MOSCOW AGAIN PLAYS THE PEACEMAKER IN SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100053-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: May 3, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
9100053-7
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Moscow Again Plays The Peacemaker in South Asia
State Dept. review completed
Secret
3May1971
No. 1685/71
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
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Its transmission or rc-,elation of its convents to or re-
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on-Our T'- --
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 May 19 71
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Moscow Again Plays the Peacemaker in South Asia
Introduction
Moscow's attitude toward the present trouble
in Pakistan is a logical outgrowth of the Soviet
position in the Indo-Fakistani crisis of 1965=1966,.
The Tashkent Conference in January 1966 marked the
end of the USSR's one-sided support for India in
the Kashmir dispute and the debut of the USSR in
the role of peacemaker on the subcontinent. Premier
Kosygin personally met with Indian and Pakistani
leaders at Tashkent and succeeded in getting them
to agree to withdraw their troops to positions held
prior to the outbreak of the fighting in August
1965, to repatriate their prisoners of war, and to
work toward improving their cultural and economic
ties. The USSR committed its prestige to such a
venture because it wanted to see stability restored
on its southern flank and to deny the Chinese the
chance to exploit the conflict between the two
countries.
Note: Ts memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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Soviet Stakes in India and Pakistan
1. The same considerations that prompted Moscow
to act in 1965-1966 continue to affect Soviet pol-
icy toward the subcontinent. Moscow has worked to
maintain its "special relationship" with India, to
improve its relations with the Pakistanis, and to
prevent both the US and the Chinese from expanding
their influence. A close relationship with India
continues to be the cornerstone of Soviet policy
in South Asia. India, one of the USSR's largest
aid clients in the underdeveloped world, has re-
ceived a total of about $1.5 billion in Soviet eco-
nomic and military assistance since 1954. The USSR
has an extensive presence in India, and the leaders
of the two countries consult frequently on a wide
-variety of issues.
2. Moscow's preoccupation with India, however,
has not prevented it from courting Pakistan in order
to increase its leverage there and, in particular,
to check the grc?oth of Chinese influence. Since
1966, the USSR has agreed to provide Pakist.n with
some $172 million in economic assistance and in
April 1968 signed its first military aid agreement
with Pakistan. The provision of Soviet arms did
not succeed in significantly limiting Chinese or
US influence in Pakistan, however, and it did cause
serious strains in the USSR's ;relations with India.
Consequently, Moscow suspended these arms deliveries
in early 1969. Last June, the Soviets agreed to
help in the construction of the steel mill that
Pakistan has long been seeking, a decision that will
cost the USSR an estimated $200 million in new eco-
nomic aid.
3. Moscow has generally tried to maintain an im-
partial position on contentious issues in Indo-Paki-
stani relations and has encouraged the two sides to
seek a step-by-step resolution of their outstanding
differences. In April 1966 and again in August 1967,
when the Soviets apparently were concerned that Indo-
Pakistani relations were deteriorating, Kosygin
personally interceded with the leaders of both coun-
tries to urge moderation.
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Moscow Slow to Recognize Crisis
4. Although the Soviets were apparently slow to
realize the dangers inherent in the latest Pakistani
crisis, they finally did make attempts to defuse
the situation. Though their efforts to moderate
West Pakistani actions in the East failed they were
probably successful in moderating to some degree
Indian reaction to Pakistani developments.
5. I Ithe Soviets
viewed the results o the ' a is ani elections last
December with mixed feelings. They took some satis-
faction in the victory of "progressive" forces, but
they were disturbed by the good showing of former
foreign minister Bhutto's party in West Pakistan.
As the s,:lf-proclaimed architect of Pakistan's policy
of rapprochement with China, Bhutto ht,.s long been
one of the USSR's least favorite personalities on
the Pakistani political scene. Moscow seems not to
have fully appreciated, however, the depth of frus-
tration among the East Pakistanis and their deter-
mination to ensure that discrimination against them
would not be perpetuated in the new government that
was to be established.
