GUATEMALA: NO END TO VIOLENCE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100073-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: July 29, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Mern0tan1m
Guatemala: No End to violence?
Secret
43
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
29 July 1971
No. 1721/71
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 July 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Guatemala: No End to Violence?
Summary
President Arana's first year in office, espe-
cially since he imposed the continuing state of siege
last November, has been marked by a no-holds-barred
campaign against Guatemala's decade-old insurgency,
The extension of the security operations to include
collaborators, leftists, and miscellaneous trouble-
makers has affected a significant portion of the
very small group in Guatemala that participates in
the national life.
The guerrilla-terrorist organizations have taken
serious losses and have managed to maintain only a
low level of activity over the past several months.
In the past, the terrorists' most notorious and
daring acts, including the murders in 1968 of the
US ambassador and two US officers in the military
mission, have occurred when the insurgents were
feeling the pinch of security operations. The
terrorists may believe that the time is again ripe
for a spectacular act that would retaliate for their
losses and symbolize their continuing "revolution."
The high incidence of violence attending the
effort against the insurgents, particularly the in-
clusion among the victims of a few very prominent
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and was coordinated within CIA.
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persons (a congressional deputy, a labor leader,
several university professors and journalists) ,
is adversely affecting the prospects for politi-
cal stability. The progressive hardening of at-
titudes may have removed all chance for eventual
accommodation between the left and the right. As
the opposition's grievances against the incumbent
government grow, it is increasingly unlikely that
those now in power would risk the accession of
the leftists.
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Introduction
1. Violence and polarization are continuing
in Guatemala in spite of hopes that the unprecedented
transition from one government to another in elec-
tions last year might presage institutional stability
and new opportunities for sociopolitical development.
Within the generally poor, illiterate, and backward
society, only a small segment consciously shares in
the national life, and that group is torn by civil
strife unrelieved by any sign of compromise. Indeed,
the refusal of Guatemalan politicians to seek a
mutual accommodFttion is so ingrained that virtually
all doors to e..,.alogue, moderation, and constructive
action seem closed. The general acceptance of ex-
tremism from both the left and the right has reached
the point where even excessive violence is greeted
with apathy.
"Politics" Today
2. The administration of Gener&l Carlos Arana
Osorio, completing its first year this month, is
pledged to the pacification of Guatemala. Arana ? s
background as the army zone commander who cleared the
guerrilla-terrorists from their long-time safe haven in
the eastern hills earned him, along with a strong man
reputation, the sobriquets of "Lion of Zacapa" among
his admirers and "Butcher of Zacapa" among his de-
tractors. His presidential campaign for the 1970
elections was based on the caudillo appeal and won
him more than 40 percent of the valid vote, a plural-
ity that beat two candidates politically to his left.
3. Arana, perhaps sensitive to his position as
a minority president, immediately upon assuming of-
fice dedicated his term to improving the lot of the
"margins2" Guatemalan through socioeconomic reform.
He also promised to exercise restraint in the security
field. His exaggerated efforts to erase the picture
of Arana "the assassin," such as publishing poetry he
had written to his daughter, produced a round of criti-
cism, cruel jokes, and new epithets. Nevertheless, his
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seeming sincerity in wanting to turn the country
around, to end political, violence, and to help all
his countrymen won him at least an open mind and a
bearing from the legitimate opposition. Soon, how-
ever, Arana's own supporters convinced him of his
own lack of political expertise and lobbied for a
no-holds-barred counterterrorist campaign. The ac-
tive insurgents, who had been thrown off balance by
Arana's initial reformist rhetoric and insistence
on legality in dealing with subversion, reverted
to their position that a repressive government best
serves their purposes and set out to invite repres-
sive action. They resumed terrorist activity, con-
c%ntrating on murdering easy targets such as minor
police officials.
