone. The
wider economic jurisdiction would presumably encompass
special fishing rights and probably a general claim to
economic resources as well. There is some evidence
that the other mainland South American 200 milers, with
the exception of Brazil, have found merit in the pro-
posal. The Brazilians, however, will presumably con-
tinue to argue strongly against the plan as well as
any effort to make it public in the near future. The
Brazilians apparently believe that such a public dec-
laration would risk losing a valuable negotiating po-
sition better saved for the 1973 Law of the Sea Con-
ference and certainly should not be floated now during
the six week Law of the Sea Preparatory Conference that
opened in Geneva on 19 July.
Prospects
37. Whether the potential Latin American position
is made public at the Geneva talks or not, it is apparent
that there is considerable flexibility on the territorial
limits question, even among the 200-milers. The Central
Americans, as well as many of the mainland South Ameri-
cans, will probably find themselves in general agreement
with the economic-zone proposal presently being floated.
It preserves one aspect of the claim that is, in fact,
probably non-negotiable. The 200-mile figure, if in
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somewhat diluted form, will be a necessary ingredient
in any territorial-seas agreement with the Latin Ameri-
cans. A second necessary aspect, given the widespread
publicity accorded the fishing dispute:, would be some
special coastal-state control over living resources.
38. There are two possible exceptions to the
softening position evident in Latin America. Panama,
presently engaged in attempting to wring as many con-
cessions from the US as possible during new canal
negotiations, may use its stand on the 200-mile ques-
tion as a bargaining wedge. in that case, its position
would be tempered or hardened depending on its estimate
of its chances in the canal talks.
39. Brazil his also demonstrated a penchant for
obstinacy in international negotiations. When its
arguments in favor of a strong agreement on terrorism
failed to carry the day during an OAS meeting this
year, it led an unprecedented six-nation walkout from
the deliberations rather than be voted down. The Bra-
zilians will probably be hard bargainers right down to
the wire and will try to prevent the Latin Americans
from breaking ranks. Confronted with considerable
sentiment for compromise, however, the Brazilians may
decide that their objective of becoming senior states-
men for the Southern Hemisphere dictates that they
assume a leading position within the Latin American
bloc, rather than play the role of maverick. Their
strategy will depend in part on what success their
demarches on the 20C-m..l question have in Africa and
Asia, and to what extent they have boxed themselves
in on the question at home.
40. To some degree, each nation's position on
the 200-mile issue will depend on its domestic polit-
ical situation. As has been repeatedly demonstrated,
US preosures and incidents involving US interests
only trigger a predictable chain reaction from both
the population and nationalistic-minded politicians.
The end result effectively reduces the government's
ability to compromise. Ecuador, stung by the US
suspension of military sales earlier this year, re-
sponded by expelling the US military mission and
initiating an anti-US campaign. Even the moderates
saw no alternative to voting with Ecuador at the OAS
meeting called in January to consider charges of US
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aggression. Pressures and actions that the Latin
Americans can interpret as sanctions designed to
force them toward an accommodation with US ocean
interests will only prompt the opposite effect.
They may also furnish Brazil, and possibly others,
with an appealing argument for holding firm to a
200-mile claim. If even a small minority of states
elects to hold firm to a 200-mile position, the re-
mainder will be that much more reluctant to com-
promise and leave themselves prey to charges of a
sellout of nationalism.
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