6. The first evidence of serious Soviet concern came
in mid-February during a conversation in Islamabad
between thL Soviet deputy chief of mission and his
US counterpart. The Soviet official expressed sur-
prise and disappointment at East Pakistani leader
Mujibur Rahman's inflexibility regarding autonomy
for East Pakistan while he commended President Yahya's
"statesmanlike" effort to bring East and West Pakistani
civilian leaders to some form of accommodation. He
said that the USSR favored the continuing existence
of a unified Pakistan and indicated considerable con-
cern that the Chinese might be given an opportunity
to exploit the unrest in East Pakistan
7. For a long time Moscow has maintained fairly
cordial relations with the men most likely to emerge
as leaders of an independent East Pakistan. Some So-
viets may, therefore, have argued that the USSR would
initially be off to a good start if Pakistan were di-
vided; but probably the general conclusion was that
the longer term prospects for the USSR in East Pakistan
bituiKET
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were not bright. An independent East Pakistan would
face virtually insoluble social and economic prob-
lems, and the Soviets probably feared that the Chi-
nese might ultimately find fertile ground for ex-
panding their influence among the minority extremist
groups there.
Fighting Prompts Action; Soviets Intercede with Yahya
8. Moscow, however, did not actually intercede un-
til fighting appeared imminent.
9. Once the fighting began, the Soviets lost no
time in trying to get it stopped.
On 3 April, TASS published the text of
an appeal from President Podgorny that was strongly
critical of Yahya'o resort to arms. In the message,
Podgorny called for "the most urgent measures to stop
the bloodshed and repressions" against the people of
East Pakistan. He asserted that the crisis must be
solved politically, without the use of force.
10. Among the chief reasons for the publication of
the appeal were Moscow's wish to appear responsive to
Indian requests that the USSR speak out an(l a genuine
Soviet desire to bring additional pressures on the
West Pakistanis to stop the fighting. The obvious
sympathy for the plight of the East Pakistanis that
was conveyed by the message suggests it was worded
with an eye to the East Pakistanis as well as the
Indians. Podgorny expressed concern over the "arrests
and persecution" of Mujib and other leaders, and gra-
tuitously reminded Yahya that these men had received
the support of the "overwhelming majority of the popu-
lation of East Pakistan."
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11. The West Pakistanis, not surprisingly, were in-
censed by Podgorny's intervention. Their response to
the message, however, was tempered by their desire to
avoid driving Moscow further toward New Delhi in the
current dispute and their interest in keeping Soviet
aid comi.iig. In his reply, Yahya rebutted the points
made by Podgorny, but he did so politely and in a
tone that suggested sorrow more than anger.
12. The Soviets have made no further gestures of sup-
port for the East Pakistanis. In fact, as it became
increasingly clear that the military situation was go-
ing in favor of the West Pakistanis, Moscow has sought
to relax the strains its public appeal had put on So-
viet - West Pakistani relations.
This line was further espoused in Soviet propaganda,
which denied any intention of interfering in Pakistan's
internal affairs.
13. Since the Podgorny appeal, the USSR has confined 25X1
itself to a continuing series of high-level private
efforts to defuse the crisis.
Soviets Keep Close Tabs on Indian Reaction
14. From the outset Moscow has probably coordinated
most of its moves with the Indian Government, ap-
parently counseling it against a precipitate reaction
to the Pakistani crisis. The Indians confirm that
they have been talking regularly to the Soviets about
Pakistani develop ents.
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Prospects
15. The outcome of the current crisis is at present
uncartain and depends upon factors over which the USSR
has little control. Moscow, nonetheless, can be ex-
pecte3 to continue its efforts tc prevent a deteriora-
tion to the level of the Indo-Pakistani hostilities
during the Kashmir dispute in 1965. in the event of
an imminent threat of war between India and Pakistan,
the Soviets might once again intervene in dramatic
fashion. For the present, however, the Soviets will
probably continue to move cautiously, behind the scenes,
and will do what they can tc nurture and preserve good
relations with all parties to the dispute. At the
same time, they will be trying to anticipate and
counter any Chinese actions.
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