4. Continuing terrorism and the fear that the
insurgents would attempt major violence on their 10th
anniversary led the government on 13 November 1970 to
impose a state of siege whose severity was unprecedented
in Guatemala. This move signaled an assault on the
subversives, using all resources and methods. The
security forces and allied rightist terrorist squads
have probably accounted for most of the 150 political
deaths a month, but many of the violent incidents in
Guatemala cannot be surely ascribed to any particular
group.
5. Among the dead are about 1.5 high-level mem-
bers of the major terr-rist groups. Security opera-
tions have also result(:-d in the discovery of numerous
safehouses and arms, ca,.hes, and of documents useful
for information on the insurgent organizations.
the terrorist groups
have been seriously affected by the loss of personnel,
security, and contacts, and that psychological damage
has occurred, too. Distrust between and within the
terrorist groups has mounted, and the insurgents have
accounted for a much smaller portion of the violence
this year.
6. Some of the victims of the security opera-
tions were targeted on the basis of their political
opposition to the groups in power or because of their
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association with the revolutionary governments dur-
ing 1944-54. A few had been very prominent in pub-
lic life and were representative of the most articu-
late elements in society--a congressional deputy, a
labor leader, and several university professors, radio
commentators, -.ind journalists. Dozens of students and
others from the "intellectual community" are missing
and presumed dead at the hands of army assassination
squads. The assault on this very vocal segment has
evoked bad publicity at home and abroad and spread
a general sense of insecurity to those usually pro-
tected by name, connections, positions, or wealth.
7? Many of the mutilated bodies that have been
discovered in rivers and ravines, along roads and in
other places that have become standard disposal sites
for corpses probably are miscellaneous "troubleiiiakers."
For example,
army operations in the western department of
San Marcos had eliminated 200 "insurgents and bandits"
in the seven weeks since the state of siege had been
imposed. The idea of by-passing the ineffective ju-
dicial system by eliminating habitual delinquents and
criminals appears to have fairly widespread acceptance
Firemen Uncover Victims of the Violence
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as one of the more defensible aspects of the security
campaign.
8. A few constructive government programs have
taken shape, including a rural development program,
the opening of credit to small farmers, and tenta-
tive progress has been, made on a huge investment
project (EXMIBAL) that will--if consummated--more
than double the total level of investment in the
country. Nevertheless, the major thrust of the gov--
ernment policy over the past year has been terrorism
and violence. The state of siege prohibits political
activity, and therefore only semi clandestine activity
has occurred within and between partisan organizations.
There are indications that even the politicians aligned
with the government may be feeling the pinch of these
restraints and that differences of opinion over con-
tinuing the emergency conditions may be drawing lines
between the politicians and the military.
9. Among the legal ~.: pposition political groups,
there is some behind-the-scenes effort to maintain
identity and structure, but the restrictions of the
state of siege, the inherent danger of being in he
opposition camp, and loss of leadership have left
these parties practically Inert. -Growing numbers
see their political future as desperat and their
personal lives threatened. Some privately express
the belief that the only out is to cast their lot
with that of the guerrillas, but such statements
probably indicate despair rather than real intent.
Years of Tumult
10. Guatemalan strong-man General Jorge Ubico
reiterated his philosophy of governing five days be-
fore his overthrow in 1944: "While I am President,
I will not grant liberty of press nor of associa-
tion because the people of Guatemala are not pre-
pared for democracy and need a strong hand." Thir-
teen years of his personalistic and repressive re-
gime had kept the country politically immature, eco-
nomi',ally backward and archaic in its social structure.
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Still, Guatemalans can now be heard to 'reflect
fondly on the days of Ubico, when the country was
safe and "orderly."
11. Ubico's overthrow on 1 July 1944 was not
the result of internal upheaval, but of a revolt of
young city dwellers--mainly students, teachers, writ-
ers, and other professionals and businessmen with few
ties to the "traditional" society. Many of these
young people were implementing ideas acquire) in
exile, and were hardly representative of. the whole
society. Leaders were so lacking that Juan Jose
Arevalo, born in Guatemala, was brought back from
a professional position in Argentina so that he could
assume the presidency.
12. The performance of Arevalo and his suc-
cessor, Arbenz, during the ten years they were in
power was in sharp contrast with their.. promises,
although some significant experimentation--especially
in agrarian reform--did have a lasting impact. Revo-
lutionary goals and classical democratic principles
were set out moderately in the charter of government,
but moderation was, in fact, rare. In its earliest
days, the revolution provided government by the im-
provisation of inexperienced political romantics,
and ideology soon lost out to expediency and oppor-
tunism. Power during both the Arevalo and Arbenz re-
gimes centered in the presidency and an inner circle
of professional politicians, intellectuals, and army
officers who controlled or manipulated the other
branches of government and the armed forces by patron-
age. Unrepresentative, unstable political parties
were the regime's democratic props.
13. Supporters of the old order strenuously re-
sisted the social and political upheaval. During
Arevalo's term (1945-51) some 30 attempts were made
to overthrow the government. The traditionalists'
worst fears were given substance as the Communists,
the only political element in the country with a
program and strategy, became increasingly influen-
tial. Most of the present leaders of the Communist
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Party were active in the Arevalo government. Secre-
tary general Bernardo Alvarado served in the Ministry
of Economy; central committeeman and terrorist leader
Huberto Alvarado was in the publicity office of the
presidency; and central committeeman and guerrilla
leader Carlos Rene Valle Y Valle served in both the
Education Ministry and the National Petroleum In-
stitute.
14. Many observers expected Colonel Jabobo
Arbenz, former defense minister and large landowner,
to swing the presidency away from the radicalism of
the Arevalo period. Instead, his term (1951-54) saw
the entrenchment of the Communists, who played a
dynamic and often decisive role in the government.
Their enhanced influence greatly widened the gulf
between the left and right, and harassment by both
sides brought the country to the verge of class war-
fare.
15. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and his "army
of liberation" overthrew T.rbenz at midpoint in his
constitutional term. With the bulk of the population
either apathetic or ambivalent in the brief civil
war of 18-27 June 1954, the balance of power rested
with the army, whc.se leaders were unwilling to plunge
the nation into a bloodbath to support a regime that
they finally saw as Communist-dominated and bent on
undermining the position of the armed forces. Even
erstwhile supporters of Arb,~nz wavered when, in the
face of the Castillo Arenas threat, Arbenz was forced
to adopt repressive measures even more ruthless than
Ubico's police tactics.
16. The main concern of the Castillo Armas' ad-
ministration was the elimination of Communism in the
country. In general it represented a return toward
the old-style social structure, but without the po-
litical rigidity of the prerevolutionary era. The
distance between the government and the governed
again was widened as the mass organizations of the
revolution w're dismantled.
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17. The assassination of Castillo Armas in 1957
left the country in political confusion. After two
elections were inconclusive, in 1958 the congress
finally selected General Miguel Ydigoras as presi-
dent. Parties on the left and right scrambled for
dominance during a five-year period of mushrooming
corruption and inefficiency. Ydigoras was able to
last out almost all of his term only because of his
skill in dividing the opposition and playing off di-
verse groups against one another. Administrative
chaos was matched by political turmoil, with some
30 presidential hopefuls maneuvering and haranguing.
In addition, the Communists were able to recoup most
of their earlier losses as Castillo Armas' anti-Com-
munist legislation lapsed or was weakened, and by the
pre-election period in 1963, the Party and front
groups were operating with relative openness. The
final straw was Arevalo's clandestine arrival in
Guatemala amid speculation that Ydigoras was con-
niving in a p oposeci revolutionary comeback for the
ex-president. Distrust of Ydigoras and disgust with
the total national disorganization were nearly unan-
imous. Although Defense Minister Colonel Enrique
Peralta had restrained advocates of a coup in the
past, he led the military in the ouster of Ydigoras
in late March 1963.
18. Ydigoras' continual juggling of political
elements set the stage for the triumph of extremism,
and the new military government provided a backdrop
for the terrorist politics that by now have become
standard. Although the military government itself
was not markedly repressive, its lack of legitimacy
provided incipient guerrilla groups with a raison
d'etre. Armed rebels, led by dissident junio of-
ficers from the Guatemalan military, prodded the
Communists away from polemical theorizing into ac-
tive insurgency. The military regime had almost no
success against the guerrillas, and they operated
with relative impunity, particularly in the Sierra
de las Minas in thi departments of Izabal and Zacapa.
Political anc? operational dissension within the guer-
rilla groups was the insurgents' primary problem.
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19. Since 1963, the raucous polity^,s that
characterized the Ydigoras period have been almost
totally absent, the outstanding exception being the
campaign for the 1970 elections. Full constitutional
guarantees have been operative only sporadically over
the past eight years as governments invoked various
emergency conditions to cope with the subversive
threat.
20. After many delays and much plotting, in
1966 the military government permitted elections.
The victory of the major opposition party--the cen-
ter left Revolutionary Party (PR)--over two strongly
conservative parties was in large part political
fantasy. To take and hold office, President.Julio
Cesar Mendez Montenegro had to grant carte blanche
to the armed forces in military affairs, particularly
in the field of counterinsurgency. The army's fre-
quently indiscriminate antiterrorist campaign left
thousands dead and a battered but unbroken insur-
gent movement. In social and fiscal affairs, Mendez
tread lightly, backing off from reforms that upset
important vested interests. Nevertheless, his do-
nothing government was in one respect unique in
Guatemala: it survived its full four-year constitu-
tional term and then handed over its authority to
the duly elected opposition.
21. The first year of President Arana's term
has been marked by an unrestrained campaign against
the insurgents. The extension of security operations
beyond terrorists to real or imagined collaborators,
leftist intellectuals, and miscellaneous criminals
and delinquents has affected a significant portion
of that very narrow segment of Guatemalan society
that participates in the national life. Antagonism
between the politically operative forces--the parties,
the army, and the insurgents, seems likely to intensify,
and the prospect for a happy outcome is dim.
The State of the Insurgency
22. The fortunes of terrorist groups have fluc-
tuated during the ten years they have operated in
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Guatemala. The current counterinsurgency effort
has battered the subversives as severely as did the
similar effort under Pres9.dent Mendez from late 1966
to early 1968. Stung by domestic and international
criticism of the bloodletting at that time, Mendez
all but canceled security operations, and the lull
that ensued until Arana took office last July gave
the insurgents time to reorganize and implement
lessons learned about their own vulnerabilities.
When Arana strengthened security measures, the in-
surgent movement was a harder nut to crack, but the
government has nevertheless put the insurgents on
the defensive over the past few months.
23. The insurgents unable to establish organi-
zational unity or common goals, have been their own
worst enemies. Their movement began during a rebel-
lion of the armed forces in 1960, but nationalism
was soon sullied by intrusions of the Soviet-oriented
Communist party, Mexican-based Trotskyists, and Cuban-
sponsored guerrillas. As a result, organization,
nurrmbers; alliances, and rivalries have continually
shifted over the years. At any given time, including
the present, there are reports of new dissension and
policy disagreement. Currently, as during most of
the time since 1966, there are two major insurgent
groups, the Communist party (PGT) and the Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR).
24. The FAR, long and actively supported from
Havana, is a group whose only aim is to destroy
existing social, political, and economic structures
by violent methods. It has no set political program,
and its leaders show no original or imaginative
revolutionary thought. The operations of FAR, al-
though not without sophistication, fall far short
of the campaign expertise of the Tupamaros in Uruguay.
FAR members are mainly young people with a simplistic
view of world affairs. They are fanatic in their
hatred of both their own government and the US Gov-
ernment, which they hold responsible ideologically
and materially for all they see wrong with Guatemala.
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25. The Communist Party 'PGT) includes some
young fanatics, but on the whole it is less narrow
in its view and approach than the FAR, The leaders
of the PGT, who were witnesses to and participants
in the revolutionary governments of the 1940s and
1950s, survived the counterrevolution and are known
and respected throughout the Communist world. The
party accepts and uses violence as a revolutionary
method, but not as its only or even its most impor-
tant method. Its broad strategy still calls for
long-term preparation of the masses to form the
basis necessary for a full-scale effort against the
entrenched, feudalistic system. The party, moreover,
has a plan--albeit perhaps a vague one--for governing;
it has tasted power once, and would have some capabil-
ity for governing again if it had the chance.
26. The history of the PGT and the prominence
of some of its leaders add both to the party's
vulnerability and to its strength. On the one hand,
the visibility of the leaders and supposed collabora-
tors (especially those who were members of the revo-
lutionary bureauracy under Arevalo and Arbenz) makes
them easy targets. On the other hand, the important
connections that many of the most capable leaders of
the party enjoy provide them a fairly reliable margin
of safety. During the harshest period of the Arana
crackdown, a central committee member who was also
the leader of the PGT terrorist arm was arrested and
then released, reportedly through a bribe, but probably
at least as much because of the merits of his connections.
27. Both the FAR and the PGT have taken serious
losses since the Arana government established the
state of siege. Several military operations against
safe houses netted large numbers of documents, prop-
aganda materials and arms, and led to subsequent
arrests of insurgents.
Both groups have engage in
o cri icism, 1aming poor security and lack
of discipline for some of their losses. In addition,
distrust between the two groups has mounted. The
FAR is particularly suspicious of the PGT, which FAR
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leaders believe has bought some protection by provid-
ing the government with information on the FAR. The
PGT, with about 40 leadership positions, had lost at
least five leaders by June 1971 and the FAR, with per-
haps 30 chieftains, had lost about eight.
28. The terrorists have not abandoned all activ-
ity, but evidently they have accounted for only a
small portion of the violence in Guatemala over the
past several months. Both the PGT and FAR have vacil-
lated on plans for a spectacular act designed to re-
taliate for their losses and to symbolize a continuing
ability to strike the government at will. The lead-
ership is apparently unwilling to take chances and
incur further risks. The time seems ripe, neverthe-
less, for one of the groups to attempt some important
action. In the past, the terrorists' most notorious
and daring acts, including the murders in 1968 of the
US ambassador and two US officers in the military
mission have occurred when the insurgents were feel-
ing the pinch of security operations.
29. Although the damage inflicted on both terror-
ist groups by the government is severe, far from mortal.
e PGT, es is y, remains busy on political
projects discussing recruitment goals and experiment-
ing with methods of broadening its popular base.
Captured FAR documents include recent studies of
the strengths and weaknesses of individual members,
analyses of the government's campaign, and projec-
tions of revolutionary progress.
30. The insurgents may now have access to in-
creased outside aid. Cuba has been assisting the
FAR and might be disposed to boost support for the
long-favored Guatemalan revolutionaries. The PGT
receives financial support from the Soviets through
a communications network in Mexico. The PGT is also
helped by journalistic support from its exile commun-
ity in Mexico, a group that is currently planning
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wider and more sensational publicity for the PGT
cause. In addition, sporadic and often unconfirmed
reports indicate continuing efforts by former terror-
ist leaders who left or were ousted from the move-
ment to regroup and open new guerrilla fronts in
Guatemala.
Counterinsurgency, Arana-style
31. President Arana has firmly and frequently
committed himself to a contained and professional ac-?
tion against the insurgents. Never-
theless, his "pacification campaign"
closely resembles the type of coun- -err
W11.11C,bbUU in z.acapa in 13bb-b8 when
then-colonel Arana was brigade com-
mander. Public reaction has been
mixed. His critics regard him as
a man wedded to the brutal suppres-
sion not only of "guerrillas" but
of all leftist opponents; others
see him as a traditional strong man
untrained in the art of governing
and dominated by fanatical right-
wing supporters; his associates
and supporters view him as a new
"liberator" from the Communist
menace.
General Arana
President of Guatemala
32. Arana has made some effort to project him-
self as a leader above partisan goals, as more open-
minded and perhaps more "decent" than his closest as-
sociates. In fact, however, he seems most comfortable
following the advice of his hard-line advisers, such
as minister of government Jorge Arenales and president
of the congress Mario Sandoval. These men, who advo-
cate a "decisive blow" against the subversives, make
no secret of their inclusion under the terrorist label
of university professors and other leftist intellec-
tuals whom they consider "mentors" of subversion.
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33. The President seems to have settled for a
combination of policies that satisfy his commitment
to law and order as well as to the "marginal Guate-
malan." To carry out his counterinsurgency campaign,
he is using the extreme right, which has consistently
viewed pacification as a crusade against the Commu-
nists and as revenge for the deaths and persecution
of its own party fa'thr'ul at the hands of the far
leftists. The counterinsurgency campaign shows lit-
tle or no discrimination among shades of extremism
and counts as equally favorable the assassinations of
FAR leaders and of legal opposition leaders, whom they
consider on the insurgents' side. Meanwhile, the gov-
ernment has moved forward on social reform projects.
By his frequent tours into the rural areas, President
Arana has made his government visible in regions never
before traveled by a chief executive.
34. Violence may have reached unprecedented
heights since the imposition of the state of siege
mainly because of the government's clandestine as-
sassination squads. The level of violence at any
given time is apparent rather than precise because
bodies are often found weeks or months after death.
The proportion of true "subversives" among the dead
varies substantially from area to area, as consider-
able leeway is accorded the leaders of the security
operations. Zone commanders in the hinterland, for
example, act with a high degree of autonomy. A new
variable was added in the government's recent authori-
zation of special security arrangements for the large
plantation owners. The US defense attache learned in
May from large landholders in San Marcos and Retalhuleu
that the government unofficially permitted them to
arm their trusted employees and to set up a radio
security net. Similar cooperation apparently has
been achieved on the south coazt of Escuintla, where
finca owners have recruited recently discharged sol-
diers and followers of rightist strong-man congress-
man Oliverio Casteneda to serve as armed security
personnel.
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Parties in Disarray
35. The most prominent politician in Guatemala
today is Mario Sandoval, leader of the rightist co-
alition that brought Arana to power. His own National
Liberation Movement (MLN) overshadows its ally the
Institutional Democratic Party (PID), a makeshift
group assembled by the military government in the
mid-1960s. Sandoval's roughshod treatment of the PID
has done little to ease natural strains between the
two coalition parties. Sandoval, who served as Cas-
tillo Armas' personal secretary, is a ruthlessly mili-
tant rightist, who has discouraged any activity that
might enlarg3 the MLN's image to more than a profes-
sional anti-Communist group. As a result, his lead-
ership has reinforced the MLN stereotype and left the
party very narrowly based. There is some evidence
of internal division over Sandoval's personalist rule.
The lack of second-echelon leaders and the realization
that they are high on the insurgents' target lists
lead MLN leaders to adopt a grim view of the future.
They see only two possibilities: continuation in
power or death.
36. The opposition parties, considerably more
constrained than the coalition under the state of
siege, have had to operate semiclandestinely. The
largest opposition party, the centrist Re'rolutionary
Party (PR), is suffering a leadership crisis. Two
abortive attempts to elect party officials have di-
vided the party between old guard and young liberal
elements. Long-time PR stalwart Carlos Sagastume Perez
is head of a rightist wing that may be considering
alliance with an Aranista political grouping. The
PR's most active and aggressive leader, former for-
eign minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr, went into volun-
tary exile in fear of his life after the Arana gov-
ernment had imprisoned him at the time the state of
siege was established. Fuentes' rhetoric about the
need for a move to the left frightened mo& rates in
his own party, and in the eyes of the r.Lght he became
a symbol of leftist extremism. His departure from
Guatemala probably weakened his political position
substantially, but perhaps only temporarily, as the
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counterinsurgent campaign is helping consolidate
Fuentes' position within the liberal faction of the
PR. Fuentes himself has reportedly been plotting
against the government and attempting to form a
leftist political group. The leader of the PR deputies
in congress recently indicated to US officials that
they believe the legitimate political opposition is
being forced against the wall by the government's in-
discriminate murder of innocent victims.
37. Although the MIX can for the most part live
with the PR--unless and until it "goes left" with
Fuentes Mohr--the democratic left is beyond the pale
of acceptability. In addition to an amorphous element
of "Arevalists" dating from the old revolutionary days,
Guatemalans generally consider the democratic left to
include two political groups: the legally registered
Guatemala Christian Democracy (DCG) and a less i'ormal
grouping, the Democratic Revolutionary Unity (URD).
The left in Guatemala is a highly elitist group of
proud intellectuals whose superiority in oratoxy,
populism, and publicity gambits feeds the obsessive
fears on the right that the left is stronger than it
appears and that the "democratic" left is thorough-1
infiltrated by Communists. The DCG and URD drew 20
percent of the vote in the 1970 elections. Their
key stronghold is Guatemala City, where they captured
the mayoralty and where they now control the municipal
government.
38. The democratic left at first was sympathetic
to the difficulties the Arana government faced in
dealing with the security problem and was happy with
Arana's social development program. But after the
shooting of two prominent intellectuals associated
with the PGT in November 1970, DCG -d URD leaders
became worried. Heightened Communist terrorism in
December, including the murders of an MLN congressman
and a controversial labor leader, gave rise to rumors
that the government would retaliate. When the se-
curity forces assassinated the sole URD congressman
and the country's major peasant leader the leaders of
the democratic left were fully convinced that the
Arana government had opened a campaign to eliminate
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all left-of--center political opposition. The DCG
leadership made representations to the US Embassy,
urging the US Government to exert its influence to
change Arana's policies. The DCG secretary general
and the URD mayor of Guatemala City temporarily left
the country, believing themselves next on the gov-
ernment's assassination list.
39. Guatemala City Mayor Colom Argueta claims
that he is deeply troubled about Arana's alleged fits
of rage. Colom believes that all key figures on the
left are potential targets should something provoke
the president at a given time. The kidnaping and
murder last month of Colom's half-brother is interpreted
by the mayor as an attack upon himself. Adding to
the fears among the left are repeated public refer-
ences by Arana associates to alignments between the
opposition parties and the subversives. For example,
at the opening of the second year of congress early
this month, Congressional president Sandoval spoke
of the decadent role of the Catholic Church and of
the dangerous openings Christian Democracy was pro-
viding to subversives.
The Military
40. Traditionally, the armed forces have been
the most important political force in Guatemala.
Since the military assumption of government in 1963,
they have broadened their position in society and
consolidated their. bases of control. The officer
corps forms a small but powerful clique within the
national society that normally has little chance to
mix with civilians let alone to build real friend-
ships in the civilian sector.
the
natural propensity for cohesion in the military has
developed to a remarkable extreme in Guatemala.
even the young officers who became
guerrillas retained personal and informal relations
with some of their former colleagues. The corporate
nature of the military is reinforced by the fact that
future officers are brought into the military poly-
technic academy after grammar school and receive
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their five years' training during adolescence. Al-
though General Ubico, overthrown in 1944, was the
last of the dictators in Guatemala, military men
have held the highest political office for most of
the time from 1944 to present.
41. The ever-present threat of military inter-
vention is a strong inhibitor that intimidates the
professional politicians. The parties on the demo-
cratic left believe, probably correctly, that the
armed forces would not permit them to take power.
When President Mendez assumed the presidency in
1966 the officer corps was deeply concerned and
forced him to abdicate his power in particular areas.
As a career military man, President Arana is h:'.ghly
acceptable to the armed forces and probably will en-
joy their.continued support. The fact that Arana
must also deal with his civilian party supporters
nevertheless opens the possibility of eventual con-
fl.,,..cts of interest with the officer corps.
42. The existence of a leftist group within the
officer corps is occasionally suggeste.3 by observers
of and participants in Guatemalan politics. In pro-
jections of a possible Peruvian-style coup, two offi-
cers consistently enter the scenario: the chief.of
the school of advanced military studies, Colonel Ri-
cardo Peralta Mendez, and the head of the military
academy, Colonel Jose Rios Montt. No hard information
confirms the existence of a "Nasirist" clique in the
services, but the prevalence of the notion may indi-
cate some basis in fact. Mayor.Colom Argueta recently
claimed that "many" mill'.a-,ary officers were unhappy 25X1
with Arana's pacifi:,a,;,ion effort, which they considered
more political than antiguerrilla.
43. On the basis of data available, however, the
armed forces seem unlikely to step leftward in the
foreseeable future. It is the armed forces that have
been used as principal executioners of guerrilla,;,
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troublemakers, and even those with whom the "legiti-
mate left" identifies. A retaliatory purge would in-
evitably accompany a political turnaround, and at pres-
ent military institutional unity is an overwhelming
barrier to such a development. If, however, civil
strife continues much longer, revolt by some portion
of the armed forces is a possibility.
Outlook
44. The extreme violence with which Guatemalans
have lived in the past decade '-as both polarized and
brutalized the society. The public tolerance for law-
lessness and violence is evident in the general apathy
with which more than a hundred politically motivated
assassinations were greeted in May 1971. Violence
seems to become significant in the eyes of the public
only when persons of prominence are victims. Some of
the quiet that passes for apathy, however, is fear,
as guilt by association with either side is often
fatal.
45. The institutional progress implicit in Arana's
constitutional succession with no break in the legal
process probably is more illusory than real. The pos-
sibility of a free election in which the legal opposi-
tion could expect to enjoy the fruits of vi^tory seems
no greater now than in 1963. The legal method by
which Arana became president loses some of its osten-
sible significance in light of the probability that
no other party would have been permitted a peaceful
take-over of office.
46. Guatemala's political parties, especially
the democratic left and the MLN, have a paranoid view
of their own situations. Those in the MLN who have
lived in fear of a terrorist attack for over a decade
believe that the leaders of the legitimate left have
abetted the insurgents. They also believe that the
Guatemalan electorate will support the opposition in
1974, and that the leftists will completely destroy
their. personal security. The left views the MLN 'in
equally simplistic terms. They see its members as
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killers who have already eliminated one of their leaders
and who threaten the others. The progressive harden-
ing of stereotypes seems to h--,ve removed all chance
for the kind of accommodation that finally contained
similar political fratricide in Colombia. Nor does
Guatemala have the visible national leader commanding
respect and trust beyond his own partisans that Colom-
bia could turn to.
47. The most likely prospect is that the right
will entrench its position in the form either of an
extended term for President Arana or, should the mili-
tary again see the civilian politicians as intolerably
disruptive to the national life, of a successor mili-
tary government. As the leftist list of grievances
against the incumbent government grows, it is in-
creasingly unlikely that those in power now would
risk the accession of the leftists to power.
48. The society has become inured to a high
level of violence, but how long Guatemalans can ac-
cept political fratricide remains a question. Po-
larization continues, and growing desperation on the
part of the democratic left is suggested by its of-
fers of collaboration with the Communists, in spite
of all the dangers of such an association. The most
respected daily newspaper in Guatemala on 30 Septem-
ber 1970 described the narrowness of the views of
all segments of society: "In Guatemala each sees
violence from his own perspective. Students protest
over violence against students, officials over the
death of their agents, and even we the press complain
with special intensity over attacks on our own col-
leagues. This is not a new phenomenon. Blood be-
gets blood, hate brings vengeance, and these in-
gredients are poisoning the soul of our nation, per-
haps irreparably."
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